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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a critique of the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its associate 
semiotic analyses. Their utilisation of Lacanian notions of the Symbolic, structured by the Phallus, 
leads this model, and its cultural examinations, to define woman as 'lack', which renders identity a 
Symbolic effect. I suggest that if the Symbolic determines the form representation can make, and if 
these representations go on to constitute gendered subjects dichotomously, then sexual dichotomisation 
should unambiguously structure representation. However, I contest this and support it with evidence 
from a content analysis I conducted, which analysed 500 fashion images. I offer a methodological 
defence regarding the use of content analysis, arguing that if meaning is understood as operating 
conventionally, it is sufficiently stable to quantify (Goffman: 1979). The defence is based upon the 
contention that meaning, which serves an ideology, cannot be also polysemic and elliptical. My results 
show that the cultural representations are free of a whole range of variables that are supposed to secure 
a dichotomously determined and subordinated femininity. Moreover, the data showed that there was no 
longer a marked gender difference between codes used; in fact, an increasing homogeneity between the 
images of men and women was recorded. Thus, images of men are equally commodified. Culture 
cannot therefore be said to secure gender identity. My results show that representation does, however, 
reproduce the discourse of the dimorphic body. Thus, in the light of this, I offer a tentative means of 
bringing the body into the social without the body reassuming its place as the primary determinant of 
the social. I do this by offering a model of the body that seeks to emphasise the interrelatedness of the 
body to society, and to sex and gender in particular. I offer the model of family resemblances as a 
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing interrogation by feminists regarding the interrelationship 
between the female body and the social category of'woman'. Of particular import is the resistance to 
the notion that femininity is a naturally subordinate correlate to masculinity. The subordinate position 
of'woman' is deemed morally legitimate because it stems from natural sexual differences between the 
bodies of men and women. Early critiques, most notably the sex/gender distinction, have been 
criticised for not deconstructing sufficiently the association of the female sex to nature. Lacanian 
postmodernism/feminism has become the central theoretical model that challenges this dualism, but I 
will suggest that their challenge rests upon dissolving the corporeality of the body because they do not 
give the body a material dimension outside of discourse. The influence of the Lacanian model of 
psychoanalysis is crucial here because sexual difference is elevated to the level of the Symbolic. The 
Symbolic is then defined as constituting sexual difference, that is, rendering the body a discursive and 
Symbolic effect. Significantly, the Symbolic is always prior to, and determinant of, the subject and so 
this model is ahistorical; hence it often describes the Symbolic in terms of the 're-presentation of the 
feminine'. Therefore, it follows that if gender dimorphism is solely an outcome of the Symbolic, 
dichotomisation must be the key feature of the Symbolic. Bodies and representation must directly 
correspond to that dichotomisation. I challenge this description of the Symbolic universe. Using 
evidence generated by a content analysis, 1 demonstrate that a large number of the signs, said to mark 
sexual difference, simply were not present. The evidence derived from the content analysis shows that 
conventions used to construct an image are significantly less dimorphic than this model can allow or 
account for. I suggest that this has major repercussions regarding this particular model of the formation 
of the subject.
I develop this by suggesting that drawing attention to corporeality need not lead to the re- 
naturalisation of specific historical and social formations of gender. I offer an alternative, suggesting 
that sexual difference ought to be understood as an element, amongst others, of the category of sex. 
Only by engaging directly with the body is it possible to identify where and when the body fails to 
determine the discursive category of sex. In this way, 1 think it is possible to begin to understand 
corporeality as an entity that has some existence outside of discourse, yet equally, the body is not 
wholly independent of such discourse. I think it is necessary to attempt to theorise outside of the 
constraints of the dualism established by sex and gender and what is therefore necessary is a model that 
does not give causal priority to 'sex' or 'gender'. Essentially, I think that the category of sex 
incorporates much more than genital difference. Until the body is tackled directly, the ideological 
position of the body and/or sex as fundamentally and absolutely distinct from society will continue. 
Thus, I suggest that postmodernist/feminist theorising, especially that underpinned by Lacanianism, 
will tend to be confined within dualistic strictures that it politically identifies as a target. Therefore, 1 
will be placing emphasis upon practice so that the practices that intervene on the body to help produce 
'sex' can be examined. I suggest images, and their potential influence, need to be included as part of 
the practice of gender, not the determinate of gender. This opens up a vital space, in my view, to 
theoretically emphasise that discourse is not uniformly effective. This is necessary if a move toward a 
non-reductive version of gender is to be achieved.
Guillaumin encapsulates the issue regarding the relationship between 'natural bodies' and 
'social selves' thus: 'all human beings are natural but some are more natural than others' 
(Guillaumin: 1996:72). Her rhetoric endeavours to undermine the singularly important maxim of 
patriarchal ideology: the natural order is just and thus sacrosanct. Implicit within her rhetoric are the 
principal aims of the feminist project: 1 to de-naturalise the current patterns of femininity by exposing 
their constructed form; to delineate the power and inequality inherent within them in order to break 
apart 'natural sex'. Initially, this theoretical and political project was elucidated through the sex/gender 
distinction, which theorises by making an epistemological differentiation between the body and 
society: sex is the objective biological category and gender is the social correlate (Oakley: 1972). The 
distinction also elucidates the causal relationship between the constituent parts by radically inverting 
the direction of causation upon which the ideological maxim depends: gender becomes the mechanism 
through which feminine identity is formed, not sex. Essentially, the aim was to understand femininity 
as being produced in the body, not the essence of the body.
The sex/gender critique offers a dual attack. First, that our cultural representations are not 
about the actual cultural lives of women. Ostensibly, therefore, these representations are, at best, mis- 
representations and, at worst, blatantly ideological. Second, that women's cultural lives are not of the 
fixed biological body, but are cultural patterns and thus are open to being undertaken differently 
(Oakley: 1972). This normative challenge culminates in the following forceful conclusion: there is 
nothing natural about women's subordination. By taking up the distinction between the biological body 
and the social category of gender, the critique was able to establish a social connection between 
representation and women, namely that the restricted nature of the representation was unduly limiting 
the potential social roles women could fulfil.
Paradoxically, however, the sex/gender distinction cannot keep the body in view because 'sex 
as an objective category' remains, thus effectively attributing gender to the domain of personality or 
mind (Connell:1987; Spelman:1982; Fuss:1990). Consequently, essentialist versions of the body re- 
emerge and reassume a primary role in the constitution of gender. Delphy (1996) argues that this is 
because an order of sex is established by means of a classification of its essential properties that are 
deemed independent of, and prior to, any social practice. The problem of'sex', argues Delphy, is that it 
leads us to treat as objective properties things that are socially and historically constituted. Herein lies 
my critical endeavour. I argue that the radicalisation of this distinction by the postmodernist/feminist 
programme cannot keep the body in view either, and therefore, the postmodernist/feminist position 
depends equally upon a body that falls outside of the forces of social construction. In short, I argue that 
their political programme depends upon essentialist foundations from which to theorise the feminine; 
the pre-Oedipal and/or jouisscmce often fulfil this role. Only then can they 'find something outside' of 
the comprehensive forces of cultural reproduction. Thus, the critical principle that Guillaumin weaves 
into her rhetorical device is paradoxically the very logic from which postmodernism/feminism 
theorises. Postmodernist/feminist theory has failed to overcome the dualistic nature of the sex/gender 
distinction (Cealey Harrision and Hood-Wi!liams:2002; Burkitt:1999: Lloyd: 1984), which it claims to
' The initial parameters, which questioned directly the notion that biology is destiny, were set by De 
Beauvoir: 1975.
have deconstructed (Butler: 1990; Flax: 1990). Essentially, within both approaches, the body remains an 
un-interrogated, self-evident unit upon which discourse sits. Thus, the body 'disappears' 
(Ostrander: 1988) or slips underneath the discourse that is allegedly constituting it. If the body is 
immaterial, what places us in the world?; what gives us a perspective in and on the world? We have a 
point of view because we are our bodies (Burkitt: 1999). I propose therefore that the body is not 
reducible to discourse and ought to be thought of as an unfinished entity (Shilling: 1993)
Therefore, I suggest that sexual dimorphism is a consequence of intervening and 
transformative practices, which contribute to the naturalisation of sex in a significant way. These 
practices are, however, treated as the natural and inevitable outcome of the primacy awarded to sex. 1 
have the following example in mind: 'women don't have facial hair, therefore I pluck mine'. The 
unintended consequence is, of course, to confirm the initial socially based assessment that 'proper' 
women are hairless. Thus the practices aim to manage the secondary sexual characteristics, like muscle, 
breasts, hair and so forth. What is crucial is that practices naturalise current patterns of gender 
appearance. Thus, while these secondary characteristics are deemed to be a direct, unchangeable 
biological disposition of the body, it takes various social practices to achieve this (Connell: 1987). 
Essentially therefore, the variation of secondary characteristics is measured and regulated against the 
normative body. My central proposition is that 'natural sex' ought not to be placed outside of the 
social, as if the biological and social spheres are readily separable, but seen to combine the body one 
has with the social practices that sustain it, be that in terms of health or gender practices. Thus I seek to 
include the social intervention upon the body as a part of'making sex' (Laquer: 1991) and that sex 
needs to be included within the ontological assessment of self (Giddens: 1991; see Lash and Urry 
(1994) for a cogent critique of Giddens' reproduction of the mind/body dualism).
Finally, there is that part sphere of sex that pins sexual/personality characteristics to a set of 
genitalia. This is what was initially referred to as gender. These characteristics vary a lot as many 
personality traits belong to the condition of being human rather than derived from the 
genitals/chromosomal/genetic. Again the normative body makes its entry here because, while it is 
recognised that a woman can be aggressive, she ought not to be (Franks: 1991; Garfinkel: 1967). One 
can hear the residue of the ideas of the 'fairer sex' here. Essentially, therefore, by stressing that 
practices have an equal role in the functioning of the category of sex, I seek to explore how 'sex', be it 
genital or chromosomal, underdetermines the social category of sex. Moreover, I believe it offers a 
space to explore how practice intervenes to reproduce bodily appearance and character that is then 
naturalised. Images, I suggest, are best understood when they are located within this dynamic rather 
than being treated as determinates themselves.
I address these questions across the following chapters. In chapter 2,1 offer a detailed account 
of the shift from the sex/gender distinction to the formation of the subject via the semiotic operations of 
meaning. I argue that this model ejects the body from analysis by over-emphasising the determining 
effects of meaning. I suggest that this is problematic for a number of reasons: first, the body loses its 
corporeality in the world and becomes a symbolic effect; second, this ejects the very entity we have to 
act in and on the world in order to transform, resist or continue current social practices; third, because 
the subject is reduced to an ideological effect, postmodernism/feminism of this kind cannot account for
their own consciousness without calling upon the residues of non-socialised desire, namely an 
essentialist notion of the feminine. Hence, postmodernism/feminism of this kind, and its associate 
semiotic deconstructions, depend upon certain Lacanian psychoanalytic models with which to 
formulate a model of the subject. I will present the case that utilising Lacanian concepts in this way 
leads the postmodernist/feminist critique to depend upon functionalist logic, despite the polemical 
language in which this logic is embedded. Likewise, they eject the body from the social domain, just as 
Parsons (1951) did before them.
In chapter 3,1 offer a methodological defence for the use of content analysis as my chosen 
method. Drawing upon the work of Goffman (1979), I argue that codes operate conventionally and that 
this establishes sufficient stability within which to quantify the contents of the images. Moreover, 
conventions guide how we use codes and signs so that, providing one is attentive to these conventions 
during codification, the quantitative data generates a macro view of the modes of representation that 
semiotics cannot achieve. The content analysis consists of 25 variables, which contain some 350 sub- 
variables. Using this coding frame, I assessed the manifest content of 500 images. The data is assessed 
using the Chi test of association. The sub-variables reference the ideological features that are said to 
secure the 'feminine as passive'; for example looking away aligns the gaze with the passive (Dyer: 
1986; 1992). It also looks at the formation of the image and how it functions so that a representation is 
accepted as an 'authentic version of myself 2 .1 draw upon Goffman's Gender Advertisements again 
here to establish that the flow of social life has to be over-emphasised to make it visible to us. He also 
draws attention to the symbolic effect of representing a three-dimensional world in a two-dimension 
frame, which allows me to examine the symbolic relationship of space projected within the physical 
limits of an image.
In chapter 4,1 analyse the data generated. My data shows that representation is sufficiently 
ambiguous to raise serious doubts as to the explanatory adequacy of the postmodernist/feminist 
position. The data furnished shows that many of the variables said to anchor femininity as lack or 
passive or 'the other' are simply not present. Thus I conclude that, far from quintessentially defining 
the feminine as passive, these codes are regularly applied to codify men's bodies. Consequentially, the 
categorical description that aligns the passive forms of codification to the production of femininity is 
undermined. I conclude that the codifications are sufficiently ambiguous as to be unable to define 
whether the woman represented identifies with the Symbolic order and thus her own subordination; in 
fact, it was often only possible to code the body as female. Thus images target the dimorphic body. 1 do 
not make any inferential statements as to the actual lived patterns of femininity, as I do not award the 
image any causal affectivity independent of its location in practice. This requires empirical research 
(Bourdieu:1997; Waquant:1993) and I will address this in the conclusion.
Lastly, in chapter 5,1 offer some tentative steps that might be taken to resurrect the 
sex/gender distinction, by emphasising the dynamic between the body and the social order, so that 
neither entity is given undue theoretical significance (see for example Douglas: 1966; 1969; 
Mauss:1973; and more recently Waquant:1993; Davis: 1995; 1997). Most importantly, I wish to 
emphasise that sex and gender are not distinct objects but are, in fact, fuzzy because the body interacts
1 This is necessary if the images are to operate within Lacan's mirror phase.
with the social and is modified by the social. Shilling's (1993) notion of the 'unfinished body' is 
pertinent here. I explore how we might theorise 'gender' in a way that maintains an eye both on the 
differences and similarities between bodies. I do this by drawing upon Lakoff s work (1987), which 
offers an opening that can integrate various social practices with the corporeal as a normative object 
targeted by discourse and as the living entity that places us in the world. Most importantly, I think, is 
that Lakoff s development of the concept of 'family resemblance' does not force us to hierarchise these 
elements, replacing this with concepts of maps and sets that stress the interaction between the elements. 
This way it is possible to examine the body in a way that integrates internal differences amongst 
women yet maintains equal attention to the public, normative classifications to which women are 
subject. His model explores the social and embodied implications of the category 'woman', without 
having to capture the essence that unites all embodied 'women', alongside the complex ways a 
category is lived. I am particularly interested in the ways that this maintains an emphasis upon the 
dualistic abstractions, which align the masculine with the active, for example, but equally renders this 
construction mythical: the average man is no more the 'One' than the average woman is the 'other'. 
I conclude this thesis with an overview of how I seek to develop this research empirically. I 
have emphasised that my theoretical priority is to explore 'women' as internally differentiated at 
certain points, brought together corporeally at other points, and collectively targeted by the discursive 
productions of the normative. My engagement with the image is based on accepting that they are 
influential but not causally determining of the individual. I aim to extend this analysis by examining 
two groups of women in order to tackle the differences within the category head on. These are young 
women, who are intensely targeted by images produced within the cultural sphere, and older women 
who are largely absent. I aim to examine how a sense of oneself, as a woman, is negotiated within two 
differing contexts, focusing in particular on the contrast between being an overt target of the normative 
body as the body beautiful and a potentially reproductive body and those who are defined as the 
opposite, in the sense that they are deemed to be in the 'twilight' both in terms of reproduction and 
beauty. Theoretically, this provides a context within which to explore the explanatory efficacy of the 
notion of family resemblances.
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This chapter explores the alleged radicalisation of the sex/gender distinction offered by 
postmodernism/feminism. Representations are made up of signs that collectively make up the 
Symbolic. The Symbolic is understood as constituting or producing subjects, which is theorised 
through various mechanisms derived from the psychoanalytic model. Thus, bodies become subjects 
within the pre-existing cultural formations and, because these formations are ordered by key patriarchal 
hierarchies, they go on to order gendered subjectivities hierarchically. Thus, the theoretical target of my 
critique is the model of the Symbolic constitution of the subject, which is highly dependent upon the 
psychoanalysis of Lacan (1977), as well as Althusser's (1971) concept of interpellation. Proponents 
argue that this de-centres the subject, deconstructs the myths of the speaking T, and, with it, the 
fallacious notion that the subject is the source of meaning rather than the product of meaning. Their 
concern is with the constraints that language as a system, that is the Symbolic, imposes and the various 
ways language organises the polymorphic desires of the infant. Hence, this axis integrates the social 
system to the production of complicit sets of identities and aims to account for how they feel fixed, 
personal, instinctual, that is, how cultural formations come to feel 'of the body'. Neither masculine nor 
feminine subjects belong to the realm of nature but are demonstrably cultural products. This is what I 
will describe as postmodernism/feminism and I examine, in particular, those who seek to apply this 
within the cultural images that subjects consume. I propose that Mulvey's work (1975;1993) continues 
to hold a paradigmatic position in terms of those who seek to deconstruct cultural images in the light of 
the above critique as to how a specific image of the Symbolic determines subjectivity.
However, I contest that this model effectively de-naturalises the Subject because the 
dependence upon interpellation and the linguistic construction of the T, at best, displaces the body 
and, at worst, dissipates the body. Without tackling the body head on, it is not possible to tackle the 
cultural dimorphism by which bodies are said to be naturally organised. Therefore, this model has not 
tackled the constancy of sex and its association with an ahistorical natural order. On the contrary, I 
propose that this model is utterly reliant on the constancy of sex, by pinpointing the ways the body is 
drawn upon when postmodernists/feminists theorise even though they never directly address this 
dependence. While postmodernists/feminists appears to be offering a radical model of the constitution 
of the subject, through signs and discourse, their dependence upon psychoanalysis reveals how they are 
dependent upon the body: what throws the girl into the Oedipal crisis is the sight of the penis. 
Therefore, this model fundamentally problematises fleshy ,tforporeal bodies. In theoretical terms, it also 
continues to theorise within the dualisms it claims to deconstruct, emphasising instead the cultural over 
the biological. Arguably, postmodernism/feminism fails therefore to go beyond the strictures of 
sex/gender dichotomy.
In order to do so, I trace some of the weaknesses identified regarding the sex/gender 
distinction, which entails focusing on the theoretical challenges that postmodernists/feminists have 
launched against the distinction. This necessitates concentrating upon the critique that the sex/gender 
distinction does not sufficiently challenge the nature/culture dichotomy, which aligns the feminine to 
the domain of nature and thus legitimates the exclusion of women from the social, economic and 
political realms. Essentially, the postmodernist/feminist charge is that these realms are not sufficiently
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interrogated historically so do not sufficiently de-naturalise our sense that our current order is related to 
nature in some way. (Guillaumin:1996; Lloyd: 1984; Gatens: 1996).
Having outlined the central weaknesses of the sex/gender distinction, I trace how 
postmodernism/feminism has sought to go beyond these limitations. A particular focus will be upon the 
shift to a notion of the Symbolic and the idea that culture and/or language is largely responsible for the 
constitution of the gendered subject. Equally, the Symbolic is deemed to be largely responsible for the 
discourses of the nature/culture dualism. This requires that I present the briefest of overviews of 
Lacan's reconfiguration of Freudian psychoanalysis in order to provide a context for both how it is 
used and where I think it fails. I will then explore in some detail how theorists, such as Mulvey (1976), 
Doane (1991) and Cowie (1997), describe the Symbolic and how the Symbolic goes on to (re)construct 
masculine and feminine subject positions and provide an account of the structural negation of active 
female heterosexual desire. Since only the feminine is passive, all sexual objectification is done to the 
feminine, irrespective of sex assignment of the body in question. By implication, all active heterosexual 
sexual desire is masculine. A particularly important concept used to (re)present the masculine and 
feminine is psychic oscillation (Mulvey in Easthope:1993), which aims to mobilise the polymorphic 
directions that desire can take within the gendered dichotomy. In this way, when a body assigned as 
male is sexualised, the Symbolic3 determination of that body is feminine. (He) is said to have 
undergone the process of feminisation (Neale: 1992). I ask what, then, is the body? A container?4
I argue that Mulvey continues to hold a paradigmatic position viz a viz cultural analysis and 
the formation of the subject because her work remains central to the semiotic engagement with the 
Symbolic, that is, how meanings construct the feminine. Her work began with the inscription of the 
masculine/active and feminine/passive into our Symbolic universe. Developments have not superseded 
this but have merely added to the number of structural positions available by working through the 
possible combinations. Hence, central to my critique is the assumption that the semiotic function of the 
sign maintains a determining function between femininity and passivity and its associate dualisms. 
Moreover, I argue that this is central to its explanatory adequacy because without it the Symbolic 
becomes heterogeneous and thus too varied to secure 'sex as a discursive construction'. In other words, 
this model must remove interpretative indeterminacy of culture if culture is to reproduce the social 
order.
The way that these structural positions are theorised deploys what Connell (1987) has 
described as categorical logic. These categorical units reorganise the examples that, on the surface, 
contest the validity of this model's explanation. The emphasis upon construction means that a sense of 
possible social or cultural change is lost, as is the possibility of variation in representation. By 
describing the eroticisation of the male body as an instance of'feminisation', this model is able to 
maintain the coherency of the key sexual hierarchies; that is the permanent denigration of the feminine. 
Note that this explanation only works if the self-evidence of the male body is presumed. Primacy is 
awarded to the structural ordering of the Symbolic, which reconstitutes the body as a circuit of subject 
positions. In order to do so, it must eject the body, while implicitly drawing upon it in an uncritical,
3 Capitalisation of this kind reflects the embedment of such theory within the Lacanian paradigm. 
4 1 argue that there is a worrying echo of the mind/body dualism here and I suggest that this is derived
from their central dependence upon psychoanalysis.
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common-sense way. 5 Hence, current forms of codification go by unrecognised, both politically and 
empirically. Furthermore, using Nayak's (1997) examination of the Haagen Dazs advertising campaign 
(1997), I show how the categorical logic that informs the feminist analysis of this kind equally orders 
the analysis of the representations of'race'. Moreover, introducing the postmodernist analysis of'race' 
reveals the extent to which theory of this kind is unable to combine two or more structures at any one 
time: does the white woman hold the gaze or the black man!
Finally, I conclude with an analysis that suggests that this explanatory model implicitly draws 
upon functionalist reason, as outlined by Parsons (1951; Parsons and Bateson:1956). Parsons also 
turned to psychoanalysis to explain how a specific set of values, working for the collective good, 
operate on a deeper level than rational choice: social actors fulfil various social roles because they feel 
bad if they transgress such obligations. Parsons argued that what are effectively socially contingent and 
historically specific practices must be internalised and made one's own, and he looked to stereotypical 
representations to fulfil, in part, this function. Therefore, both models have made identification a 
system problem, and within both models, the social order is structurally over-determined. The influence 
of Althusserian thought6 on postmodernism/feminism is particularly important to my argument because 
Althusser's concept of interpellation connects directly the ideological requirements with the formation 
of the subject, effectively ensuring that the system requirements correspond to the actor's motivated 
actions. It effectively plays the same role as internalisation. This is the point where the normative 
departure from Parsons makes its entry. Likewise, both reduce the social order to an internalised 
psychological state thereby failing to provide an adequate account for both the sources and occurrence 
of sustained, rational resistance, and the instrumental manipulation of norms according to the 
expediency of the social context (Goffman: 1969). I suggest that 'subject position' and 'social role' 
perform the same explanatory function and therefore both models fail to address action that falls 
outside the social order and its norms. At best, action is non-conformist or transgressive, that is 
temporary, and by implication pathological. One is only left with those residues that have not been 
'successfully' socialised; a melancholic performance perhaps?7
Equally, therefore, I critique this model arguing that it treats signs as functioning in much the 
same way as stereotypes. By this 1 mean that the meaning of the image is homogeneous, determinate 
and possibly monolithic because anything other than a structurally homogeneous Symbolic cannot 
secure identification. Furthermore, I argue that signs operate on behalf of the subject position in much 
the same way as stereotypes were thought to function on behalf of the social role. Thus, I argue that 
what differentiates postmodernist/feminist cultural analysis from Parsons is not the 
postmodernist/feminist creation of a radical alternative but merely a difference in their respective 
normative orientation.
5 Therefore, this model draws attention to the uncritical upon the background that naturalises gender
patterns rather than making this their object critical analysis.
6 1 was alerted to the comparative logic by A. Frank (1991). He addresses Turner's analysis of the
body. He argues that because Turner addresses the body as a social order problem, the contingency that
the socially produced body can force into the interaction is removed from view. The outcome is that the
body tends to be a passive receiver that fulfils the system's needs.
7 See Riviere (1929)
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However before I proceed, a delineation is necessary as to who and what is meant by the 
cluster 'postmodernism/feminism' because this is by no means a self-evident set of headings, and 
conceals what is, in fact, a dauntingly heterogeneous movement. I have used this cluster as an 
abbreviation for those who adopt and apply the psychoanalytic framework to the de-centring of the 
subject and combine this framework with the concept of interpellation. Thus, theoretical framework of 
the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism is applied to the cultural visual form. Semiotic 
analyses attempt to explore the operations of the subject position already constituted. Thus they draw 
heavily on the strong programme and, in my view, reveal some fundamental weaknesses in that 
programme. Thus, the emphasis upon Lacan has tended to mean that the theorists I critique here 
concentrate upon the semiotic and ideological formation of the subject by the sign, visual or linguistic. 
This therefore sets these theorists apart from other feminists who engage with the postmodern, who, 
like Benhabib (1992) or Scott (1992) consider subjectivity in non-naturalistic ways and yet maintain a 
distance from some of the stronger claims of postmodernism. I have in mind here the rejection of meta- 
concepts by Riley (1988), or the rejection of the material base to the world, for example Harbord and 
Campbell (1998). Adams (1996), for example, consistently explores the production of sexual difference 
through its Symbolic signification, which continues to be organised by the hierarchy imposed by the 
Phallus, while Gatens, seeming to offer us a de facto position on the body, reconfigures it through the 
Oedipus complex. She states:
Given that in this society there is a network of relations obtaining between femininity and 
femaleness, that is, between the female body and femininity, then there must be a qualitative 
difference between the kind of femininity 'lived' by women and 'lived' by men. 
(Gatens: 1996:10)
All well and good. This is certainly something that strikes a chord with a proponent of corporeality as 
'in' and 'affecting' the world - as something other than real through its discursive materialisation 
(Butler: 1993). But then she goes on to state:
Freud's neglect of the effect of the menses on the pubertal girl's psyche is significant. That the 
flow of blood would have profound psychical significance for her is clear and that this 
significance would centre around ideas of castration, sexual attack and socially reinforced 
shame is highly probable. (Gatens: 1996:10)
Why should the menses be linked psychically, or otherwise, to castration, when she previously states a 
de facto reality to sexual difference? It is the real beginning of the possibility of reproduction, a 
corporeal possibility, and thus its symbolic significance should surely be rooted in the material base of 
the body. The use of psychoanalysis, both theoretically and in terms of its semiotic application, rules 
out other ways of experiencing, visual experiences included. I cannot reconcile the facticity of the body 
with the psychic determination of the body through castration, an act which has never been carried out 
or is even close to the corporeal experience of that body. Moreover, I hear a strong echo of Doane here,
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who unreservedly asserts that the sight of the penis by a little girl secures the knowledge of her lack. 
Hence, my main target is those united by their commitment to a strong programme of postmodernism 
(Benhabib:1992) operating in combination with psychoanalysis and who seek to trace this via semiotic 
analyses of visual culture.
Equally, I do not wish to unite political aims of those who theoretically contribute to the 
ongoing debates regarding the 'postmodern', one of the core dividing lines being the sense in which 
'women' as a political category should be maintained as the focus and purpose of theorising (Harding: 
1990; Gatens: 1996; New: 2003; Scott: 1992; Guillaumin:1996 for example) or whether it is overly 
homogenising and thus potentially dominatory through the negation of difference (hooks: 1981; 
Young: 1995; Flax: 1990 for example). I therefore aim to challenge the explanatory and political 
efficacy of a model that places a singular emphasis upon the causal determination of the cultural 
domain. Thus, part of what emerges from this analysis is the exposure of the theoretical tenet of 
postmodernism/feminism that is forced to combine psychoanalysis with the immaterial operations of 
the Symbolic in order to have a distinct field of analysis. To quote Harbord and Campbell, it requires:
a continued dialogue between cultural theory and psychoanalysis...(because) without 
psychoanalysis, cultural theory has little to challenge the discourses of materiality and with it 
the rational.... In the absence of a psychoanalytic framework, cultural theory lacks a model of 
subjectivity, a model that is crucial to understanding the way in which culture is produced and 
operates. (Harbord and Campbell:1998:l) (my italics)
I argue that using a quasi-transcendental and idealist notion of the feminine - this is what remains, after 
all, once the material and the rational have been ejected - leads to the inversion of the sex/gender 
distinction, rather than the surpassing of its limitations. Thus, theorising of this kind reproduces the 
very sort of dichotomous essentialism it nominally rejects. The crux of my critique targets the 
postmodern/feminist assumption that the body is 'in the world' through its Symbolic signification only. 
In contradistinction, we need to hold onto a body that can act in and on the world so that we engage 
directly with the entity that materially, empirically places us in the world (Shilling: 1993; Crossley: 
1996). As thinking bodies (Burkitt: 1999), we negotiate structures and meaning by incorporating and 
managing them within the micro-practices we undertake.
To reiterate, the combinations of postmodernisms/feminisms is often bewildering, almost to 
the point that the area where these cohere can only be stated negatively, that is, one can best come 
away with a sense of what they are not. However, the result is that one is left with a troubling, vague 
idea of what they actually are. What is the relationship between those who explore these themes in 
terms of their cultural application and those who pursue them theoretically? What links the cultural 
application of Riviere's story (Doane: 1991) and those who utilises it theoretical and in a more complex 
way (Butler: 1990)? Theory ought to engage in some way with the subjects on whose behalf it theorises, 
namely women and the discursive constructs that target them. Mulvey's work does undertake an 
analysis of what the strong programme 'looks like,' in terms of its cultural contours, and the subject 
position the Symbolic is alleged to form. She is, in some senses, attempting to apply the theoretical
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targeted: it considers how the various processes order a specific notion of the 'feminine as role' and 
how these are integrated with the body to produce the appropriately socialised subject. Parsons' 
response is that the system's norms become the individual's values and norms. Most importantly, 
Parsons has adopted Freud's concept: internalisation is the mechanism by which the system is 
inculcated into the individual. Therefore, the feminine is an internal state made up of the norms and 
values required to sustain the social system.
The descriptive detail concerning gender can now be grafted on to this model of causation. 
Hence, role theory 10 is the approach to social structure which locates its basic constraints in stereotyped 
interpersonal expectations. In this sense, the space or split between biology and society with regard to 
gender can be identified. It is not our biological make-up that makes us the women and men that we 
are, but rather the interpersonal exchange of role expectation and role sanctioning that is internalised to 
become subjective states. Thus, internalised social norms become the reason individuals give for 
action, which again re-emphasises the importance of representation as a means to convey the social 
norms to be internalised."
Oakley's distinction mirrors too closely the notion that the natural cannot be changed. To 
borrow from Cearley-Harrison and Hood-Williams:
Oakley simply echoed and exacerbated what we 'knew' already....Talcott Parsons' (1949) 
attempt to argue that the purpose of sex-role differentiation was to minimize the potential 
strain produced by the occupation system in a mobile class-divided society - which is a 
wholly and self-containedly sociological explanation - rests finally upon the allegedly 
biological 'fact' of the bearing and nurturing of children. Two separate explanatory principles, 
the sociological and the other biological, are at work and the latter constitutes the ultimate 
basis for the former. (Cearly-Harrison and Hood Williams:2002:18)
Hence, we have come full circle because we find ourselves faced with the following: how much is 
social therefore?
This reveals the fundamental flaw with the sex/gender distinction, argues Delphy (1996), 
because it does not sufficiently tackle head on the notion that biological aspects of the body are socially 
determining in a profound way. Thus, it continues to operate within the field that is her object of 
critique. For example, in the much quoted introduction, Oakley asks: "(I)f biology determines male and 
female roles, how does it determine them?" (Oakley: 1972:15). Men and women's natures need to be 
worked through in order to sort out the residue of culture that is left. This pushes culture into a 
derivative, secondary position, thus the naturalisation processes of culture go by unchallenged. This is 
the part that is open to political transformation because only this falls outside of the (presumed) 
transhistorical features of natural bodies. The issue has been locked into how much of the social is a
10 1 recognise that the distinction can be applied in other ways, for example psychoanalysis. However, 
its application within role theory has been central. As New (2003) notes, the realist model lost its way a 
little for not being sufficiently critical.
" Although, deeply embedded in this is the struggle between the sense that action is voluntary 
(Parsons' allegiance to Hobbes) and internalised action (Parsons' indebtedness to Freud).
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result of our natures, which is demonstrable by the endless debate regarding nature/nurture. Hence, 
bodies are defined as unproblematically 'there', constituting the solid, unquestionable common sense 
entities we call men and women. Bodies are free from symbolic elaboration and thus free from the 
discursive effects these may have. The cultural domain, which is open to dispute, is thus the world of 
representations and learning, that is the domain of socialisation. We are socialised into roles; we leam 
through scripts and stereotypes. This represents an insufficient analysis of culture and its relationship to 
bodies.
The sex/gender distinction carries over the mind/body dualism also. Again, this reflects, in 
part, a reliance upon social role theory. For example, Parsons' (1951) logic brings him to the 
conclusion that norms are the causes of social action; hence, consensus becomes the primary feature of 
the social order. The effectiveness of role theory 12 is dependent upon accepting that actions are 
motivated by reasons, and that reasons are, in effect, society's beliefs and norms, which produce the 
appropriate motivation for action. 13 Consequently, Parsons needs to explain how the system's 
requirement for consensual public norms, and thus a functioning society, become internal subjective 
dispositions 14 . Thus, socialisation only targets the mind, while the body is left fully outside of the social 
realm.
The circularity is repeated with regard to the social order. In order to sustain a social order, it 
must reproduce its population. Therefore, it is necessary to socialise two distinct sets of people into a 
functional division of labour: those who reproduce the population and those who reproduce the social 
structures, the aim of the division being to stress that sexual division of labour was not an outcome of 
biology but of social functions. However, this becomes even more unconvincing when the notion of 
universalistic and particularistic values are integrated 15 . It rapidly mirrors the constructs of women's 
natures and thus their affinity to this role. The bodily realm is feminised and the realm of the mind 
masculinised. Oakley's notion of the role struggles against this conclusion as the sexed body remains 
firmly separated from the culture and thus she fails to tackle a core dualism that denigrates the 
feminine.
Therefore, Delphy argues that while Oakley aims to move beyond the remits of biological 
determinism, she ends up operating within it because she has not tackled head-on the constructed 
features of the nature/culture dichotomy. Fundamentally, Oakley has awarded ontological primacy to 
the field of nature. For example, 'women's biological roles* are placed as the foundation upon which 
issues of gender are placed. I think that the sex/gender distinction falters because it assumes a strong 
causal connection between a bodily function and the cultural understanding derived from that function. 
I argue that this is far more indeterminate than her framework permits. There are examples where the 
understanding or meanings that construct gender do not neatly map onto the sexual difference - 
male/masculine and female/feminine. One need not look to the exotic but to our histories where we can 
trace the emergence of sex as dualistic and opposite (Laquer: 1990). Significantly, the distinction tends
12 Be it gender role or social role more broadly.
13 See J. Bohman (1991) for a more detailed explication of how norms become reasons for action - esp 
p. 77.
14 This attacks head-on the social order problem as defined by Hobbes: that society must overcome the 
randomness of individual desired ends and conflicts of interest.
15 Most clearly formulated in Parsons and Shils (1962).
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to treat sex and gender as autonomous spheres when perhaps fluidity, or a sense of their 
interrelatedness may have been, and potentially is, a more fruitful form of theorising. In fact, left as 
distinct spheres, the distinction tends to mirror Levi Strauss's notion of the raw and the cooked.
This strikes me as central as I aim to open up a space between the historical constancy of sex, 
things like the process of reproduction which requires both a man and woman who are both able to 
produce healthy sperm and ovaries, and the huge possibilities regarding what that might mean for a 
society. Not all bodies, unproblematically defined as man and woman, are allowed or should engage in 
reproduction, according to society's values. For example, are two bodies, both unambiguously female, 
awarded the moral sanction to proceed with reproduction?; or, indeed, teenagers who become pregnant 
or older women who also become pregnant; what does this do to the 'experience' of being pregnant? 
Alternatively, we can look to menstruation where the cultural symbolism that engulfs it fundamentally 
alters how it is understood and possible even felt. For example, does a woman within the West 
understand and experience menstruation in the same ways as a woman who must enter Purdah during 
this part of her cycle? Within this is the discursive intervention that constructs the natural, but the 
discourse is not 'making the body'. 16
In this sense, I wish to move further than the sex/gender distinction allows. I aim to consider 
that the cultural is more than the political, in the sense of the rights due a respective body (New:2003). 
I aim to use this as a means to move issues of corporeality and culture from the strictures of sex/gender 
and nature/culture dichotomy. This represents part of the postmodernist/feminist challenge, a challenge 
that I argue is unsuccessful. They merely reverse the causal direction so that culture becomes the 
paradigm from which 'sex' emerges. Consequently, the body is 'silenced' so to speak; for example an 
infertile woman cannot be materialised through discourse into being fertile (Butler: 1993). Moreover, I 
argue that postmodernism/feminism, and the accompanying cultural analyses, refer to the corporeal 
body as obviously and unambiguously sexed, that is in common-sense ways. They use the apparent 
self-evidence of the body when they need to anchor ideology and its discursive constructions. Without 
this, one cannot describe semiotic function as feminising; feminisation requires that one carries over 
ideas about the dimorphic body.
Despite the problems outlined above, the feminist movement, using the sex/gender distinction, 
produced a formidable critique of the supposition that the division of labour, based upon gender, was 
equitable or functional. Emergent evidence, and critical reflection, merged with political action to 
delineate the position that the division of labour was in fact an outcome of sectional interests; those of 
men's at the expense of women's. This position proffers a number of fundamental challenges to the 
consensus model of the social order. It stipulates that these respective sets of interests are in conflict 
and therefore the presumed reciprocity of interests is broken; this problematises the presumed natural 
basis of rights. In addition, the space between biology and society that the sex/gender distinction forged 
meant that the relationship between current patterns of representation and gender formation could be 
the cultural contours were traced and contested 17 . This provided a significant critique to many of the
16 This is where Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams and I part company. They move too far away 
from the corporeal, and that elements of the body are extra-discursive.
17 1 recognise that these two contributors do not flow from the same methodological or theoretical 
position, but the interrogation of culture undertook many forms.
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structuralism, namely that "in order to make sense of the epistemic object one need (not) appeal to an 
epistemic subject at all." (Benhabib: 1992:208) This anti-humanist position has been very influential. 
Now language is the source of our sense of self- it is prior to us and limits and constrains 
fundamentally what it is we can say. De Saussere (1972) offers a model of language that sees meaning 
operate through difference. This meaning is relational in the sense that it requires the combination of 
the signifier and the signified. These often work as a set of structural opposites: masculine/feminine for 
example. The signified then builds up into chains of connotive associations which work through 
substitutions: the rose a sign of love, or coyness as a connotive element to the feminine. Such patterns 
are traceable through semiotic analysis. But the significance reaches further than this; it offers the 
possibility of discarding notions of human nature and replaces it with an entity that is an effect of 
various historical, social and linguistic structures. This de-centres the subject as, unlike Descartes' 
thinking subject, we cannot stand outside of these structures from an Archimedean point, and neither 
can we pledge that the source of what we know or think is derived from an application of an objectivist, 
rationalist system of knowledge.
This departure is fundamental. 'Man' is not a unitary thinker but an outcome of competing 
structures. 'He' is the outcome of language and competing desires. Gone is the 'myth' of a self- 
transparent entity, reaching for full autonomy. The Subject is replaced by subjectivity   a product of 
competing discourses, controlled by desires, needs and forces whose effects shape and constitute the 
make-up of subjectivity. This is a fundamental attack upon the presumed unity of the Cartesian subject, 
therefore it also provides a framework to undo the dualisms that are said to have locked women into 
subordination. There is no Subject from which women are excluded because of their bodies. Instead, 
the Subject is rendered fictitious and thus both masculinity and femininity are products of social and 
discursive forces.
What is of central importance here is the affinity between the de-centred subject and the split 
subject as theorised by psychoanalysis. To reiterate, this is theoretical context within which the cultural 
analyses critiqued here were conducted. The human psyche is not unified but fundamentally split. 
Lacan (1977;1984) argues that the T is a linguistic construct, the outcome of the organisation of desire 
into its socially sanctioned form. The residues are locked into the unconscious, ever present but never 
directly utterable. Thus, Lacan's radical re-reading rests with conceptualising the unconscious as the 
structuralist system of language. Meaning, coming from the«mconscious, is contained in the material 
signifier, or conscious speech. These signifiers are cast out from the signifying system, as they cannot 
be integrated in conscious discourse since patterns of desire of this kind are socially taboo. In 
particular, Lacan and Freud are concerned that the incest taboo be repressed 19 . Thus desire can only 
operate through displacements or substitutions of the signifiers that attach the forbidden desire onto 
something else. For example, the fetish is said to operate in this way. The fusion of Freudian analysis to 
structural linguistics leads the symptom, as an expression of the unconscious, to be treated as a signifier 
which fixes the subject to another signifier. This fundamentally undoes the pretension of the Cartesian 
Subject because the subject is a construct through which language speaks and therefore the object of
19 Although they both recognise that such repressive practice induces trauma, hysteria and other 
patterns where the unconscious erupts into conscious life.
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analysis is the formation of identity as a linguistic function. Importantly, speech is not treated as 
intentional expression because the constellation of signifiers does not signify for the subject. Thus, the 
unconscious is awarded priority as the core of subjectivity.
The next important element to consider is that language is now the system through which 
Oedipalisation occurs. Thus, Lacan places equal emphasis upon directing desire toward the genitals and 
toward heterosexual ity. Thus, the formation of the T is an outcome of the Oedipal complex that 
organises sexual drives so that the primacy of the genitals is attained to secure heterosexual ity20 . Lacan 
de-centres the process by elevating language as the mechanism through which we enter the Symbolic 
and assume a subject position within that Symbolic universe. Hence, Lacan's model offers a non- 
rationalist explanation of how sex is translated into sexed subjectivities. Equally, it provides a paradigm 
with which to connect the formation of the subject to the cultural representations semiotically 
deconstructed. What is most crucial here is that the Phallus becomes the core signifying mechanism 
that institutes the normative order of heterosexual ity. Subjectivity is formed under the rule of the 
Phallus which forecloses the possible characteristics the feminine/heterosexual can assume. Lacan 
concludes the two following problems are crucial to the formation of subjectivity: what is it that 
produces sexual difference and how does this fix the relationship between the sexes so that gender 
dimorphism comes to be experienced as an asymmetrical and unequivocal fact of existence? As Grosz 
states:
For both sexes, though in quite difference ways, the phallus serves as a means of access to the 
'domain of the Other'. The Other is understood here in two senses: as a socio-symbolic 
network regulated according to language-like rules; and as a psychical structure, 
representative of the social Other, internalised in the form of the unconscious. 
(Grosz: 1990:117) '
What a formidable challenge. It offers up real possibilities for challenging the dualism that naturalises 
current forms of femininity. Moreover, it offers a frame work within which to embed the images that 
are critiqued here. Sex no longer stands outside of the culture but is drawn in and constituted by 
culture. Thus the political focus remains on culture but the system through which culture was 
interrogated has changed. Culture is formative of the subject find thus the content of that culture is 
intimately bound to the subjectivities it constitutes. Philosophically, this model offers a system that 
profoundly challenges the naturalisation of inequality, which ideologically construes that inequality as 
a natural outcome of sexual difference.
Yet, there remain normative issues here because the order of the Symbolic, which elevates the 
phallus as the core symbol of sexual difference and the social law through the Father, has been 
definitively identified as patriarchal. It was noted above that Lacan seeks to structure the unconscious 
like language and that language operates through difference: thus the phallus is symbolically functional
20 This gauges Butler's insistence that gender is meaningful only through the heterosexist matrix 
(1992).
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because the feminine (body without) symbolises lack. 21 This poses some problems for feminist politics. 
What of those sectional interests served by the various cultural constructions, for example? The current 
cultural and linguistic configurations dominate women, organise inequality and mark the feminine as 
the other to masculine. The feminist re-configuration of Lacan seeks to work through the consequences 
for feminine subjectivity. One of the central ways this is done, in terms of cultural analysis at least, is 
by combining Althusser's (1971) model of culture as ideology to the formation of the subject through 
interpellation. The mirror phase and interpellation combine mechanisms that make self-identity 
something that comes from the outside and the concept of interpellation makes the exterior culture 
riddled with ideology. Again, this demonstrates the extent to which this theory provides the theoretical 
context for the assessment of the image. In fact, ideology is said to operate in the very constitution of 
the subject.
What will now follow is an account of the incorporation of semiotics as the method with 
which to best interrogate culture, alongside the integration of interpellation to link the cultural 
constructions to an ideological position compatible with feminism. Thus, the aim of the cultural 
analyses was to incorporate Althusser's notion that cultural configurations are ideological with Lacan's 
model of the mirror phase. The combination ensures that identities are formed through the 
identification with cultural configurations. Crucially, ideology is engaged with directly and placed at 
the heart of the formation of subjectivity. The reign of the phallus is deemed to be an ideological 
construction rather than a necessary structuring to ensure gendered subjectivity and heterosexuality, as 
Lacan would argue (Fink: 1995). Thus, what is crucial here is the normative departure between the 
feminist application and that of Lacan.
SIGNS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY
One of the problems that stalled the political development by the sex/gender distinction is that 
it failed to tackle sufficiently critically the issue of whose reality is the real one. The challenge offered 
by the cultural and linguistic turn is that it re-defines all images as false, thus removing the need to deal 
with the various realities of women's lives and images that depict this. Moreover, the analyses critiqued 
here are able to move directly from the theory upon which it draws to the formation of subject, thereby 
by-passing issues of action and the social practices that potentially resist the current ideological 
patterns that subordinate women. Despite paradigmatic shift, they nevertheless took the following 
questions from the analysis facilitated by the sex/gender distinction: if femininity was not inevitable, 
what other ways could the feminine be constituted?; what does the symbolic system contribute to this? 
These questions were best interrogated by semiotics, which offers an analysis of how the signifier and 
the signified combined to produce the sign.
Semiotics defines representation as a form of cultural practice that belongs to the overall form 
of discursive production, a normality that allows a strictly de-limited range of variations that are based 
upon a network of mutually referring references (Barthes:1972; Eco:1976; Panofsky:1970). These 
references came be seen as legitimators of the hierarchical relations that justified and naturalised
21 Lacan's notion of A: not A, the 'not A' denotes the feminine as 'without penis', that is castrated.
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gender patterns. The move to examining images within a semiotic framework means that the image is 
not treated as an icon, dominated purely by a figurative element. Rather, the sign consists of signifying 
elements that have to be decoded as part of their interaction within a specific visual configuration. In 
making such an interpretation, one must connect the implied meaning directly to the material signifier 
through which the meaning is generated.
This shift implies that careful analyses of the single specific construction of the feminine 
body, the specific modes and sites of representation, as well as discussion of how the signs address the 
imagined spectator, made a superior contribution than content analysis upon which so much of role 
stereotypes relied.22 'Woman' is defined as the sign that functions in the (re)production of sexual 
differentiation for which a certain body image is a signifier. Representation was identified as one of the 
many social processes by which specific orders of sexual differentiation are ceaselessly constructed, 
modified, reconstituted and potentially resisted. The adoption of semiotics was based upon the 
Saussurian model of language, its omnipresence and synchronic structures that are prior to the subject 
and hence, 'woman as sign' aimed to transcend the idea that representations are symptoms of objective 
causes external to them. Thus, it aimed to bring the body into the process of cultural signification. 
Signs were analysed in their active role in the production of the categories of sexual differentiation. 
Thus signs constitute sexual difference - not bodies. Corporeality is not confronted and as a result the 
ideological elements that are bound to that corporeality are not confronted either. 23 Given this emergent 
theoretical environment, the appropriation of Lacanian analysis, particularly by merging of the 
synchronic system to the order of the Phallus, provided a system to integrate 'woman as sign' to a more 
thorough model of subjectivity.
The notion of 'woman as sign' is an attempt to bring together the fact that 'woman' is already 
a category constituted in society and thus subject to the various signifying ideological practices that 
sustain this category. The project has now been identified as one that explores the relationship between 
'woman' and sign in signification systems like film. Pollock summarises the endeavour thus:
Images of women places the emphasis on the problem of the images with regard to the 
contested ideas about what women are like or would be like. The concept of'woman as sign' 
makes us doubt that images signify women at all, though they undoubtedly circulate the sign 
Woman incessantly - and with the purpose of seducing persons of the female persuasion to 
recognise themselves in these signs and places. Visual images that proffer iconic figurations of 
the feminine body through rhetorics technically and ideologically aiming at the reality effect - 
this is, the disavowal of their rhetorical character behind the illusions of direct reproduction, 
transcription and replication - play a particularly important role in this masquerade. The 
visual signifier 'woman' is potent precisely insofar as the forms of representation, especially 
those associated within photographic processes, naturalise their constituents and presents
22 The debate in part reflects the broader discussions concerning the appropriateness of the positivist 
method that dominated at that time.
23 See Kessler (2000) for an empirical investigation of the normative sexed body. My concern here is 
that the dichotomy is not tackled and thus the fact that bodies do not secure that dichotomy is left 
unaddressed.
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themselves as mere description of a neutral content. Woman can therefore be simply seen, that 
is, in 'images of women. (Pollock: 1991:205).
The shift to semiotics integrated the critical discussions of ideology, forcing the question of 
how an all-pervasive ideology functioned within a culture. Specifically, Althusser's influence (1971) 
extended the reach of ideology beyond its initial remit of the 'ruling ideas of the day' to its permeation 
into every level of society, even down to a handshake. Henceforth, ideology was understood to serve a 
system of domination in four key functions. First, legitimation extends sectorial interests so that they 
become society's interests. Second, the various state institutions (ISAs) function by targeting and 
forming the subject so that identification with the social order operates at an unconscious level. Third, 
culture interpellates the subject: ideology consists in the very process of constituting individuals as 
subjects of effects of recognition and identification, the outcome of which is that individuals recognise 
themselves in those ideological patterns. Finally, ideology provides a bridge between the imagined 
representations, which project a set of conditions that are not really one's own, and the actual material 
conditions of the subject. False-consciousness belongs, therefore, to the cultural domain: the cultural 
domain is coterminous with ideology. Mulvey attends to this by examining how an image or mise-en- 
scene24 can be semiotically decoded so that the meaning and the subject position identified.
Mulvey (1975) combines Althusser's definition of ideology, that is, the 'imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real relations of existence' (1971:164) with Lacan's theory of the 
subject's constitution in language. By connecting the two, the relation between power and the subject 
could be explicated. For example, the reason given why women were not embracing the politics of 
feminism was because of the connection between ideological cultural patterns and the ideologically- 
constructed patterns within the unconscious. This position, in particular, is the object of my critique. 
Thus, my analysis is fourfold:
1. I aim to demonstrate the degree to which Mulvey's initial work continues to set the parameters of 
the debate, especially with regard to the use of codes and their structural determination and their 
consequent incitement to pleasure;
2. I challenge this model because it theoretically blocks any notion of a feminine heterosexual desire 
that is not masochistic and passive in form. 1 will argue that this reveals the extent to which much 
of this theory remains dependent upon the notion of the subject position;
3. I will explore how this feminist normative critique is sustained by deploying functionalist logic as 
the mode of explanation; without it, there is no need or possibility for feminist critique, given the 
theoretical closures within which this model operates;
4. I will show that their reliance upon psychoanalysis displaces the body by shifting emphasis upon 
the internal organisation of desire and, with the body lost from analytical view, that such analysis 
is dependent upon categorical logic to sustain 'the female' as coherent entity;
24 1 have not attended to the shift in cultural form because this paradigm does not attend to its potential 
consequences.
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THE DOUBLE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION OF 'WOMAN' IN FILM
Mulvey addresses the structures of identification and the mechanisms of pleasure that 
accompany them. She argues that the cinematic use of classical narratives, which are modelled on 
realism, stimulate and satisfy scopophilic desire. The position of the spectators in the cinema is one of 
repression of their own exhibitionism and the projection of that repressed desire on to the performer/ 
character. The cinema reproduces the mis-recognition of the mirror phase, thereby stimulating both 
narcissistic and scopophilic desire. Scopophilia is essentially active since its pleasure is derived from 
subjecting the object to a controlling gaze. This is said to parallel the spectator's position regarding 
realist film: one is able to look into a social world without the reciprocity demanded by belonging to 
that world. Voyeurism is therefore said to define the functioning of the filmic form. Thus, filmic form 
stimulates narcissism because the spectator projects the desire of self love into the more perfect image, 
for example the hero who has full diegetic control over the other characters. Mulvey extends the 
homological analysis by arguing that the narcissistic desire is satisfied through the identification with 
the alter-ego so that the screen image stands in for the subject's own image. Thus, the film image 
mimics the more perfect view of the self identified in the mirror phase, which stimulates identification. 
Most crucially, identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order that articulates 
desire.
At this point, the phallocentric binary opposition is shown to be essential: scopophilia is an 
active pattern of desire and therefore bears the mark of the masculine, thereby instituting female as 
passive. The subject whose scopophilic desire is satisfied is the man and his selected object is the 
female. The libido, defined as the active erotic function, is equally aligned as masculine. The identification 
process is based upon rendering the female form fearless to men by representing it using codes that 
satisfy in themselves to and for men. Woman becomes simultaneously looked at and displayed. Her 
appearance is marked with strong visual and erotic codes and she is reduced to being a passive, erotic 
spectacle, while the man comes to connote narrative or the active subject. With each step, Mulvey 
builds upon the dualisms: masculine/feminine; active/passive; subject/object of the narrative. The 
castration complex is central to Mulvey's model because it requires that the image of the woman be a 
fetishistic one in order to disavow the threat of castration that«her body symbolises.
Mulvey goes on to assert that the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of sexual objectification cannot be 
borne by the male figure because those who are 'already in a state of castration' cannot disavow phallic 
presence. This is why the main narrative is deemed masculine; in addition, it provides space for the 
identification with the ego ideal, which further demonstrates her dependence upon the mirror phase, 
reflecting the conception/recognition of the ego. Filmic structures thus give the (male) spectator the 
pleasure of omnipotence. The male star personifies the more perfect, more complete, more powerful 
ideal ego. He is never the object of the erotic gaze; he is never iconic, unlike woman. Here we see the 
uncritical use of the female body as castrated. This needs to be critically addressed and the relation to 
the corporeal tackled - the female body is the male body minus the penis. Moreover, no attention is 
paid to the shift from the male - a pre-discursive entity - to the cultural inscribed masculine
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spectatorial position. If sexing the body is a discursive process, then these elements need to be 
problematised.
The process of objectification, which fetishises the female body, provides an avenue of escape 
for men from the fear of castration; therefore they cannot transcend it. Castration does not act upon 
woman's psyche as a threat but as a real lack of her penis. The desire to make good that lack makes the 
phallus symbolic: 'she is said to speak of castration and nothing else'. This inability to transcend the 
castration complex means the woman is rendered 'other', bound by symbolic order in which man can 
live out his fantasies through the linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of the 
woman.
Mulvey's original piece, by instituting a generalised dichotomy of the active/passive structure, 
identifies the negation of female spectatorship contained within realist film. The polemic of her 
analysis establishes the masochistic nature of feminine desire constituted through the identification 
between woman and the objectified woman on the screen. In 'Afterthoughts...inspired by Duel in the 
Surf (in Easthope: 1993), Mulvey begins to explore whether the female spectator can experience a 
deeper, more complex relationship to the filmic text, and whether there is a substantial change in 
spectatorship with a woman lead. However, Mulvey makes it explicit that she has a particular spectator 
in mind, namely one who is 'masculinised and is secretly enjoying the freedom, action and control over 
the diegetic world that identification with the hero provides' (Mulvey:1993:126).
Mulvey draws upon the inherent instability of femininity, which is said to be a direct 
consequence of a woman's inability to fully resolve the Oedipal and castration complexes: femininity 
as a subject position is produced by the condition of being 'castrated', therefore the feminine cannot 
develop fully the regulative function of the super-ego. This is ambiguous: is the state of castration 
metaphoric or the real psychic determination of the feminine? Freud describes the woman's 
recognition of castration as an awareness of her wound of narcissism. This produces a sense of 
inferiority: the clitoris is likened to a scar. I argue that this presents the feminine with three structurally 
determined options:
1. If she holds her mother responsible for her castration and her lack, this will cause her to despise 
women as men do, which makes her neurotic and inhibited (defined as pathological);
2. She can refuse to abandon the pleasure of the active clitoris, the amputated penis, but must remain 
masculine (defined as pathological);
3. By exploiting the passive elements of her instinctual drives (reflecting that bodies have the propensity 
for both the masculine and the feminine) she can transfer her sexual attentions from her mother to her 
father, first wanting his phallus and then analogously his baby, thus requiring the transfer of pleasure 
to the vagina (defined as normal).
Therefore in seeking out the masculinised woman in 'Duel in the Sun', Mulvey is exploring a female 
protagonist who has no stable sexual identity. The feminine subject is seemingly resistant to the 
Oedipal norm, torn between passive femininity and regressive masculinity. This is played out through 
her position as determined by her two brothers: passive femininity is established through the brother
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who has fully resolved the Oedipal complex, satisfied with his heterosexual object choice and marriage, 
with the Symbolic at his disposal; regressive masculinity is explored through the brother who struggles 
against the Symbolic and revels narcissistically in the desire to embody phallic omnipotence. Thus the 
female protagonist must oscillate between her acceptance of her 'correct' feminine position, via the 
first brother as object-choice, and her narcissistic brother who guarantees her resistance to femininity. 
Already, the pre-Oedipal is being drawn upon. Her inability to follow one of the paths fully, to achieve 
a stable sexual identity25, is said to reflect the positioning of a certain female spectator, namely the type 
who relinquishes femininity and engages in the masculinisation of identification. Here is another 
example of the confusion regarding the corporeal. She describes the spectator, which is a social entity, 
as female and yet uses female in the sense of the objective category of sex (Delphy: 1996).
Psychically, oscillation draws upon the inherent instability of the feminine by returning to the 
active phallic stage before its repression. The 'lack' of the penis renders the feminine unstable because 
she lacks the necessary capacity for psychic resolution that the castration complex provides. This 
reflects the positioning of the female spectator, for if she is to receive pleasure she must also engage in the 
masculinisation of identification. If a woman is to access this desire in the language of the text, she must 
oscillate uneasily in her 'borrowed transvestite clothes'. Hence, Mulvey's interest in the 'Duel...' lies in 
what she describes as a 'series of transformations that comment upon the function of "woman" (as opposed 
to "man") as a narrative signifier and sexual difference as personification of "active" or "passive" elements 
in a story' (Mulvey, in Easthope: 1993:129). Combining of the Lacanian model of the subject and the filmic 
form works to give desire cultural materiality by inscribing desire in the language of the text. Yet, the terms 
are all over the place, with corporeal and the cultural used interchangeably - is the absence of the penis an 
instance of real lack?
To reiterate, the Oedipal complex offers three options, two of which are pathological, offering 
only temporary transgression's from the passivity of heterosexual femininity. The concept of oscillation 
encapsulates this by defining the feminine as open, since she is unstable because she cannot frilly resolve 
the Oedipal complex. I suggest that this reflects the normative order of psychoanalysis insofar as the 
feminine is not properly formed, which directly invokes the dichotomous order that defines the masculine 
with Reason. Thus, the formation of heterosexual femininity is defined by the absence of active desire. 
Only within the masculine are the residues of active phallic26 desire to be found, therefore showing how 
fully operative the phallocratic logic is. The dualism of subject/otyect is being re-inscribed into the 
explanation, and is thus failing to operate outside of terms that are said to contribute to the subordination of 
women.
DEVELOPMENTS OF MULVEY'S PARADIGM
Doane's work further contributed to the dichotomy of the feminine as passive by adding the 
iconic to it. The conceptualisation of'femininity as iconic' is defined as the "over presence of the image -
25 If she is already in the state of castration, and thus cannot fear the law, then her patterns of desire are 
more free not less surely? What threat prevents transgression of the already castrated body?.
26 Note that this ought also to imply the clitoris, but this element is left out when the 'phallic feminine' 
is discussed.
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she is the image." (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn: 1992:223) Theoretically, Doane supports this assertion by 
drawing upon what she describes as the significant degree of congruence between certain theories of 
images and theories of femininity. Doane argues, following Freud, that woman is too close to herself and, 
hence, she is unable to establish a critical distance between herself and her image that enables her to 
achieve a 'second look'. This closeness is likened to the closeness of iconic sign systems, for unlike 
language where a superior distance is created between the signifier and the referent, the iconic cannot 
disengage itself sufficiently from the real. Thus, woman is a writing in images, but a writing that is not for 
her, only of her. Woman cannot mobilise the gap or distance that voyeurism requires. The proximity 
between femininity and image is a direct result of the immediacy of knowledge that the little girl gains 
upon the sight of the male anatomy. 'Freud claims that the little girl, upon seeing the penis for the first time, 
"makes her judgement in a flash'. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it. 
(Doane in Caughie and Kuhn: 1992:223).27 This writing of images assigns a special place for woman in the 
cinematic form and representation while denying her access to that system. Again, there are issues about 
what the subjectivity is. Is the corporeal involved at all? If so, what are the consequences to describe the 
feminine as the image? This seems to me to be moving further away from a model that seeks to explore the 
cultural inscription of the body. Instead, it feels more like the disembodied 'signifying interior' that 
Berthelot (1995) identifies. This model moves ambiguously between the fleshy penis and the symbolic 
phallus; consequently, is castrated feminine the state of woman? If so, what lies behind this construction? 
From where or how do they gain the critical distance for their analysis? Something that lingers beneath the 
constructed perhaps? If their model is to move into the analysis of the formation of the subject, then I 
suggest that they ought to address these issues.
This shifts language from being the Master of subjectivity to being the tool of the Masculine 
Master. Hence, Doane follows Mulvey in arguing that the masculinising of the female spectatorial position 
through the process of oscillation is necessary if Woman is to gain access to the cinematic pleasures. 
Hence, the feminine proximity to her own body, the image of the body on screen, can only remind her of 
her castration that cannot be fetishised away. Doane is arguing that the dual effect of the sublimation and 
repression of femininity has come to determine the cinematic form, both in the plot and the mise-en-scene, 
which psychically re-enacts the dual effect, placing the feminine figure in situations of fetishistic 
idealisation or voyeuristic punishment. The moment of knowledge for the girl is the initial sight of genital 
difference and, therefore, Doane is not theoretically floored, in psychoanalytic terms, in developing the 
notion of femininity as iconic. The nexus of recognition that defines femininity is not signified in language 
at all because only masculinity can achieve that essential distance to enter the Symbolic and language; the 
Symbolic (or socially sanctioned) order is again masculine. Thus the structural logic orders the feminine 
with the passive and now the iconic. This merely extends the dualistic logic and further condemns the 
feminine to the passive. Where fluidity is integrated, it exists only insofar as unconscious desire shifts
27 This draws directly upon Freud's analysis of the constitution of femininity within the girl child. In 
contradistinction, the little boy considers his first sight of female genitalia as insignificant. Only with the 
threat of castration does he re-read the image he has seen and endow it with a meaning in relation to his 
own subjectivity. The boy experiences a distance between the look and the threat, and thus his knowledge 
is achieved through that all important distance. The gap between the visible and the knowable enables him 
to disavow what he has seen and enables him to fetishise what is fearful later on in adult life.
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between the structural positions. Moreover, this fluidity stems directly from the inability of the feminine to 
form a stable subject position. Hence, this merely reasserts the logic of the phallocratic dualism.
Thus, Doane extends Mulvey's position regarding the instability of femininity: by mobilising 
this instability, woman is able to use femininity as if it were a mask. Riviere's (1929) case study of an 
intellectual woman showed that in order to compensate for her assumption of the position of the subject 
(masculine, according to the binary opposition) of discourse rather than its object, she had produced 
herself as an excess of femininity. 28 Doane sees masquerade as a method whereby the woman can 
achieve some distance, or 'a simulation of the missing gap or distance' (1991). The masquerade is 
described as being subversive in its ability to use the space available to destabilise the male gaze by 
destabilising the image, but it is not an escape because it is a 'pathological response', according to the 
Symbolic order. It renders the image, femininity, as artifice. Lacan suggests the instability of 
femininity, its pathological elements, leads to women experiencing desire in a mediated form as 'desire 
for the unsatisfied desire', while Doane coins the phrase 'the desire to desire' (1991). As Butler notes, 
resistance, through masquerade, is an ambiguous experience, in the sense that the simulation Doane 
alludes to is partial and temporary, therefore is not a subject position as such, but rather a transgression 
that is always melancholic (Butler: 1990:104-05).29 It also brings to mind Irigaray who attempts to 
imagine a femininity that would emerge in a language that was not of the Masculine Master, but rather 
would let the female body speak (1985a,b). While offering varied critiques of patriarchy, their 
emphasis upon language, as structure, leaves little outside of discourse. Increasingly, the body is known 
only as a discursive product. How do they achieve the distance to develop such a position within 
language?
The detailed discussion of these two highly influential writers shows how the narrative is 
defined as masculine: only the masculine can assume the position of activity in order to drive the 
narrative forward; conversely, the feminine subject position provided by the narrative institutes a 
spectatorial position that is masochistic and pathological in orientation. 30 Moreover, the iconic status of 
the feminine renders the active female spectator a mere simulated, masculinised position.
Other writers have attempted to correct the feminine as passive but because they remain 
within the psychoanalytic paradigm, this is limited to expanding other subject positions, notably the 
homoerotic. It therefore stays firmly within the existing paradigm. This entails two distinct avenues: 
first, by turning to the specific pleasures that women can gain from the images of women; second, by 
attending to the various modes by which 'masculine as active' is constructed. Byars (1991) and Stacey 
(1988; 1995), for example, turn to Chodorow (1978), while Studlar (1991) turns to Deleuze as a 
potential source of pleasure, which necessarily entails accepting the feminine as a fetishistic object. 
Others, like Erens (1990), Seneca and Arbuthnot (in Erens) examine the pleasures of the subtext. Re- 
examining the 'masculine as active', but still within structural categories, includes the possibility that 
the male body may be erotica!ly encoded, which institutes subversive subject positions. Neale (1992),
28 Note also that the notion of transgression as a form of resistance is also limited because to transgress 
is implicitly to re-affirm the institutional isation of the Law.
29 Note also that the extent to which transgression is temporary is revealed by its reaffirmation of the
law.
30 1 refer back to Freud's model that only passive femininity is normal.
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for example, argues that this cannot be adequately attended to without looking at how the 'masculine as 
active' functions visually. My interest concerns the scope of this model to integrate, or at best offer a 
theoretical space for, an active heterosexual pattern of feminine desire. However, before I turn attention 
to this, I briefly discuss the structural relationship between the feminine subject position and the 
feminine (homoerotic) image.
THE PLEASURE OF THE (FEMININE) TEXT OR THE WITHDRAWAL INTO THE PRE- 
OEDIPAL
The central facet of this alternative approach stems from the narrative structure of melodrama. 
Byars (1991), for instance, argues that the female-centred narrative, when combined with a distinct 
mode of camera work, produces points of view that provide specific and positive expressions of female 
desire. This structure operates in two ways: first, it is assumed that they are watched by an all-female 
audience; second, the emotional intimacy played out between the characters stimulates 'feminine 
connectedness'. 31 The ordering of desire that is produced by same-gender exchanges produces an 
outlook based upon its relationship with the other rather than disconnected to it. This sense of 
interconnection with others is reflected in the narratives of melodrama. Melodrama draws upon the 
remnants of the feminine attachment to the mother, left over from her tenuous resolution of Oedipus 
complex. The recognition evoked by the women on the screen produces pleasure that can be considered 
a specific form of female gratification constructed out of the dominatory formations of the family. 
Identification between subject and text remains vital to the analysis. This is why I argue that the mirror 
phase, instituted by Mulveyian paradigm, maintains its centrality. Moreover, by turning to 
'connectedness', Byars seeks to utilise a distinct pattern of desire derived from within the pre-Oedipal. 
However, this leaves intact the hierarchies of the Oedipal order that has locked the feminine to 
'connectedness', that is, the connection between subject and Mother as one, into the pre-Oedipal in the 
first place.
Arbuthnot and Seneca (1990) examine the capacity for these texts to be read against the grain. 
The chosen text is Gentlemen Prefer Blondes. While they recognise that the surface of the story 
concerns the quest to find a husband, the main characters are independent and strong, and the 
exchanges between them reveal a subtext in which they struggle to maintain their intimacy and resist 
male objectification. For example, while Monroe and Russell are constructed as objects for the male 
gaze, nevertheless, they always defy the objectification by staring back, assessing the potential 'market' 
of husbands. However, this assessment is done with solidarity and genuine affection; they point to their 
tactile intimacy. Moreover, the primacy of this affection is secured by the double wedding. This 
closure, they argue, secures their relationship and thus makes this film feminist via its subtext. 
Therefore the pleasure is derived from reading against the grain. Yet, this marks a return to models of 
thought that Mulvey sought to correct: if reading against the grain is that 'easy', then representation 
ceases to be of such a central concern.
31 This draws upon Chodorow's reconfiguration of Freudianism, as well as potentially integrating the 
concept of jouissance by reflecting that the feminine is less individualised that the masculine.
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Stacey also looks at the desiring interactions between two females. In 'Desperately Seeking 
the Spectator' (1988), Stacey examines the fixation by a housewife upon the formidable counterpart in 
the film 'Desperately Seeking Susan'. The anchor is derived from the housewife's assumption of her 
'mirror image', brought to life by Susan; narratively conveyed through memory loss. In return, Susan, 
in seeking to identify her impostor, occupies the domestic sphere from which the housewife has taken 
flight. The narrative concludes when the two characters are finally united. Most importantly of all, this 
resolution is not accompanied by violent termination of one or both characters. Stacey argues that such 
a narrative fundamentally undermines masculinisation by centralising the lesbian basis of desire. 
Therefore, the narrative and visual codes do not allow pure identification or erotic codes of one or other 
- the exchange exists between the feminine. However, whether this overcomes the problems posed 
remains uncertain. First, it remains unclear to what extent Susan is in fact the mirror image since the 
housewife uses Susan as an avenue of escape, not identification. Second, it centres on the potential for 
lesbian-based desire between women which has had its pathological elements ejected, replaced by a 
somewhat Utopian bond. Third, the centrality of Madonna as Susan locates the film within a wider 
cultural terrain, at a time when she was intensely heterosexual. It remains to be seen whether the 
foreground given to the subversive readings maintains the political momentum that initiated the 
examination of the relationship between representation and the social order in the first place. Does it 
not in fact suggest that patriarchy is quite a different entity if so many plural positions, readings and 
pleasures are possible? Perhaps we ought to be thinking more carefully about who are doing these 
readings (Hermes: 1995).
There are a number of points that need to be raised at this point:
1. The notion of the subtext is introducing an empirical subject through the back door because
different interpretive elements are being brought to bear that fall outside the psychoanalytic remit;
2. Moreover, the clash between the empirical and the unconscious is more evident when the potential 
for the homoerotic is pitted against a 'star' with a specific and, in this case, explicit heterosexual 
persona;
3. Yet these manoeuvres do not deconstruct the phallocratic binary but instead they retreat into a 
Utopian sense of the connectedness developed from the normative departure. They are merely 
championing what is usually dis-privileged. This invokes tfce second tenet of liberalism: 'different 
but equal', which fails to undermine the phallocratic order implicit within it (see Heckman's 
application of Gadamer here: 1990:16);
4. It still empirically blocks active heterosexual femininity, since the structural regime remains intact.
Cowie equally seeks to move away from what she argues is a premature foreclosure of the 
Imaginary. The Imaginary fixes the subject but it is also the point at which a central mis-recognition 
takes place. The outcome is that the subject is never fully fixed and so the subject is able to mobilise 
this instability in fantasy. 32 Thus, the mise-en-scene of desire can produce multiple places for the 
subject of the fantasy and for the viewing subject, who, through identification, may similarly take up
! Cowie is equally drawing upon Lacan and Rodowick (1982).
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any of these multiple positions. These may be defined as active, passive, masculine, feminine, parent or 
child, mother or daughter, father or son. Cowie argues that the complex of identifications arising for the 
subject are a result of the castration complex, but that Oedipal relations are not determined by active 
and passive aims, instead they emerge as passive or active as a result of exigencies of the subject. 
Cowie in effect asserts that, within the unconscious formation of fantasy, the subject can assume any 
subject position, thus the feminine is able to oscillate within the unconscious so that desire can assume 
multiple forms. However, Doane (1989) counters this by arguing that if pleasures within fantasy are 
accessible and multiple, despite the patriarchal nature of much of the imagery, there remains little for 
feminism to critique. She argues that feminising (the position) must deal with the constraints and 
restraints of reading with respect to sexual identities - in effect, the question of power and its textual 
manifestations resides with the closure of these free forms of fantasy. Cowie's position not only places 
the (constructed) subject in a spurious position, but it also effectively forecloses both the necessity and 
possibility of feminist critique.
Each time, the feminist model develops more complex models to 'find' feminine desire, while 
remaining silent about an obvious source, namely the erotic images of men. Does this open up patterns 
of meaning that secure different identifications? Apparently not. Moreover, Cowie leaves us with 
nothing other than a retreat into the unconscious, which negates the conscious level of existence, 
namely, the patriarchal order which is the source of the problem in the first place. The corporeal body 
is rapidly being replaced by a cluster of desire that moves between subject positions defined by 
representation, and yet sex as an objective category continues to be utilised in order to make the 
'subject position' coherent and to remind us of the object being represented.
THE CODING OF THE MALE BODY AND ITS PROPENSITY FOR PLEASURE
I begin with Neale's 'Masculinity and Spectacle'. 33 Neale turns his attention to the various 
codes that produce the male body as an erotic spectacle through the use of close-ups. He argues that the 
male gaze is turned upon the male protagonist who incites narcissistic identification through the 
fantasies of power, omnipotence, mastery and control. Therefore, the close-up triggers desiring 
patterns in the male viewer. The central figure remains the male hero, upon whose will or project the 
external world can impose no limits. Neale argues that narcissism is integral to the fantasies produced 
by the narrative and its source is the exhibition of the phallic power displayed by the body in action. 
Most importantly, the close-ups concentrate upon the body in action, in movement, that is, as the 
embodiment of power. Thus, the narcissistic identification with a hero is a strategy of fantastic 
identification with the power of the phallus, which the male lacks. Note that this position is 
fundamentally different to that of the female because feminine narcissism is pathological, because its 
source of the desire is produced through identification with the passive object on screen. Also, the 
codes used to make the body erotic are fundamentally different from the feminine because they remain 
bound to producing the male body in action.
33 See also Jon Stratton (1996) Nixon (1996)
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By implication, an additional dimension to the pleasures experienced is the repressed 
homoerotic desire satisfied by the erotic codification of the male body. Neale argues that the repression 
of any explicit avowal of eroticism in the act of looking at the male is structurally linked to a narrative 
content marked by sadomasochistic fantasies and scenes. The organisation of fetishistic desire dictates 
that the male spectator will desire to internalise, consume and possess the phallus. In essence, the male 
body must be combined with violent action in order to assist the disavowal. He concludes by arguing 
that, given that the central spectatorial axis is organised for the male, it is necessarily the case that the 
relationship between the spectator and mainstream cinema is repressed and disavowed. If not, 
mainstream cinema is faced with the spectre of invoking homosexual desire.
Combining the erotic spectacle of the male body to narrative control by the masculine subject 
leads Neale to argue that the female spectator still cannot look directly. Again, women must experience 
their desire in a mediated form in order to make good that lack. Any desire that is contained within the film 
tends to be built up around the diegetic ambiguities between the male protagonists using masculine body 
codes of representation that are implicitly homoerotic. So, men can be sexual spectacles to women in 
certain instances, but only via implicitly homoerotic spectacles. Once again, if the female experiences 
actively-structured desire, she must assume the masculine subject position and thus undergo oscillation.
Alternatively, argues Neale, the male body can be feminised in order to incite the repressed 
homoerotic desire in men. He singles out Rock Hudson as the object of an erotic look in films usually 
identified as being aimed at the female audience. He gives an example of a scene in which Rock Hudson is 
framed in a doorway, caught with his shirt off. However, Neale argues that Hudson is not masculine in his 
moments of eroticism for women, but rather has become feminised, has adopted the feminine 'object' 
position. In this approach, the man must undergo an act of oscillation to become feminised so that he can 
become passive. The character/actor/body is secondary to the structures into which they are inserted, no 
matter how improbable the structures may be. Neale argues, in confirmation of Mulvey's perspective, that 
the codes of eroticism are such that 'only women can function as the objects of an explicitly erotic gaze" 
(Neale: 1992:286). The commitment to the structural order persists despite a growing number of examples 
that appear manifestly to contradict the Symbolic order. This requires ever more complex layers of theory 
to reorientate or, perhaps, contort the meanings to fit the structural order. I will show that such gymnastics 
are repeated in order to a) maintain the central axis of the active/passive dichotomy and b) impose the 
number of subject positions from which the inferences regarding the formation of subjectivity can be 
drawn.
Alternatively, one can turn to Finch's (1990) development of gay pleasures from programmes 
organised along a heterosexist diegesis. Addressing the convention that defines melodrama as a 
feminine genre, Finch asks whether the male viewer can occupy the feminine subject position in order 
to access the desire organised by a feminine textual form, namely, take the male as an object of desire. 
Hence, he must implicitly attend to whether oscillation is necessary for a male viewer to gain pleasure 
for a narrative such as Dynasty. My interest stems from whether the absence of the masculine narrative 
drive where action is controlled by the male lead allows access for feminine desire. Finch develops the 
nature of the address by introducing a negotiation between 'textual subject place' and the 'spectatorial 
social position'. This is explored in two ways: first, by assessing the subject positions constructed by
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the diegesis; second, through the empirical considerations of how the gay audience use camp to queer 
their viewing. Having established that the melodrama is on the surface aimed at women, he queries the 
capacity of Dynasty to operate directly for women's pleasure. This is partly attended to via his analysis 
of hyper-realism of the narrative drive, which blocks the usual structures of identification. 34 For 
example, the character Fallen nearly dies several times, and when she is finally dead, doubt is re- 
introduced because the body cannot be identified, leaving open the possibility of her return once more. 
Most importantly, Finch established that, contrary to filmic conventions, men are in the state of undress 
in Dynasty, not women, yet he rebuffs resolutely the notion that this establishes the male body as an 
object of erotic consumption by women; such an assumption is defined as 'naive' (1990:68).
Finch argues that Mulvey's model explains the various modes through which the codification 
of the body is produced, especially the use of fragmentation and fetishisation. However, his emphasis 
upon the spectatorial social position would apparently lead him to reject the way she maps pleasure. In 
this way, he argues that the pleasure that women gain from Dynasty is not from erotic contemplation, 
but from the mirroring of the codification practices so that men's bodies are treated in the same way as 
women's. He rejects the idea that heterosexual women can experience an active desire from men who 
are 'caught in moments of undress'. Therefore, the exposure and eroticisation of the male body can be 
dealt with only through the gay man's position.
Finch identifies the weaknesses of Mulvey's position as the initial negation of a distinct 
address to women within the woman's genre and the exclusion of extra-textual constructions by the 
spectator, especially in the determination of sexuality. Usually, when women are eroticised textually, 
lesbian and heterosexual male spectators are most easily accommodated. The lesbian's transgression, 
achieved through oscillation, is blurred by the fit of conspiring in the eroticisation of heroines, 
alongside the masculine spectator. Hence, the lesbian develops the modes of address to access the 
erotic construction of the feminine. He follows the logic of the Mulveyian paradigm by arguing that
for the female heterosexual spectators, a non-masculine position is an impossible one, for 
along with gay men, they have to work to convert the hero's actions into spectacle. But 
women are not trained15 to objectify bodies as men are, which implies that Dynasty's 
codification of men along a Playgirl/Cosmopolitan discourse enables a gay erotic gaze at men 
through the relay of a woman's look....... [I]n a hierarchy of erotic pleasure, the gay male
spectator who occupies a culturally constituted feminine position is perhaps the one for whom 
the (erotic) system works. (Finch: 1990:69) (my italics)
This produces a somewhat anomalous outcome: despite the overt heterosexism of the diegesis, as Finch 
identifies through his analysis of the surface liberalism introduced through the characters' exchanges, 
the most problematic formation of desire is for women looking at the men's bodies, even though they 
are manifestly on display, and a direct outcome of that very narrative. I argue that it is only if the
34 Note that this point reveals the broader acceptance of the Mulveyian paradigm.
35 Read socialisation?
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organisation of desire, as defined by Mulvey, is assumed to operate can Finch state that it is the gay 
male who has the most ready access to the codification of the male body.
Finch and Neale examine the codification of men with the aim of tracing the potential for a 
homosexual gaze of men by men. However, despite considering the feminine subject position, neither 
can provide access to the male body from the feminine subject position. Others have sought to correct 
this by taking up the issue of masochism introduced by Rodowick (1982). Each time, new levels of 
complexity are engaged with in order to 'find' pleasures that are blocked because of the ways in which 
they have defined the Symbolic and its structural organisation of identity. Moreover, because these 
structures are primary to the formation of the subject, they cannot look directly to what the subject 
might do. They have excluded the possibility of action from the frame, and thus must look to 
unconscious circuits of desire to find something other than total domination - except, of course, if the 
subject identifies with feminine heterosexuality, when she must resign herself to the desire for desire.
Studlar (1991) draws upon the pairing of fetishistic scopophilia with masochism36 by 
juxtaposing the identification of the masculine spectator with the hero who has diegetic control over the 
action with the subject position produced when the narrative does not create control over the object. 
Usually, the masculine character carries the narrative forward through his command of the objects and 
events, thus serving both the male gaze and the narcissistic desire of the ego-ideal. However, when the 
narrative is not driven by the command of the hero/ego-ideal, the subject position produced is 
masochistic because it signals the inability to ensure that control of the sexual object/woman. Studlar is 
keen to avoid the implied positioning of the woman in the sadistic role and thus turns to Deleuzian 
notions of masochism because it locates masochistic desire back into the pre-patriarchal symbiosis of 
plenitude between the mother and child. 37
In effect, Studlar's model removes the necessity for the mediation of the male gaze and thus 
establishes a direct look between the woman-to-woman gaze, invoking pre-Oedipal, and thus non- 
patriarchal sexual pleasure. Studlar concludes that:
Although Dietrich may be constructed according to a masochistic male gaze, the absence of 
male mediation of the look, as well as the sexual ambiguity of Dietrich's erotic image, 
encourage a female looking that defies heterosexual norms and the accepted 
dominance/submission agenda of patriarchal sexual poetics. The mechanisms of masochism 
disturb the power of the 'phallic' gaze to create space for an erotically charged female gaze 
fixed on the woman star. The result is a system of looking that elicits both the female 
spectatorial identification with and desire for the powerful femme fatale. (Studlar: 1991:248)
36 Studlar is also drawing upon Rodowick here.
37 Within Deleuzian psychodynamics, the masochistic unconscious fantasy aims to disavow the father, 
thereby re-instituting the connections with the all powerful pre-Oedipal mother. Therefore, unlike the 
sadist who pursues Oedipal negation of the mother through her destruction, the masochist idealises her, 
submits to her so that he can be punished by her thereby symbolically punishing and denying the father 
in himself. The rejection of the father within himself is simultaneously the rejection of phallic 
sexuality.
37
The structural determination of the subject/object relations and the positioning of subjectivity it forms 
categorically block any consideration of the positioning of the male star in Marlene Dietrich's films. 
Hence, there is little consideration of the erotic potential of Gary Cooper in Morocco. Where he is 
discussed, his visual codification is defined as feminised. Therefore, if the female viewer is to access 
Cooper erotically, and if she is to 'remain' feminine, she can do so only by accessing the 'pathological' 
patterns of self-objectification. Alternatively, the female viewer can submit to the filmic form, undergo 
oscillation and access Cooper from the masculinised position. Yet, despite the introduction of the 
Deleuzian twist, the structural determination persists. Again, the turn to pre-Oedipal does not disrupt 
the categorical order, but rather introduces ever greater contortionist moves in the endeavour to find a 
way out of categorical determination of the subject position that defines the feminine as passive.
Ultimately, the turn to Deleuziuan analysis merely emphasises the pre-Oedipal elements of 
psychic formation, which leaves the Oedipal operations intact. I argue that this reflects the broader 
political normative position: Deleuze's revolutionary position seeks to find a space through which the 
domination of the Oedipal organisation can be undermined; in contrast, Lacan and Freud look to the 
formation of psychic energies that supports the current order. The oedipalisation of desire, with the 
concomitant organisation of subject positions by the Symbolic, is always put beyond question by this 
model. Thus, to accept the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity is necessarily to accept the emphatic 
subordination of the feminine because psychoanalytic applications cannot escape the primary and 
privileged status of the phallus/penis. The dispute rests with the normative evaluations made of the 
various levels of the psyche; is the inculcation of the social order necessary to avoid the destruction of 
unlimited desire?38 1 draw parallels with the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism here 
because, in my view, their mutual reliance upon the Oedipal complex, recast as a structuralist 
operation, necessarily produces these various closures brought about by the structuralist determinism 
upon which they rely.
Another strategy to wrest Mulvey's paradigm away from these closures is offered by Lewis 
and Rolley (1997). In '(Ad)dressing the Dyke: Lesbian looks and lesbians looking', they trace the 
possible lesbian visual pleasures offered by fashion imagery in a field of cultural production that targets 
exclusively the female and overtly heterosexual audience of 'Cosmopolitan' magazine. Their aim is to 
explore critically the convention of understanding the process of women's consumption of images as 
one in which women passively identify with the 'woman-as-sign,', subjected to the active male gaze. 
They contest the over-simplification of the forms of identification and desire inherent within Mulvey's 
initial theorisation, suggesting that it can be re-configured, by differentiating "desiring to be' from 
'desiring to have", thereby introducing new identifications.
This is explored via women's capacity to assess other women's bodies developed by the use 
of women's magazines. They argue that the effectiveness of the image is dependent upon a sexual 
exchange of looks between the photographer, mostly male, and the female model and is initially 
structured by a heterosexual exchange. This implicitly references the assumption that the manifest
38 This reflects the continued engagement with the Hobbesian problem of the social order.
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features of the image will 'obviously' be those that objectify the female model for the male gaze.39 Yet 
it is known to be consumed only by women, that the female model's desiring looks are consumed by 
women. This emphasises that the images and the codifications that aim to incite sexual desire are 
constructed with women in mind; the heterosexual pitch is thus marginalised. The lesbian is able to 
draw upon the codes in themselves, alongside the knowledge of other lesbian readership and 
community. In contradistinction, the heterosexual woman has to relocate her gaze back into the 
broader structures that codify the woman's body ultimately intended for the male gaze and thus 
identification must take place among erotically charged images. Again, the broader location of the 
psychoanalytic model is central, for it offers a means to treat as secondary the empirical or conscious 
identification replacing them with 'real' lesbian identifications.
This is theoretically substantiated by the core concept of distanciation, understood as dealing 
with both objectification and narcissism. First, it is concerned with the distancing from the male gaze 
that objectifies and implicitly dehumanises the woman represented. Thus, the core structural position, 
namely the passive objectification of the woman in the image, remains of integral importance. Second, 
it addresses the over-identification that organises the relationship between the female viewer and the 
image. Ultimately, if she is to remain a part of her conscious identification, the female viewer must 
place the image and its associated desires back into the heterosexist logic that orders the representation. 
Only then can she negate the problematisation of her sexuality inherent with women looking at women. 
She imagines herself into the position of the model and thus projects herself as the passive object of 
(male) desire. The structural operations work to ensure that the female gaze is defined as masochistic 
because she submits to the objectification by which her subject position is defined. Therefore, from the 
heterosexual feminine identification position, the woman can desire only to be the passive object, 
which suggests that Doane's dictum, 'to desire to desire', remains pertinent. The objectification in her 
case is complete for she can desire only to be the object of desire. The central point of differentiation 
between this and the lesbian gaze is that the latter can encompass the tabooed position denied the 
heterosexual woman because the lesbian is able to embrace the desire to have the woman. Moreover, it 
reflects also the narcissistic desire of the active stage; implicitly, the subject position is both active and 
masculine. This illustrates the primacy of the psychoanalytic theory to their model of subjectivity.
However, the feminist normative position leads Rolley and Lewis to seek an escape from the 
pathology assigned to the (heterosexual) female viewer. Hence, their argument is forced to make 
another turn. Despite defining this relationship as psychic fantasy, they must reintroduce the conscious 
level in order to redefine the heterosexual woman's pattern of desire as lesbian, thereby ejecting the 
pathological elements. This is achieved by emphasising the empirical context of a fashion magazine 
where the viewer is known to be almost always female. Since the image is produced for women's 
magazines, Lewis and Rolley argue that this viewing context undermines the heterosexual fantasy 
because the model is knowingly looked at by other women. The conscious knowledge of who 'owns' 
the gaze secures the pleasure as lesbian: the narcissistic projection of the self as the model, coupled
39 Again, this means that the images in general circulation will be marked overtly by the gendered 
active/passive dichotomy.
40 This seems to me to be rather important insofar as it introduces the issue that meanings are derived 
from practice, in this case lesbian practice, and it is here where their efficacy is derived.
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with the desire to be loved as that object/model, is undertaken even when the (empirical) viewer is 
'known' to be a woman. They are able to conclude that the pleasures gleaned from women's magazines 
are lesbian in structure by reproducing the conscious level, thereby negating the dubious political 
consequences of the unconscious operations of the heterosexual feminine subject position.
Stacey (1995) offers another example of the clash between the empirical and the unconscious. 
She attempts to synthesise the empirical descriptions of the pleasures women experienced when 
watching Hollywood melodrama with the deeper psychoanalytic identifications. The outcome is that 
the two elements of the book remain thoroughly disconnected insofar as she fails to relate or integrate 
the unconscious subject positions to the actual explanations given by the women interviewed. This is 
important for were one to provide some empirical evidence, confined as they be must within conscious 
utterances, these would be dismissed for they fail to fit with the 'real' unconscious structures. For 
example, public utterances of active female heterosexual ity found in many problem pages, in 
'Cosmopolitan' for example, would not be read literally but as utterances that disguise the actual source 
of the desire as defined by the primary axes within the unconscious. Interpellation and the mirror phase 
define how the subject is constituted. The Symbolic is ordered by the Phallus, therefore active feminine 
sexuality is not possible. Once constructed, the subject is fixed and thus the Phallic symbol must reign, 
which renders the model ahistorical. The Symbolic constitutes a re-presentation. This axis constitutes 
the subject and thus is awarded primacy over utterance.
In summation, we find the same problems reappearing:
1. When is the empirical or conscious feature to be treated 'as it is' and not a deeper unconscious 
substitution? The problem of dealing with the empirical leads postmodernism/feminism to talk of 
'women as women'.
2. The structural order is sustained so that the subject position is also sustained. Psychoanalysis can 
be used in this way as the base to imply the actual desire of the subjects and the identifications 
formed.
3. However, this ensures the continued negation of the active feminine heterosexual desire: it does 
not exist because it is always redefined as another psychic position.
I suggest that active heterosexuality simply cannot remain a subject position known only through 
negation, never embodied or lived within the practice of heterosexuality (Jackson: 1995). Moreover, I 
argue that this emerges as a problem only if one fails to recognise that the 'Masculine heterosexual 
Master' is an ideological fiction just as the absolute negation of active heterosexual femininity is. I 
argue that this negation is upheld only to sustain a political agenda that seems hell bent on ensuring that 
patriarchy, as a system that structures the psyche as well as defining the language system in its entirety, 
dominates at all time, so much so that Harbord and Campbell, for example, are prepared to reject both 
materialism and reason as the illusions of such a master. I suggest that this is an inevitable outcome of 
embedding subjectivity within a psychoanalytic paradigm, particularly when the sole emphasis is 
placed upon identification.
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THE PRESENTATIONAL FEATURES OF THE MALE PIN-UP
In contradistinction, I argue that any empirical examples that unambiguously and 
unquestioningly present an erotic masculine/male figure must present problems for the dichotomous 
logic I have critiqued. I turn therefore to Dyer (1992) who presents a direct analysis of male images. 
Dyer addresses the block between the heterosexual woman and the male body. What makes Dyer's 
article of particular interest is his attention to the empirical evidence of the way in which looks are 
produced and situated in the context of an interaction. If, asks he, the interaction between the viewer of 
the image and the subject of the image is constituted through power, how exactly is the relationship 
within the interaction played out?
Dyer argues that women do look at men, which is at least a break with the structurally led 
categorical ism that defines the Mulveyian paradigm, and singles out the male pin-up model and the 
male 'star' as two key instances. The images of male stars are defined by a certain instability, 
particularly when model is encoded as sexual spectacle because sexual objectification of men by 
women is a violation of the codifications that differentiate the male from the female. He argues that the 
codification is altered through the personalisation of the mode. By this, Dyer means that each star has 
his own look defining how his presentation is to be viewed. Therefore, he centres his analysis on how 
the model organises the looking axis while he is being photographed.
The first codification traces that men do not look modestly away (Berger: 1972), but rather 
look up and off from within their position in the visual environment. Looking off outside the 
photographic frame, Dyer argues, signifies the lofty heights of the soul and intellect, something that the 
female cannot reach: 'higher is better than lower; the head is better than the genitals below' 
(Hoch:1979: Nayak:1997). In addition, Dyer acknowledges cases where the model does not avert the 
gaze but that the returning stare of the male pin-up differentiates it from the coy, partial but submissive 
look of the female model. The stare reaches beyond the boundaries of the field of vision established 
within the frame of the image, asserting his subjectivity. In contradistinction, the female gaze stops at 
the boundary of the field of vision between the viewer and the model. He then attends to the potential 
desire available to heterosexual women, noting what has previously been missed, namely that 
heterosexual women, as 'already castrated', have nothing to fear from transgression since there is no 
threat. 41 How then is the phallologic order of the image sustained? First he argues that the male gaze 
utilises the semiotic to block such identification patterns; hence the importance of the lofty stare. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Star's embodiment, contained within the pin-up, calls upon 
conventional codes of active masculinity; for example, the man must be doing something.42 Dyer 
identifies how structural relations can be made to work visually and using the most mundane sources to
41 Again, this draws on a common-sense, unequivocal corporeal fact and leaves unattended the 
relationship between the corporeal, as flesh, and the fact that this fleshy entity underdetermines the 
category it is naturalistically supposed to mirror or determine.
42 Neale identified that display is often combined with the narrative, often during moments of 
aggression, so that the spectre of homosexuality is disavowed. Likewise, it has been noted that in 
Dynasty, men were often 'caught' in a moment of undress. Hence the predominance of grooming on 
these occasions. Suzanne Moore notes this when she addresses the female heterosexual pleasures; see 
Here's Looking at You, Kid! (1988).
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codify. Alternatively, the muscular body is emphasised, through lighting and posture, thereby 
connoting the promise of activity and power. He talks of the strain shown on the body, often signified 
by the visibly bulging veins. I will return in detail to these elements in my taxonomy as they trace the 
performance of masculinity and the body rather than defining the image through its relationship to the 
Oedipus complex. Dyer develops the argument further stressing the integration of the discourses of 
race with physicality. He notes that this embodiment is one that is 'of the jungle', impetuous and 
unreasoned. These themes will be taken up again with Nayak's piece (1997).
CRITIQUING THE PHALLIC SIGNIFIER AND THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION
In summation, I began with a critical account of the sex/gender distinction, identifying that it 
continued to use sex as an objective category in an insufficiently critical way. To this, I traced the 
broader re-evaluation of language, the central importance of which is the prior-ness awarded to 
meaning. The significance is that the analysis of language aimed to deconstruct the subject/object 
dualism, rendering both the subject and the object fictions generated by meaning. This built upon the 
existing ideological critique and its causal effect through representation. The development is premised 
upon the omnipresence of meaning and its active role in category production. To this, 
postmodernist/feminist critique fused a model of the subject, as defined by Lacan to Althusser's 
position of the ideological role of culture. Henceforth, this causal nexus aims to trace and explain a 
number of elements:
1. The unconscious and the sexual desiring patterns thus formed ceased to be treated as pre-given 
facts, as something essential to the human form. Instead, they must be thought of as constructions, 
as objects that have histories within and from which the subject is to be found.
2. This institutes the following order: the body is born into language and it is within the terms of 
language that the human subject is constructed; language is always prior to and constitutive of the 
subject.
3. In consequence, speech never belongs to the speaker, rather, the T is the outcome of the position 
within which we emerge in language.
4. Therefore, the Cartesian subject is displaced by the production of subjectivities within the matrices 
of the structural positions within language. This encapsulates the fundamental appeal that Lacan 
has to feminist critique. It positions the subject as outcome, as construction, rather than essence, by 
placing language at the heart of what subjectivity is.
5. This integration of meaning to the social order, organised under the patriarchal banner of the 
Father, marks the entry of the first structural organisation of meaning: the feminine is passive.
6. Mulvey has applied the dialectic logic of Lacanianism to the seeing/seen axis and integrated into 
this the second axis of the active/passive.
7. Via the mirror phase, Mulveyian paradigm asserts that the feminine image of the screen must 
reflect the feminine position of lack. Therefore, the feminine must present itself as the object of 
desire, but equally disavow the lack that is her symbolic function. Therefore, the feminine as
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sexual objectification is categorised as universal and permanent because of the Symbolic order. 
The essence of the feminine body is to signify lack since, corporeally, she cannot 'grow' a penis. It 
is this point, in particular, that raises the charge of biological determinism.
This oppositional interplay is played out by the objectification inherent in the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' as 
well as active function of display.









These sets of dualism are supposedly dislodged by the introduction of the tabooed homoerotic desire. 
However, it can do so only by leaving the feminine/passive axis in place. This reflects the central 
importance of oscillation: woman mobilises her desire, which is less fixed than the heterosexual 
masculine subject position, and returns to the phallic stage and disavows her castration. 43 She returns to 
her active stage and the eroticisation of the clitoris, and adopts the position of the masculine. Therefore, 
the pleasure of the feminine is tied to the pre-oedipal stage where the girl child remains masculinised 
by means of the active function of the phallic organ; hence the silence that defines the active, 
heterosexual woman. This is a development of Mulvey's initial paradigm: heterosexual women's desire 
to desire is brought about by their objectification (Doane: 1991). Therefore, the structural order persists 
and has been expanded, further producing a circuit of subject positions:
1. Men actively desire women and are therefore heterosexual and masculine; defined as Oedipalised 
desire.
2. Men actively desire men and are therefore homosexual and narcissistic; the object of desire is 'the 
same' and reflects the narcissism prior to Oedipalisation; it is therefore active.
3. Women actively desire women and are therefore homosexual; the object of desire is 'the same' and 
reflects the active phallic stage which is masculine achieved through oscillation. This represents a 
division between the fact of'woman' and the unconscious desire as masculine.
4. Women that desire to be loved by men are therefore heterosexual, which is an outcome of
Oedipalisation and is defined by passive objectification; she can desire only to be the subordinated 
object of desire.
43 However, this is at the cost of her (conscious) moral development, as define by Freud and Lacan.
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These structural orderings of desire and identification result from the foreclosure of the content of the 
image. By fixing the subject through the Symbolic order, they are able to introduce a series of 
structural relations that stabilise meaning. This emphasises the synchronic features of language: those 
who are formed by a system, those that have assumed the T, are in no position to alter the structures 
because they define who the T is. Identification is therefore defined by either the failure or success of 
assuming the Oedipalised subject position. This effectively removes the potential of history and, by 
implication, social practice to change meaning, which equally reflects the ambiguous position the 
empirical holds in their explanations. At certain points, it is re-configured as another instance of the 
unconscious, for example Cowie. At other times, it demonstrates the identification structures, for 
example Lewis and Rolley.
Hence, the relationship between the Symbolic and the structuralist legacy forecloses 
categorically the forms the feminine may take because the structures are awarded primacy in the 
determination of the meaning and subjectivity. I argue that this leads directly to the overly 
homogenised analysis of cultural forms, thereby sustaining the inferential relationship between passive 
femininity as the subject formed and language as the causal mechanism that secures it. The semiotic 
function combines with the structural legacy to impose the universality of the active/passive.
Second, I return to the example of Harbord and Cambell who argue that the psychoanalytic 
model of the subject is central to the production of culture. They are therefore stipulating that the 
Oedipus complex is primary to the cultural formations we have, which I argue must lead to an 
additional closure: the 'story' of culture is the (re)presentation of the Oedipus complex. For example, 
Cowie (see also Gallop: 1982; Rose: 1986; Emberely:1989) trawls through numerous films identifying 
how each replays the heterosexual relationship via the complex of exchanges between the mother, 
father and child. The postmodern project means that feminists of this kind are bound to the 'end of 
history', but not as synthesis; as Hegel would have it (Descombes: 1980), but as the eternal return of the 
linguistic order. I argue that this is where the idealist model of language is derived. The subject is 
defined as the outcome of the linguistic order, therefore language is awarded causal priority so that no 
subject acts on language, uses or transforms language to alter the Symbolic subject positions. Therefore 
the argument is essentially circular, each element depending upon the other for its coherency. 
Moreover, because the subject does not 'act' 44 they must look beneath the subject to the unconscious 
desiring flows for a trace of non-dominatory desire; hence the naed for the theoretical gymnastics 
(Flower-MacCanneIl:2000: Harbord and Campbell: 1998; Balibar: 1994; Copjec:1994).
To reiterate, the castration complex orders the codification and organisation of the visual 
presentation. The image of the feminine must be coded through fetishisation in order to disavow the 
threat of castration that personifies the feminine. In addition, each form of codification situates each 
subject position. This institutes the third closure. It begins with the location of the feminine as the 
absolute other of the masculine, and the ejection of the third term, namely the Other as language. Lacan 
uses the capitalisation as a means to denote that both the masculine and feminine (men and women) are 
subordinate to the Other, that is, language that constitutes them as subjects. This emphasis reflects his 
position that subjectivity is the outcome of signification through language. This is how language speaks
44 Defined as a metaphorical illusion.
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through the subject. This re-working establishes the two clear subject positions, namely the deadlock of 
the subject/object opposition. The tripartite relationship45, which is fundamental to Lacan's model, is 
reduced to a dichotomy so that the feminine functions through her desire to make good her lack: 'she is 
said to speak castration and nothing else'. The dualism means that only the feminine is subordinate. 
The feminine cannot transcend this state, and thus cannot alter the state or mechanism that defines her 
as lack. Again, I would argue that the corporeal is used uncritically.
Another example of the same reductive logic is the seeing/seen axis. Mulvey et al. remove the 
dialectic operation within the subjectivity and redefine it by, and align it with, the existing dichotomies. 
This dichotomisation further solidifies the structure of'the feminine as the absolute subordinated 
other'. Thus, no subject both sees and is seen, rather the Master masculine subject sees and the 
feminine (slave) is seen. This is how the structural positions emerge when Lacan is reworked according 
to a feminist normative position: the positions are dualistic rather than tripartite. Only by making the 
masculine and the feminine dialectic opposites can feminists overcome Lacan's position that both 
subjects are subordinate to the Law: the power of the Father does not 'belong' to the feminine, neither 
does it belong to the masculine (man). 45 Moreover, this dualistic reorganisation implicitly collapses the 
penis and the phallus because the masculine subject has been conflated with the Law.
Language is treated as a 'quasi-free-standing entity' which is reflected in the 'ness' Mulvey 
awards the feminine. The centrality of culture is given precedence over and above the things the subject 
may do. Moreover, the cultural domain colonises the unconscious, the place from which motivation is 
derived. The unconscious is the source of the real motivations and meanings, thus the truth lies behind 
the surface patterns of speech. Following this, the significations ordered by the phallus prescribe what 
is really going on: the active woman is really masculine, because the linguistic regime orders it so. 
Most importantly, the re-alignment of Lacan's model into a dualistic order introduces categorical logic 
to the postmodernist/feminist model; hence, the centrality of the 'ness'.
The 'dilemma' between the conscious as regulated (ideological) speech and the unconscious 
levels of desire is not something that Lacan faces. Lacan argues that to speak the T is to submit to 
Symbolic order. His normative orientation aims to bring desire that is socially tabooed into the realm of 
what is socially sanctioned. Therefore, his aim is to bring the Real into the domain of Oedipalised 
desire. There is, then, a level at which conscious discourse is central. However, by making Lacanianism 
a proto-ideology, feminists are forced to reject conscious discourse because it is enveloped by what the 
illegitimate social order requires. Therefore, conscious speech becomes the equivalent part to the 
ideological position, namely passive femininity, and our speech acts bring forth the normative regime 
of patriarchy.47 By rejecting the order of the Law of the Father, they seek to lift that taboo and thus
45 Fundamental to Butler's analysis. It reflects that her analysis is considerably more sophisticated.
46 Lacan argues that those men who also make the fallacious assumption that their phallus and the 
Phallus are one often suffer from impotency caused by the latent fear that the penis will not meet the 
power of the Phallus. See B. Fink (1995)
47 The full impact of this is sometimes ignored, particular by those who seek to manipulate Lacan for 
libertarian purposes, by which I mean that they seek to liberate the identities and desire produced 
through the failure of Oedipalisation. Logically speaking, with that failure comes the failure of the T 
that speaks. I argue that they cannot turn to the notion of the non-discursive language because of their 
deployment of Derrida elsewhere. He argues that there is no outside from which the insane can speak.
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release the 'legitimate' desiring flows of lesbian and gay identifications and so forth. However, this 
again merely inverts the phallocratic order; it does not deconstruct it sufficiently.
AND THE WOMAN'S BODY?
I have argued that the structural orientation forecloses the analyses of the representations as 
well as the sorts of identities it is said to form. Most importantly, the ideological over-determination of 
the Symbolic has removed women and the activities they do from the analyses. Thus, the analysis 
cannot be anything other than ahistorical and reductive because, by making the social order reside in 
the psyche, the analysis removes any potential action from consideration, and thus the capacity to 
change things. This is a direct result of the over-emphasis upon the interpretative effects that form 
subjectivity. Consequently, this greatly simplifies the richness and diversity of the social world. In fact, 
as demonstrated in the numbered points above, they have reduced the human condition to four basic 
categories.
The feminist theory addressed thus far turned to psychoanalysis to account for the fixity of 
identity and aimed to inscribe the body into social process. The sex/gender distinction was abandoned 
precisely for its failure to do so. The sex/gender distinction leaves the body outside the domain of 
social organisation by remaining implicitly dependent upon the mind/body dualism. Butler refers to this 
as the 'raw body'. The body is treated as a self-contained and ordered entity that biologically fulfils its 
capacity. Yet, when the sexed body meets with its social organisation, suddenly two essential bodies 
emerge, reflecting the ideology of a natural hierarchical order of Western culture. This process draws 
the body into the 'cooked', a product of the discourses of power/knowledge.48 These discursive orders 
are imposed on and constitute the entity of the body itself. As Butler continues, feminism shows that 
there is nothing but the cooked:
How are the sex/gender and nature/culture dualisms constructed and naturalised in and 
through one another? What gender hierarchies do they serve, and what relations of 
subordination do they reify? If the very designation of sex is political, then 'sex', that 
designation supposed to be the most raw, proves to be always already cooked. 
(Butler: 1990:38)
Discourse as representation is prior to and formative of T; the feminine is therefore that which 
language fixes as a position. This model by-passes the body by submerging it beneath the linguistic 
effect. The absent body, ejected by the discourses of the Symbolic, has been replaced by the subject 
position. The causal force awarded such construction pushes the corporeal body out of view because
We are left, then, with desiring patterns that are absolutely unknowable or a subjectivity that is the 
ideological subject position.
48 The switch to Foucauldian language does not conflict with the psychoanalytic backdrop, because 
Butler (1990) or Braidotti (1991) for example, argue that the two can be synthesised because both are 
fundamentally anti-Cartesian.
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there is nothing to the body apart from the cooked.49 The corporeal is not deemed to bring anything to 
the cultural, bar the raw material. Again, this emphasises the extent to which the subject is merely an 
affect of meaning. The discursive forces appear to take on a form of their own and organise the subject 
position independently of the body. I suggest that if the phallus is, as Lacan (sometimes) argues50, 
merely the signifier of power, rather than bodily difference, then subject position that discourse defines 
is all there is: the mascuVmised is a redundant term because this only signifies that shift to the 
masculinised assumes a female body in the first place. If this were not the case, why is the 'male' 
category always behind any analysis of oscillation if the signifiers have effectively feminised body? 
Why the maintenance of the biological signifier? I argue that the fact we must refer to masculine men 
in order to maintain a feminist position suggests that there is in fact a deeper commitment to the 
biological body than their chimeric vocabulary suggests. Without the biological body, the subject 
becomes a product of language as a 'quasi-free-standing entity', and thus there would be no problem 
regarding the absence of'women as women'. In fact, it ought not present itself as a problem. To 
illustrate, I quote Grosz:
(Irigaray's) aim seems to be the exploration of a new theoretical space and language which 
may be able to undermine the patriarchal and phallocentric domination of the sphere of 
representations, and, more positively, provide a mode of representation for women as women. 
If, she argues, women's bodies are inscribed as lack by dominant representational systems 
which leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity, their limits need to be 
recognised and transgressed. (Grosz: 1990:168-9)
This implicitly refers to the body because without it we are left only with a metaphysical entity.
Returning to Macey's points: to speak is to assume the subject position in language: we are 
where ideology has positioned us. This reflects the earlier emphasis that the postmodernist/feminist 
programme puts on Althusser. This closure is responsible for that the postmodernist/feminists' inability 
to 'find' women as women who could undertake practices of self-determination. Woman, as a 'cooked' 
subject position is always already in the signification, that is, is already constituted or interpellated by 
the ideology. Thus, they have defined 'self-determining woman' as a Utopian moment. By making the 
body a Symbolic entity, action is always in full service of the Symbolic, thus there is nowhere to create 
an alternative subjectivity. Is this not why 'women as women' is such a philosophical conundrum.
Furthermore, postmodernist/feminists owe us another explanation as to how they 'escape' the 
domination of the rational, so that they are able to rationally theorise the source of their total 
domination. Unlike Althusser, they have no myth of science with which to assume a position outside of 
that which language provides (1971:168-70). This is where the essentialist base to their critique is 
exposed: they draw upon their jouissance with which to represent a feminine subject that emerges out 
from under the full weight of the Symbolic construction. Yet, the very moment that thejouissance 
produces representation ironically locks it back into the Symbolic domain. They have not broken down
Reflecting the Levi-Straussian legacy, this institutes another dualism. 
See Fink for a thorough if complex account of this 'ambiguity'.
47
the dualistic term that subordinates it in the first place (Gadamer: 1979). Moreover, the absence of any 
sustained methodological reflexivity (Bourdieu: 1992) has caused them to overlook their own activity, 
the social institution from which it takes place, and consequently, their power. This cannot be 
recuperated as an instance of masculinised identity because that would make a mockery of their 
agenda. Perhaps, their inability to account for their own social power stems directly from the fact the 
'empirical woman' is such a theoretical conundrum for them. It leads them to overlook the empirical 
reality of their own lives.
Criticisms of this kind have been registered within feminist debate (Butler and Scott: 1992) but 
the particular offerings of Benhabib (1992) seem to me best placed to identify a space between the 
closures of subjectivity contained within the Enlightenment programme and the closures that appear 
within the postmodern programme. Situating the Se/f explores several aspects that have informed 
directly the analysis provided here. While she engages in the offers made by the postmodernist/feminist 
programme, she queries the efficacy of inverting the dualistic logic formalised within the 
Enlightenment project (Pateman:l988; O'Brien:1989; Gatens:1996) by drawing upon the hermeneutic 
position that explores how this logic merely reasserts the initial direction of the hierarchy 
(Gadamer: 1979; Heckman:1990). I refer here to the essentialist residues of desire that reside beneath 
the construction. Elements of her work have informed my engagement with practice51 , but here I 
merely wish to trace how she creates a theoretical space between the radical constructionism of the 
postmodernist/feminist programme and the philosophic traditions of the Enlightenment. Benhabib 
concentrates on Flax's ideas (1990) but I think this critique equally applies to the work of Adams 
(1996), Adams and Cowie (1990) and Probyn (1996) for example.
Benhabib delineates three spheres that unite the concerns of feminism and postmodernism, 
namely the 'Death of the Subject', the 'Death of Metaphysics' and the 'Death of History'. I will 
concentrate upon the Death of the Subject since this informs the problematic of the active subject 
identified above; in my case, active heterosexual desire in women. Benhabib argues that it is possible to 
take on board the rejection of all essentialist conceptions of human being but only through radical 
situatedness and contextualisation. Furthermore, it is possible to turn away from ideas of pure 
consciousness by engaging in the structures of language without essentialising those structures in 
turn 52 . She argues that the 'Death of the Subject' rapidly leaves the theorist nothing other than a 
fictional entity that has:
"dissolved into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator". 
Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet "another position in language" 
disappear concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity and autonomy. The 
subject that is but another position in language can no longer master and create that 
distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can 
reflect upon them and creatively alter them. (Benhabib: 1992:214)
51 This will be introduce as part of the rethink as to the power of the image.
52 See Eco for a scathing critique of the essentialisation of'la' and Me'.
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1 suggest that the analysis above shows exactly how that dissolved subject is produced within the 
Symbolic. The subject that is left is two-dimensional. Following Benhabib, it is our capacity to 
creatively alter the conditions of existence that makes us human: it is our embodiment that makes us 
radically situated.
Therefore, that radically situatedness need not force a silence on the body. On the contrary, it 
is the body that places us in the world and it is the body that forces a person to take a point of view. 
Bodies are complex and interrelationship between the culture and the body is clearly complex. 
However, in my view, treating bodies and society as interrelated rather than distinct entities offers us a 
hermeneutically sensitive alternative to the raw and the cooked. I am a social being partly because I am 
a body. And as Gatens points out, being a social being is premised on the fact that my body is female. It 
throws me down certain structured paths, but the paths do not determine fully what sense I will make of 
them. My body gives me agency to act not only in the world, but on it, in a transformative way. Thus, I 
challenge the model assessed above by seeking a space between 'sex' as an object outside of society, 
free of discourse and the subject position that fully constitutes my sense of self. The T is not 
independent of either but is a product of their interrelatedness.
AND THE HETEROSEXUAL WOMAN?
Throughout, I have been drawing attention to the theoretical negation of the possibility of an 
active heterosexuality experienced and lived by women. I rebel against the negation because of its 
ahistoricism: I do not have, nor can I ever have, an active form of sexuality. This seems to me to be 
premature. Nor does it tally with the changes within which heterosexuality is being explored by 
women. I do not necessarily think that going to see male strippers is an 'advance' but it seems to 
suggest a shift in the possibilities to experience desire by women in the act of looking. They do not 
watch in silence, alone, unlike the setting of a peep show, but view collectively and experience, what 
may still be transgressive, the desire of looking and are excited by the exhibitionism of the male 
stripper. I do not see that this can be recuperated into the subject positions offered by 
psychoanalytically-based cultural analyses.
There are other theoretical issues to be considered too. I can best engage with these by turning 
to the debates regarding pornography where the link between vision and the erotic is most apparent. 
One of the points that anti-censorship feminists (Snitow et al.:1984) make is that often defining male 
sexuality as active introduces an unhelpful dichotomisation, namely that female sexuality is essentially 
tender and anchored in the connection between mother and child. The ahistoricism of the 
psychoanalytic model tends to accept uncritically the assumption that heterosexual women's desire is 
essentially missing, lodged as it is within the notion of the gentle and tender. The dichotomisation is 
self-defeating. Moreover, it does not really tally with the 'sex talk' documented; for example, Friday's 
(1992) collection of women's sexual stories. Hardy (1998) suggests that there may in fact be much 
more in common between the heterosexualities of men and women than is generally acknowledged. I 
sympathise with this position as it connects with my critique of men and women as opposite rather than 
different in some ways and the same in others.
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Hardy, I think, offers some insightful thoughts about the heterosexuality, and most 
importantly, he does not shy away from the part power has to play in it. He argues that active/passive 
structures do enter the sexual imaginations of some men. However, his research suggests that thinking 
about patterns of desire within a fixed structure of active/passive re-confirms rather than challenges 
men's thinking regarding the differing sexual patterns of women. Moreover, he argues that positioning 
the variability of men's actual patterns of desire within the hegemonic formations, as structured in 
pornography for example, offers an opening for men and women to generate differing patterns of 
sexual intimacy, rather than locking 'sex talk' to the active/passive structures that Snitow et al. identify 
as self-defeating. Perhaps a part of that ought to be an opening of the notion of desire women gain from 
looking. Moreover, as my results show, there has been a marked shift in the codifications of men's 
bodies, in particular the absence of a social setting with which to negate the objectification implicit 
within the image.
FUNCTIONALISM THROUGH THE BACKDOOR
I have emphasised the extent to which the cultural analyses above stress the structural 
reproduction of subjectivity. Thus, there appears to be no voice outside of the positions offered by the 
Symbolic. Equally, functionalist logic finds itself with the same dilemma. I argue that cultural analyses 
above do in fact carry an idea of the social self but one that is confined to the 'roles' it has been 
assigned. Both end up with a bankrupt version of the social actor, one that is two-dimensional. 
Moreover, both ultimately reside in categorical logic. In order to argue fully how these closures 
implicitly deploy functionalist reason, I will show how this same logic has been transferred to analysis 
of representation of race, exposing again the implicit dependence upon interpellation, and 
psychoanalysis more broadly, in order to connect desire, identification and the social order. By 
showing how this logic applies equally to representations of race, focusing particularly on how a 
subject is unable to hold two positions simultaneously, I isolate how fundamental the functionalist 
reason is to this mode of theorising. I therefore argue that the postmodernists'/feminists' 
reconfigurations of Lacan operate using a functionalist logic, and hence fall at identical hurdles. 
Moreover, the categorical logic and the processes of identification critiqued above can be best 
illustrated using Nayak's analysis of advertisements. The reason I shift to post/colonial theory here is to 
expose how neither model is able to deal with embodiment, that is, the lived patterns of belonging to 
more than one social classification at any one time. I will illustrate this below.
CATEGORICAL LOGIC, IDENTIFICATION AND THE 'SUBJECT' OF RACE
Nayak explores how the black body is seen as a source of unstable, order-threatening but 
intense and extreme desire, as against the moral and order-preserving white body. This discourse is 
drawn upon to mark out the black body as an entity that is beyond regulation and self-control but, most 
importantly, as a powerful force that can seduce and thus pollute white moral regulation. Hence, 
discourse produces 'race' by connecting skin colour to a type of human nature. Yet the mutually
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exclusive categories establish a powerful source of transgression and fascination. Nayak argues that the 
HaSgen-Dazs advertisements encode the black bodies within this discourse, therefore marking the 
black body as intensely sexual and corrupting. This initial delineation already establishes the 
comparative basis of the categorical logic, but also intimates the clash between the subject positions: 
who is occupying which side of the dichotomy and when? For example, an advertisement for the 
campaign, entitled 'Feel Me', displays a black male body unclothed, as 'an objectified figure stood still 
in time' (Nayak: 1997:53). The image deploys codes that freeze the body, rendering it statuesque. The 
back of the body is the 'subject' of the pose, therefore we know nothing about the man: he is his body. 
This permits a fetishisation of the body operating through the athletic and mythological power of the 
natural physique. Presumably, this is derived from the discourse that defines the black male to be much 
more 'of the body'; bound to its capacity for musculature and force. This ideological critique is then 
combined with the notion of the gaze, because, as I argued above, only then can ideological 
representation be shown to matter, since the gaze connects the image to the desiring subject. The pose 
ensures that he remains unaware of the voyeuristic scrutiny of the viewer, and thus the photographic 
subject cannot assert his subjectivity with a returning gaze. 53 The combination of the pose and its 
location within the broader imperialist dichotomy effectively encodes his 'body as object' and the 
'white as the mind'. Again, this draws attention to the possibility that one could substitute male and 
female for black and white, reflecting the closeness of the ideological critique.
Nayak identifies a core code which he describes as the coupling of fear and forbidden 
fascination; the codes draw upon the symbolisation of black masculinity as phallus (p55). He identifies 
the body posture of the black model as arched, hardened through musculature, erect and straining, the 
body itself symbolising a large black penis. Upon his back is a dripping white hand that is losing its 
form. He argues that when this is combined with the hyper-sexuality of the black man's body, it means 
that the white ice cream could stand for semen and the uncontrolled emissions of a primitive sexuality. 
The black man as phallus is confirmed by the removal of the head from the visual frame of the 
reference. This acts as a symbolic form of castration, a timely reminder of where the real control of this 
fantasy lies. Nayak concludes that the phallic construction of black masculinities54 substitutes penis for 
personality, thereby 'eclipsing the negro. He is turned into a penis. He is the penis' (Nayak:54; quoting 
Fanon: 1970:120). The logic is pursued further so that the phallus continues to secure power, but this 
time, the phallus being defined by the black man.
At this point, Nayak shifts the domain of analysis: the movement swings from the semiotic 
domain, with its concern with the constructions of meaning and the broader ideological location that 
gives these signs their weight, to the defining moment of subjectivity:
Significantly, the 'racial' dichotomy is also informative of white subjectivity in a doubly 
defining moment where the construction of the fantastic black Other simultaneously discloses
53 1 will be returning to this because it represents a brief example that encapsulates the slips made
regarding the gaze, image, identity and photograph. Goffman traces this very well, and I borrow from
his complex analysis to support my position that some images, advertisements in particular, are about
'the world' but only partially. He argues that representations of this kind hyper-stylise conventions of
interaction.
54 The first time a plural is used.
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the elaboration of whiteness ... Analysing how such phobic bodily representations are put 
together can expose anxieties that lie within white ethnicity ... For Kobena Mercer, the fear 
and desire surrounding the black body 'not only demonstrates the disturbances and decentring 
of dominant versions of white identity, but confronts whiteness with the otherness that enables 
it to be constituted as an identity as such.' (Nayak: 1997:56) (my italics)
Hence, he has swung from the frame of semiotics into the effects of the meaning. The codification of a 
specific kind of image, aiming to sell a specific kind of product, speaks about the desiring patterns and 
their pathological manifestations as identity. The ideology constructs desire within white ethnicity. 
Moreover, his quote shows that Mercer makes the same errors: he moves from the notion of 'version' 
to the effective constitution of the identity. Implicitly, the dependence upon interpellation remains 
central because only then can the formation be said to produce 'a mental orgasm that the "perverse" 
black body appears capable of inducing [which] is informative of the phantasmal and phobic 
machinations of whiteness' (p55). This mirrors the form of the feminist cultural analysis above. In 
addition, Nayak argues that the use of single black bodies has the effect of positioning the 'male' 
viewer as the fantasy organiser, capable of almost entering the scene and the bodies on display. This 
parallels the fantasy of omnipotence the masculine assumes by having the phallus. The structural 
orientation and positioning of the subject leads Nayak to fail to problematise who is viewing this 
advertisement. If the viewer is assumed to be Black then this problematises the analysis of the black 
objectiflcation insofar as the viewer is presumed to have the phallus and therefore cannot be the phallus 
as well.
This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind is determined by the categorical 
application of the group in question, which is then elevated to the structural organisation of meaning 
and the corresponding identity. The outcome is that they are fundamentally unable to cope with two 
oppressed subject positions at the same time. The (male) black model is defined as 'being the phallus', 
as the object of desire and fear, which is the very entity by which the whiteness and/or white identity 
establishes itself. Yet, despite the fact that the eroticisation of the body is said to serve as a fetish for 
the white imagination, this is reconfigured as an instance of transgress) ve desire integral to the queer 
look. Thus, the single codification is made to serve both the reproduction of the normative white order 
and therefore the negation of the other, yet it also secures the very production of the transgressive 
identification, namely the queer look. Alternatively, how are we to define the subject position of the 
white woman? Does the representation position the white (woman) as the subject who is constituted 
through the negation, or the (white) woman as the very source by which the Master knows himself? 
This is a fundamental contradiction.
In more general terms, Nayak identifies clearly the various uses of black and white to 
commodify ice cream sexually; therefore the ideological map is insightful. An ideological map does 
not have be free of contradiction unless treated as causally effective. However, his analysis falters 
when extended beyond this domain. This is most clearly manifested when the article breaks away from 
the advertisement, as both a constitution of power and a source of identification, to how the formations 
of the body represented can stimulate transgressive desire. Nayak includes here readings by black gay
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men of Mapplethorpe's photographs, which the first example copies, and attends to 'pleasures of 
reading against the grain'. Such examples coalesce to create the 'possibility of subversive readings and 
radical alliance - "evoking female desire, gay looks and affirming black male identity'" (p60). Yet, the 
ideological analysis previously asserted forecloses such modes of reading. Just like Cowie, he ought to 
stipulate where such free subversive readings come from, given the assumption of the interpellation of 
image and subject. Does it not undermine the order of the Symbolic if so many fail to assume its 
positions and pleasures? The issue of agency forces a space between the pervasiveness of ideology, in 
this case racist ideology, and the corresponding construction of identity.
Furthermore, and I am indebted to Connell (1987:185) for pointing out this relatively simple 
inversion, just as the representations do not speak of the real lives of those represented, neither should 
we assume, de facto, that ideological constructions of meaning say anything about those whose power 
it protects. White people, or men, for that matter, may well have access to illegitimate power, by virtue 
of their embodiment, irrespective of whether they seek to act on it. However, the point is, and this is a 
fundamentally empirical point, the power base is there to act on should the occasion arise. In this way, 
the structural ordering of power can be understood as something that exists among a group, without one 
having to argue that this power is dependent upon the unified and homogenised identification. The 
differentiation aims to open up a space for the asymmetry that exists between the structure and its 
relationship to power and those who act within them: the structures of power cannot be assumed 
uniformly to determine those who hold power.
IMAGE, IDENTIFICATION AND THE ANALYTIC DEPENDENCE UPON FUNCTIONALIST 
REASON
I begin with the reflection that the above analysis is united by approaching the body as 
'system problem', namely that its organisation is in line with social structural requirements. Thus, the 
Law, within postmodernism/feminism, or the order of the whiteness, according to post-colonialist 
theory, is the starting point. Borrowing from the long-standing interactionist critique that structural 
Marxists and functional theorists were indistinguishable bar their normative departure, I argue that the 
same critique applies to alleged postmodern shift. Both models struggle to maintain an emphasis on 
social or interpretive indeterminacy. When included, it tends to lead to such variability that the 
(illegitimate) normative order stops the causal mechanism whereby reasons, as defined by the 
normative order, cause action. Ultimately, I argue, this homology is based upon the wholesale failure 
by a postmodern agenda to deal with the mediations of power between action and structure. I will begin 
with each part of Parsons' model and follow with examples and concepts that follow such reasoning.
FUNCTIONAL LOGIC AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
The Parsonsian backdrop has as one of its defining features the presupposition that the 
presence of the normative order is insufficient to assume its determining function in organising the 
social. Parsons begins by addressing the Hobbesian problem of the social order: random or non-unified
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pursuits produce a social order that is dictated by force, fraud and social conflict. The normative order 
is, therefore, the mechanism that removes the discordance of agents pursuing their own individual ends. 
Furthermore, without coordination, the alternative means and action of others would be impossible to 
explain and thus their actions and ends are random. Parsons' development therefore rests upon his 
insight that the ends pursued through individual action must cohere with the actions of others within a 
common framework. Moreover, this common framework must be a collective of larger social and 
cultural processes through which actions can be rendered sensible. To conclude, the normative order 
explains how reasons as causes of action connect individual action to a larger system of actions.
A connection is therefore required between the wide range of values held by individual 
members and a broad system of values necessary for the good of that society. Hence, Parsons requires a 
mechanism whereby the values of the society become an internal position, which motivates individuals 
towards appropriate action. Parsons' answer is internalisation, 55 and through this concept he integrates 
three elements. He begins by defining social integration as the product of the collective subscription to 
commonly held norms and values. Next, he stipulates that such values are 'internalised'. These two 
elements are then combined: the internalised values do not merely limit egoistic tendencies but become 
constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire appropriate for the collective.
Taking his influence from Durkheim and Freud, Parsons requires that actors discriminate 
between the various objects in the situation and that social objects be invested with accordant positive 
or negative cathartic significance (Parsons: 1951:201-26). Following on, the social actor must evaluate 
possible courses of action in relation to them. These three steps are further guided by culturally 
transmitted value orientations or 'organised sets of rules and standards' (1951:60). The social rules, 
once internalised, go on to determine the validity of their cognitive judgements, the appropriate 
cathartic attachments, for example (compulsory) heterosexuality, and the social actions then 
undertaken.
The central principles of social organisation are the following. The primary anchor is that the 
normative rules are the causes of action. By deploying the Freudian concept of internalisation, Parsons 
is able to develop a system in which internalised value standards are uniquely integrated to institutional 
activity. Moreover, the internalised values are constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire. For 
example, in becoming heterosexual, we become subjects that the social order requires and this socially 
determined subject is equivalent to who we think we are, which further motivates us to marry and 
defines our desires to have children.
The homology begins with the parallel descriptions. First, the functionalist and the 
postmodernist/feminist structural models argue that the social values of the order assume an internal 
position, and both depend upon internalisation as a mechanism to ensure that society's values feel like 
my values. This is why I have emphasised throughout the elements of psychoanalytic models that seek 
to look at the formation of the subject in terms of a broader social order problem. The Oedipus complex 
straddles the formation of the subject in terms of familial context and the formation of the super-ego 
that must correlate with the moral order. Second, both establish the correlation between the (external)
55 The concept represents the later stages of Parsons' work at Harvard: Towards a General Theory of 
Action and The Social System.
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values of the social order and the subject. Third, these external social values, once internalised, are 
constitutive of the objects of desire and thus responsible for moral regulation. The 
postmodernist/feminist agenda seeks to intervene in this constitution and its relationship with the 
'moral' order, which leaves the feminine as 'less moral'. I argue that the apparent re-location of the 
Oedipal complex into the domain of language does not alter the broader employment of functionalist 
reason. Lacanian application has merely brought these organised sets of rules and standards under the 
banner of the 'Law of the Father' and made the transmission of the rules operative through language. 
The normative order is not tightly carried through the system of language. Finally, both establish the 
normative order as prior to the subject56 and formative of a subject that acts according to the 
appropriate norms and values; the normative order is inside the subject and thus motivates him/her to 
act accordingly.
Parsons recognises that this process is a tenuous one. Making the social system an internal one 
opens the subject up to the threat or strain of not being able to live up to the demands of the social 
situation and/or role. This causes painful internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. This challenges 
the assumption that only the psychoanalytic model of the subject is able to cope with internal conflict. 
Moreover, Barnes (1979 in Barnes and Sharpin) rightly notes that Parsons' failure was not that he did 
not address deviancy or social change; on the contrary, Parsons' attention to deviancy was extensive 
because he understood that the failure fully to internalise norms and values was ubiquitous within his 
model. Equally, therefore, Parsons recognises that the formation of the 'subject as internalised norms' 
is never complete, which is why a system of sanctions and rewards is required. Hence, the maintenance 
of the social system as subjective disposition is further strengthened by negative sanctioning or threat 
of having love and praise withdrawn. This further exacerbates the threat of internal conflict and the loss 
of self-esteem. It cannot be argued therefore that Parsons is closed to internal conflict. He utilises these 
threats further to stabilise the social system as subjective disposition so that deviation from the standard 
expectations will be immediately met with negative sanctioning, the loss of social standing and other 
disadvantageous consequences. This directly parallels Lacan's function of the 'Law of the Father' 
(1989). The fact that postmodernists/feminists seek to magnify this failure is not a negation of the 
functional reason but its confirmation: the subject position/role becomes an internalised position; 
subject is what the system's normative order stipulates, so we can only look to its failure to find 
'something outside' of the order. Their 'something outside' is tr^nsgressive desire. Likewise, the 
attainment of heterosexuality by the woman is the moment the normative order has colonised the 
subject, which is why there is no pleasure for the feminine other than the masochistic desire that this 
identification secures; hence Mulvey's initial formulation of the male gaze.
Ostensibly, by making social system requirements and the internal subjective states equivalent 
to each other, Parsons has made the social system and the social role mirror reflections. Althusser's 
model of interpellation parallels this model, bar the normative departure. The social system is 
coordinated to meet sectional interests as opposed to collective interests and the social system can 
function with this essential conflict only if the system becomes an internal and subjective condition.
56 Parsons' subject no more represents a natural or essential one than does the 
postmodernists'/feminists'.
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Hence, the subject has a set of internalised values that become their own, which is why they work for 
the system. This forms the basis for the postmodernist/feminist synthesis between Althusser and Lacan 
because theorists define alienation as a primary feature of subjectivity. Ostensibly, therefore, social role 
and subject position are the same thing: the subjective conditions correlate with the social requirements 
of the order; neither includes nor accounts for interpretive indeterminacy.
This exposes the fundamental problem with the postmodernist/feminist applications of Lacan: 
from where is their own normative evaluation made? Recasting Lacanian dialectic from the internal 
position in the subject to structural opposites between the feminine other and the Masculine Symbolic 
Law means they have no speech that is not of the Law, and thus no place to account for how they make 
such a normative departure. Unlike Althusser (1971), they cannot call upon the critical distance 
between subject and position brought about by the objectivity of positivist science. Hence, the double 
effectiveness of the Masculine as the Symbolic locks the feminine as subject into the Real, which, like 
many theories that mobilise functionalist logic for a radical agenda, must look to some 'quasi-space' 
that lies outside the socialised subject. In conclusion, therefore, this feminist model comes face to face 
with failure of normative determinism: making the social action an outcome of psychological 
disposition means that they cannot account for their normative evaluations. Nor can they account for 
the public nature of meaning.
THE FAILURES OF NORMATIVE DETERMINISM - BOTH FUNCTIONALIST AND 
POSTMODERN
In principle, Parsonsian functionalism stresses that institutions can be non-coercively 
maintained by emphasising that normative order assumes an internal position. Parsons was right to 
identify the existence of macro norms and values as universal and thus move towards a model of 
society as containing a normative order. Yet this is precisely where Parsons' problems begin, namely 
that social orders must be explained in terms of the motivation for action:
It is through internalisation of common patterns of value-orientations that a system of social 
interaction can be stabilised. Put in personality terms, this means that there is an element of 
super-ego organisation correlative with every role-orientation pattern of the individual in 
question. In every case, the internalisation of a super-ego element means motivation to accept 
the priority of collective over personal interests, within the appropriate limits on the 
appropriate occasions. (Parsons: 1951:150) (my italics)
Thus, action that is outside the role/subject position is always defined as an instance of temporary 
transgression or deviancy. Parsons and postmodernists/feminists alike simply have no way of dealing 
with sustained, systematic form of resistant action that is persistent and ordered; it can never be 
rational. This action is authentic social action, ipso facto. Barnes argues that his notion of the social, 
being confined to a psychological disposition, is simply too narrow, and with it rational action is never
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dealt with comprehensively. Nowhere does he deal with the interpretive practices that individuals and 
groups bring to the things they do.
Likewise, the postmodernists/feminists have an equally ambiguous position towards action 
and, in fact, this reflects why it is rarely 'seen'. I return to the quote from Grosz: 'dominant 
representational systems ... leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity'. They 
question how, and from where, active femininity may emerge. This is only a problem because they 
have elevated (illegitimate) norms as the causes of the action and, because the subject position is the 
outcome of internalisation of those norms and values, they cannot 'find' any action that is not defined 
by those norms. Therefore, action is characterised by compliance.
By tackling motivation in terms of internalised norms and values, Parsons automatically treats 
them as the causes of action. This remains one of Parsons' fundamental errors. As Heritage succinctly 
defines it:
this treatment inexorably draws attention away from the logic of action, that is the 
interpretative bases in which actions are constructed and understood in terms which are 
meaningful to the actors involved. Starting from a framework which began with the subjective 
point of view of the actor, Parsons had arrived at an entirely external analysis of the norms 
and values which he treated as constraining and determining conduct. (Heritage: 1984:18)
Parsons made what is truly social a condition of acting in accordance with internalised norms and 
values. Therefore, what is truly social in any order must be the outcome of individualised, subjectively 
motivated actions, produced through the internalisation of the appropriate norms and values. 
Furthermore, any action that is to count as social must be caused, via constraint and conditioning, by 
those very same norms and values. In effect, Parsons has reduced the social to clear unambiguous 
psychological states. Again, this parallels the notion that the normative order, redefined as ideology, 
occupies the subject: the subject is that subject position: the paternal law, via the universality of 
language, assumes an internalised, psychological dimension. In fact, by re-casting the normative order 
into a linguistic entity, Lacanianism secures it further by making the very system through which, and 
by which, we speak. It is the determining function awarded to norms and values, equating them with 
the causes of action, that fundamentally failed to integrate the micro-practices that people do with the 
system. Thus, despite this endeavour to integrate the system and actors, Parsons ends up effectively 
with a model of the actor that is unable to undertake social action. Hence his failure to account for 
deviancy and social change. The social order is effective through the psychological make-up of the 
actor; deviation from that order is symptomatic of a pathology or at least, in Parsonsian terms, the non- 
rational.
Nayak's work also introduces an additional problem, which reflects the emphasis I placed 
upon his stipulations regarding the subject positions instituted through the representation. Functionalist 
reason stipulates that the normative order assume an internal position. How then are we to account for 
a body that assumes two subject positions simultaneously? Or rather, how is the actor to perform, in 
accordance with the normative order, in two social roles that conflict? In addition, how is a subject to
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respond? Do I respond to you because you are a man who happens to be middle class like me, or do I 
respond to your difference, namely your gender? Nayak thus finds himself confronted with the 
impossibility of dealing with two structural locations and thus two subject positions that the body 
intersects at the same time. This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind has tended to remain 
silent regarding such intersections. This form of theorising merely extends the categorical logic by 
adding one category upon another. Never are the categories integrated. This theorisation cannot 
consider embodiment, which attempts to fuse together these elements. Rather, the analysis is subject to 
the same problems as the sex/gender distinction by leaving the naturalised classifications intact. It 
neither integrates them into the flow of life nor deconstructs the categorical logic that underpins the 
classification.
Thus, just as Parsons loses sight of action, so too do the postmodernists/feminists when they 
seek to apply their model. Parsons' actor acts on the basis of his internalised position, in accordance 
with an organised set of rules. In parallel, actions that define the feminine are those actions that support 
and reproduce the order. I have argued that only if one adopts Flax's position does the empirical 
problem of'women emerge. They have made the patriarchal normative order the very 'soul' of the 
feminine and, consequently, the motivations and desires are caused by norms of that order. Hence, 
Benhabib's critique that this leaves us without an active and socially-situated subject.
The overly determining function awarded the internalisation of the norms and values extends 
beyond the failure to address sustained and rational resistance; it equally distorts both Parsons' and the 
postmodernist/feminist treatment of regular social action. For example, the creative output of a 
conversation falls outside analysis. One can discuss, one may have a particularly coherent line of 
argument composed before the conversation begins and one may abide by the rules of conversation, 
nevertheless, the exchange and identifying where the conversation ends cannot be defined by adherence 
to those norms. They cannot determine the nuances that really define a conversation (Gadamer:1979). 
Such social interactions are sustained without recourse to a normative order. The conversation, in any 
form, is not the re-performance of the norms. I have in mind here the emerging trend to stress that the 
representation is a re-presentation, thereby re-establishing the feminine as passive and its associate 
identification. Just as with Parsons, such an emphasis simplifies greatly the complexity and depth of 
social interaction and/or interpretive actions which an ongoing activity requires. The indeterminacy that 
Lacan allows through the slipping signifier has to be foreclosed so that the structural relationship 
between the feminine as other and the Masculine as the speaking T can be sustained. The consequence 
is that the signifier returns to the feminine as castrated. The feminist normative criteria require the 
foreclosure of what meanings can be generated and thus spoken. We have two famous instances of this: 
first, Kristeva, who argues that 'strictly speaking there is no such thing as a Woman' (1986); second, 
Spivak (Nelson and Grossberg:1988) makes the same error when she asks whether the Subaltern can 
speak. Therefore, the subject position is even more determined by the normative order than in Parsons.
However, I argue that, on the contrary, feminists are able to make the critiques they do 
precisely because the normative order does not attain an internal position. They have identified the 
capacity of individuals to assume other values where circumstances encourage it, which is precisely the 
skill that confidence tricksters deploy (Goffrnan: 1969). What such examples show is that, far from
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internalising norms and values, which makes them stable and fixed, such stability is the outcome of 
contexts of action, not of the individual. Again this reflects the critical emphasis I have placed upon the 
requirement that a subject submit to the law to assume the T, as argued by the 
postmodernists/feminists. 1 have argued throughout that the postmodern agenda cannot merely seek 
non-identity and maintain the existence of the social order, illegitimate or otherwise. Thus individuals 
move between contexts because they have the rational dexterity to adopt new situations, to more 
situationally appropriate norms. It reveals the extent to which individuals utilise instrumental, rational 
responses to the demands that a context sets. For example, some homosexuals are only out socially, 
which means that they are able to draw upon situationally appropriate conventions to pass at work. The 
normative order cannot be both responsible for the formation of the subject and yet too weak to allow it 
to be set aside if the context so demands. This runs beneath the critique of the assumption that ideology 
is effective in the formation of the subject, yet so weak as to provide psychic capacity so that any 
subject position is available within that circuit. We cannot be both formed through such structural 
positions and yet free to assume any identification our desire demands. Accepting that we live with the 
normative order and rejecting that we are the normative order means that we can account for the 
variability of interpretation without losing sight of the social context that stabilises interpretive acts that 
gives them meaning. Thus, most importantly, the rejection of the notion that the normative order 
assumes an internal position means that we return norms and values to the public domain. 57 Thus, we 
are able to consider representations reflexively, while maintaining their location within the social 
world.
Barnes concludes:
Social action is not co-extensive with normatively constrained action; it extends beyond it. 
Norms and values are not implanted stably in individual minds; they persist in the public 
realm not the private, the social context not the individual psyche. Norms and values have no 
inherent implications which enforce and sustain a social order; on the contrary they are 
provided with implications by interacting human beings, so that what norms imply can in no 
sense explain how people interact. Accordingly, we can conclude, without equivocation or 
qualification, that normative determinism fails. (Barnes: 1979:36)
Likewise, the postmodernist/feminist agenda equally fails to describe social action because it redefines 
the normative order as ideological and seeks to locate the effectivity of the normative order within the 
formation of the subject. This model, in a bid to pursue a radical agenda, equally brings about exclusion 
of social action, replacing it instead with privatised, highly concealed motivations. Moreover, just as 
Parsons ends up with a model of the actor who often is unable to give the real determining or 
motivating forces behind his/her action unless the description happens to correspond with the 
determinative subjective elements (Bohman: 1991:36), the postmodernist/feminist cannot integrate the 
conscious descriptions and meanings that actors award their own action into the model of social
57 1 am indebted to Barnes for pointing out that the internalisation of the normative order signals the 
privatisation of the linguistic, normative domain. I develop this in the conclusion.
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causation. This is why pleasure is addressed via the concealed homoerotic orientation, an orientation 
that is equally concealed from the conscious subject.
IN CONCLUSION
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the postmodernist/feminist model assumes an 
inferential relationship between the representation of the masculine/active and feminine/passive axis 
and the correlated formation of the subject position as subjectivity. By further embedding this axis 
within the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, postmodernism/feminism forecloses the forms of 
codification and meaning that the representation can assume and thus forecloses the subjectivities it 
positions. Moreover, I argued that the broader psychoanalytic context reveals an implicit dependence 
upon functionalist reason that ostensibly organises the structural imperatives of the social order as 
equivalent to the social roles or subject positions performed: the subject is the normative order. This 
description asserts that the nature of the Symbolic operation is such that it will construct modes of 
codification that categorically distribute the feminine with the passive. Only then can the feminine be 
utilised to define the masculine as its opposite, with the consequence that the feminine is defined as the 
absolute Other. I also added that, theoretically, the sign in fact is as the stereotypes were, in the sense 
that there remains an implicit commitment to the notion that the representation could furnish an 
authentic identity.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL REASSESSMENT
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The empirical work undertaken here seeks to investigate the validity of the assumed 
descriptions and codes derived from this inferential relationship. I propose that in order to challenge the 
postmodernist/feminist description it is necessary to trace anew the extent to which the Symbolic, 
which assumes sexual difference is the primary difference, remains the pervasive determinant of 
representation and, if so, in what form. I do so by undertaking a content analysis of fashion 
advertisements because only by engaging with the manifest and generalised features of a collection of 
images can we get a sense of the extent to which the feminine is actually categorically connected to the 
passive. I argue that if the feminine as passive defines the Symbolic, then it must be apparent within 
our universe of representations, fashion advertisements included. Semiotics can readily produce a 
number of instances where the meaning is clearly marked by the gendered oppositions of the Symbolic. 
However, I argue that the increasing dominance of semiotic analyses, which produce intricate maps of 
meaning of a handful of images, is at the expense of the generalisable contours. Resulting from the 
tendency to give disproportionate attention to how meaning is produced at the expense of what 
generalised features are manifest within representation, I propose that we are no longer familiar with 
the manifest features of representation.
Therefore, I argue that we need to readdress the basic features of images: is it still the case that 
core-gendered dichotomies of the Symbolic empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of 
representation? I attend to this by applying a taxonomy of the body that combines specific gendered 
gestures and postures with the broader techniques that construct the image. Together, these 
conventionalised features connect to the discursive features of the Symbolic that produce sexual 
difference. 1 have isolated codes that are paradigmatic to the postmodern/feminist agenda, as well as 
identifying codes that correspond to key elements of their agenda. Hence, the taxonomy is guided by 
two principles:
1. The final meaning ought to ensure that the feminine-as-passive is manifestly apparent.
2. This level of meaning is graspable using content analysis because the meaning attended to is 
conventional and not unduly complex.
I am suggesting that if content analysis is strictly confined to 'what is in the image' it can make an 
effective contribution to cultural analysis.
Principally, content analysis must concern itself with conventional patterns of representation 
that are regular and manifest. By locating the nature of a category within the conventions that form it, 
one can place some distance between its historical association with objectivism and inappropriate truth 
claims regarding a cultural form, while systematically collating generalised forms of representation. 1 
will attend to this level analysis by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, 
regarding the productive codification of gender. Only if the content analysis strongly indicates that the 
categorical distribution is empirically dominant can the strength of their claims regarding the fixity of 
the Symbolic and the sexual difference it produces be considered legitimate. Moreover, I argue that the 
overt interrelationship between the advertisement image and the economic base within which it is 
produced limits the complexity of the 'advertisement as text', because advertisements are first and
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foremost economic: they must secure consumption. Therefore, I suggest that there is a level of meaning 
found in the cultural form of advertising that is conventional, regular and thoroughly public. Content 
analysis is able systematically to access this level of meaning. In fact, it is best placed to analyse the 
manifest features of meaning providing it is confinedto its conventional level.
METHOD AND REPRESENTATION
The chapter begins with a discussion of the principal aims of the empirical research and 
introduces some of the central methodological issues involved. I will draw out from a summary of the 
postmodernist/feminist model the combined theoretical and methodological weaknesses that are a 
consequence of sole dependence upon semiotics. I will then follow this by explaining why my aims are 
best examined using content analysis, despite its weaknesses, particularly positivistic associations, and 
its supersedence by semiotics. Hence, this initial introduction examines the relationship between the 
theoretical aims and the methods chosen, particularly their respective strengths and weaknesses.
I go on to describe why fashion advertisements were selected, the magazines from which the 
sample was taken and the sampling technique and the use of chi-square to analyse the frequency data 
generated. I also provide a description of the statistics package 'Snap for Windows', explaining the 
different formats and the impact that filtering and suspending elements of the sample population has 
upon the results.
A detailed description of the taxonomy58 follows, paying particular attention to sources and 
debates that it references and analyses. Alongside the codes identified by the postmodernists/feminists, 
I have also included a number of variables that draw directly upon Goffman's 'Gender Advertisements' 
(1979). In particular, I have adopted from Goffrnan the way frames draw upon specific features of 
social interaction and stylise them (see Leiss et al. (1986) for an alternative application). In this way, 
'hyper-realistic' codifications function by making seemingly 'realistic' representations of ourselves. 
Through the hyper-ritualistic transformations, images can appear to be 'about our social world' and yet 
fundamentally divorced from that reality; for example, relative positions in space can be reproduced 
within the two-dimensional frame and thus convey the same conventions of status. The same model of 
identifying regular units that guide the composition of the commercial image has been used here. The 
notion of commercial realism appeals because it foregrounds the centrality of the economic function, 
and combines this with the mode of representation it produces.
This is followed by a discussion of the methodological departure that is specific to this 
research. Unlike many forms of research examining sex scales or other stereotypes, I have refrained 
from defining those features that are feminine as part of the operationalisation. As an alternative, I have 
isolated a series of codes that have been used to describe gender, but 1 do not organise, prior to the data 
analysis, which descriptive term reflects which gender. Connell (1987) discusses the categorical nature 
of much of the research on sexual type and character, which I argue equally defines the logic that is 
also present in the feminist studies discussed above. I argue that the alignment of gendered codes to the 
sexed body prior to the data analysis reproduces the 'truth1 that these very same categories continue to
58 For a detailed description of the evaluative criteria used for each code developed, see appendix.
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describe the gender well. My aim is to avoid such closures as well as expand upon the existing 
discussion of the categorical nature of much of the research surrounding 'the feminine'.
The final section presents the reasons why I have elected to undertake a quantitative method 
within a more broadly interpretive model. Attention will focus upon the justification for the 
quantification of meaning, paying particular attention to defending the position that signs can be 
dissected according to specific categories, and that these categories do not merely reflect some form of 
discursive imposition. The notion of the conventional origins, rather than objectivist origins, of the 
category is central here.
AIMS
The taxonomy aims to problematise the assumptions that underpin the dominant explanatory 
models in feminist Cultural Studies and the postmodern philosophical models that inform it. They 
focus upon the deep features of the social order that are determined by essential dualistic terms; terms 
derived initially from Levi-Strauss and reconfigured into essential linguistic structures by Derrida59 
(Delphy:1996; Cowie:1997). I argue that the structural legacy that remains implicit within this model 
removes the prospect that social dimensions can change and shift in a qualitative sense, rather than 
emerging as another example or presentation of the same (denoted the neologism '(re)presentation') 
(Descombes: 1986). In particular, it removes from the view the possibilities that representations of 
gender could converge insofar as they begin to share key presentational features. This would 
problematise the categoricalism that defines their analysis. I have suggested that one of the outcomes of 
this theoretical model is its failure to identify both the extent to which the masculine is now sexualised 
and commodified and, most importantly, that these processes may in fact be converging with the 
feminine so that the male body is codified using the same visual techniques. In the preceding chapter, I 
offered a critique of the reorganisation of an example that 'on surface' appears to contradict the 
Symbolic order as in fact constituting another instance of the Symbolic, often by using the imaginary to 
reassert the binary logic.
Thus, a singularly important element remains the presumed universality of the signs. This is 
partly derived from the content analyses conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s where the 
universality of certain features were empirically demonstrated. Hence, I aim to re-examine the extent to 
which the dichotomies traced still empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of 
representation. I will do this by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, between 
the codification of men and women: how is the body codified and where does the gender differentiation 
lie? Describing the manifest forms of gender display that advertisements put to use traces anew the 
general trends in gender advertisements, and this raises a number of core research questions:
1. Is it still possible to describe the modes of representation in dichotomous terms?
59 This is important because it is also the source that treats the representation as real in a way a 
corporeal body is real; that is, the body dissolves into a discursive register rather than being an entity 
that both limits what that register can be and also limits an individual's capacity to represent a feature 
of that register, under normal circumstances. Berthelot, Body and Society, 1995.
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2. To what extent have these representations remained the same over time?
3. Is the core dichotomy of masculine activity and feminine passivity still the central ideological
feature? 
Together these form the following problematic:
4. What are the relationships between men and women and the codes, props, contexts and body 
positions that maintain objectification and commodification as gendered processes within 
representation?
I cannot stress enough that no inferential statement is made or presumed about the relationship of 
representation to identity. On the contrary, the overall aim of this thesis is to contest this very 
inference. Neither do I claim that the data generated can be generalised to extend to the genre of 
advertisements per se, let alone all representations of men and women. I suggest only that if the 
postmodernist/feminist argument is to hold true at all then the description it provides ought to be 
applicable here. I argue that to make an effective critique of the paradigmatic hold that the 
postmodernist/feminist description and analysis have within the academic community, it is necessary to 
apply systematically their terms to the images in circulation.
CENTRAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Content analysis refers to a standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the 
presence, the intensity or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science. 
(Roberts: 1997:14)
I elected to conduct a content analysis precisely because it aims to trace standard symbols that 
can be systematically applied to a sample population. This goes some way to balancing the current 
dominance of semiotics that attends to the detailed specificities of a single image. By producing 
systematic descriptive data, content analysis identifies the central features that define the 
representations in that particular cultural field or cultural market. This macro perspective furnishes 
patterns that are almost impossible to identify unless large numbers are assessed according to the same 
criteria, and, despite certain issues addressed in a moment, this remains one of its central empirical 
contributions. In particular, without a 'survey' of representation, we face the following dilemma: one 
example is presented as an instance of cultural change and another may be offered as a counter 
example; which application is actually representative of change or social status? In theory, this could 
continue indefinitely unless a context is provided in which we have a sense of how 'representative' 
either illustration is. Conducting a content analysis provides systematic organisation and 
operationalisation of the criteria by which an image is to be analysed. When combined, the systematic 
framework organises the data in ways that separate the material from the impressions one forms and the 
tertiary levels of interpretation (Panofsky: 1970) in which one readily engages. Yet what one loses in 
the subtlety of interpretation that attending the tertiary level provides one gains in critical distance.
65
Berelson (1971) has set a number of methodological parameters that guide the application of 
this method. First, Berelson argues that content analysis can best follow the scientific research criteria 
if the operationalisation utilises systematic procedures, which integrate objective practices into the 
coding frame. Second, he argues that this principle therefore requires that the content subject to 
statistical manipulation must be of a manifest form only. Therefore, he argues that there ought to be a 
picture of the general context so that those elements that are factual and their associate meanings can be 
quantified. There is a specific departure that I make regarding the conventions of content analysis. I 
redefine my categories as systematic rather than objective. By making this shift, I wish to import the 
notion that the categories are reflexively constructed so that they connect to both the area under 
analysis and to specific community interpreters. The assumption that meaning can be 
unproblematically divided into its manifest and 'latent' forms illustrates one of the grounds on which 
positivistic applications of content analysis have been so thoroughly rejected. This is why 1 have 
endeavoured to pin my categories to those that have emerged from the postmodernist/feminist analysis. 
Therefore, my categories are not necessarily universal, but they are sufficiently public within the terms 
of the debates and critiques here to be applicable in a systematic way.
There is an additional impact that treating the categories as conventional and regular rather 
than objective has upon the status of the statistical analysis. I recognise that 'statistical analysis is only 
as good as its operationalisation', which is why the contexts, both socio-historical and linguistic, have a 
direct bearing upon the categorisation and that the specific conventions that I draw upon have been 
made as visible as possible. Therefore, I make no claim that the categories contained here are final, or 
'hard facts', or mind-independent features that reveal something 'fundamentally true'. Arguably, such 
claims were always outside the remit of content analysis. I argue only that reflexive and systematic 
application of the codes provides a context so that it is possible to engage in a critical commentary with 
the postmodernist/feminist descriptions of the gendered body.
Next, the results of such analysis cannot be extended beyond the sample population. This 
principle is one that Liess, Kline and Jhally (1986) advocate also. This means that any results obtained 
from the taxonomy cannot be extended beyond the population of fashion advertisements. Therefore, I 
make no assertions that the shifts that may occur reflect some broader shifts in the Symbolic. Abiding 
by this strict principle of application does not affect the critique made: the postmodernist/feminist 
analysis asserts that the gendered dualisms are primary and thus they must be apparent in most 
mainstream, if not all, representation. Therefore, if these dualisms are not found to organise the 
representations analysed here, this undermines their claims for the centraliry and unity of the Symbolic 
and sexual difference. Following Berelson, 1 do not seek to extend the specific features identified here 
to other forms of representation, but argue that the empirically identified manifest content contests the 
presumed universality and categorical distributions of the cultural signs in circulation.
Unlike Krippendorf (1980), Berelson (1971) argues that content analysis cannot furnish 
inferential statements regarding impact or effect of the communication. Again, Liess et al. (1986) 
equally regard this as outside the remit of content analysis. They argue that the most beneficial 
outcome of conducting a content analysis is derived from the patterns that emerge from processing 
large sample sizes. This also stands in opposition to other forms of analysis proposed by Cartwright
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(1953 in Berelson:1971), for example, who advocates the extension of content analysis to behaviour 
observation, such as 'NVC' studies in psychology. This hits at the centre of the debates concerning 
content analysis among its practitioners: whether content analysis should and can provide inferences 
regarding the encoding process and what the audiences do with the product. Following Berelson and 
Leiss et al., I argue this extends content analysis beyond its remit; coding observation removes the 
centrality of conscious intentional meaning that combines with the embodied performance, which does 
not lend itself to quantification.
I have also queried the inferential relationship presumed between representation and identity 
by arguing that the descriptive detail of an image is insufficient to describe the 'effects' on, formation 
of or interpretations of the subject. This reflects both my theoretical concerns of tracing the general 
contours of a group of gender representation, as well as providing defining limits of what a 'survey' 
application can reveal. I will make the case below that advertisements function through simplification 
of the social world and thus do not operate through anything like the same complexity of exchange that 
marks streams of interactions within the lived social world. I make no claims that what is presented 
here is 'a definitive statement' on the representations under consideration. This is not, therefore, the 
only way these images could be approached.
Shapiro and Markoff argue:
the effort to analyse a society or personality, or to learn something of importance about it 
exclusively by means of a content analysis of some of its literary products, is, in our view, 
based upon much more questionable methodological principles than the more modest (but 
sufficiently difficult) effort to measure one or more variables by means of some kind of 
processing of the text. (1997:17)
In other words, grappling with meaning is not a sufficient base from which to make inferences about 
interpretive activities or the formation of subjectivities. This suggests that perhaps what caused content 
analysis to lose favour is not just the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in the model of signification, 
but that it had been extended beyond its proper parameters. Content analysis tended to shift from 
identifying stereotypes to tracing the effects in the formation of sexual character; for example the 
output of the Social Roles journal.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
However, demarcating more clearly the appropriate domain of application may improve 
matters, but it falls short of answering the deeper critique that semiotics launches, particularly those 
regarding the nature of meaning: semiotics refutes that meaning can be captured when communication 
is broken down into discrete categories of form and content. The central methodological departure that 
semiotics introduces is that meaning is an internal structure. The object of analysis is therefore to learn 
how the signifier, or the material vehicle, carries the signified to the interpreter. This is said to 
constitute a paradigmatic departure because it rejects outright the notion that meaning can be manifest
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or on the surface (Dyer: 1993; Leiss et al: 1986). The semiotic model argues that meaning is dependent 
upon the place of any particular item within an entire system. Thus, isolating any element significantly 
alters the meaning of that element, as well as the whole structure. For example, it may well be the 
connotive feature of the sign that is the centre of the meaning, but this connotation is secured only 
through its relationship; 'BEANZ MEANZ HEINZ', for example. This is partly countered by the 
appeal to the distinction between the denotative and the connotative. The denotation aims to trace a 
particular concept or category upon which the connotation was placed. Thus, all significations are of 
this form (denotative) or a derivative of this form (connotative). However, the Sausserian distinction 
that separates the signifier from the signified is a theoretical distinction only: the meaning is both 
elements at the same time (Barthes: 1978). Moreover, as each derivative develops it builds up these 
associations, wherein each single signifier generates several signifies in succession. Thus each concept 
has a chain of potential associations, each one building up chains of its own so much that the 
immediate mental concept or denotation becomes more abstract, in the end, the denotation can be 
impossible to find as it is encompassed by ever more meaning. The denotative object or concept can no 
longer be merely itself. Thus, stable categories cannot be isolated from this chain because they are in 
effect the workings of the content and the connotation. It queries whether the object can maintain the 
meaning of what it merely is.
This is the main area of the critique that is launched at content analysis: one cannot isolate a 
category because it is 'taking over' play of implied, connotative meaning. Moreover, it is argued that 
the connotative meaning increasingly assumes central position, that is, the Symbolic order is primary. 
For example, Sawschuk (1989) examines an advertisement from a Dior campaign and draws our 
attention to two elements. First, she addresses the gendering of the word 'Coloniales', which she argues 
signifies woman as the colonised subject at the same time as she is elevated to the level of the exotic. 
Second, she draws attention to the headscarf, which with closer inspection is in fact the flower 
anthurium. She argues that the centrality of the flower is not one of illusion necessarily but has to do 
with the phallic signification of the stamen. Thus, the connotative takes centre stage, defining the 
meanings by which the woman's face is encoded, which requires both the flower to be the substituted 
phallus and the feminine 'e' to anchor the meaning of the image. This displaces the importance of 
quantity or frequency because the meaning of the items within the message has no understandable 
context, without establishing their interrelation.
However, implicit within this model of signification is the notion that meaning cannot be 
stable. Only the combination of the context and the specific interactions of the signifier and signified 
can trace meaning. This may well be the base from which all meaning emerges once the prepositional 
foundations of objectivist models of language are rejected. However, this needs to be combined with 
the fact that even simple statements are derived from the same interactions, but they are nevertheless a 
stable feature of social interactions, so that we do not treat basic categories of language as problematic 
(Goffman; Lakoff; Eco). If we cannot treat language as regular, conventional and stable, that is, stable 
enough to count certain examples, then we are rejecting the notion that meaning is ready at hand
60 This also gives an indication of the case with which difference has been brought into the analysis of 
commercial culture.
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(Cavell: 1995). This implies that each set of interactions is equally specific. If this were the case, there 
can be no generalisable or conventional features to meaning, each meaning being singular and new. 
This seems to negate the public and conventional nature of meaning, that is, meaning that is in social 
circulation. I argue that convention is central to how meaning operates, in fact, to how anything is 
meaningful at all (Cavell: 1995; Taylor: 1985). It is in this sense that I have emphasised that content 
analysis (a) must be confined to the manifest features and (b) provides no evidence from which to make 
inferences beyond the sample population. To this I add that as competent linguistic users, we can 
practically apply a category at its denotative level, even if in effect this is an artificial distinction in the 
production of meaning (Cavell: 1995). Even if meaning cannot be finalised, this does not mean that 
meaning can never be stable and thus treated as foundational for pragmatic reasons (Benhabib: 1992).
Yet this does not clarify when semiotics is an essential method and when content analysis is 
appropriate. When is the meaning conventional and when is it more complex, thus requiring an analysis 
of its specificities? I turn briefly to the three levels of meaning to which Panofsky (1970) refers in order 
to elucidate how we might differentiate them. 51 The first level he develops is described as that of the 
primary subject matter, which consists of lights, colour, shape and movement, that is, those features 
that contribute to the elementary understanding of representation, whether of people, objects, gestures, 
poses or expressions and the interrelations that comprise events. This level of meaning corresponds 
well with the notion of manifest meaning, which operates on the surface. I argue that content analysis is 
able to contend with this level of meaning. The secondary level is associated with the more complex 
composite and conventional sets of meaning that relate to the wider culture. He gives the examples of 
particular motifs that are linked to themes and concepts. These motifs combine to form sets of images 
and combinations of images that form stories and allegories. Where my codes connect to the wider 
culture they do so because they have been drawn out from the various semiotic readings, and belong to 
and are recognised by a specific community with whom I am in contention. Finally, Panofsky describes 
the level of meaning that is most complex as the intrinsic meaning that combines with underlying 
principles, which reveal the basic attitudes of a nation, a period, class and so forth. This is comparable 
to Gadamer's notion of the interpretive horizon (1975).
This model establishes some boundaries between levels of meaning to which content analysis 
can be applied and the levels of meaning that can be grasped only by semiotics. Clearly, opting for a 
systematic approach to the content of advertisements is necessarily at the expense of the more subtle 
and deeper engagement with meaning that semiotics provides. However, this in itself is insufficient 
grounds to reject content analysis, since it mirrors, in a sense, the 'cost benefit' analysis between 
quantitative and qualitative research: a strength of one is the weakness of the other. When images are 
treated as a population, we are able to identify generalised trends: when images are examined 
singularly, we are able to trace the interactions required for the production of meaning. We exchange 
the 'what' of the image for the 'how' of the image. Yet, despite the strength of semiotics in exploring 
how meanings connect and interact, it nevertheless faces problems also. My main criticism refers to the 
absence of a systematic methodological approach with which much of this form of analysis is
61 Panofsky's study applies specifically to his analysis of paintings, but I think as a guide it is 
applicable to most symbolic artefacts.
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undertaken within Cultural Studies as a whole. One should never generalise from specific and limited 
examples, however valid the data furnished.
Returning to the historical emergence of semiotics within Cultural Studies, I have embedded 
this within the broad contours of representation that the survey of the images, that is, content analysis, 
had established. However, what occurs now is that single images, sometimes a few, are selected and 
analysed in such a way that they are assumed to describe the macro ordering of ideology. The examples 
analysed are then taken as examples of the (re)presentation of ideological forces. At no point have the 
images selected gone through any systematic procedures. Unlike in qualitative analysis in the social 
sciences, those interviewed have been systematically selected from the relevant sample population. The 
findings that are generated out of these unstructured interviews are extended beyond the specific 
individuals; that is, the results are high in validity, because of the strict sampling procedures initially 
followed. Therefore, the small sample co-exists in regard to its relationship with the wider population. 
In no cases during my literature research was I introduced to reasons why these particular images were 
selected. Therefore, there are no checks or balances in place with which to prevent the selection from 
being guided, consciously or otherwise, precisely because they are instances that reflect their model of 
argument. For example, in Krocker and Krocker's Panic Bodies (1988), Faurshou and Sawchuck both 
selected the same Christian Dior advertisement to show that the feminine and the oriental are both the 
Other to the Law of the Father. Alternatively, Doane (1988), Cowie (1997) and Mayne (1993) have all 
undertaken analysis of /Vow Voyager. This surely carries the implication that the advertisement was 
picked because it demonstrates the argument, rather than forming or adjusting the argument as a result 
of the empirical evidence.
Second, I argue that the postmodernist/feminist applications of semiotics, applied as part of a 
broader ideological critique, readily make inferences regarding the effects upon subject (position 
formed). This is why psychoanalysis is central to their model of argument. They use it and the 
meanings produced through the Symbolic both as the base by which the image functions and the base 
by which the image can be assumed to be representative; the latter being premised upon the 
universality of the Oedipal story and its subsequent organisation of the feminine as passive. Therefore, 
they are using an analysis of how meaning is formed and extending it inferentially to describe the 
identification process the subject positions constituted. I argue that this is equally beyond the remit of 
semiotics.
Therefore, the appropriateness of content analysis rests with the following issues: what sort of 
meaning is produced within the form of the advertisement?; how do we get a handle on the various 
levels of meaning to which a systematic analysis is appropriate? First, I argue that advertisements are 
not defined by high levels of complexity and that the blanket term of'text' obscures the considerable 
differences between them and thus the appropriate methods to analyse them. Second, the 
methodological link between the complexity and subtlety of the tertiary level and the regular manifest 
levels of meaning, with which I argue advertisements deal, is convention. A successful advertisement is 
one where the targeted consumer connects the commodifying meaning to the product in question. Next, 
where advertisements tell stories, in this case about what men and women are, they do so by drawing 
from the complex flow of gendered interactions, condensing them so that they are readily identified and
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presenting them back as realistic versions of those interactions. Barthes (1972) argues that this is how 
advertisements contribute the production of modern myths, while Goffman (1979) upon whom I 
explicitly draw, defines this as the hyper-ritualisation. However, before I discuss in more detail the 
relationship between the advertisement and the social presentations made, I will describe the sampling 
procedure and the population source and define the categories operationalised.
Essentially this entails a defence of counting the respective frequencies of the codes as they 
occur on the bodies of men and women. I counter the charge that the categories I have developed are 
merely an interpretive imposition in two ways: first, a significant number of the categories in fact 
identify only the body position, posture and so on that are featured within the two-dimensional frame; 
second, where more complex codes have been used, these draw upon publicly accepted codes that are 
recognised as central to representation of the genderised active/passive dualism. The codes are 
therefore either drawn from embodied categories (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson: 1987) or 
reference directly ideological patterns that the postmodernist/feminist programme identifies as key to 
the (re)presentation of the feminine as passive.
To question the homogenised description of postmodernism/feminism requires attending anew 
to the manifest content of representations. Therefore, I aim to challenge directly the closures identified 
above in three distinct ways:
1. If the gendered dichotomy is operative in the way postmodernists/feminists define it, then this 
ought to be readily available to interpretation, by which 1 mean that it ought to be 'on the surface' 
rather than requiring complex semiotic readings from all readers. The abstractions that stipulate 
that representation is an outcome of a phallic order of signification are the primary target.
2. It is necessary to re-engage with what an image 'is'. Goffrnan argues that in order to understand its 
relationship to power it is necessary to pay attention to its resource, its production, which is 
dependent upon those resources, and the cultural meanings involved in the latter; I therefore query 
that the power lies in the image.
3. The abstractions dissipate the body as an entity and, in consequence, the body as locus of action is 
dispelled. I return the body by examining what the body must do to be self-evidently passive, that 
is, identifying how the body performs the supposedly determining dualism. I therefore seek to 
trace the manifest content by examining how the body itself performs these presentational features.
In this way, the taxonomy pays specific attention to the visual conventions of the body - what is the 
body doing when it does passivity? - which are combined with the specific conventions of the image.
I have organised the masculine and feminine according to the ways the body is conventionally 
positioned and what the body must do visually to perform the semiotic effect of passivity, as well as 
looking at 'who' does that performance. I have attempted to take a step back to see anew what might be 
involved in this accomplishment. This directly reflects the influence of Goffman's examination of the 
'presentation self (1969) when it is re-cast into the domain of representation (1974). By emphasising 
the materiality of the body, I have sought to use it as a base, thereby starting with 'body as action' 
rather than the 'body as system outcome'. I break down the broader ideological contours to identify the
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units of the body that combine to produce them. Therefore, the emphasis is placed upon what the 
corporeal body can do in presentation, instead of treating it as the outcome of representation. I seek to 
shift the emphasis a little by considering the ways in which the body is involved in the representation 
and then locate this representation back into the social world. In this way, I want to think of the 
representation and its impact in terms of locations in social action where poses may be taken up, 
perhaps in different domains of social interaction. This shifts the emphasis away from merely defining 
our postures as the outcome of a prior representation. Thinking about the active body introduces a 
space wherein we transform ourselves, perhaps only minimally by ridding the posture of its artifice, but 
at least acknowledging that we are competent users and interpreters of those presentations. I propose 
that we ought to consider inverting the direction of causes, namely that we have the representations we 
do because they rely upon our conventions of embodied interaction. This is, in effect, what I mean 
when I say that we should not only examine the body as system or structural outcome.
As well as addressing the specific features of the body and its codes, I have also drawn upon 
various codes identified by postmodernism/feminism. My aim here is to apply the codes and turn them 
back upon themselves, as it were, that is, use their own criteria to assess just how frequently the 
feminine is represented and codified using the soft focus, for example. A central defence of the use of 
content analysis rests on the fact that I am drawing upon a bank of established codifications, both as a 
public source by which to apply the codes, but also that the public recognition ensures that the codes 
are not merely a set of (private) discursive impositions. Postmodernist/feminist argument is dependent 
upon anchoring the code of specific sets of meaning that re-confirm the reign of the phallus. Thus, they 
have isolated codes such as soft focus, different forms of concealing the face, different direction of 
looks to demonstrate the symbolic production of the feminine as fetish, for example. The elaboration of 
a semiotic reading from specific codes is not the remit of the content analysis either. I have merely 
applied these codes on the basis that a majority ought to be prevalent and categorically distributed in 
order to make the case they do. Therefore, I mobilise their criteria to trace the potential shifts in 
representation.
FASHION ADVERTISEMENTS
The sample is confined to fashion advertising, notably because if one seeks the specific 
elaborations of a commodified and sexualised femininity within hegemonic cultural forms, one would 
expect to find it within this intensely visual domain. Therefore, I argue that this weights the analysis 
towards re-establishing categorical sexual difference. Hence, I begin with the specific elements that 
relate to feminist critique. First, fashion directly links the presentation of femininity to the economic 
realm. Second, the advertisement can utilise almost any social scene, be it within the public or private 
domain, because clothes are a universal feature of social life. Therefore the image makers have at their 
disposal a whole range of ideological tools (Lash and Urry:1994; Featherstone: 1982:1991; 
Wernick: 1991 Jameson: 1984), for example, placing single women in the domestic sphere and always 
accompanied by men in public space (Goffman:1979). Third, fashion is a central domain for the 
institution of various disciplines imposed upon the female body, particularly dieting regimes. This links
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directly with other contemporary debates on the health of body, for example the stiletto heel: the shoe 
damages the foot as well as altering the position and shape of the spin, thus placing it under 
considerable strain (Bordo;1993; Sawschuk in Krockerand Krocker: 1989). Fourth, by examining 
fashion one is able to integrate the foundation of postmodernist/feminist critique to the wider normative 
assumptions regarding the essential feminine body. This is the 'real and natural body' that is subject to 
distortion and control in order to meet the aesthetic of extreme thinness that renders the real woman's 
body child-like.
Regarding more broadly sociological issues, considering fashion firmly locates us within the 
problem of the body for it signals the possibilities for intentional elaboration of the body as a 
manipulable, material surface and form within certain social structural possibilities. Not only is the 
latter signalled by the increasing capacity of people to integrate various commodities into a specific 
style, but it also marks the entry of social structure in that this governs the sense that can be made of the 
development of a style. This connects back to the position outlined above that signs are manipulable 
within highly regular and structured contexts. Moreover, it reveals the extent to which the corporeal 
body forms a significant base to these practices (Shilling: 1993).
An additional and distinctly sociological interrogation of the body also makes its point for 
entry here: clothes remain a central and regular practice undertaken to accomplish accurate sex 
assignment. Plucking eyebrows; shaving legs; walking in way that makes wearing high heels possible, 
which impacts upon the muscle development in the legs; wearing skirts which alter how one can sit, 
especially if it is short; colour; the way the shirt buttons up: these are all common-sense, relatively 
unseen features of accomplishing gender. As we all pre-reflexively assign sex where genital 
confirmation is not possible, the detail of'sex' that we read every day is carried by the clothes we wear 
(Kesslerand McKenna:1978; Kessler:1994: Garfmkel:1967). The unquestioning commitment we have 
to 'two absolute sexes, and that I am most definitely one' is carried through the clothes with which we 
perform our gender. For example, breasts are more frequently used to convey a social gender than to 
perform a specific biological function. Thus, clothes play a central role in the discursive construction of 
sex upon which the decisions as to what clothes we wear is built, as well as the kind of femininity a 
woman may want to perform. Thus, clothes are central to 'keying' or practical and performative 
accomplishment of sex.
MAGAZINE SAMPLE
The magazines chosen are Cosmopolitan, Arena, The Face and i-D 62 They have the same 
target audience age of 18 to 35 years. There are no lifestyle magazines targeted solely at men outside 
this target age group and also there are no lifestyle magazines of comparable genre that are targeted at 
both men and women outside this age group like The Face for example. Arena and Cosmopolitan are 
single-sex magazines. Both magazines contain generic features on fashion, style, interviews, reviews as 
well as tips on who should wear what, on what sorts of figures and so on. Cosmopolitan magazine
62 In addition, I could also be assured unrestricted access as they are all held at national libraries, as 
well as avoiding the conditions of use that are often imposed by the magazines' libraries.
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describes itself as 'an intelligent woman's sparkling best friend. Punchy, provocative, and pertinent 
articles that inform and entertain'.63 Thus, it sets up its discourse as being for and about the 
'independent woman'. It is published by National Magazine Company, one of the biggest publishing 
houses in the UK, which also has a sizeable share of the US market. The recorded circulation figures 
for Cosmopolitan magazine are large at 456,131 readers (Willing* Press Guide, 1996). Clearly, then, it 
has significant power within the market, suggesting that it secures the most hegemonic configurations 
out of the magazines selected; defined as such by its market position and the assumption that it serves 
'sectional interests'. Cosmopolitan is, arguably, an example of how the commercialisation of the 
discourse of feminism has co-opted and de-politicised the feminist agenda by making feminism an 
issue of lifestyle.
An additional reason for selecting Cosmopolitan is that it is the prototype of young women's 
magazines. It was launched in 1971 and has been central in the production of the 'young woman who 
can have it all'. This sample has been extended back to 1975, which indicates how the representation 
seems to have shifted since then. The cases assessed will be examined through a number of key clusters 
in order to tease out some sense of shifting formations of femininity in a magazine that has a privileged 
position in defining femininity.
The other three magazines reflect different market shares, as well as supplying both the youth 
and men's markets. Arena magazine describes itself as 'general interest magazine for men on the arts, 
film and fashion'. This magazine has built up a reputation among its target audience as being for the 
professional single man who takes an 'interest in all things cultured' while maintaining his 'straight' 
sexuality (Mort: 1996:Nixon: 1996). The Face and i-D are youth magazines read by both men and 
women. The latter emphasises style and fashion, and concentrates on youth sub-cultures, such as the 
dance scene. Both these magazines are self-consciously stylistic in the sense that they have redrawn the 
boundaries between the mundane, design and mass culture by bringing slick design and presentation to 
the layout and interviews. 64 They do not contain generic features such as problem pages or guides to 
achieving a flat stomach in ten weeks (see Men's Health magazine). Thus, of the four magazines 
chosen, two are targeted at single-sex audiences and the other two are 'style' or 'youth' magazines. As 
stated, the magazines have also been selected on the basis of their varying publishers. The Face and 
Arena magazine are both published by Wagadon Publishing Ltd.
Wagadon was launched in 1980 with The Face. This magazine was considered 'ground- 
breaking' at the time. Since then, it has come to be a middle-sized publishing company, but with 
considerable clout because of its original creative input to the magazine markets. 65 Its circulation 
figures have fallen since its heyday in the mid-1980s because of the growth of similar magazines but it 
still maintains a circulation of 107,192 (Willings, 1996). Arena magazine was launched by Wagadon in 
1986. Some difficulties were faced when it was launched as a result of the fact that men as a group 
were resistant to being identified as such, which is highly significant. As Mort (1996) argues, men were
63 Willings Press Guide, 1996. P.348. All other magazine descriptions are also derived from Willings 
Press Guide.
64 For a non-academic reference see The Guardian, 241 November 1997, or the Independent on 
Sunday, 30th November 1997.
65 See The Guardian, 24th November 1997 or Mort: 1996.
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used to being the 'One' 66 and found the prospect of being defined and identified as having distinct 
interest from cars to grooming somewhat disempowering. The circulation figure for Arena magazine is 
76,879 (Willings, 1996). i-D magazine is published by Level Print Ltd, a small publishing house. Its 
estimated circulation is about 40,000 per month (Willings, 1996). These figures suggest that it is subject 
to fewer of the commercial pressures dictated by the mass-market sector. It is also a competitor of The 
Face. This raises the issue as to whether the images contained are also non-mainstream and therefore 
outside the hegemonic concerns of culture.
Together, the magazines provide scope to analyse the extent to which representations of 
femininity and masculinity are homogeneous, irrespective of the magazine's pitch. For example, is 
there as high a frequency of macho images of men in both kinds of magazines or do the different target 
audiences affect the gendered nature of the presentations of the body? If the magazine is aimed at and 
read by men does it significantly affect the way women are portrayed compared with the way that 
women are portrayed in a women's magazine? This may reveal any differing stereotypes that one sex 
has of the other or, alternatively, how one sex wishes the other sex to be represented and thus 
consumed. Does Cosmopolitan magazine predominantly represent men as romantic heroes or as sexual 
studs, for example?
SAMPLING
The sample is made up of twenty advertisements per magazine and two magazines per year 
taken from 1975, 1985/7, 1990, 1995. The bulk of the analysis will concentrate upon the time span 
from 1985/7 to 1995.67 The sample is selected from the April and September issues. The six-month 
period helps to ensure that the results were not overly affected by the pure stylistics of the magazine, 
thus preventing any results from being an outcome of short-lived trends rather than any substantive 
shift in the modes of representation. If the former were the case, one would expect a high frequency to 
cluster around a single period. In addition, April and September were chosen because this would ensure 
a balance in the amount of flesh revealed, as these months correspond to the 'fashion seasons'. This is 
necessary in order to prevent the variable that traces patterns of sexualisation from being skewed.
The random sample was selected by counting the number of advertisements per issue and 
dividing this number by twenty. The random selection starts with the first fashion or perfume 
advertisement. Thereafter, another image, for example the third, would be selected, thereby achieving 
an evenly distributed sample of twenty images. The sample to be selected from in each magazine 
includes the inside cover through to the back cover of the magazine. The front cover of the magazine 
was not included in the sample as it has a particular semiotic construction that targets the promotion of 
the magazine's features rather than the commodities selected here. Moreover, the semiotic construction 
is more discursive in nature, using headline-like, verbal constructions that connect the magazine to sex
66 Although he provides little evidence for this. Moreover, should this not produce problems for the 
Symbolic order since 'to be the One' is an outcome of being able to define the Other?
67 The starting years 1987 and 1985 differ because the emergence of men's 'lifestyle' magazines did 
not take place until the late 1980s. Arena magazine was first published in December 1986; therefore, 
the first issue was taken from 1987.
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and relationships to broader discourses of sex. These strict selection rules were adhered to so that the 
sampling was repeated across the different magazines, ensuring that the differing magazine layouts did 
not distort the sample.
An important distinction to note is between the sampling unit and the actual cases processed. 
The sampling unit is the advertisement and the case is the individual body. I chose to select the bodies 
within an image in a bid to maintain an eye upon the relationships between them. However, this 
produced an anomaly: while twenty evenly distributed advertisements were selected, the object coded 
was the body or bodies contained within any single image. It went by unnoticed because a majority of 
the piloting had been conducted on contemporary magazines that rarely use more than one model per 
image. Hence, while the sampling frame selected twenty advertisements, this would not necessarily 
lead to the processing of twenty bodies. The outcome was a significant growth in the sample size. It 
rose from the intended 500 to the actual number of 703. However, the random sampling did also 
balance out the case distribution across the magazines. The average number of total cases per magazine 
was 158.25. The largest deviation from the mean was 171. Thus, there is a relatively even distribution. 
To reiterate, the decision to select the advertisement as the unit of analysis stems from the aim to 
identify the relative positions and status between the models within each sampling unit. I sought to 
maintain a holistic sense of the image as a whole. While the method collates the relative distributions, 
an attempt to convey a more complex set of interconnections was inappropriate. This is discussed in 
more detail when variable twenty-four is considered.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The logic behind the categorisations is to produce frequency data from which information 
about the relative distributions of the codes of body elaboration between the male and female figures 
can be ascertained. The object of the statistical analysis is to examine the extent to which the 
independent variable (sex) determines the frequencies of the dependent variables (codes of body 
elaboration). The operationalisation of the taxonomy is such that only nominal frequency data can be 
recorded, consequently, I use chi-square as the statistical test because it places no upper limit on the 
size of the tabulation. This test evaluates whether the difference between the observed frequencies and 
expected frequencies under the null hypothesis can be attributedio factors other than sampling 
fluctuations or to factors other than chance. Chi-square is a test of difference that shows whether the 
distributions are statistically significant. Significance is judged by the score, which if of a certain value, 
strongly states that a relationship exists between the variables measured.
Note also that the variables are unrelated. Thus, the framework does not measure the differing 
response of the same subject to various sets of conditions and this excludes the possible use of stronger 
inferential statistics. Unlike correlation, it cannot describe how one variable affects another, be it in a 
positive or negative direction. The chi-square test states only whether a relationship exists or not. 
Inferential statistics like correlation are able to identify overall trends as to where or with which 
variables the significance lies; chi-square does not. Therefore, where a difference is measurable, it is 
insufficient to secure the endurance of the dualisms in question. For example, statistical significance
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may be a result of marked difference where the masculine has a higher frequency of'looking down and 
to the side', a code that we associate with the feminine. Chi does not describe relationships thus and we 
cannot assume that the difference confirms the persistence of the gendered dichotomy. Therefore, when 
difference is statistically significant, 1 have taken care to relate this to distributions of each individual 
code in order to avoid assuming that the distributions reflect the conventions of the gendered code.
Furthermore, my concern is not to produce inferential statistics as this would entail developing 
a model of sexual scales or stereotypes. These models of sexual scales, no matter how detailed they 
become, are effective only insofar as they rely implicitly upon sexual dimorphism (Maccoby and 
Jacklin-,1975). I reject the operationalisation of sexual scales68 because they most often reproduce the 
integrity of the masculine and feminine sexual types: correlations like 'the slimmer the model, the more 
feminine' by definition maintain the dichotomous sets of associations. Connell argues that the 
operationalisation of much sex scales research is ostensibly responsible for the 'confirmation' and 
endurance of the internal unity of category of femininity.69 Any results found are dependent upon the 
prior legitimacy of the measures, that is, they are dependent upon assuming that only femininity is 
defined and measurable through thinness. As this logic is extended, it means that different measures for 
the masculine are operationalised. At best, scales can describe stereotypical expectations. They cannot 
describe gender because most of the traits selected for analysis describe most men and women at some 
time or other. For example, stereotypically we ascribe aggression to the masculine. Thus, the 
codification reflects the dimorphic logic because the masculine is all of these things and the feminine is 
a different set of traits. Even if this staggered into a scale so that the respondent or image is measured 
by 'more or less' masculine, it still presumes that this trait or code 'belongs' to the masculine and by 
implication is not of the feminine. Hence, the prior operationalisation rules out that the masculine may 
be equally associated with thinness. Different frequencies in distribution are seemingly entrenched 
because the male and the female are always assessed with different criteria (see Millum; 1976). In 
contradistinction, the categories operationalised here are not defined as masculine or feminine prior to 
data collection, instead any potential difference is established by the actual distributions themselves. 
Potentially, therefore, this could reflect either categorical difference or gender plurality. Hence, the test 
of association describes numerical relationships between the distributions produced.
The last departure concerns the convention of refuting the null hypothesis. Quantitative 
research stipulates that the null hypothesis be phrased thus: there is no relationship between the IV (the 
sex of the model) and the DV (the codes used to represent it). The outcome, however, is that 
researchers are bound to find difference in order to have a body of results. This is particularly important 
in undertaking gender research because it has the unintended result of seeking to find sexual difference 
rather than similarity. I do not seek to prove or disprove anything, contrariwise, my aim is purely 
descriptive. I do not claim to explain how ideology connects to the social world by conducting a 
content analysis. I seek only to trace the frequency of use of the categories that 
postmodernists/feminists assume to be universally present and categorically distributed. Thus, my aim 
is not to describe the correlation or make casual connections, but rather to identify if the differences in
68 This aims to bring Connell's analysis of sexual scales to bear on the method.
69 R. W. Connell, p. 171
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the frequencies are due to factors other than chance. Neither therefore do I define what those factors 
may be. To reiterate, the single most important shift to the operationalisation is not to organise the 
codes into masculine and feminine types or groups. I have elected to allow the results to define what is 
a masculine code, a feminine one, or whether, in fact, it is empirically used equally across both body 
types. This research is particularly interested in exploring latter possibility.
DATA AND ITS ORGANISATION
The package allows the coding frame to be programmed in such a way that if certain prior 
cases were recorded it would automatically mean that some questions would be excluded in the future. 
This is one reason for the varying sample sizes across the differing variables. The pre-programmed 
exclusions ensure greater accuracy and save time (see Cottle:1997 www.Soc. Res. Online). As stated, 
the extent of detail in the taxonomy was included to ensure that any potential variability was recorded. 
The detail was also maintained because the package can be re-programmed so that those categories 
with an expected value of five or less could be merged together, which then enables those cases to be 
statistically assessed. Only those categories that are mutually exclusive can be combined. For example, 
twisting away and twisting forward may be merged together because the body can be only one or the 
other. They can either re-group in a more general category or merge into the 'other' category.
Note that the tabulated data included in the next chapter has a slightly different format from 
the original. This is operative only within a previously designated variable. The amalgamated cells are 
entitled 'derived'. It was necessary to do this, as the detail of the coding frame was not required. As 
stated above, the extent of the detail was included in order that the regularity or variability of the image 
could be traced rather than imposed by pre-determined codifications. The rearrangement of the variable 
can be examined as it is included in the appendix. Care has been taken to ensure that any 
amalgamations made are done so in accordance with the logic of the taxonomy. Moreover, I have 
ensured that each of the sub-variables that have been collapsed together is not counted twice as a 
frequency.
KEY PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TAXONOMY
As stated, I have generated a number of codes that target the body in order to examine what 
the body must do to perform femininity. For this, I have drawn heavily upon Goffman's analysis of the 
body and its performance within the visual form, as well as Goffman's notion that the naturalistic 
within representation can function only through its artifice. He argues that this is necessary to make 
visible or accessible the myriad of behavioural styles that we use but do not recognise: 70
these expressions turn out to be illustrations of ritual like behaviour which portray an ideal 
conception of the two sexes and their structural relationship to each other, accomplishing this
70 This reflects Goffman's indebtedness to Wittgenstein's notion of the social and linguistic 
background.
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in part by indicating, again ideally, the alignment of the actor in the social situation. 
(Goffman: 1979:89)
His central tenet therefore proposes that the veneer of social reality in the advertisement is produced by 
the codification practices of hyper-ritualisation. Hyper-ritualisation encompasses the intensification of 
standardised and simplified forms of ritual taken from social life. Moreover, we can take this process as 
real (but temporarily only) because of the absence of complex cues that define embodied social 
interaction that extends through time. Advertisements work, he argues, by condensing social scenes 
that make them available for immediate consumption. They are idealised representations under the 
auspices of the way things really are. So, when a man lights a cigarette for a woman the presupposition 
is that the female is worthy of his assistance, yet this assistance implies that she is limited in some way 
and that she should be helped out with even the simplest things. The fact that this is taken up from 
rituals performed in real life and then magnified is not sufficient to collapse the distinction between the 
social world and the representation. Nor is it sufficient to assume that, because the social act is 
magnified in the ritualisation, the status differentials represented do not draw upon real differentials in 
status within the corpus of display from which the code is drawn. By linking the two fields through 
convention, Goffman introduces a foundation that is sociologically sensitive because he uses our 
standard practices as the stable contexts, which he then transforms, through hyper-ritualisation, making 
them distinct from the resources from which they are drawn.
The notion of ritualisation relates more broadly to the idea that advertisements belong to a 
system of social communication that draws directly upon symbolic forms of behaviour as a resource. 
This genre creates meaningful visual constructs by compressing common sense and familiar features of 
the social world. Hence, they reference, but do not mirror, many of the conventional features of 
embodied interaction that we depend upon all the time. In a sense, one can consider these meaningful 
constructs as part of our vocabulary of body display. Nevertheless, argues Goffman, while realist forms 
make a resource from this vocabulary, they can make the constructs visible only by grossly 
exaggerating them. This returns to the social world because they bring into view things that we 
essentially take for granted. Hence, the rituals are recognisable but they are not the same.
In addition, Goffman draws attention to regularity of the modes of display used. Again, this 
differentiates embodied display from those represented insofar as the conventionalised elements are 
considerably more limited in range. This establishes an anomaly in that the images may 'look' like we 
do, but only by radically simplifying what we do. Goffrnan's formula, which I have used here, argues 
that advertisements use units that stylise a scene'and social display, which key into our systems of 
recognition; for example gestalts, poses, gestures, expressions and props. In effect, we are able to use 
our social competencies, more or less pre-reflexively, as part of our imaginative projections that 
connect primary gestalts to visual and socialised space. Together, these form conceptual units that 
emerge from close visual analysis to produce the identification of recurrent patterns of portrayal. The 
conceptual units in themselves, once formed as part of the coding frame, become 'abstract notions from 
an empirical perspective' (Jhally: 1990:146) and, once abstracted, the codes cannot return to the 
background whence they came.
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THE CODES OF THE BODY
The taxonomy includes twenty-seven variables. The number of codes within each category is 
variable. The sub-categories number approximately 350. All the variables have 'other' included unless 
it could be categorically assured that no unanticipated cases could occur. These included the time span 
of the sample, the sample magazines and the commodities included, namely perfume and fashion items. 
Note that the detail of the commodity promoted was not included, despite recognising that it may alter 
the codification of the image under analysis. This is because a single photograph could have any 
number of items on display on one model. In addition, piloting highlighted that there were instances 
when the particular fashion item for sale was highly obscured. Identification was always possible 
because of the anchorage of the fashion label. Thus, the style of the image is entirely dependent upon 
the model's body, which suggests that there is an intensification of the commodification and 
sexualisation processes in the images. As stated, the operationalisation of the taxonomy was tightly 
integrated to the categories traced by existing and accepted research subject to critique here.
Variable one71 begins with the sex of the body, which is classified as either 'male' or 'female', 
'androgynous' or 'other'. The identification of the sex of the model uses the everyday methods by 
which sex is assigned in social activity, given that genital inspection is not possible (Garfinkel:1967; 
Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:2000). Thus, assignment was fundamentally premised upon that 
background knowledge we use, yet do not 'know', to assign sex. Code three classifies those instances 
where a part of the body is photographed, without any particular phenomenological key to its sex, or it 
excludes other common forms of cultural elaboration that conventionally assign sex. I am particularly 
interested in the codification used to make the gender of the body apparent, namely the secondary and 
territory sexual characteristics by which most sex assignment is undertaken. These are guided by the 
conventions of the sexed body so that if one were to describe a body as having developed muscle on 
the arm and as seated with the legs wide open, we are much more likely to assign the male sex to that 
body than the female sex. If the body turned out to be that of the female, we would tend to treat it as an 
'exception' that proves the rule. This is the basic conventional level to which the taxonomy attends. 
This connects with Goffman's model by drawing upon our social practices of gender and magnifying 
these elements in order that we key the appropriate sex assignment within representation. For example, 
the model with its back to the camera will use a number of overt codifications so that we are able to 
assign the model a sex, when many of these secondary and tertiary features are missing as a result of 
the body position. Thus, they magnify the elements of'normal sexed body'. These presentational 
features, which are treated as evidence for the truth of sex, are conventional practices at the secondary 
and tertiary level that Agnes72 proved to be a master.
Variable two counts the number of bodies included in the image, which includes 'single body', 
'mixed-sex/single-sex couples' through to 'groups'. This variable is central for the identification of the
71 For more detailed description of each individual code and the rules of its application, see Appendix
B.
72 Agnes showed how sex is accomplished in interaction because she successfully passed as a woman. 
See 'Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person, part 1' (pp. 116-85) 
and especially the 'postscript' in Garfinkel, op. cit.
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extent to which advertisements are still noticeably marked by the heterosexist imperative. I argue that 
staging the body within this frame provides the central context that readily anchors both the 
active/passive elements of the dichotomy but also secures the marginalisation of homosexual 
relationships and homoerotic desire more generally. In terms of the latter, I am drawing directly upon 
Lewis and Rolley's (1997) notion of coupling as a means to access lesbian desire. Logically this can be 
extended to gay desire patterns also. Combining the female sexed model with the male sexed is the 
simplest way of securing normalisation of the heterosexuality. From this context, many other elements 
of the gendered dichotomy can be secured with the use of further codification. The ownership and 
direction of the gaze are of central importance here.
Variable three identifies the ratio of white models to minority ethnic models used. This 
variable seeks to identify the extent to which Britain's black population has become visible within the 
frame of the body beautiful and, if so, to trace the extent to which the ethnicity of the body significantly 
affects the coding of the body idiom, especially the extent of sexualisation and nudity (see Nayak:1997; 
hooks: 1981; 1992; 1996; Young: 1995; Hoch:1979; Kaplan: 1997). Potentially, it is possible to trace the 
extent to which the overt sexual codification is also racialised, by combining the language of desire and 
excess of the advertising genre73 to the excess assigned to the black body. The assignment of ethnicity 
in this category again uses the background knowledge through which the Black body is produced and 
labelled in everyday life. White and black are discursive productions that deal with and remove the 
actual ambiguity of embodiment; thus, the background as the criterion for the categorisation does not 
negate that fact that there are an infinite number of ambiguities within ethnicity. The categories are not 
independent of the discourse of the everyday where they function. There is no 'truth' to the categories, 
they are instead the common-sense meanings through which they function, regardless of the fact of the 
black body.74 Again, basic 'keying' or 'common sense' labelling processes are used (Goffman:1974).
Variable four identifies the product advertised, either a perfume or fashion item. This variable 
considers whether the kind of commodity significantly affects the sorts of coding that the body idiom 
undergoes. While it will not be subject to specific analysis, I have included a differentiation between 
the commodities in order to ensure that included in the sample is the specific visual relationship 
between the commodity and the body included as part of the overall sample. For example, it introduces 
the scope for extensive use of nudity, as well as including a particularly intense form of 
commodification in that the smell must be awarded a social and cultural significance. In addition, it 
provides a space to assess the endurance of a codification to which Goffman explicitly draws attention, 
namely the extension of the object, its delicacy, for example, through the combination of the product 
and the fragility of the feminine caress (Goffman: 1979:29). The product placement by means of 
emphasis established by the touch not only enhances the product placement but also genderises the
73 Again drawn from Liess, Kline and Jhally, who historically locate their analysis within the shifts in 
the pitch of the advertisement. In the first half of the book, they address the expansion of language of 
desire that is coterminous with the decline of the functional language. In essence, they argue that the 
shift represents a move from 'what can the product do?' to 'how does this product make me feel?'
74 Again, this reflects my overall resistance to the scepticism that often accompanies discursive 
analysis. There is a materiality to the body upon which racism works, which is quite unlike the 
discursive construction of patterns of desire.
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product and the model. However, these sorts of issues will be examined within the respective 
codifications rather than leading with the product type. 75
The fifth variable, entitled 'model', traces the relationship between the model and any 
potential commodity or prop, for example, bodily subjugation to a perfume bottle. Here the body itself 
is made to shadow the shape of the bottle. The variable seeks only to count the number of cases where 
the model has control of the commodity and the cases where the model is subjugated to the prop or 
commodity. Thus, it seeks to identify only the generalised trends of the positioning of the model 
(Millum: 1975:189). Sampling revealed that this mode of codification is conventional and thus utilises a 
series of standardised visual techniques to commodify the body, of which the example above is one of 
the most common. The second mechanism to define the general patterns of power to objects, space and 
props traces the gendered dichotomy according to the relationship the model has with his or her 
surroundings. As discussed above, the core guiding rule for this variable is the extent to which the 
model could said to be in control of his or her environment. Thus, the male who is located in the office 
is often presented giving instructions to the (female) secretary. To reiterate, the significance of fashion 
advertising is that clothes have a ubiquitous presence within social interaction. Therefore, the potential 
of very diverse settings and narratives is considerable. Note, clothes have not been automatically coded 
as subjugating the model because this tends to conflate clothing items that differ in their potential to be 
dominatory. For example, excessively frilly clothes lock the female model directly into the traditions of 
hegemonic, emphasised femininity, in the way that dungarees worn by a female do not, in the sense 
that they are not conventionally gendered, nor do they hinder or dictate the movement, sitting position 
and so forth (Connell: 1987:183-7). I am not concerned with the particular item of clothing but rather 
the relationship to social status and the presentations of gendered made through it.
Variable six begins by locating the body in the projection of space, if a naturalistic mode, or 
on the two-dimensional pl'ane, if not. The codes range from 'dominating the frame' through to 'less 
than %'. The amount of space therefore reflects the length of shot but also keys into the symbolic 
organisation of the two-dimensional plane. For example, if the woman occupies half of the two- 
dimensional plane and the man occupies only a third, conventionally, we would align this to her greater 
visibility compared to the male. Contrariwise, if the male is made more central, we would expect this to 
be accompanied by additional codification that aligns his position with power. These first sets of codes 
aim to contextualise the other modes of codification. In most normal cases the bigger the space 
occupied, the more central that figure is made. A notable exception to this is that the first code 
'dominates frame entirely'. Here the body dominates the frame of the image, which has the effect of 
bringing the body to the surface of the picture frame. The gaze is able to linger upon the detail of the
flesh.
This is followed by a series of codes that trace the relative location of the sexed model in 
space. The codification is based upon the conventional spatial orientations by which we live; for 
example, we talk of a lowly serf; we look up to role models (Lakoff and Johnson: 1980; Johnson: 1987). 
Likewise, if the male is predominately in the centre of the frame, it places the female in a secondary
75 For the proportion of the sample that is made up of perfume and clothes items, please see Appendix 
C.
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relationship to the space within the image, identified in codes 'centre' and 'off-centre'. The fact that the 
centre is of primary importance remains a part of the cultural tradition of status relations as well as of 
core metaphoric organisation: 'he was at the centre of the affair'. Thus, each spatial classification in 
variable six relates to a certain social position, especially those images that re-create a social setting. 
'Higher' and 'central' express greater control and social standing than 'lower' and 'periphery'. The 
second half of the variable relates to other relative spatial positions between the models photographed, 
'opposite', 'centre', for example. This sort of organisation is readily transferred into our visual 
representation, especially those commercially based that require ready and instant comprehension. 
Socially, we tend to consider the occupation of space, relative to others, the priority of those with 
power. This clearly connects back to the significance given the heterosexual couple and the gender 
differentiation of space. It concerns women's inability to command space, for example, needing 
assistance with the chair to sit at the table.
This is what Goffman describes as the ritualisation of subordination (Goffman: 1979:41) He 
suggests that a classic way that one displays deference, for example, is by lowering oneself physically 
in some form of prostration. Correspondingly therefore, we can visually display superiority or disdain 
by holding the body erect and high, the head looking up, which reflects the metaphorical conventions 
that Lakoff and Johnson trace in Metaphors We Live By. Most importantly, Goffman adds that 
advertisers draw in and endorse the claimed universality of the theme (Goffman: 1979:40). He then 
identifies also conventional spaces through which status differentiation could be seen to 'naturally take 
place'. He isolates places such as beds and particularly floors, where the less clean can be encoded. To 
this, I add that sexual availability has also been conventionally located in such places.
Finally, included in the spatial variable are two distinct codes, 'perspective' and 'non- 
perspective' . These specify in a generalised way whether the overall frame of the image is realist or 
otherwise and thus the extent to which the visual spacing establishes a view within the image that 
'reflects' that of the naked eye. Note, that the analysis of these sub-categories is combined with the 
analysis of variable seven below.
Variable seven relates to the camera work and categorises an image according to the length of 
shot and the focus used. The first cluster identifies the focus length and is divided into three broad 
categories: 'long shot', 'medium shot', and 'close-up'. Moreover, this type of codification is awarded 
central importance to the formation of the feminine. For example- Cowie (1997) argues that this is due 
to the removal of time and space from the frame, which facilitates the transvestism inherent in the point 
of view it establishes. Doane similarly argues that close-up provides the quintessential example of:
the meaningful moment of the close-up, for the spectator, the scale of the close-up 
corresponds less than other shots to the dictates of perspectival realism. And this being-the- 
gaze-for-the-other is, of course, most adequate as a description of the female subject 
(Doane: 1991:47).
Each shot length determines the size of the body within the photographic frame, and thus determines 
how much of the body is exposed. There ought to be a high degree of correspondence between these
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sub-categories and the preceding variable: the longer the shot, the 'smaller' the body and thus the less 
'physical' space the body appears to occupy visually. One would therefore expect there to be a higher 
degree of coincidence between the distributions of the 'dominating the frame' and the use of the close- 
up.
Doane, in particular, has argued that the short-length shot has been used upon female bodies 
as a means to fetishise the female body and thus disavow the threat that this body symbolises to the 
masculine (see also Cowie and Adams: 1990; Cowie:1997; Adams: 1996; Erens: 1991; Doane: 1987; 
1991: Dyer:1992: Kaplan:1997; special issue of Camera Obscura, 1989; Stacey: 1988; 1994; 
Mayne: 1991; 1994). The use of the short-length shot means that the camera is able to move across a 
fragmented body, thereby highlighting the surface of the dissected body and rendering it fetishistic. 
Conversely, one would not expect this code to be widely applied to the male body if it is not available 
to the processes of fetishisation as defined by the male body 'having the phallus'. The man must, 
minimally at least, represent the active autonomous subject and therefore cannot have that subjectivity 
visually negated. If this is not the case, the man is said to have undergone feminisation, thereby 
ensuring that the gendered dichotomy is left intact. However, this poses the dilemma: if the model is 
codified using visual practices that define the feminine, thus is feminised, what are we to make out of 
this feminisation process, if nevertheless the model is clearly identifiable as male, that is, codified with 
the magnified social resources that accomplish the assignment as male? The central issue is the clash of 
the 'feminisation' with the direct and clear codification of male; neither codification is premised upon 
the assumption that the codification speaks 'the truth of his sex', but nevertheless corresponds to the 
cultural production of the male.
Returning to the postmodernists/feminists, one would expect these cases to tally with the other 
sub-variables that code the occupancy of space, as well as to be a determining factor in what parts of 
the body are represented; hence their importance for fetishisation. Following Doane, one would also 
expect that soft focus is predominately used upon the female form as a visual means to encode 
passivity as well as to assist the process of disavowal. Thus, this form of codification is treated as 
quintessentially feminine. The softness of the image is treated as an extension of the translucent veil 
that conceals her lack. Moore (1988) and Wernick (1991) have traced the use of soft lighting but limit 
its use strictly to the contexts of the man's auto-eroticism. Therefore, as viewers, the best we can do is 
peer into his auto-eroticism; hence the extensive use of bathroom and grooming scenes. Moreover, 
these are 'natural occasions' when the man would be revealing his torso anyway. Thus they argue that 
the naturalistic setting defines the moments when the male body can be displayed. Moore concludes 
that it is only in the context of auto-eroticism that the soft focus and mellow lighting can be 
legitimately applied to the male body without erupting the spectre of homosexuality and the possibility 
of an overt active female eroticism (Moore: 1988:44).
Next, the taxonomy traces the use of specific focuses, which again draws on their argument 
that the soft focus is a distinct form with which the feminine is represented. One would expect there to 
be a high frequency of use on the female body. The soft focus is also said to assist the disavowal 
process by contributing to the substitution of the missing phallus by displacing her lack on to another 
object. The soft focus is said to contribute to the codification of the feminine as object of desire. By
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drawing upon Lacan, postmodernism/feminism positions the image as the reflection of the feminine as 
lack so that the image signals her status as the object of desire, but also positions the image of woman 
as threatening. Codifications like soft focus work to suppress the fear through objectification.
These elements are then built upon again in variable eight, which traces the form of the 
photograph. This has been divided into three sections: 'naturalistic mock-up'', 'stylistic' and 'neutral'. 
The first refers to the widespread and much documented use of realism in photography. Note that the 
issue of realism is defined above as operating on two levels. The first aspect refers to the 'realism' of 
the scene depicted. The ideological content has been gauged according to how much like 'real life' it is. 
This would include scenes such as getting dressed in a bedroom or other daily activities like hailing a 
cab. These scenes respond to our common-sense expectations of the features of life. In order for the 
normalcy of the scene to be recognised, argues Ooffman, it is necessary to hyper-ritualise these 
mundane features, thereby bringing them into view as opposed to remaining concealed within the 
background. The scenes 'look like real life' but in no way belong to the realm of the real. Mulveyian 
paradigm does not attend to the exaggeration of the codes in the image, but the medium of the 
photograph is such that it allows the viewer to gaze at it as if it were the more real, more perfect 
reflection of the self during the mirror phase. Furthermore, the Mulveyian paradigm argues that the 
realist and its associate narratives are an essential feature by which the feminine is connected to the 
passive so that the male protagonist is secured in his (sexual) active potency. Thus, this particular 
coding uses the identification patterns that such an image establishes as its primary means to operate 
ideologically. Following Mulvey et al. one would expect this to be a dominant feature of the gender 
representations, and of femininity in particular, confined as she is by her 'to-be-looked-at-ness'.
The second aspect of realism concerns the particular ways that photography can capture 
perspective or three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional frame. One of the particular qualities that 
photography has is its ability to capture a scene 'objectively', as if the viewer were actually there. The 
impression given is that the visual space depicted represents the scene as it would be seen by the naked 
eye. It assumes that the frame and editing have not distorted the view in any way. However, the actual 
framing and editing remain implicit, obscuring the perspective and ideology contained within. This sort 
of construction is more often associated with a voyeuristic position. The Mulveyian paradigm argues 
that this ideological transformation is something that women are particularly subject to, so much so that 
this form of encoding has become synonymous with femininity. I« addition, this variable draws upon 
the presumption of identification that underpins much of the work critiqued here.
This variable also addresses the potential for at least minimally more surrealist, non- 
naturalistic or stylistic modes of photography that was traced during sampling and is treated as anti- 
realist in its form. This is how it resists the construction of ideological identification patterns. It is 
achieved through highly artificial gestures, self-conscious or self-referential codes that quote back to 
the advertisement its naturalistic illusions. These images mock the pose and defeat it as posture or 
gesture that can be adopted as an expressive gesture by the viewer. Also, within such an image there is 
the impression that the model is mocking or satirising the act of modelling. The second feature of this 
code refers to those images in which the model is presenting an ordinary gesture but is set against a 
contradictory background. For example, the model could be in a fake beach scene wearing winter
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clothes and pretending to feel cold. This code does not seek to give this feminine presentation the 
veneer of authenticity. Collectively, these features expose some of the formal features of construction 
of realism and thus they resist securing patterns of identification.
The third refers to those images identified as part of the operationalisation process where some 
images had no explicit setting at all, surreal or otherwise. 1 observed that the background was often just 
white or coloured. If there is extensive use of codes two and three, this poses the question of the extent 
to which identification can be presumed to be a key feature of consuming advertisements. Potentially 
this could undermine Mulvey's argument since not only does this represent the feminine differently, 
but it also acts against the Symbolic and its concomitant identification patterns.
Variable nine refers to those aspects of the debates regarding the extent to which the female 
body is fragmented and therefore commodified and fetishised compared to the male body. The variable 
ranges from the "full body' through to the "head only*. The object of this variable is to trace 
substantively what parts of the body are depicted, how often and what parts of the fragmented body is 
represented. It is a simple and effective way to trace those parts of body that fetishistic conventions 
mobilise. This can then be related to the debates concerning the ideological impact of the framing of 
the body within representation, as well as the extent to which this divides along gender lines. For 
example, one would expect that there would be significantly more images of women being reduced to a 
fetishised leg than of men. 76 Potentially, therefore, the results of this code could confirm Pollock's 
maxim that the fragmentation of the female body is extensively used to sell, as well as confirm Doane's 
argument that the fragmentation of the body as image is a necessary form of representation that seeks 
to disavow the threat of castration that the female represents. The variable also includes the code 'face 
only\ This variable also returns to Nayak (1997), who draws attention to the ways in which the 
concealment of the head is used to transform the body to the object. The dismembered body is free to 
receive any connotations by way of the viewer's 'reading'. The second benefit that this 
operationalisation brings to the analysis is that the coding of the parts of the body is effectively free 
from evaluative influence: the parts of the body are absolutely known within a society. This is a central 
premise of the taxonomy: that, while the body is subject to symbolic elaboration of the most extensive 
kind, within that social background and its historicist roots, those categories and symbols are of the 
most natural kind (see for example, Douglas:1973; O'Neill:1985; Mauss:1973). Bodily metaphors of 
this kind remain relatively stable over quite long periods of time.
Further detail is added by isolating the various potential body positions (variable ten). The aim 
of the variable is twofold: first, it seeks to trace how the sex of the model affects the position taken up 
within the image; second, how these positions relate to the 'subordination' or 'domination' that the 
various positions impose. As argued above, fashion can be advertised in a seemingly infinite number of 
ways and therefore it carries no bars as to the ways the models are required to pose. I argue that, 
because of the universal presence of clothes, the sorts of positions adopted are not determined by the 
restrictions imposed by the commodity, but stem from the conventionalised presentations of the sexed 
body. The proposition here is that if the representations of body positions convey stereotypical versions 
of the sex, thus establishing identification, then these sorts of poses adopted ought to vary markedly by
' See Appendix B, for the ideological associations connected to the other codes.
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the sex of the model. Additionally, the various positions may be organised by the conventionalised 
postures through which subordination and domination are ritualised. Thus, the variable seeks to trace 
whether the sexed dichotomy is linked to the relations of power between men and women.
The variable has, where possible, enabled me to endeavour to capture the movement of the 
body, the displays of the body, as well as isolate body positions that tap into the undercurrent themes of 
the gendering of domination and subordination. Examples of the codes are l lying on the side', "twisting 
away\ "back facing camera' and so on. 77 Theoretically, these positions have been classed as 
visualisation of ritual subordination (Goffman: 1979). Therefore, according to postmodernist/feminist 
agenda, one would expect this to be significantly affected by the sex of the model. Specifically, one 
would expect this to be used extensively upon women because of the implied (sexual) passivity of lying 
down with regard to another (male) gaze. Each position can therefore be referred back to its context 
and the ideological significance attributed. For example, following Nayak, one would expect there to 
be a high frequency of black models whose face was obscured in some way so that the gaze cannot be 
reciprocated.
The next level of detail refers to the embodied presentations of the model and, in particular, 
focuses upon the physical appearance of the body. Many of the codes in this variable are drawn directly 
from the secondary literature, particularly the recurrent codes used within sex scales (Connell:1987). I 
have directly adopted these classifications where the category of sex is combined with sexual character, 
for example ^emotionaP. This variable also traces the detailed ways in which the body is gendered 
and/or sexed. Relating this to my specific concerns, this variable is also where the secondary and 
practically accomplished marks of sex are accomplished. The marks range from painted nails and long 
or short hair to the presence or absence of body hair, musculature and impressions of weight. Note that 
the coding criteria of this variable insists all images are read as they appear, rather than through an 
empirical lens of how the images are actually composed; 78 for example, that 'naturalness' is a cosmetic 
effect. This does two things: first, it avoids speculations concerning the extent of cosmetic intervention 
to produce the appearance of naturalness in each individual image; second, accepting the image in 
terms of its final production is much closer to how the image is to be interpreted if it is to function to 
construct passive femininity. We naturalise the signification process, argues Goffman. If the reader 
approaches the image 'knowing' that the images are highly structured, then ideology as an entity 
becomes an entirely different operation. We read images as they appear: signs function when they are 
treated as they appear.
Variables twelve and thirteen deal with the containment of the body in the represented 
physical space. This builds upon the spatial location in as much as withdrawing from space is 
something that is commonly associated with subordination and vulnerability. The first variable 
delineates who or what contains the model and therefore deals directly with the issue of power. In
77 There have been some adjustments regarding the codification of this variable. The actual results did 
not warrant such a detailed classification. Therefore, some of them have been amalgamated. Note, 
however, those that have cannot be repeated in other sub-variables and thus there is no distortion 
produced by some cases being counted twice. See Appendix B for greater detail and definition of 
application.
78 Again, this reflects Goffiman's analysis that as consumers of an image, we are quite happy with this 
blurring between the real and the fake.
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particular, a body contained or confined relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level 
of autonomy that body is constructed as having. In particular, the ascription of status is often marked 
by the use of the body as barriers to demarcate ownership. Goffman (1979:54-6) argues that often the 
man will extend his arm into space in such a way that it effectively prohibits any 'intrusion' by another. 
The variable progresses from the most patriarchal to the least. As it indicates complicity on behalf of 
the woman, the most dominatory position is classified as the woman who voluntarily contains her own 
body and therefore withdraws from (public) space. This is followed by the code "contained by man\ in 
which a series of blocks may be placed in front of the woman, thus constraining her ability to move 
through space freely. This is classified as less dominatory because of the woman's potential resistance 
to his confinement.
I have also included a variable that reflects the potential reversal of this form of containment. 
For example, it may be the case that the female is now the boss and imposes the same limitations on the 
lower male workers. Therefore, it would usually require that this reversal be bound by a narrative in 
order that the relative differences in social status be included as part of the scene. In effect, this sub- 
variable seeks to consider whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As 
repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume the dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this 
association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. 1 have also extended the logic of Goffman's 
analysis to the concerns of the cultural critique in that they have been effective in demonstrating that 
this same restriction or domination can be symbolically carried by an object, usually phallic. Lastly, I 
have addressed the various codifications that address the mutual containment, in which case all of the 
above must be absent and both models must be embraced by the other. The sexual consumption of one 
body by the other, usually male of female, must also be absent. The evidence of sexual gratification has 
to be equal, as well as the absence of relative positioning to secure differential status and so on.
These cases whefe heterosexuality meets with patriarchy and heterosexism refer to a complex 
web of social relations and structures and remains a contentious issue within the feminist movement. 
However, following Stevi Jackson (1995), it cannot be assumed above all else that heterosexual 
relationships can mean only domination for women and that correspondingly all representations of 
heterosexual relationships are entirely ideological and therefore pernicious to heterosexual women. It is 
of course difficult, as the ideology of heterosexist romance is often bound up in the images of equality. 
However, also within those images, there must also be the codes in which his authority, the primacy of 
his pleasure and her willingness to please it are manifestly present. It remains to be seen how pervasive 
these images are, but it is possible that the images represent reciprocal desire, rather than the more 
general relationship of women being desired and men doing the desiring. If there are enough cases to 
make such images a minority trend, but nevertheless a trend, there needs to be discussion as to what we 
think these might mean. Moreover, it may not necessarily be the case that those images that are 
encoded as mutual desire are heterosexual couples. As Lexis and Rolley (1997) have argued, there has 
been a shift in the patterns of desire represented so that an accessible lesbian spectatorial position can 
be adopted regarding 'twin' images. These images are composed of two women entwined and made up 
to look like each other. They argue that this offers a space through which lesbian desire can be 
experienced. In such cases, there would be two women embracing mutually and desire in the women
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would be embodied in toe form of a pout, a smile or semi-nudity. This variable concludes with 'non- 
containment', where the body stance cannot be said to be withdrawing in any sense.
The second variable in this cluster details the most regular body positions adopted to signify 
the various forms of containment. It concerns the embodied positions adopted to perform passivity. 
This is then a central variable that traces how a body may be positioned in social space to 'do' 
passivity. One example of self-containment is to have the woman seated with her arms folded around 
her legs and her legs pulled up to her chest. Another example traces the frequency by which the man 
places his arm in front of or around the woman, thereby marking ownership. Note that there is an 
automatic coding operation here in which if the preceding variable is marked non-contained it 
automatically skips out this variable. 79
Variable fourteen seeks to trace the various codes used to sexualise or fetishise the model by 
means of the dress and the various ways the flesh is revealed. By 'reveal', I mean that the clothing is 
removed, unbuttoned or lifted to draw attention to an area of flesh. This references the psychoanalytical 
contributions as to how fetishism works. Accordingly, those theorising within the Mulveyian paradigm 
must insist that this marks the female body categorically, not only that there be marked differences. 
Furthermore, by including the various ways that the body itself conceals its own nudity, the extent of 
sexualisation within the image can be specified. Examples are ''revealing of the shoulder', 'hip', 
'breast', 'see-through clothing', through to 'fully naked'. The latter example reflects the decision to 
include advertisements that signified through the logo alone rather than restricting the sample to 
advertisements of specific items of clothing. The code 'fully dressecf refers to bodies sexualised by 
facial expressions, for example the pout. The securing of sexualisation via the face is treated elsewhere 
in the taxonomy. The code 'non-sexualisation' refers to those images only where the model is fully 
dressed, devoid of a descriptive background and has no visible facial expressions. In addition, here the 
model must be fully clothed, without any parts of the body exposed. I argue that this is a non- 
sexualised image because there is nothing specifically erotic about the codification. 1 argue that the 
central features are those that commodify the image rather than commodity and sexualise the model.
Variables fifteen to seventeen trace the presentation of the hand. Variable fifteen traces who is 
touching whose body. 80 Also included are codes identifying cases where the hand is inactive; both are 
classified as relatively ungendered. Variable sixteen traces the parts of the body that are touched and 
variable seventeen traces what kind of touch is involved. Again drawing on Goffrnan, women were 
depicted touching things much more than men. The hand is used to trace the outlines of things or to 
fiddle with things. He argues that this mode of'barely' touching contrasts strongly with a competent or 
utilitarian mode of touch, which grasps things or manipulates them. I have applied this by combining it 
with specific codes that trace what is touched as well as how it is touched. This taps into another 
convention in which women are seen to caress much more, as part of the private domain of caring. 
Thus, not only do women touch other people much more but they also touch themselves much more. 
Additionally, this draws specific attention to the gendering of the hand through daily practical 
accomplishments such as nail varnish, manicures, length of the nails and so on. One is able to trace the
79 All pre-programmed exclusions are listed in Appendix B.
80 Note that this includes the commodity itself, following Goffman's observation.
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extent to which gender is secured by practice, and is therefore relatively open-ended, rather than the 
structure or social order reduced to a move in language. The cross-tabulations enable us to trace how 
gendered the touch is by examining who is touched, by whom and where. Each categorisation relates to 
the dimensions of the gendered dichotomy; for example, 'utilising' has distinctly active connotations.
The taxonomy further codifies the body idiom by the positioning of the limbs (variables 
eighteen and nineteen). By tracing the various positions of the arms and legs, it is possible to trace how 
the body is gendered through movement: the active body is conventionally connected to the masculine, 
while the feminine is pinned to a motionless body. Contrariwise, the Mulveyian paradigm has 
emphasised that action defines the masculine. Regarding my separate concerns, this demonstrates the 
theoretical commitment to the material body, that is, what does the body have 'do' visually to represent 
hegemonic patterns of masculinity? Consequently, the taxonomy consistently tackles the material 
embodied positions adopted to convey symbolic meanings that are not innate to the body. Passivity has 
to be enacted, not merely assumed to be symbolically imposed by the Law. Therefore, movement as 
part of the promise of power81 ought to be one of the consistent ways with which the male body is 
encoded. To reiterate, I argue that if the structurally determined dichotomy still organises the 
representation of masculinity and femininity, then this categorical difference must be encoded in part 
by the movement of the body. The taxonomy is able to build upon this by tracing the respective 
positions of the 'performative body parts'.
The next cluster of variables (twenty to twenty-four) traces the various features concerning the 
head, face and gaze and is central to the postmodernist/feminist argument regarding the categorically 
gendered nature of codification of the body. This cluster directly examines the frequency and the 
continuing value of the Mulvey paradigm. I argue that the structure of the gaze needs to be empirically 
present to be operative in the way she describes it. Variable twenty identifies the various positions of 
the head. The position of the head determines, and thus excludes, possible looks and interactions 
between the viewer and the model within the image, which is central if we are to examine the structure 
of the exchange of looks. Again, this variable has isolated the various head positions in detail in order 
that the image dictate the frequency of use. It includes therefore "head back', 'head down' and so on, 
leading to "head in profile'. Its additional significance is that it exposes the materiality of the body that 
I argued is lost in models that trace the Oedipal organisation of the body. The symbolic ordering of the 
body cannot overcome the fact that a structure of exchanges that takes place in looking is negated if the 
head is looking upwards. Even an example like this exposes the categorical nature of structurally 
determined description because to argue that this represents the feminine attempting to avoid the 
masculine gaze is to impose a specific inscription upon the image that reflects the theoretically 
determined normative position implicitly assumed. The image cannot be always reorganised to fit the 
structural imperative imposed and justified by recourse to the Oedipal organisation of the body. I have 
argued above that this is exactly what the notion of'feminisation' does: it negates certain coding shifts 
by recuperating them into the linguistically structural and thus universal dichotomy, while ignoring that 
feminisation assumes a 'common-sense' assign of sex: it has been established 'he's a feminised man'.
Reflecting the analyses of Dyer.
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To the head position the mouth is added (variable twenty-one). Examples include "pouting1 , 
'kissing, "phallic mouth1 , "phallic mouth with object' and so on. This variable explores the extent to 
which the mouth is central to the sexualisation of the body. Arguably, the mouth is subject to specific 
and intensive cultural elaborations, which mark the mouth out as one of the central erotic areas of the 
body. As a result, the mouth is an intensely symbolic domain, which, if the dichotomies presumed do in 
fact order the presentation, ought to be clearly marked by categorical difference. For example, using the 
mouth and cigarette is a central technique for the femme fatale. The eroticisation can be intensified by 
having the head tilted backwards slightly in order that the viewer can look inside the mouth. 
Additionally, it is central to the genderising of the body by means of practical regular 
accomplishments. For example, this variable draws attention to lipstick to produce a clearly gendered 
body. If there is a high frequency, it suggests that there has been a massive inroad of pornographic 
codes into mainstream magazines and, consequently, a marked difference in the expressive mouth will 
be treated as a significant evidence for the continuation of a subordinated sexual femininity as the 
postmodernists/feminists define it. Note also there are a number of codes that have been included that 
specifically target what has come to be known as the 'Lolita effect' (Silver-man: 1994; Stratton: 1996). 
This may be connected to other codes in the taxonomy where specifically child-like characteristics 
have been included. The use of child-like poses also integrates the elements of status back into the 
visual field (Goffmann: 1979). This further connects to the debates regarding the discursive discipline 
of women's 'natural flesh' One would not expect there to be a high frequency of cases where the male 
body is encoded in this way. Therefore, if a high frequency is traced within the female sample, specific 
tables will be built excluding the male population of the sample. It is possible to delineate the extent to 
which the body is securely coded in this way, or whether other childish postures are set in contradiction 
to the gaze.
The next variable in this cluster identifies the direction of the gaze (variable twenty-two) as 
well as the spectatorial address (variable twenty-three). The latter variable refers to the mode of address 
contained within the image. There are three altogether and the coding follows strictly the descriptions 
and definitions provided by the postmodernist/feminist model. The variable moves from the most 
active position adopted by the model towards the imagined viewer to the most passive position between 
model and viewer. Thus, the primary access in this variable concerns the set-up between the model's 
gaze and the imagined viewer at the point when the photograph is taken. This structures the image so 
that the relationship is re-established when the viewer sees the image, even if the viewer reads against 
the grain of the image. Code 1, "public addressing viewer', traces an exchange of looks constructed by 
the model looking directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer in the place of 
the camera: the gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions 
himself or herself to the image. Hence, to look at such an image is to engage with the model. The 
description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. 
Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or desire 
for the viewer, but it need not necessarily be the case. For example, the model appears as the initiator of 
a sexual exchange by adopting a gaze that makes the viewer the object in the exchange. It can therefore 
apply equally to male and female models.
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This compares with what has been described as 'narrative address'. Code 2 refers to those 
images in which the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the 
main axis of exchange between one of the models and the viewer, while clearly excluding the other 
model/character. For example, the female model looks into the camera and therefore at the viewer, 
while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby excluding the boyfriend/model from the central exchange 
of looks. The implication is that the boyfriend/model is being laughed at, therefore making the joke 
private to viewer and model. This draws upon the film form. The central protagonist in such a mise-en- 
scene is the female model since she both commands the viewer's gaze and dupes her boyfriend. 
Similarly, the male model could place the viewer at the centre of the narrative by covertly initiating the 
male viewer's gaze at another women, while in the presence of the presumed girlfriend. Not only does 
such a narrative assert the heterosexist assumption, but it also connotes the convention that the 
exchange is between the men because the object of exchange is the woman.
Code 3, ''private voyeur', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze 
of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus, the relationship of the model to the viewer is one 
where the viewer can peer into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocity and free to see 
or impose what he or she wants. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing and, as a result, 
one would expect this be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. This exposes the 
extent to which psychoanalysis underpins the analyses subject to critique. If such a frame is used 
pictorially to represent men, a male gaze that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic usually 
accompanies it. Dyer defines the instabilities contained in images of men thus: in order to disavow the 
latent passivity of being an object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity. 
For example, by displaying his cerebral superiority by looking up to the heavens, the male model 
makes his own body inconsequential to his true being. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic 
gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus is said 
to determine whether the gaze is gendered.
To conclude, the variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this 
'realistic' medium. More specifically, spectatorial address captures the extent to which the passive 
position of the female model in a frame and the active position of the (presumed) male viewer structure 
the mise-en-scene. It directly references the ways in which postmodernism/feminism, and Cultural 
Studies more generally, argue that passivity is visually structured, which then must be negated if the 
model is male. This directly references Mulvey's paradigmatic position regarding the ways the visual 
form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.
The expression of the gaze (variable twenty-three) adds detail to the above structure of the 
exchange of looks. It details the extent to which the exchange of the gaze is further disambiguated by 
the expressions that accompany them. Some codes target the active side of the gendered dichotomy, 
most notably the codes that identify the 'authoritative', 'assertive' and 'other-worldly' gazes, while the 
passive features are pinned to codes such as 'coy', 'dreamy', 'shy' and so on. 82 The expressions 
encompass both the direction of the eyes and the use of the eyebrows to anchor the meaning further. 
Note also that certain features of the expressive gaze are secured by the direction of the look and the
82 Many of these terms have been lifted from Millum's The Images of Women, 1976.
92
head position, which will have been detailed beforehand. The codes used within the advertisement 
itself and the operationalisation undertaken here mean that the reading of the code and its mode of 
display are not treated as synonymous to the gestures used in embodied interaction. The codes of 
display are not a part of a broader flow of interaction that takes place within time, the conclusion of 
which is not controlled by either interlocutor. Each gesture works through its stylisation, that is, 
through the exaggeration of the common features of a gesture. Again, I return to Gofftnan for 
justification: these expressions are not complex like the real material social interactions upon which 
they are based: they function because they are dependent upon conventionalised hyper-realistic forms 
and this is what makes them instantly recognisable. Therefore, I argue that codes contained within 
commercial images are both highly staged and thoroughly dislocated from real time and space. 
Moreover, the staged nature of the image is further compounded by the fact that is seen and 'reflected 
back', via the directions of the photographer, to the model throughout the shoot, which further 
problematises the relationship between the viewer and viewed because the image is mediated through 
the photographer. There are, then, various ways in which the image exaggerates 'naturalistic' 
expressions in order that it be 'read' as intended.
Variable twenty-four is a departure from those that specifically target the body. Rather, it 
traces the use of social scenes to stage the narrative presented, thus further removing ambiguity from 
the meaning. Certain social settings are accompanied by relatively fixed conventions about what is 
understood to take place there. Therefore, it introduces the ideological elements of social space into the 
representation: the feminine is equated with the private/domestic sphere. The codes selected range from 
scenes of a 'lovers' tiff to the 'countryside', 'cafes 1 to 'bars' and so forth. The scenes act as 
ideological contexts within which the body idiom is located and by doing so automatically exclude 
inappropriate keying of interpretive practices. Furthermore, the variable extends the ideological 
grounding of the image within broader sets of hegemonic relations. For example, it provides a 
mechanism to trace those representations of social space that remain highly dichotomised; the feminine 
remaining private, for example. Variable twenty-six identifies both the magazine and the year. When 
used as part of the results, this is broken up into two to facilitate ease of interpretation.
Variable twenty-five traces the macro structural features of the image according to the 
gendered dichotomies. Each sub-variable contains a hierarchised pair: the first value is the one applied 
to the man, the second value is applied to the woman. For example, one would expect the masculine to 
be equated with the assumption of the subject and the feminine with the particular form of 
objectification; hence the masculine is the mind (as defined by Dyer) and the feminine the body (as 
identified by feminist cultural theory). If this relationship is reversed, 'the mind' will be positioned as 
the second value, which has been constructed as the feminine side. The variable contains codes that 
count the potential frequency of both. The aim was to trace two elements simultaneously: first, the 
respective distributions of the masculine and feminine as determined by the theoretical account of the 
dichotomy; second, the interdependence between the active/passive, mind/body, narrative/image 
descriptions. By doing so, it was intended to identify the extent to which visual representation 
contributed to its reproduction, or whether there was emergent evidence that the structural dichotomy 
was weakening.
93
However, this operationalisation was not successful because it was too cumbersome and thus 
failed to measure what it set out to identify. This was in part a result of a distinct set of distributions 
that broke up the logic of the dualisms far more significantly than piloting had suggested. Second, it 
underestimated the extent to which the method restricted such relational analysis. It was operationalised 
thus in order maintain a sense of the interrelationship between the two opposites, which was why the 
advertisement was defined as the coding unit. The cumbersome nature of the coding directly led to 
statistically invalid results. Unlike the other variable codes, these do not exist as separate entities, 
which makes the application of chi invalid. I have therefore excluded analysis of this variable. The 
second major problem with the operationalisation more broadly is that a number of the variables are 
simply too long and, as a result, many of the findings are obscured by the sheer size of the tables. When 
this has occurred, I have broken them up into smaller logical clusters. 83
In summation, the central emphasis of this taxonomy is to trace the positions, gestures, 
contexts and photographic codes that, in general terms, produce the images that surround us. When the 
codes have been more descriptive, I have adhered to the semiotics discussed above for the criteria of 
application. However, most of the codes contained isolated body parts: how much is shown, what is 
shown, how the body represents itself in an advertisement in order to 'do' gender. I have chosen the 
most basic features with which to do this. Therefore, while I recognise the critiques to which content 
analysis is subject, I suggest that if we are to treat many of my variables as inherently problematic, then 
we must ask if meaning can work at all. I have sought to restrict the codification to the most basic 
features of an advertisement, aiming to limit any potential ambiguity that characterises the interpretive 
meanings that organise social life. I attend to a level of analysis that Goffman defines thus:
[the book is about] the organisation of experience - something that an individual actor can 
take into his mind - and not the organisation of society. [He makes no claim whatsoever to be] 
talking about the core matters of sociology - social organisation and social structure. I am not 
addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any 
moment of their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in every way and individual's 
current involvements to be second; this report deals only with matters that are second. 
(Goffman: 1974:13)
This informs my rejection of the inferences that regularly emerge from the axis between representation 
as social order and identity. As argued, we should desist from assuming that certain identifications are 
made as a result of the linguistic or representational order. However, I recognise that the adoption of 
such a tenet is insufficient justification for the return to the quantification of meaning. Thus, what 
follows is a detailed exploration of certain public practices upon which more complex interpretations 
are made. I argue that we can treat certain categories as constructed, but nevertheless foundational: the 
construction operates foundationally once it is taken for granted, that is, it belongs to the social and 
linguistic background. To this, I add that these basic categories are dependent upon a certain facticity of 
the body that provides a resting place, as it were, from which language is made meaningful. Therefore,
83 These can be examined in Appendix B.
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I reject the radical sceptical position adopted toward language to which content analysis is particularly 
vulnerable.
To reiterate, GofYhian argues that there is a direct relationship between the meaningful social 
world we live in and the representations that we make of this world. However, he queries the 
assumption that these representations are more than a direct mirror reflection of the social world they 
nevertheless encapsulate. He is, therefore, targeting the very assumption I have critiqued above: images 
can be about the world in which we live in a direct way, but this does not justify the causal leap that the 
postmodernists make, that somehow they are that world. Goffinan is explicit as to how the 
representative and the real are bound to each other, without further pinning this to a structuralist model 
of social reproduction and its formation of appropriate identities; he therefore excludes the reduction 
that culture operates as a psychological disposition. He remains sociological about the image but makes 
fundamental distinctions between the social and the cultural that I think can make a considerable 
contribution to feminist analysis.
METHODOLOGY, CONVENTION AND THE IMAGE WITHIN THE FIELD OF 
COMMERCIALISED AESTHETIC REALISM
Goffman84 begins by asking what sort of a thing is the photographic image. He argues that 
ambiguity in photography lies in our linguistic incapacity to distinguish what the photographic image is 
'of. With regard to the stage, we have the semantic distinction between character and actor to 
discriminate between the real and the temporary, but such a distinction is missing with regard to 
photography. A photograph can be said to be 'of the subject, as well as 'of the model: it merges them 
both by concealing the difference that is then taken for granted. An example of such a blur is the 
instance when the framing of a 'model' is staged so that the 'subject' appears surprised by having her 
photograph taken. Other examples include rigged photographs where the model and the scene are real 
but are brought together to induce radically wrong inferences about what is taking place so that the 
viewer is misled. Photographic forms of representative realism work precisely because the number and 
depth of cues are insufficient to indicate what is really going on. Goffman argues that the result of the 
failure to sustain the semantic distinction is that we treat photography as if we are concerned with one 
kind of problem, when in fact we are concerned with another, substantively ignored. 85 Consequently, 
the staged nature of image is lost when it is successful in staging the real.
Significantly, Goffman links the staging of the 'material world' to the advertisement form and 
defines this relationship as 'commercial realism'. This directly draws together the mode of visual 
presentation to the social field in which it takes place; hence, his considerations are explicitly market 
oriented. Commercial realism employs standardised scenes and props to pass the scene off as a 
potentially real one. Furthermore, it provides a particularly acute example of the ambiguity between 
model and subject. For example, an image that depicts a nude but well-known woman will raise 
questions about the modesty of the model; a picture that features some nuns idolising a car is likely to
84 The following analysis of Goffrnan's contribution is taken from section 2 of Gender Advertisements.
85 Gender Advertisements, p. 13.
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raise questions about the desecration of the subjects. Regarding the latter, we are concerned about the 
image, but this concern is not based within the material instance but with the generic social type 
depicted and the advertisement. Nayak makes this exact slip when he refers to the subject of the 
photograph, which carries with it the assumption that the subject is the model in real life. The semantic 
slip conceals the extent to which the posture belongs to the realm of commercial realism rather than 
black subjectivity. This equally emerges in the feminist analysis of stereotypes which sought 'realistic' 
representation about the 'real' lives of women, to have 'real women's bodies' in the advertisement, but 
at the same time to make a commercial image promote changes to the social order, that is, to make 
them about the promote social change, that is, to produce another reality. Implicitly, I argue that the 
cultural analyses critiqued above have not moved far from this position: the singular emphasis upon 
representation86 means that they are forced to look for 'positive images' to challenge the current 
phallocentric stranglehold. Perhaps this is an outcome of the model of socialisation, upon which this 
model is implicitly dependent.
Therefore, commercial realism encompasses a form of artifice that defines the photograph: the 
simulated scenes represent narrative-based action located within the stream of time and place from 
which inferred meaning is gleaned. The artifice deployed renders the natural expressions crude, 
simulated and frozen. Hence, all models transformed into subjects in the narrative are united in their 
artifice. For example, the exchange of looks can seek to bring the viewer into the frame of meaning; the 
subject makes eye contact, sometimes collusively, as if that someone were there in the flesh. 87 This 
echoes Mulvey's notion of the male gaze. 88 This model does not reject the conventions within the 
image by which it makes sense to talk of the male gaze, rather it rejects the inference that assumes that 
this forms identity and organises patterns of desire. On the contrary, this construction is brought about 
by the slip of model/subject. His point is that we know Brutus didn't really kill Caesar when we were at 
the theatre last; likewise we know that the model and subject are different, that the latter is fictional, 
even if we suspend this in order that the image work. Without this semantic distinction, the social form 
dissolves through such a series of misframes. We 'know' the difference between a social interaction 
and a representation even if we have to 'suspend' this to make the representation work. Interaction and 
interpretive linguistic activity make such a semantic distinction available and brings the effects of 
meaning into the conscious realm where it is 'available for use'. Thus, we abandon the analytical 
distinction so that we can treat the scene naturalistically, that is, accept its subject, despite the fact this 
has nothing to do with what went on to compose the image.
Asked what is in a particular ad, we might say, 'A family fishing.' What makes us think the 
four subjects in the picture are in a family relationship to one another is exactly what might 
make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in real life. So, too, on seeing the 
images of fishing lines in the water. Asked whether we think the four persons who are 
modeled for the picture are really a family, or if there are hooks at the end of the lines, the
86 Moving as it does between the levels highlighted in the introduction to the literature review.
87 This is where I have drawn the code 'narrative address' from.
88 This is important because it suggests a stability of meaning that does not entirely lie with the reader. I
...ill _»<-..«w* +rt 4-ltif in rv»r»fV> H^i"51llwill return to this in more detail.
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answer could well be, 'Probably not, but what does it matter?' The point about an ad is what 
its composer meant us to infer as to what is going on in the make-believe picture scene, not 
what had actually been going on in the real doings that were pictured. This is subject, not 
model. (Goffman: 1974:15) (my italics)
Such a semantic distinction does not ground the semiotic analyses undertaken by 
postmodernism/feminism and so this slip finds it way into the heart of the analyses they undertake. 
This means the differing levels of representation often go unattended. We want our photographs to say 
true things about us, and we are prepared to suspend concern for the artifice that creates it. Is this not an 
interesting way of situating the possible ideological elements of photography while taking the 
utterances people make about the photograph seriously? Moreover, the knowledge of its artificial 
construction suggests that the meaning is not operating within the unconscious because its 
construcutedness is at once recognised and ignored. Thus, while he traces very similar forms of 
exchanges, he locates their operation in quite a different domain from the Mulveyian paradigm: the 
construction is a phenomenological projection from the cognitive reading of the image to the capacity 
to 'see' the photograph as space that the viewer temporarily occupies. Therefore, the photograph 
operates through the phenomenological practices of perception; practices that change over time, up and 
beyond the basic units or gestalts of perception. Furthermore, these practices can be treated ironically, 
and in doing so, it is possible to disrupt the interpretative practice and dislodge the meanings integrated 
to the space the viewer temporarily occupies89 . Moreover, the text is able to present to us a new view 
on the representation. In this way, it is possible to integrate notions of how the text is able to alter our 
interpretative horizons: it can bring to the fore what was once merely taken for granted.
THE REPRESENTATION AND THE COMPETENT READER
Goffman emphasises that commercial images reconstitute social space. Therefore, there is no 
sense in which the space depicted is to be treated as equivalent to physical space, again stressing the 
semantic distinction between model and subject. Goffman singles out the regular features of an image, 
and he is careful to trace the semiotic elements specific to commercial realism that build upon those 
regular units. He examines in detail the relationship between the form and content of a type of 
representation and argues that the combination has a significant impact upon the final product. 
Arguably, he works with the presupposition that we can adopt codes, categories and words that are 
used practically within interaction and transform them so that they function in the visual form, for 
example, but relay the same conventional meanings. Therefore, representative realism must draw upon 
the conventions of the social and linguistic background and reconfigure them in such a way as to make 
them produce those same associations within a two-dimensional frame.
By using Goffman's model, I argue that it is possible to integrate the notion of linguistic 
background into social interaction, and that it is thus public in nature and yet pre-reflexive. The 
background of meaning is central to how we know things, but often we find it very hard to explain
89 A phenomenological parallel is the optical illusion.
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what it is we know. The rules that we follow are so complex that they become opaque. What is required 
is a series of techniques by which we can penetrate certain kinds of meaning to a certain level. By 
'keying', Goffman means that we have myriad rules that we apply pre-reflexively when interpreting a 
text or social interaction. This places an essential distance between the fact that things are meaningful 
to use and the fact that this meaning is not a private internalised entity, as psychoanalysis presupposes, 
but thoroughly public. This technique is something that we use to get a handle on the polysemy of 
social and linguistic life, that is, complex forms of meaning. The process of keying institutes the 
appropriate frames of reference when doing interpretation. It is a process in which we know when an 
instance is an exception and when it is a common daily occurrence, for example. Moreover, it is the 
system by which we differentiate different kinds of texts and recognise the different level of analysis 
that is appropriate to a text.
Thus, Goffman is isolating the social competencies that we as social actors employ as part of 
our interpretive practices. Moreover, the sets of competencies required are bounded by the social and 
cultural order: those who have not become embodied, socially competent actors in this order may not 
have the necessary cultural references or keying structures to understand the gesture fully. For example, 
Russian men can congratulate other men with a kiss on the lips. In Britain, such an exchange between 
non-kin adult men is almost always considered a homosexual act because of the discourses of sexuality 
and counter-discursive constructions established by gay pride. Conversely, therefore, a man and a 
woman in an embrace would generally be assumed to be a couple, particularly if the context is a 
fashion feature in a women's magazine. The stable contexts of meaning combine with the conventional 
and standardised codes to produce the appropriate cues. The differentiation does not lie in the integrity 
of the act, but in the social context and the way these features define what sort of an exchange it is. We 
use keying skills to differentiate these elements. Thus, part of the complexity of this interpretive 
technique is the many social interactions it informs and unpacks: it enables one to trace power 
asymmetry within a social interaction in which the actors participate. Moreover, these interpretive 
activities are conventional in form and operate most effectively in 'normal cases'. I shall return to the 
importance of normal cases and circumstances in a moment.
Goffman departs from other writers concerning the image because, before he considers the 
content, he explores the photograph as a phenomenal object to which he conjoins the 
phenomenological experience of viewing the object. Goffman asks first what sorts of things go into 
making a photograph; only then can its meaning be considered. He argues that these two focal points 
operate prior to the interpretation of the image and are therefore integral to the interpretive practice. 
The significance that is being drawn from this is that it seems to suggest that the image 'works' because 
people are readily aware of the highly artificial context and content of the image's scene. Therefore, the 
fabrication, integral to the fashion image, is an element of the function of the image. He argues that 
photography, as a specific form of representation, has two special elements: first, the apparent capacity 
to capture a perspective as the viewer would see it; second, the naturalistic view of a world presented as 
a controlled, manipulated and staged view. The spontaneity of being caught by the camera is a fake, an 
artifice produced to stage the narrative. Goffman's departure is to make the artifice of realism central to 
his analysis, as well as to the interpretations viewers make. Therefore, we are able to keep a keen eye
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on the artifice of realism, without branding the viewer who consumes it a cultural dupe, as the 
postmodernists/feminists are forced to do because only they, somehow, muster the critical distance that 
prohibits their identification.
KEY PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
Goffinan has outlined persuasively that a condensed form of meaning operates within 
advertisements, and he has put the case that this is highly conventional in form. I attend to this by 
differentiating between texts and the interpretive competency required. I argue that reading most 
advertisements does not require that we attend theoretically to the instability of meaning. 
Advertisements are quite unlike the texts that postmodernists themselves write, in which the polysemic 
features of language are central to even a surface engagement with them. I relate this accomplishment 
to the conventional contexts available for use. Interpretation is a fact of life but this does not mean that 
there are not different sorts of interpretive activities. By this, I mean that we must attend to where the 
interpretation is taking place, what sort of an entity is subject to interpretation and where it comes from. 
Sorting out the varying aspects of interpretation enables us to grasp fundamental differences between 
the interpretation that confronts us within social interaction and the interpretive activities we undertake 
when we read a text. The fact that, as Goffinan readily illustrates, these forms of interpretive 
competencies interact and that the boundaries between them are blurred is not a problem we face as 
users. We have a common-sense background to draw upon that allows us to make the necessary 
differentiations.
Interpretative interaction with others is located in space and time in an immediate embodied 
sense. We are unable to go back and undertake the interpretive activity again. Texts, on the other hand, 
can be re-read, re-interpreted. I argue that we bring different skills to bear when we interact and make 
those interpretations as part of the ongoing chain from those that we use when we approach a text. This 
marks out textual interpretations from social interpretation, even if we metaphorically apply the 
methods of textual interpretation to the embodied forms of social display. For example, we 'read' 
people's display and this can say something about their consumption practices, but this must not be 
taken as an instance of text as body. In this sense, I stress that these meanings are distinctly public in 
form and function because of the structured contexts from which they emerge.
Moreover, we apply different levels of interpretation to different cultural texts because we 
ascribe different statuses to them. In this way, we treat advertisements as relatively rudimentary texts, 
particularly when they are aligned to more complex texts such as novels. Advertisements ought not to 
be subsumed under the homogenising heading 'Text'. Postmodernism has pursued zealously the notion 
of the 'death of the author' and argued that we should cease to consider a text according to authorial 
intention. However, this has been pursued without any differentiation according to the context that 
produces the text. Advertisements are overtly commercial forms and it is of primary importance that 
advertisement successfully achieve the association of the language of desire and the product placement. 
On estimate, a campaign such as that run by Haagen-Dazs can cost about £30 million. If a campaign 
commits this much investment into persuading people to buy the good, surely this suggests that it aims
99
to anchor meaning rather than promote a product via the free-floating signifier. My central point is this: 
a campaign cannot be so ambiguous or so complex as to fail to connect the meanings it generates and 
the product. Therefore, I reject the notion that advertisements are so unstable as to prohibit a content 
analysis of their key features. We apply different keying techniques and we expect different forms of 
cultural content and presentation from them. Arguably, this distinction is taken for granted, but it is 
nevertheless fully operative.
IN SUMMATION
Goffman argues that advertisements are representations that are about our world. They are 
condensed representations that draw upon certain socio-cultural features of actual embodied 
interaction. However, he argues that they can operate successfully only if a number of conditions are 
met:
1. Goffman provides us with a semantic distinction between the model and the subject that allows us 
to describe the social reality represented without the epistemological slip that the representation 
encapsulates 'real reality' in some authentic way.
2. The capacity of the advertisement to represent society is dependent upon the artifice of the codes, 
props, bodies and stages.
3. The socio-cultural world that is recognisable in the image yet accomplished though artifice does 
not seem to have an adverse impact upon the reader.
4. On the contrary, the lay reader readily discards the artifice in order that the representation achieved 
can continue to be about our socio-cultural lives.
5. The social world staged is based in artifice, which means that the codes draw upon the background 
of embodied social interaction, but then greatly over-emphasise them. The social conventions of 
face-to-face interaction are 'hyper-ritualised'.
Therefore, the social conventions by which embodied interaction is regularly achieved is drawn upon 
exaggeratedly so that these features are readily understood without any extra interpretive work. For 
example, he isolates the use of the male body as a means to act as a barrier to the women's movement. 
He is suggesting that it mirrors the convention of presentations of the public self. Public male figures 
are notorious for stating symbolically that 'she is my wife'. Through the exaggeration, readers are 
readily able to project the embodied sets of meanings that flow from interaction on to the stylised 
versions in representation. The codes work because of their dependence upon convention, and it is with 
the conventions of representing gender that I am concerned.
Regarding content analysis as a method, the following conditions apply to its application here:
1 It is beyond the remit of the method to draw inferences about the relationship of representation to 
the social order more broadly.
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2. Equally, it is beyond its scope to make inferential conclusions regarding interpretive activities.
3. 1 make no claim to replace the causal mechanism of internalisation with another.
4. If we seek to locate the effect of representation, then I propose that we look to its location within 
interaction. This effectively rejects representation as somehow a causal effect.
5. Advertisements are essentially conventional, which is why I argue that the method of content 
analysis is applicable.
6. I seek only to draw out the body positions and postures and so identify the extent of their gender 
differentiation.
In essence, then, the aim of quantifying the gendered nature of representation is to contest its 
assumed uniformity, which is a direct consequence of the categorical logic that informs the mainstay of 
semiotic analyses conducted. I argue that this requires a move beyond the form of description that 
merely contest a single semiotic reading with another single counter example, which undertaking a 
semiotic analysis of the content would produce. In a sense, the endeavour reflects the need for an 
overview of the representations, rather than attention to the specificities of the meaning. The consensus 
regarding the meaning of representation overlooks two central elements: first, it tends to overlook the 
commodification and sexualisation pressures and the extent to which the markets both target and 
marketise masculinity; second, it forecloses change that could potentially erode the gendered difference 
initially identified in the 1970s. The primacy awarded the gendered dichotomy as both the source and 
the outcome of representation inevitably leads to the reproduction of the dichotomy because there is no 
source, trajectory or subject that can produce sustained and systematic resistance to it.
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GENDERING THE BODY OR CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT?
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The purpose of quantifying the bodily based codes is to contest the assumption that 'the 
sign' constitutes the gendered dichotomy, thereby constituting feminine identity as the absolute other. 
In chapter 2,1 outlined what I consider to be the fundamental difficulties of theory that seeks to define 
or infer patterns of identification, that is, the formation of subjectivity, through a specific semiotic 
decoding of an ideological cultural contour. Here, I seek to challenge their assumptions of what the 
contours of culture actually are. Hence, my results investigate the validity of the following theoretical 
standpoint: the Symbolic is ordered by the core dualisms of patriarchy so that the active/passive 
elements are combined with the masculine subject and the feminine object. For example, a number of 
codes isolate which direction the model is looking: looking down and away is passive and thus 
feminine, whereas looking directly into the camera is active and thus masculine. For these semiotic 
analyses to be good empirical description, that is, good description of the Symbolic, then the Symbolic 
ought to reproduce the structural dualisms of patriarchy. In relation to a content analysis, if the 
Symbolic is thus structured, the tables generated ought to be categorically distributed by sex, 
measurable by chi square (statistical difference). If this is the case, the sex of the model will determine 
the dependent variables; the direction of the gaze, for example. Hence, the codes I have isolated define 
the position of the body, its gestures and expressions, in order to directly connect the Symbolic 
structures to determination of the body, that is, how the body as (feminine) object is visually produced.
In essence, I propose that the content, which I defined as the 'what' of the image, is anything 
but a forgone conclusion and the results offered here therefore aim to contest the assumption that 
culture is something ordered by a patriarchal Symbolic, which reproduces the (re)presentation of the 
feminine. On the contrary, I offer this content analysis as a means to: a) examine afresh the content of 
images; b) to redress the methodological imbalance produced by concentrating solely upon 'how' 
meaning is constructed. I have argued in chapter 3 that this imbalance leads to the loss of any sense of 
the basic description of gendered images.
THE ORDER OF ANALYSIS
The results are divided into two rough groups of codifications, beginning with those that 
identify simple photographic framing techniques, followed by those that pinpoint various forms of 
bodily gender display. I start by introducing the issue of how we raad the body as self-evidently male 
or female. Crucially, how are bodies are represented so that assignment of male or female is made, 
when the genitals are concealed? My interest here resides in issue of how natrualised gender is 
produced within the image, namely that this is what a man 'looks like' Correspondingly, it negates the 
required practices to accomplish what is seemingly natural order of the body. This is important for how 
we think about the causal relationship between genitals and the gendering of the body. I then trace how 
frequently the male and female models are pictured together, singly, in mixed or in homosocial groups. 
The emphasis here is to explore the central ideological anchoring of the image, particularly in terms of 
the heterosexist presumption and its corresponding dualisms. This is followed by the identification of 
the distributions of shot length, the type of focus and the combined effect of codifying the image
'The sign' has assumed the status of a generic type.
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through the generalised form of address. I place particular importance on the extent to which the 
address is defined by the voyeuristic codification. I build upon this by examining the realist 
photographic conventions. This form of codification is then located in terms of the social situations in 
which it is anchored. Here, I identify the gendered contexts of the public and private spheres, as well as 
the prevalence of specific settings for the interaction between men and women, the detail of the how 
the public and private domain is integrated into the production of the image and, in particular, the sites 
for heterosexual romance. There then follows an examination of body gestures. These variables, when 
combined, give us an overall picture of the current modes of gender codification, especially the extent 
to which the gestures remain distinctly gendered. I conclude with an analysis of the composite findings, 
to which I add my own specific concerns regarding the sex/gender distinction.
Note that the presentation of the results will be limited to the sample from 1985-95. This 
restriction has been imposed because, in places, the sample is too small to provide clear indicative 
shifts. Also, taking the body as the sampling unit, rather than the advertisement, produced the anomaly 
of increasing the sample size from the intended 500 to 703. As a result, the sample from Cosmopolitan 
1975 distorts the statistical calculations of chi square because the ratio of women to men91 here was 
3:1, therefore already producing clear statistical difference. As a result, I will examine shifts from 1975 
in terms of the generalised trends within Cosmopolitan. Where possible and relevant, I will include the 
chi score and the degrees of freedom beneath each table. Please note that when a number of cells have 
small distributions, Chi will produce an expected value that is less than five. This is statistically 
insignificant and inaccurate, and so in those cases Chi is not included. In these cases, the evidence will 
be treated as indicative. However, such small values may be indicative of a substantial change in 
themselves when treated as part of the broader semiotic picture provided by the cultural analyses.
Although included, my results will not contain any sustained analysis of the comparative 
distributions of the production of the sexed body and its relationship to ethnic minorities for two 
reasons. First, the overall sample for the ethnic minority groups registers just over 18%92 . This means 
that there is a less than 1:5 proportion of black to white models used. The coding is simply too detailed 
to make any analysis of this proportion effective. Second, with hindsight, this is beyond the scope of 
what a content analysis can provide. To do so requires addressing theoretically the issue of how 
structures are layered but without integrating them and, subsequently, that 1 address the manifest failure 
of postmodernism/feminism to deal with two or more structures at one time (see Connell:1987; 1995; 
Giddens: 1991; Bourdieu: 1977; 1990; Calhoun: 1995). One is able to get a sense of how frequently 
ethnic minorities are used, and that, strictly speaking, this proportion could be said to reflect fairly 
accurately the ratio of ethnic mix currently existing in Britain.
THE RESULTS
As can be readily identified in figure 1 below, the random sample between 1985-95 has 
produced a relatively even distribution of men and women represented: 50.79% of the bodies were
91 Please see Appendix C which shows the breakdown by numbers in 1975.
92 Please see Appendix C.
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coded as female compared to 47.01% of bodies coded as male. Hence, there is equal visibility of male 
and female bodies within the fashion advertisements sampled. This sits in stark contrast to the 11 cases, 
just 1.73%, where the codes are sufficiently ambiguous to deter a secure assignment, meaning that in 
virtually all cases there are clear conventional secondary or tertiary sexual characteristics with which to 
assign the sex of the body (Connell:1987). This suggests that the sex of the model is visually codified 
so that the body appears as self-evidently one sex or the other, thereby negating those majority aspects 
of the body that are common to both bodies. It suggests that we treat secondary characteristics as clear, 
unambiguous signs of the naturalness of the category of sex. We tend to locate and define the body 
through genital difference first - that sex is the body. In our society, we tend not to think of 'the' body 
but of two bodies, knowable through sex, that produce two oppositional ontological entities. Keying 
functions in such a way that the body without armpit hair is self-evidently female. This form of keying 
seems to occur despite our awareness that shaving is a social activity and therefore, strictly speaking, 
has nothing to do with the "natural body". Likewise, if the body represented has defined muscle over 
the breast bone, again the conventions of keying would automatically produce the classification that




















the body is male. Muscle is a 'natural' feature of the male body, which again ignores the time spent in 
the gym accomplishing that particular muscle development. The central purpose of our cultural 
activities, it seems, is to negate these activities of accomplishment.
Furthermore, keying activity, such as this, indicates that we assume a direct correspondence 
between the secondary characteristics and concealed genitalia. This assumed correspondence is a 
process which, according to Kessler and McKenna (1978), by-passes the 'biological failure' of sex to 
clearly differentiate or dichotomise the secondary and tertiary characteristics into two distinct groups. 
Therefore, even when we encounter the myriad of'exceptions' in everyday life, it does not undermine 
the sanctity of the assumption of correspondence, that is, that certain traits, personal and physical, are 
male traits. We are faced, then, with the dilemma of the body: it is both the most self-evident of things 
and yet it is also one of the most intensely constructed entities. I will refer to the body as the male or 
female sexed model in order to emphasise the visual accomplishment.
Figure 1 indicates that the sex of the body is an accomplished and stable entity that forms the 
bedrock of the representations sampled here. This legitimates the postmodernist/feminist assumption 
that sexual difference is the core discursive product that reproduces the dualistic logic of the Symbolic. 
In addition, postmodernists/feminists would argue that this establishes the initial construction upon 
which the process of identification is founded. However, there is a central issue at stake for the 
postmodern/feminist agenda: to what extent is the universal accomplishment of sex within 
representation sufficient grounds to connect the values of the Symbolic hierarchy to representation and
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the identification representation is said to secure? In other words, is the accomplishment of a sexed 
female body sufficient to assume its place within the Symbolic hierarchy and award to that body the
 
gendered traits of subjectivity? Perhaps one requires more than the mere presence of sexed bodies to 
assume the gendered Symbolic because the production of the sexed body, which is more or less 
universal, does not produce the same sets of correspondent meanings, not just cross-culturally, but also 
within our social order (Herdt:1993). The substitution of the accomplished body with the Symbolic 
organisation of feminine and masculine as subjective identification patterns means that the various 
elements involved in the construction they are addressing remains unclear, since they are used 
interchangeably. Are they delineating the construction of bodies, sexual character or representation?
 
The interchangeability assumes that the accomplished body will secure the passivity of the feminine
 
and that this is self-evident. But does the accomplished body also readily secure feminine traits, or i
s 
such a causal connection another instance of the implicit re-introduction of the naturalised body 
(Shilling: 1993)? I return to this in greater detail as part of the evaluation of the results.
In figure 2 , a significant majority of the models sampled were photographed as single 
models (65.91% of the total sample). Not only does this suggest an emerging trend for simplification in 
representation techniques (Millum:1975; Liess, Kline and Jhally:1986; Wernick:1991), insofar as it 
removes the codifications necessary to link the two models, but it also takes away an important anch
or 
by which the heterosexist imperative is secured. For example, there is an approximate ratio of 4.5:1 o
f 
single female sexed models to those in a couple. This ratio is the same for male sexed models. It is 
now, therefore, much harder to secure the 'feminine as sexual adjunct' since she is predominantly 
photographed without a man. Moreover, she is just as likely to be photographed alone as a male sexed 
model.















































Chi = 1.3915, df= 3, there is no significant relationship
93 See Appendix B for details of which logically compatible codes have been amalgamated. Those 
variables subject to amalgamation are labelled 'derived'.




The extent of this simplification can be demonstrated by comparing the above distributions 
with those of 1975, pictured below. First, there were no cases where women were photographed in 
mixed groups; second, this contrasts with a much higher visibility of men within the magazine95 . Figure 
2a suggests that the numbers of mixed couples, and the extent to which the female could be located as a 
sexual adjunct has significantly reduced by as much as half, down from 33% in 1975 to approximately 
15% between 1985-95. It must be noted that, while locating the woman in the man's presence is one 
immediate and unambiguous way to codify the power or status differentials, there are ways around this, 
for not all forms of sexual objectification require the presence of the male body. Yet it is harder to 
assert the durability of the gendered dichotomies and their organisation through the heterosexist 
imperative if there are so few cases where the man shows the woman what to do, or protects her and so 
forth.















































Returning to figure 2, the last significant finding here is that in only 7.75% of the total sample 
between 1985-95 is the body is located within a single sex couple. Again, this frequency is mirrored 
across the sexed bodies. This indicates a number of things. To begin with, it provides evidence to 
substantiate my methodological critique of the dominance of semiotics. Returning to Lewis and Rolley, 
you will find that they isolated coupling as a key feature by which the homoerotic nature of magazine 
readership is secured. They define coupling as the presence of twe same-sex bodies, which may be 
further connected through the visual narrative. Yet this is hard to sustain when there are so few cases in 
comparison with the single model, especially if one notes that the sampling unit is the body rather than 
the advertisement. The 23 bodies located within a potentially homosexual context translate into a 
maximum of only 11 advertisements out of the 500 sampled. This compares to 218 advertisements for 
the single female sexed model96 . Therefore, a specific feature has been noted as an instance that targets 
the homoerotic and thus produces an unconscious identification with the pre-Oedipal flow of desire. 
Yet without the overview that a content analysis can provide, theorists like Rolley and Lewis have no 
way of knowing how representative such a signification is. Now, we are able to identify that the visual
95 See Appendix A
96 This distribution is mirrored also within the male models: a maximum of 12 advertisements 
compared to 190 single male model advertisements.
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pleasures constructed in women's magazines cannot be organised as Rolley and Lewis have defined it 
precisely because the coupling codification is rarely used. Moreover, this code cannot be disregarded 
by referring to the subjective criteria of the category because it attends to a basic facticity of one or two 
people. Language cannot function at all if ad facto categorisation of this kind cannot be assumed.
I now turn to the variable that traces the generalised relationship between the models and their 
environment insofar as a specific relationship between model and objects and/or props is constructed 
through a narrative (Millum:1975). Figure 3 shows that a significant majority of both male and female 
sexed models are depicted as having no specific relationship with the props or commodity. 
Consequently, codifications that subordinate the female sexed model to objects and props, contained 
within the image, are in decline. Moreover, this trend is also apparent for male sexed models to the 
extent that they do not appear to be in command of the props/objects either. This is important for two 
central reasons: first, it further secures the above suggestion that the fashion advertisement is moving








































Chi = 0.5712, df=2, there is no significant relationship
toward a presentational format that is greatly simplified; second, the passive relationship to the object 
that is said to define the feminine is less apparent as is the masculine association with the active. This 
suggests a decline in the codifications identified by both Goffman and the postmodernist/feminist 
analyses. The feminine is not defined by being draped over the car, nor is a manly fragrance secured by 
the man's ability to control the fast car. The subordination of the feminine to the commodity does not 
seem to be a central feature of the presentation, any more than the masculine doing the subordinating. 
How does this compare with 1975?
If we look briefly at figure 3a overleaf, we can see that subordination to the commodity or 
prop appears to be a central feature within Cosmopolitan in 1975. The small sample indicates that at 
25.49%, the passive relationship to the props or objects remained a central component the conventions 
of codification of the feminine. Here, the active/passive dualism appears to be a more appropriate 
description. Again, this can only be treated as an indication, but one that corresponds with the general 
trends established during the initial politicisation of the image, as discussed in chapter 2.
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The two variables examined thus far begin to alter our expectations of the patterns of gender 
difference. Variable two shows us that there has been a marked decline in the use of the heterosexual 
couple as part of the commodification process and that this has brought with it the predominance of the 
single model. With variable five, we have seen that the single model appears to have no particular 
relationship with the scene within which the body is contextualised, indicating a weakening 
relationship between the passive and the feminine to the extent that the accomplishment of the passivity 
cannot be produced through the props and social cues that surround the female model. Furthermore, the 
male sexed model does not appear to be defined by his command of the mock social environment 
either. Hence, the active/passive structure is not an overt feature of the image when relating gender to 
the props and commodities displayed. On the contrary, this relationship appears to be weakening.
The anticipated reply is that these two facets may be weakened, but there are plenty of other 
possibilities that can and do anchor the gendered dichotomies. For example, if the body is not 
subordinated to a specific prop or object, or if the woman is no longer defined via her association with 
the man, we can look to the broader narrative, the position of the spectator, the clothes themselves and 
so forth. So it is to these variables that I next turn my attention, beginning with shot length and focus. I 
will then address the mode of photography, beginning with the narrative address, followed by an 
analysis of how closely the image is bound to a naturalistic social scene. Of particular import is the 
extent to which realist modes define the centre of the codification and how the spectator is positioned
in terms of the overall naturalism 97
CENTRAL FRAMING TECHNIQUES AND THEIR DETERMINATION BY GENDER
The identification of the kinds of camera work used engages directly with the issue of the 
fetishisation of the feminine Woman through the objectifying frame. It is a central feature to the 
production of feminised and masculinised presentations of gender and the concomitant production of
97 Note: I have rejected an examination of codes 9 and 10, perspective and non-perspective, from 
variable 6 because these issues are better addressed in Figure 12, pp 120-121.
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homoerotic desire. Drawing particularly from Doane (1991) but also Cowie (1991; 1997) Kaplan (1997) 
and Stratton (1996), the short length shot, combined with the soft focus, are the two central techniques 
used to fetishise the (feminine) body in an unambiguous way. They argue that the close-up 'cuts' the 
body so that the male viewer is able to disavow the threat of the female castrated body. The soft focus 
adds an additional form of objectification because it semi-masks the body so that the body becomes the 
central object of desire; soft focus displaces the fact that the lack is real. Following the descriptive 
analysis that the postmodernist/feminists present, one would expect the feminine to be encoded using 
the close-up and the soft focus, both of which best facilitate a lingering and fetishistic gaze, as 
established by the image frame. In contradistinction, one would expect the male sexed body to be 
photographed predominately using the long shot and the sharp focus, insofar as the oppositional logic 
suggests that the masculine is conveyed by the marks that are not feminine. Therefore, this school 
would assert the categorical difference that underpins their analysis to determine, to a significant 
degree, these forms of codification.
Contrary to the expectation formed by their analysis, figure 4 shows that there is little 
variation between the length of the shot and the sexed model. The medium shot length is the most 
frequently used, at 48.95% of the total 1985-95 sample, compared with only 30.92% for the long shot, 
and surprisingly, only 20.13% for the close-up. Note also that the long shot is used more frequently to 
codify the female sexed model than the close-up; just over a third. While it remains the case that the 
body can still be fetishised using the medium shot, this process is made much harder with the long shot 
when the fetishism has to operate within the image (see Doane:!99l:46-8;Cowie: 1997:104-5). The 
close-up ensures that the body dominates the frame and so produces a closeness to the viewer that is 
singular to the image. Doane accords this closeness a special connection to the feminine state of'to-be- 
looked-at-ness' because the viewer is awarded unconditionally the control of the gaze. What is more









































Chi = 4.5991, df= 2, there is no significant relationship
significant is that of all the photographs of female sexed models, only 17.08% of the representations 
use the close-up, compared to 23.41% of male models. While this difference is not significant 
statistically, the direction of the difference challenges the postmodernists/feminists' categorical 
assumption that more female sexed models than male would be photographed using the close-up.
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How does this compare with focus use, the second code to which the postmodernist/feminists 
have given central importance? The importance of the soft codes rests with its capacity to render the 
feminine iconic by seeming to make the thing desirable in itself (Doane; 1991). First, soft focus glosses 
over the textures to produce a smooth soft surface to the face and body. Second, it is also a key 
technique by which we conventionally codify the feminine with the emotions of the intellectually 
adrift, for example dreaminess. In contradistinction, sharp focus attends to the precise detail of things, a 
quality that has been extended to denote engagement and concentration. If we look at figure 5, we can 
readily identify that, again, there is no significant difference between the sexed models and the various 
focuses used to photograph them. Both the male and female sexed models are predominantly 
photographed using the sharp focus: 66.15% of female cases, compared to 61.74% of all male sexed 
models photographed. Thus, the realist focus is the predominant codification. Moreover, the direction 
of difference again runs counter to expectation: the higher frequency does not rest with the masculine. 
Only 26.40%, that is just over 1:4, of the women photographed were codified using the soft focus as 
compared to 31.88%, (just under 1:3) of all male sexed models in the sample. Once more, the direction









































Chi = 2.2489, df= 2, there is no significant relationship
of difference runs contrary to the expectations raised by postmodernist/feminist analysis: the higher 
frequency lies with the male sexed models.
In addition, this represents a shift in frequency from 1975. Figure 5a overleaf indicates that the 
above distributions signal a shift in the codification of both the male and the female sexed model. 
For example, from the 1975 sample we can see that just over 80% of men shown were codified in sharp 
focus, which corresponds much more to the kinds of descriptions afforded by the 
postmodernist/feminist model and surely reflects the context within which the initial semiotic analyses 
were conducted. In contrast, there is a 3:1 ratio of soft focus to sharp focus, which is more in line with 
the order of the gendered dichotomy.
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We can combine the focus with the shot length. The tabulation below shows that the most 
dominant form of fashion photography combines the medium shot with the realism of the sharp focus 
(33.43% of the total sample). Second, there is the long shot combined with sharp focus, accounting for 
21.07% of the sample. Within these groupings, there is a marginal difference across sex, with the 
female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of the long shot. Thus, the female sexed 
model assumes a higher proportion of the codes which, when combined, fetishise the least. In contrast, 
the close-up is used more frequently on the male sexed body, both within the sharp and soft focus. In 
fact, 29.47% of male sexed models codified using the soft focus are shot in close-up compared to 
24.71% of female sexed models. Thus, the combined codes that are said to fetishise the most are used 
more frequently on the male sexed model than the female. Two elements emerge: first, the realist forms 
of codification assume the greater proportion of the cases assessed; second, the codes that are said to 
fetishise the body, that is function as a form of disavowal for the lack that it signifies, par excellence, 
are used with a greater frequency on the male sexed model.




























































Chi = 16.2049, df=6, there is a significant relationship at 5% 
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR
It has been shown that the distributions of the above variables further challenge the 
categoricalism that defines the assignment of meaning and the structural, causal significance of certain
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codes within the postmodernist/feminist model. Through their selected semiotic readings, proponents 
of this model have identified relationships between the signifler and the signified that are said to be 
definitive of the representations of the feminine and thus integral to the formation of the identity. Yet 
my results find no statistical difference in the distributions of the shot length or the focus. Furthermore, 
where minimal difference does appear, the frequencies of use are higher when representing the 
masculine than the feminine. Arguably, these codes may be overridden by the fetishisation of the body 
through clothes and the narrative context, as well as the direction of the gaze and so forth. For example, 
it may be the case that the soft focus is put to minimal use because the feminine as passive is securely 
anchored through body positions that show the feminine withdrawing from space, that is, the social 
symbolic is drawn upon to reproduce gendered oppositions. Yet if we combine these results with the 
finding that codification of the model through use of the prop did not reflect the gendered dichotomy 
either, then an empirical base is forming that directly challenges the categorical assumptions that define 
semiotic readings undertaken within the postmodernist/feminist perspective. Furthermore, the notion 
that the male sexed model has undergone feminisation (Neale:1992; Startton:1996) does not provide a 
clear basis to explain these apparent contradictions. This is an important point of friction because it 
brings to the fore the irreconcilable tension: the corporeal accomplishment contradicts Symbolic 
construction.
NARRATIVE ADDRESS AND CONTEXTUAL REALISM
One source that may secure the Symbolic determination of the gendered body is the specific 
narrative address. This is established through the interaction of the model's gaze, the photographer and 
the spectator. From Mulvey to Dyer to Mayne and Kaplan, all have addressed the division between the 
masculine and the feminine in terms of who looks away (private voyeur), and who looks and asserts 
themselves to the viewer (public addressing viewer). The seer/seen axis is elaborated through the 
structural relationship to power: the 'seer' is always the masculine Master. Where the gaze is held by 
the 'slave', this look is temporary, transgressive and surreptitious. However, as figure 7 shows, this








































Chi = 0.7929, df= 2, there is no significant difference
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structural relationship is not organised into categorically opposite groups whereby the masculine is 
defined by the active gaze, and the feminine is defined by the private voyeuristic gaze. In fact, the 
private voyeur is emerging as the central mode of codification for both the male and the female sexed 
models; 61.90% and 64.74% respectively. What difference exists is statistically insignificant. This 
compares strikingly with the low frequency with which the direct active gaze is utilised; only 30.04% 
of male sexed models are thus codified compared to 26.73% of female sexed models. This table 
establishes that sexual difference does not define how the codification is deployed and thus does not 
correspond to the active/passive order of the mode of address. Even if we take into account Dyer's 
recognition that the private voyeur, while marginal, is applied to the male pin-up, this still fails to 
recognise the extent to which men are equally subject to the look that cannot be returned. This 
significant increase may be a result of the equally significant shift to the single model because arguably 
'private voyeur' is best able to commodity the body via the language of desire. I return to this again in 
the examination of the facial expressions: do images deploy strategies that negate the passivity of being 
the seen object and are these strategies used to encode the masculine as the postmodernists/feminists 
describe. To summarise, the mode of objectificaiton that is said to define the voyeuristic gaze appears 
to be defining how both the sexed bodies are represented.
Figure 7a indicates that in 1975, just over half of the all the female sexed models were 
codified in a manner that directly draws the viewer into narrative. This compares notably with the fall 
to just 8.29% of all the images sampled between 1985-1995. This fall seems to suggest that narrative 
address is no longer considered an effective form of commodification. More important, however, are 
the implications for identification patterns. Narrative address has a particular format that includes the 
participation of the viewer in order to complete the narrative. This requires a recognition on behalf of 
the viewer of the social scene staged and, according to the postmodernist/feminist model, secures the 
identification axis between the scene and the viewer. Figure 7a suggests that these sorts of 
identification strongly mark the codifications in 1975 when the mock-up realism of the image was 
identified during the first run of content analyses. This appears to have all but disappeared by 1985-95








































and, with it, the identification patterns assumed. The source of this change is, in part, a knock-on effect 
of the significant shift to the single model, which blocks this type of narrative interaction.
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We have thus far identified the extent to which the narrative address has declined in 
significance and the extent to which the 'private voyeur' now dominates. The significance of this lies in 
its separation of the active and passive elements of the narrative. The dominance of the single model 
codes and the absence of any direct relationship of model and prop leads one anticipate a significant 
impact on the image's ability to reproduce wider social relations through spatial relations within the 
two dimensional frame. Potentially, this may mean the removal of the image's capacity to draw upon 
wider social relations to reproduce the active/passive axis.
In conjunction with the decline of narrative-driven advertisements, one must re-introduce the 
massive impact that the single model will have upon how the space is occupied. To reiterate, the use of 
the single model compared to the heterosexual couple model is approximately 4:1. When we combine 
this with the fact that many of the models did not have any specific relationship with the visual 
environment, we find that, overwhelmingly, the symbolic production of the hierarchy through space no






























































































































































98 The proportion of same sex couples means that the distributions are too small to be significant.
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longer defines how the model is codified. Or at least, the clues are insufficient to be able to make th
at 
interpretation with any regularity. Figure 8 shows exactly how far-reaching this impact is. Both the
 
single model and the heterosexual couple are overwhelmingly depicted centre or just off-centre of the 
image. With regard to the single model, the table reconfirms that there is an absence of any clear 
relationship between the model and props, which means that the single model is the sole focal point
 of 
the image. This automatically marginalises the other spatial relationships to such an extent that the
y are 
of hardly any statistical relevance at all. Regarding the heterosexual couple, the table shows that the
y 
too have moved toward a much simplified spatial relationship, which is also organised around the 
centre focal point. The female sexed model is no more or less likely to be seated on top of a prop or
 
model than the male, nor is she more likely to be positioned in front of him so as to emphasise furth
er 
his probable larger relative size. Together, these findings signal a significant shift away from orderi
ng 
the image by a symbolic hierarchical relationship established through the relative occupancy of spac
e 
within the two-dimensional frame. Relative size is widely used to naturalise sexual dimorphism. 
Moreover, this provides further evidence that the codification of the image is moving toward a much
 
simplified form, which represents a significant shift from Goffrnan's careful analysis of how embod
ied 
social hierarchies are performed and highlighted within a two dimensional frame. The evidence here
 
simply does not show a marking-out of social space in terms of these particular gendered hierarchie
s.
The next two variables address the interrelationships between the scene and the active 
participation by a particular model with others and the designated social space. Again, preponderan
ce 
of the single model already curtails the extent to which the following variables are relevant. This 
necessarily affects the follow-up variable that seeks to define how bodies interact to demarcate, as w
ell 
as sexualise, space. Goffman isolated a number of key features that identified how the public/private
 
dichotomy was symbolically established. In particular, he examined how the connection of public 
domain to competency and command was secured through a number of visual barriers. These often 
cut 
across the two-dimensional frame. I adopted this not only for a more substantial historical link, but 
also















































because it readily achieves the status differentials that define patriarchy through the positions of the
 
body. It directly draws upon how the body performs, and thus reproduces visually, what are in effe
ct
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abstract relations. However, as figure 9 shows, this form of hierarchical display, where the male sexed 
model is in command of the social space so that the female sexed model is confined within his 
demarcations, has barely any continued relevance. The body is primarily codified by 'non- 
containment', (80.68% for the female sexed model compared to 83.90% for the male). The only 
marginal difference lies in the extent to which the feminine tends to be self-contained compared to the 
conventional representations of the masculine. But at only 8.14% of all the females sampled, this is of 
little consequence. This means that the man does not extend his body in front of the woman to establish 
a symbolic barrier thereby limiting the movement one can infer would have taken place in the social 
world. Equally, the female hardly ever contains herself by pulling her limbs in so as not to occupy 
space. This is a striking rejection of clear codifications that produce the feminine as passive. 
Consequently, the following variable, number 13, which aimed to identify exactly how the man 
contained the woman, as in the example above, is shown to be of no relevance. This can be readily 
demonstrated by identifying the number of automatic exclusions produced as a result of the 
overwhelming majority of cases identified as 'non-contained': 323 of the female cases were excluded, 
compared to 298 of the male".
I turn next to the centra) anchor for framing the image, namely the extent to which fashion 
advertisements codify the commodification process within realist social contexts. The significance of







































Chi = 7.7900, df= 2, therefore there is statistical significance at 5%
this is the extent to which the models are contextualised within ritualistic formats whereby the 
image 'looks like my life'. The 'naturalistic mock-up' carries the realist format and thus best facilitates 
identification. Therefore, this codification is crucial both for Goffrnan's analysis of how the image 
works in order to feed back to us our view of the social world as naturally hierarchical, and for the 
identification patterns that construct the subjectivity undertaking the viewing. If interpellation is at 
work, then it should be evident here. The postmodernist/feminist analysis seeks to examine how the 
identification process operates within the naturalisation of the gendered dichotomies because this mode 
of identification exposes the masochistic features of femininity: the process of identification takes place 
despite the dominatory version of femininity presented. Thus, 'naturalistic mock-ups' must dominate
' Please see Appendix C for the whole distributions left once the majority of sample is suspended.
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the codification, if the Symbolic is marked by the patriarchal order. Yet again, my results seem to 
suggest a shift in the format of the image. Figure 10 introduces some substantial statistical shifts. 
First, it shows that the 'naturalistic mock-up' is no longer the central form of codification by which the 
feminine or the masculine is set. In only 27.11% of the total sample is there a naturalistic setting, with 
the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of this, 29.38% compared to 24.66% for 
the male sexed model. This would seem to explain why the social divisions of space appear to have 
marginal presence here. Therefore, the significant difference rests in the extent to which the male sexed 
model is located within a neutral setting. In 47.97% of cases the male sexed model is located against a 
blank backdrop where there are no props or scenes of any kind. This means that nearly half have no 
social contextualisation whatsoever. Note the corresponding significance of the higher frequency of 
female sexed models within a stylistic codification compared to male sexed models: 33.75% and 
27.36% respectively. This is combined with the markedly higher number of male sexed models in a 
neutral context than female (47.97% compared to 36.88%'°°). This shows that the presentation of the 
male body does not tend to be contextualised, and when it is, this is least likely to be in a realist 
context.
The stylistic codification is the second most frequent coding for the male sexed model, 
assuming 27.36%. Here the model is either located within a contradictory setting compared to mock 
action, or the model himself is exposing the artifice of the image by self-referentially bringing to the 
fore what actually takes place to produce a naturalistic image. In this way, the techniques of the 
naturalistic mock-up are exposed by making the artifice the theme of the image. Neutral and stylistic 
codifications combined make up 75% of the sample of men, which undermines the assurance by which 
we can legitimately assume that realism continues to define how the male sexed models are codified. 
Moreover, it removes a considerable number of clues by which we usually make speculative inferences 
as to 'who' the model might be. Only naturalistic images gives an idea as to the models personality 
traits, that is how feminine or masculine he is.
With regard to the female sexed model, there is a more or less even distribution across the 
three codifications, with naturalistic mock-up accounting for just under a third and neutral codification 
taking the largest proportion at 36.88%. Again, the naturalistic code, which is best able to interpellate 
identification, is found to have the lowest frequency. Correspondingly, the female model is more likely 
to be depicted exposing the artifice of the image than securing the naturalness of the female model and 
the private sphere. Therefore, the realist form that carries forward the ideological patterns, as well as 
securing the identification of subjectivity via the representation, is shown to be a marginal form of 
codification for the male and female sexed models. The absence of a naturalistic setting also makes it 
harder to secure the naturalness of the gendered gesture because the context, which is central to 
securing the gesture's meaning, is absent. Therefore, to make the gesture apparent, it must be rendered 
even more obvious, that is further subject to the hyper-ritualisation through which a gesture can be
read.
We can get a sense of the extent of the shifts from figure lOa (overleaf). This table reflects the 
kinds of distributions we would expect from both the feminist content analysis and from Goffman's
100 When crosstabulated, Chi score registers 6.0527, df = 1, 5% significance level.
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analysis. As indicated, in 1975 there is a dominance of the realist format at 66.67% compared to the 
29.38% that emerges from 1985 onwards. In addition, the format of the advertisement has yet to take 
on any surrealism of stylistic codification that is associated with the postmodern cultural turn 
(Featherstone; 1990; Jameson; 1984). The extensive use of realist features provides an empirical base 
upon which its influence resided and upon which the postmodernist/feminist semiotic analyses depend. 
1 argue that the data presented here shows that this base is in decline and, with it, go the features of the 
naturalistic mock-up that are said to interpellate identification.








































There are a number of significant shifts suggested by the data presented here. First, it was 
noted that there has been a massive reduction in the use of the narrative address that implies the 
participation and thus identification of the viewer. Second, it was noted that the images do not draw 
upon the symbolic organisation of space in order to recreate the social relations of space we embody. 
This was further secured through the total decline of aligning the feminine to the private sphere, which 
was said to determine the ways in which women occupy space. Fourth, this shift is not gender 
differentiated. Therefore, the male sexed model is just as likely to be codified by the 'private voyeur' 
form as the female sexed model. Then, the social contextualisation of the image was examined, and it 
was found that the 'naturalistic mock-up' no longer defines the context of the body's presentation, 
instead both the male and female models are more likely to be located in a neutral context, or in one 
which draws attention to the artifice inherent to the image. As identified, 42.21% of the total sample is 
located against a neutral backdrop, which automatically excludes 291 cases from the social setting. 
This clearly affects the gendering of space. Finally, an important relationship appears to be emerging: 
as the realist mode declines, so the simplification of the image increases.
THE SOCIAL SCENE
The central issue is whether the social location of each sexed model continues to observe the 
order established by the gendered dichotomy. The social scene establishes the extent to which social
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settings and different kinds of activity are aligned to this dichotomy. However, the results above, 
particularly the decline in the realist context to the image, has already undermined the extent to which 
social space will reflect this order: first, it has been identified that the male sexed model is not 
contextualised socially in nearly 50% of all cases; second, it has been established that the application 
and exaggeration of social relations regarding space no longer appear to define the construction of the 
image. Therefore, for those cases that are relevant here, one must identify some clear differences in the 
context if it is to be described as reflecting the Symbolic world we live in at all. For example, it must 
provide the appropriate backdrop to establish the activity of the masculine subject, particularly through 
dynamic scenarios, as well as those that establish the feminine as passive. In addition, one would 
expect to find here the extensive use of'grooming' or the more non-specific 'narcissistic' codifications 
to locate the explicit eroticisation of male sexed models. This contextualisation is said to aid the 
negation of the objectification process, and in particular, maintain a structure between the viewer and 
the viewed whereby the male sexed model leaves the gaze unacknowledged. This directly references 
Moore's analyses (1988), as well as drawing upon elements of Wernick's analysis (1991). Also, it 
extends the logic of Dyer's examination of the pin-up which I addressed, namely that the codification 
negates the significance of the (woman) viewer. Essentially, the codification 'catches' the male sexed 
model in a context where he would be naturally undressed (Finch: 1990). This form of negation is not



















































































Chi = 7.4835, df = 8, there is no significant relationship
IOI See Appendix B for a the full extent of the amalgamations.
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required by the feminine because the objectification it implies is said to be the very essence of the 
'feminine as represented'.
Significantly, the table above gives a strong indication that those specific locations in space no 
longer contexutalise gender display in fashion advertisements. The male sexed model is no more likely 
to be pictured 'socialising' than the female sexed model. Neither is the male model located in the 
context of leisure or sport, another context whereby the body can be shown while negating the implicit 
objectification. The two codes, which maintain an echo of the gendered dichotomy, are the rural 
settings and the private or domestic sphere, but only minimally so. By this I mean that there were only 
the barest of props or setting established, which was suggestive rather than clearly contextualising. 
Note also the low frequency of grooming. Even though this had to be amalgamated with 'narcissistic', 
still only 2.5% of the total sample of male models were coded thus. Strictly speaking, it is not even 
statistically valid because the nominal number is supposed to exceed 10. Potentially therefore, it may 
be the case that the male sexed model, while sexualised, no longer mobilises strategies, contexts or 
looks that negate the implicit 'to-be-looked-at-ness'. In conclusion, these results strongly indicate that 
social space is no longer ordered by the gendered dichotomy of the public/private.
The final formal feature I wish to introduce, before moving on to the particulars of the body, is 
the part of spatial variable that examines the more abstract relationship of the model's body or part of 
body with the two-dimensional plane of the image. I had intended to use these codes for two points of 
analysis: first, to trace it as a formal feature that identifies the relative importance awarded to each 
sexed body by the sheer amount of pictorial space the body assumes; and second, to utilises Goffman's 
analysis, which hinges on the premise that we can treat an image 'as real' if it structurally reproduces 
status differentials that define social interaction. However, the distributions no longer appear to be 
defined by such differentials, at least to any significant extent. I turn then to the second feature (which 
uses the amount of space the body assumes as a point of fixity for the bodily presentations). Thus its 
second purpose was to address the metaphoric distance placed between the viewer and the body. The 
second aim relates to the framing produced by the shot length and ways this goes on to frame the whole 
body. It identifies how much of the body, and 'parts' of the body are contained within the frame. For 
example, in 'dominates frame entirely' the part of the body depicted will fill the whole frame and, as a 
result, it will bring the body very close to the viewer. It has the effect of magnifying the flesh and is 
therefore a crucial code with which to render the flesh an object of desire in itself. For the other 
codifications, a greater sense of naturalistic perspective is introduced, linking the shot length to the 
sense of the body within naturalistic perspective 102 .
Figure 12 indicates that the formal frame and its positioning of the body fails again to be 
marked by difference between the sexes. The sex of the model has a marginal affect of the differing 
distributions, usually about 3%. For example, of all the male sexed models, 19.39% occupied '/2 of the 
visual frame compared to 16.93% of the female sample. The most significant difference lies between 
those that occupy a third of the space and those that dominate the frame entirely. Again, this difference 
goes against the expectations formed by the postmodernist/feminist analysis because it is the male
102 This proved to be a more accurate way of codifying perspective, which is why codes 9 and 10 were dropped 
from analysis if variable 6.
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sexed model that is more likely to be codified using the extreme close-up that effectively eroticises the 
flesh by making the whole torso fill the two-dimensional frame. Note also that, empirically, this 
corroborates the shot length discussed earlier, thereby demonstrating the consistency of coding. Of all 
the female sexed models sampled, 24.21% occupy a third of the visual frame compared to 18.71% of 
male sexed models. This gives us a sense of the full body at middle distance so that the head and feet 
correspond to the top and bottom of the page. 17.61% of female sexed models sampled were framed in 
the extreme close-up compared to 26.87% of males. We can add to the shot length the effect this has on 
the body presented, producing two distinct modes. First, we have a sense of the body being close to the 
surface of the image, which gives the bodily presentation the tactility and intimacy of the close-up, 
particularly of the male sexed model. Second, we have a sense of the whole body in the distance 
framed by the picture's edge, particularly for the female sexed model. The fact that this contradicts 
expectations so much cannot be attributed to the coding, as there is very little that this ambiguous about 
the dividing the image into three, with the female sexed model occupying the centre third.




























































Chi = 10.5921, df- 5, there is no significant relationship
Thus, on a more methodological note, this illustrates how the variables within taxonomy 
cross-reference each other and thus act as a check that the coding procedures are extended across the 
coding frame as a whole. Each variable isolates a specific feature from its interrelated parts, yet an 
accurate correspondence exists between them which suggests that dependence upon the conventional 
use of each term establishes a secure base with which to apply the same criteria repeatedly. I argue that 
this supports my methodological position that each image can be successfully assessed in terms of 
manifest parts and thus not solely in terms of its unique individual features.
SUMMARY THUS FAR
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1. The codes analysed present evidence that key features in the construction of the image cannot be 
said to be categorically distributed by gender. In fact, there is a marked absence of statistical 
association.
2. There is a relationship emerging that traces an inverse relationship: as the simplification of the 
image increases so the codes that construct the image as realist decline. By simplification I mean 
that the detail of the ideological baggage is being replaced by direct codes that place the body and 
the clothes worn right at the centre of the image, rather than using props, settings and so forth to 
tell a story about the sort of men who wear label 'X'. This emerging trend was initially identified 
in Millum and was also shown to persist, if marginally, by both Liess et al. and Wernick.
THE TAXONOMY OF THE BODY
This section traces how various conventional body positions and expressions are utilised to 
mark each body and thus connect each body to the broader contours of the Symbolic. The central 
principle is that the codes seek to isolate what the body must 'do' to readily achieve natural femininity. 
For example, Goffman drew particular attention to the feminine touch, arguing that this was a specific 
way the fragility and delicacy of the feminine can be applied to the commodity itself, while the 
Mulveyian paradigm examines the direction and force of the look to reflect the broader patterns of 
Symbolic power. I argue that the Symbolic and its associated oppositions ought to filter through and, at 
the very least, organise the simplest, most manifest features. If sexual difference, as described by the 
Mulveyian paradigm, defines the everyday visual world, then it ought to be readily apparent, not 
requiring sophisticated and highly skilled semiotic analysis in order to identify its meaning. This is 
because, when we undertake ordinary interpretation in the everyday world, we don't attend to meaning 
in that way (Cavell: 1995).
How does the visual image combine the various codifications in order to make the sexing of 
the body the most unambiguous code to apply? I have argued that what this is examining are the ways 
in which utilising, grasping and manipulating define the production of the masculine because this is 
treated as unproblematically reflecting the essence of the male body. Self-evident in this treatment of 
the body is the fact that sex and gender, as defined by Oakley (1972), are treated as equivalent and 
interchangeable in a common-sense context. For example, the withdrawal from space, be it for reasons 
of modesty or in response to a potential threat, ought to mark the feminine because this reflects the 
ideological essence of the female body, namely weak and in need of protection. Therefore, this 
accomplishes the naturalisation of sexed body. Moreover, it is in this sense that the accomplishment 
raises the question of'what the body does' in order to re-established that process of naturalisation. This 
is what is involved in the negation of the practices of gender accomplishment.
I begin by tracing what part of the body is represented, primarily because it gives us an 
immediate sense of the diversity or limitation of the body positions and gestures possible. For example, 
if to accomplish the feminine requires the repeated representations of the torso, which brings the body 
closer to the picture surface, then this also brings the breast closer to the viewer. The breast is regularly 
used to achieve the social accomplishment of sex. It deploys the inference that breasted people have
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vaginas and are therefore women. To this, we can add the closeness of the face, perhaps as a 
mechanism to anchor the softness of the skin and the absence of a larynx. It acts as substitute and 
reference for biological sex. By using these codes, therefore, it is possible to trace the encoding or 
sexing of the body. I conclude with an analysis of the variable that traces the specific ways that the 
body can be fetishised. This is followed by an analysis of'body type' (variable eleven), which 
addresses the physique, appearance and character presentations of the body. This last analysis will take 
two distinct forms: first, it will begin with a brief account of why this variable was only partially 
successful; second, I assess the distributions of the types of bodily features. I then return the analysis of 
the accomplishment of the sexed body that we initially encountered.
THE GENERAL BODY FORM: WHAT PARTS OF THE BODY 'DO' GENDER DISPLAY?
Figure 13 below identifies the specific parts of the body framed by the image. The variable 
establishes the bodily base on which the further detail of the expressions and positions can be added. 
Those techniques that encode 'to-be-looked-at-ness', those said to define representation of the 
feminine, bring the body to the surface of the picture frame and would surely be applied more 
frequently to the female sexed model. Here, however, there is clear evidence that many of the gestured 
codes must be contextual ised in terms of the whole body (60.63%), rather than the various bodily 
fragments (39.37%). This automatically marginalises those codes that break up the integrity of the body 
and contradicts the semiotic evidence of postmodernism/feminism and, theoretically, presents problems 
for their model because it is difficult to continue to place central importance upon the fetishisation 
process, which facilitates the masculine disavowal of lack, when only a minority of images represent 
the body 'in bits'. As figure 13 illustrates, the feminine is not codified through the visualisation as a 
'body bit' any more than the masculine. In fact, the reverse is true, since the distributions contravene 
the expected direction.


















































Chi = 6.1307, df=3, there is no significant relationship
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The results show that, contrary to expectations, it is the male sexed body that is more 
frequently represented via the face or the torso alone not the female (20.85% and 10.95% of the male 
sample respectively compared to 15.41% and 9.28% for the female sample). If one cross-tabulates 
these codes with the shot length, one finds that of the 59 male cases half also dominate the frame and 
thus appear to bring the body to the picture surface. Cowie noted that this is a particularly intense form 
of objectification, presumably of the feminine, because the combination brings the flesh so close as to 
almost denote a degree of (projected) intimacy (1997:105). This kind of codification regularly features 
in those images that fetishise the female body because the model is not in command of how the body 
will be viewed, but must passively receive the gaze. Here, it is the male body that is potentially subject 
to such a gaze. Yet, a third of all the images of the male sexed model are isolated from a direct sense of 
a body's social and physical relationship to space, replaced instead by the face as an object of beauty 
alone (Bergen 1974; Pollock: 1991; 1992). If postmodernist/feminist versions of a dichotomous 
structure pervade culture, this reversal ought not to occur.
Cultural analysis of this kind has assessed single images in terms of this specific mode of 
beautification and the particular ways that the face becomes akin to the photographer's muse. All such 
description has then been connected to the ideological ramifications in terms of the passive/active and 
the subject/object dualisms that organise the image. Yet, a content analysis drawing upon the semiotic 
codes identified within cultural analysis fails to provide evidence to reconfirm the gendered divide of 
who is objectified, beautified, made into an object satisfying in itself. This no longer applies solely to 
the feminine. Moreover, this evidence contradicts a second facet of the postmodern/feminist model, 
namely that they describe 'anomalous' cases as 'femininisation'. This 'reorganisation' effectively 
reconnects soft focus, for example, back to the feminine so that the opposition of the male and female 
is categorically ordered within the Symbolic. So rather than taking such empirical evidence as a 
weakening of the dimorphic production of the body within the Symbolic, they themselves re-apply that 
dimorphic logic so that the passive defines the feminine.
Listed in figure 14 overleaf are some simple features that locate the body in symbolic space. 
The central distribution here is the extent to which a majority of images are codified with the body 
facing forward: 59.44% of all the female sexed models sampled and 62.29% of the males. Again, this 
automatically marginalises many of the other codifications included 103 , which I argue, is connected to 
the increasing simplification of the image identified above. Many of the images coded contain only a 
single model, very few use props to tell a story about the model, and to this we now add that most 
models, both male and female, are codified facing forward. 'Twisting' is the second largest proportion, 
which at 23.55% gives a strong indication of how common facing forward is. Again, this kind of 
movement, conventionally associated with the over-stated display of clothes, is not characterised by 
gender difference (barely 2% between them). We must look therefore to the body in profile to trace a 
substantial difference: namely 25.08% of female compared to 16.84% of male sexed models. 
Nevertheless, for every female sexed model posing in profile there are over twice as many facing 
forward.
103 Hence the number of amalgamations; see Appendix B.
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The endurance of the profile as a form that readily codifies the feminine raises a number of 
issues. A body in profile does not necessarily ensure that the face will be averting the gaze by seeming 
to look elsewhere, as the head can be turned to the camera. Yet placing the body in profile does align 
the postures with the historical traditions of the feminine as representation (Berger: 1974; Dyer 1986). 
Locating the body in profile also emphasises the sexualisation of the breast by presenting it in 
silhouette. This potentially sets up a classic pose for the femme fatale: the profile emphasising the 
curves, primarily of the breast, combined with the directness of the look. There is a second facet 
connected to the endurance of the profile: emphasising the shape and 'universal' presence of the breast 
connects it to the 'self-evident' corporeal base of the sexed body. The breast offers 'evidence' of the 
absolute and categorical foundation of sexual difference. Therefore, it is in connection to the biological 
body that the profile code remains significant while other gendered postures have significantly 
diminished, as for example lying down.





























































































Chi = 22.9925, df= 3, there is significance at 1%
Codes like 'lying down' and 'leaning back' simply do not appear to feature much, for either 
the male or female sexed model. This means that a central mechanism that sexualises the presentation, 
for example lying on the back with one leg bent, is almost entirely absent, thereby negating the low 
status implied by the position. Arguably, this results from the increased simplicity of the image, 
perhaps because the body is best able to display clothes when the postures are at their most simple. But
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this equally means that the process that constructs gendered subjectivities in and through these bodily 
gestural displays is made much more ambiguous. This carries important ideological implications 
regarding the coherency of the patriarchal dualism. In addition, the model does not appear to be using 
the imagined projection effacing the viewer to entice or display. Thus, this form of framing further 
indicates an increasing homogeneity between the ways the male and the female are displayed.
The body is able to impose a fixity upon the possibility of social exchanges depending upon 
how that body is positioned in relation to the other. Yet, as mentioned, the body performs a perplexing 
number of possible gestures, which should not be assumed to be in co-ordination. The torso and head, 
connected by the spine, make for the points of fixity and a phenomenological orientation that limits the 
ploysemic possibilities of the body. Thus the face, hands, arms and legs secure the detail of the 
gesticulations made. Hence, I have emphasised the body's ability to anchor representation and 
interpretation. The next series of tables build upon our sense of the fixity of the presentation using the 
ways this can be animated and/or anchored to the core dichotomies through gesticulation. I begin with 
the legs and arms and then move onto the hand, who touches whom, how and how much.
THE BODY AND ITS GESTURES
If display is in any sense ordered by the patriarchal dichotomy at all then this must 
predominately lie within the gestures. I begin by looking at the legs, which add to the gendering of the 
body through the differing meanings conveyed through the forms of standing and sitting. Therefore we 
are paying particular attention to whether the legs are closed or open, extended outwards or not, and so 
forth.
The first thing to note is that in 42% of the images legs are not represented, which 
automatically removes a substantial part of the sample. The second element to be combined with this is 
the large percentage of women who were photographed occupying a third of the image compared to the 
percentage of men that were shown to dominate the frame, meaning that the visual orientation is not 
towards the men's legs. But does this imply that the image is orientated to the women's legs? The 
answer has to be no when one reflects that by occupying a third of the frame,the female is also 
projected as standing in the middle distance. Given that for a fetish to operate within the photographic 
frame it needs to be close-up, this somewhat rules fetishisation out as a means of recapturing 
ideologically the image. One would expect there to be a noted trend, particularly for underwear and 
hosiery advertisements, where fetishising the female leg is a central part of the marketisation. Yet 'legs 
only' has been withdrawn from the general idiom (figure 13) because it was shown to be statistically 
insignificant, registering only 5 cases. This indicates that the markets that these magazines target 
simply do not carry this kind of commodity, and thus do not codify the feminine through it. By 
implication then, the representations appear to be organised according to the requirements of 
commodification rather than the pre-requisites of the hierarchical Symbolic. This surely compounds the 
notion that images are organised to serve our latent desire, which require the fetish to function in order 
that (masculine) subjects can disavow the threat that lack poses for them. Most importantly, the 
influence of the commodification process, rather than the symbolic regime, may well prove to the
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determining trajectory within the presentation of gender. Regardless of whether it is more dominant, 
sexualising the leg via visual codification that disavow does not appear to be emerging as the central 
feature. Or rather, the decline is marked enough to query assertions that 'the feminine has become 
synonymous with selling' (Pollock; 1992:138). Or rather, both bodies are utilised to sell.






















































































































Chi = 19.9127, df = 12, there is no significant relationship
Among those 60% that were photographed presenting the full body, there is no marked 
diversity in the ways both the male and the female sexed models pose. Hence the cross-tabulation does 
not register statistical difference. Thus the female sexed model is just as likely to be seated with her 
legs open as her male counterpart, just as he is equally often depicted with his legs closed when 
seated 104 . Emphasis upon the leg does remain, namely in the posture that bends the knee slightly 
thereby tilting the hips. This draws attention to the hips as a marker of the sexed body, but also
104 Potentially, although this needs investigation, the absence difference may well reflect an emphasis 
upon youth and a 'relaxed attitude' that is set up in opposition to the discipline implied by the erectness 
of the traditional adulthood. The oppositions of these categories may prove more central to the active 
codification of specific meanings than gender is appearing to be here.
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encloses the tilted hip within an erotic codification. The female sexed model in both cases is twice as 
likely to embody this posture as the male sexed model. Yet once again, it barely registers 1 in 5 images. 
In fact, there is a higher frequency of female sexed models extending their legs into space than either of 
the above. Alternatively, one can look to the convention of crossing the legs and pulling the legs in 
toward the body. This symbolically associates the female body with appearing not to take up space, as 
well as displaying an appropriate amount of'modesty'. Yet this occurs about as frequently as those 
cases where the female model sits with her legs open.
What conclusions can one draw from this? Principally, that the position of the leg appears to 
be marked by a degree of diversity that only minimally adheres to the fetishisation and 
commodification that are conventionally associated with the display of the leg. This offers evidence 
that challenges Millum and Goffman, who both emphasised how the feminine is often reduced to body 
bits so that the leg is displayed in a manner that cuts it away from whose leg it is. In addition, the 
naturalistic postures through which gender is displayed in social interaction are seemingly being 
replaced by postures that denote 'youth'. Again reflecting the markets within which the images are 
produced.
I turn next to the various ways that the arm is positioned and how this contributes to the 
presentation of gender. The first thing to note from figure 16 overleaf is that most of the arm positions 
are not used particularly. This means that neither sexed model is encoded performing a mock-action, 
hugging the body or pointing upwards. This singles out 'arms relaxed by side' and 'arms bent' as the 
two most common types of postures. Furthermore, these are both noticeably gender differentiated. As a 
proportion, in 40.84% of cases the male sexed models were depicted with their arms relaxed by their 
sides, compared to 29.35% of females. Conversely, 47.95% of female sexed models had their arms 
bent, compared to 31.30% of the males. Thus the male model is statistically more likely to have his 
arms relaxed by his side, and the female sexed model is far more likely to have her arms bent. This 
registers a significant difference in the gestures, but only in those that appear to be most innocuous.
It is only by considering the possible implications that each coded gesture may carry that some 
sense can be made of this difference. First, the bent arm has the potential to establish naturalistically 
the gendered nature of touch, because having the arm bent tends to bring the hand towards the torso 
and into the centre of the image. Bringing the hand into the centre of the frame, also brings the markers 
of the hand that 'reflect the facticity of sex'. For example, to convey a sense of delicacy to an object, it 
tends to be held by the tips of the fingers, with nails that are usually filed and painted; conversely, a 
product for men is connoted through a grasp. Each position connotes the gendered dichotomy but does 
so through the physical display of the hand, that is, the combination of the elements that secures the 
naturalisation of categorical sex difference. Lastly, this posture sets up the potential for the image to 
reference soft-core pornographic codes through self touch. Often the female sexed model is shown to 
caress her body (in the most acute cases on or near the erogenous zones). Moreover, while this position 
sets the contexts for the hand to accomplish the femininity of the body, the corresponding features are 
not used to secure the masculine. However, the fact that there are a significant number of cases among 
male models where the hand is held by the side automatically means that the hand cannot secure the 
masculine of aptitude and skill. The extent to which the male sexed model is codified with his arms by
129
his side may in fact prove to be a series of codes that reflect the dialectic of the Other insofar as the 
masculine need not positively represent itself, but rather uses the feminine 'definitions' as a means to 





























































































Chi = 17.7606, df= 9, there is a significant association at 5%
signify what it is not. However, this requires that the gestures of the hand reflect a clear trend for 
specific sorts of gestures or expressions, that is, it requires that a trend emerge of something that is 
distinctly feminine and unquestionably passive.
Therefore, who is touching whom is central to how that we make sense of the higher 
proportion of female models with their arm bent. This can be extended to the possible means of 
displaying the hand, which also carries the markers of natural sex. However, emphasising the possible 
ways open for the hand to reproduce the Symbolic ought not to obscure the fact that just over a third of 
the all female cases also had their arms relaxed by side. Such a posture is conventionally read as the 
'body at rest' and can be defined as the body at its least symbolically invested. However, this is entirely 
dependent upon a similarly neutral hand position to be properly secured and therefore ought not to be 
undermined by any substantial evidence that verifies Goffman's initial findings, namely that femininity 
is symbolically secured through the extent of the touch as well as the type of touch.
105 Again this had to be ordered as multiple variable simply because the arms need not be doing the 
same thing. Therefore, each percentage must be treated as independent and describes only its individual 
proportion.
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The first clear distribution shows that if the hand is not held at rest then the model, of either 
sex, will touch their bodies. Of those models who touch themselves, the female sexed models do it 
more frequently, approximately a 3:2 ratio to male sexed models. Potentially, therefore an opening is 
emerging for a significant difference to be secured, providing the type of touch is equally marked by 
such statistical difference. The second stark result that struck me, which is why I have opted to include 
the whole table despite half of the codes being statistically insignificant, is how few instances there are 
of either model interacting via touch. There are four aspects to this: first, the masculine authority is no 
longer codified via his capacity to guide, lead or condescend by touching the subject with the lower 
status in the public domain (Goffman: 1979:60; Major and Williams: 1980; Henley: 1977); second, the 
feminine is not located within the heterosexist matrix by caressing and stroking the man she is with, 
particularly prevalent when located in the private domain; third, the potential for the homoerotic, 
secured through touch, is also equally non-existent (the implication that only those who are 'intimate' 
touch each other); fourth, the objectified feminine is not secured by caressing the commodity either. 107 
Therefore, what emerges is that of all those cases where the female model is shown with her arms bent, 
the likelihood is that the hand goes on to touch a part of her own body, presumably around the torso 
area. This is crucial for positively securing femininity via the bodily performance required to compose 
the image. Thus the tactility of the touch with the body is central to construction of passive femininity.
106 As I have elected to present the whole table here, Chi cannot be calculated because well have half of 
the cells will have an expected frequency of less than 5 which is deemed significant. 
107 1 have genderised the homoerotic here because women are more tactile, ideological speaking, and 
therefore it does not throw up the 'spectre' of homosexuality in the same way.
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Nevertheless, what the data has effectively ruled out is that touch is used either to anchor the male 
sexed model's higher social status by guiding the female through public space, as Goffman identified, 
or to establish for example the centrality of feminine care within the domestic setting. Conventionally, 
these codes are considered primary means to reproduce the active/passive dichotomy.
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR
We now have a sense of how the central features of the body position are located in the frame. 
What has further been identified is not a marked difference between the sexed body and the positions 
assumed, but the striking similarity and simplicity of the postures chosen. The simplicity is derived 
from the position the body adopts toward the camera, predominately positioned facing the camera, and 
sometimes to the side, with a number of the ordinary leg positions. Most importantly, none of the 
results show a clear gender pattern emerging in that they are sufficiently ambiguous to question the 
description offered by the postmodernist/feminists. Moreover, it was noted how few images deployed 
the leg as a fetish with which to secure the disavowal of the male viewer. To this, I noted how few 
images were marked by the tactile interaction between subjects, despite the fact that 40% of images 
that featured more than one model. So the potential to for the ideological anchor is there. Instead, the 
pattern that emerges is one where the highest frequencies involve relatively neutral arm positions: male 
sexed models are depicted predominantly with their arms down by their sides, and the female sexed 
models with their arms bent. The postmodernist/feminist response must surely be that the ideological 
axis of the active/passive is pinned to the self-touch offered by having the arm bent. This introduces a 
potential for the performance of gender by connecting it to where and how the hand touches the 
model's own body. Thus we must look to securing the alignment of the feminine as passive through the 
nature of the touch. This is particularly so when one considers that the results show that the male sexed 
model is not holding an object, and thus potentially manipulating it or using it as a prop to stage the 
instruction of a subordinate. The male sexed model is more likely to have the hand at rest, or in fact 
touching himself (35.47%), rather than actively doing something it.
WHERE THE HAND TOUCHES THE BODY AND HOW
I begin by drawing attention to a number of exclusions that automatically impact on this 
analysis of the feminisation of touch: in total there are 329 cases automatically excluded produced by 
the filtering system of Snap for Windows. 108 As a result, there have been a number of amalgamations, 
the most significant of which is that the various erogenous zones had to be combined in order to 
produce a statistically analysable figure 109 . So what do the remaining data show?
Arguably, these next variables ought prove to be a vital anchor for the constitution of the 
active/passive dichotomy. In addition, where the hand touches the model's own body ought to offer the
108 For example, those images coded 'face only' clearly have no bearing on this codification.
109 Please see Appendix B
132
potential to sexualise the body, particularly by touching the key erogenous zones. This appears to be 
born out here, with the cross-tabulation registering a statistical association at the 1% level. For


















































































































Chi = 28.5111, df- 12, there is a significant relationship at the 1% level
example, the female sexed model is almost twice as likely to have her hands on her hips as the male 
sexed model. This introduces a correspondence with the sexing of the body: first, in terms of drawing 
upon the conventions that define this gesture as one of assertive and confident sexuality in phallic 
femininity; second, connecting the discourse to the category of the natural body that associates hips 
with the woman's body. Yet this reading is much undermined by the infrequency of those cases where 
the feminine is constructed through this posture. They account for only 20.11% (36 out of 179) of the 
touches possible' 10 . Again, one would expect the female sexed model to be represented as touching her 
hair significantly more often than the male sexed model. However, it represents only 7.26% of all those
110 Note: because the hand can touch two things at once, it was necessary to operational ise this variable 
as a multiple variable and thus the percentage must be read as individual proportion of total number of
cases in that variable - 32 cases of a possible 179
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female models codified here. This is clearly a marginal proportion that somewhat overshadows the 
categorical, sexed nature of the touch. This also has a critical impact upon the presumptions of the 
psychoanalytic models. For example, Flugel (1930) argued that the association of feminine sexual 
attraction with long hair was that the hair is a fetishistic displacement for the castrated state that defines 
the feminine. Or, to put it in more directly Lacanian/cultural studies terms, the lack that she embodies 
(Silverman:1991; Millum:1975; Stratton:1996). Therefore, by touching the hair, the feminine model 
draws attention to its fetishistic properties and thus its sexual attractiveness. However, my data signals 
a different undercurrent: while the conventional codes of gender presentation continue to be marked by 
statistical difference, their share of the sample is now marginal. They are no longer the central codes by 
which the male or the female is represented. In other words, while the feminine touches different zones 
of the body, establishing a strong statistical association, the proportion is simply too small to be 
described as structuring the symbolic and certainly too marginal to secure the effective productivity of 
subjectivity; such small quantities are just too contingent for the reproduction of the social order.
Neither is there an apparent shift to secure the dualisms and the associate forms by 
increasingly using soft-core pornographic codes: in only 19 cases are the erogenous zones'" touched, 
of which the male sexed model accounts for a higher proportion than the female. In addition, my results 
show that in all 15 cases where the male model is touching his own body, he is shown to be touching 
his own genitalia in 5 cases and his own buttocks in 9 cases. To further compound expectations, in 
none of these cases is the male sexed model caught in moments of narcissistic admiration. Therefore 
there is no narrative to reconnect the masculine to the active. Rather, most instances occur when the 
male sexed model is located in the neutral background. The extremely low frequency questions the 
assumption that the erotic male body must be located in scenes that redefine the erotic as narcissistic 
(Moore: 1988).
This data identifies trends that, I argue, problematise the postmodernist/feminist description. 
This is because a significant proportion of the sample was excluded because no touch is involved at all. 
These distributions further impact upon the results, since only 179 (55%) cases out of a possible 323 
where found to be touching the body. Within these cases, there is a relatively even distribution across 
the various body zones, with the torso having the highest frequency, although this does not include the 
breast. Thus we can conclude that to an extent to the sexed body is produced through touch, insofar as 
the female sexed model tends to touch herself, in various areas, mpre than the male sexed model. If 
there should be a marked difference in the nature of the touch, then it must lie with how the female 
sexed model touches these various bodily zones.
Yet, as figure 19 shows overleaf, the distributions simply did not follow the categorical order. 
Again, the data is altered as a result of 185 pre-programmed exclusions, thereby excluding a third of 
cases from this form of codification" 2 . The distributions that emerge tend to confirm the emergence of 
a greater simplification in the nature of the representations and a greater degree of homogenisation 
between the male and female models. For example, the masculine is not constructed by the male model 
manipulating the object, and neither is the feminine constructed by fingering or fiddling with things.
'"Made up of the genitals, the breast and buttock.
112 The decrease from the previous number of exclusion results from the inclusion of the object or
commodity.
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The female model does not appear to be caressing herself or anything else. On the contrary, the single 
largest frequency rests with a neutral touch. This requires that the hand be defined by its pragmatic use, 
be it holding a glass at a table (but not caressing it) carrying a book or using the hand in a basic 
rudimentary way. Mostly, the hand holding or touching in this manner has a specific ideological 
connection with the model codified, and as the previous data suggests, the models were rarely 
constructed narratively to, or engaging with, their environment. This is vital to the data and I will return 
to this as part of the conclusion of this chapter.

































































































In figure 3, it was identified that 86.61% of the sample had no specific relationship with the 
props or commodities. Moreover, the codes that traced the gendering of the hand through touch did not 
reflect the gender dichotomy either. Together, this trend identifies a shift to a more pragmatic 
relationship of hand to objects and so removes a fundamental feature that connects the model to the 
social world. In particular it has become much more difficult to define the 'who' the model, that is,
113 The chi value cannot be calculated because 22.73% of the cells have an expected value of the less 
than 5.
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what sort of a woman she is. By this, I mean that without these sorts of connotive detail, it is very 
difficult to look at the model and say: 'she fiddles with things and does not seem to be able to 
concentrate'. When it is possible to make the inferences between the bodily performance and the sexual 
character, the image is much better placed to construct patterns of identification and, consequently, 
construct the 'appropriate' subject position. The images furnish data whereby the body is clearly 
marked as male or female, but does not appear to be codified further. Thus the findings lead to two 
central conclusions: first, that codification appears to have withdrawn from the domain of sexual 
character; second, the secure categorisation of sex appears to take place independently of other social 
cues.
THE FACE AND THE GAZE
I turn now to the cluster of codes that directly target the various facial expressions and the 
gendered nature of the gaze. Based upon the postmodernist/feminist analysis, a marked difference in 
the direction of the gaze and the expressions performed ought to order the distribution of the results. 
Thus, one expects notable difference in the deployment of the passive gaze, and its associations with 
looking away so as to avert the eyes, of the head being positioned in profile in order to connote the 
feminine as 'to-be-looked-at-ness' and so on. One expects also a notable difference in the use of the 
seductive gaze. This is used to define the feminine as the 'femme fatale' through which to encode 
phallic femininity. Conversely, the direction of gaze will also trace the extent to which the male body 
undergoes 'femininisation', using the conventionalised gestures that construct the (male) body as 
desirable. Equally expected are the masculine (male) codifications, for example through the direct 
assertion of a look that forces the viewer to appear to be returning the model's directed gaze. Such 
codes are central to the reproduction the dichotomy where the masculine 'sees' and the other is 'seen'. 
Also, we would expect there to be ample use of the codes that negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' 
inherent within modelling by the extensive deployment of 'looking up and out' of the imaginary frame 
so that male model can negate their objectification (Dyerl992;1993). Hence, the aim is to examine the 
extent and direction of statistical difference in the distributions of the sexed models in this cluster.
However, before the detail is examined, it is necessary to contextualise these results in terms 
of the limitations set by the corporeal body so that the importance-pf the expression can be examined. I 
begin with the head position, which establishes some of the corporeal and material boundaries as to 
what expressions can be performed. This is followed by analysis of the direction of the gaze, which 
further limits corporeally the expressions that can be performed, and then 1 follow this with the 
expressive gaze.
From the table overleaf, one is struck again by the homogeneity between the male and the 
female sexed model. For example, only 14.29% of the sample of female sexed models are in profile, 
which compares to 13.73% of male sexed models. Equally significant is the small percentage this 
codification holds overall: 14.03% of the total sample. Even if the expectation were for there to be little 
difference between the male and the female sexed models, one would surely have expected that the 
coding via the profile would assume a larger quantity overall. Yet this particular presentation, one
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which formally presents the model as an object of representation, does not feature much, despite the 
fact that at the bottom line the models are there to present the goods.
Overall, the largest frequency lies with those models, both male and female, that are facing 
forward directly at the camera. This accounts for approximately a third of each. This indicates that 
the 
cues are focused upon the body itself: the body is predominately facing forward that is most often 
combined with the face facing forward, assuming the largest single proportion. Perhaps this is beca
use 
the intense and categorical codifications rest with the construction of the body rather than the 
construction of sexual character. Irrespective, the direction of the gaze and the expressions are cent
ral 
to the meanings generated. The only code that registers any significance is the larger number of fem
ale 
sexed models shown turning toward the camera. Again, this needs further anchoring with the 
expressions to see to what extent it is used to invite the gaze. Equally significant, and again contrar
y to 
expectation, are the central codes that directly and explicitly denigrate the model: not only is there 
no 
marked difference between the male and the female sexed models, but when combined, the 'back o
f the





















































































Chi = 13.5299, df= 8, there is no statistical association
head' and the 'head down' account for just 8.25% of the total sample. This somewhat problematises 
Nayak's assertion that the concealment of the face is a central technique to denote the subordinate 
the 
Black body as otherness. Likewise frequencies this low cannot be elevated to the status of 
encapsulating the negation of feminine that is central to producing the Master: the masculine is kno
wn
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by what the feminine is not. Neither body nor subject can be interpellated by such an infrequent 
codification.
The final element I would like to draw attention to refers to a code borrowed from Goffman. 
This is the head cant (p 179-86) which he describes as a core mechanism by which to demonstrate the 
lack of seriousness in women. He argues that the posture is often performed in combination with 
dreaminess or an adrift expression. He describes it as a form of'cutesy-ness' or submissiveness, 
especially when the head is dropped onto a man's shoulder. However, my results suggest that not only 
is this rarely used (8.07% for females), but again, it is used just as often on the male sexed model 
(7.75%). The deeper theoretical question is this: does the head cant, for example, maintain its 
connotative meaning of the gendered nature of sexual character, or does it mean that this connotation is 
losing its conventional base when used on both males and females? Overall, I argue that my results 
argue that the latter is the case. The level of the connotative is operating to reproduce naturalised sex so 
that sex and gender, male and man, are understood common-sensically as interchangeable.
Thus to make sense of the uniformity with which the face is presented, namely facing forward, 
it is vital that the direction of the gaze and the expressions be examined. In particular, the directions of 
the gaze, and its social and metaphorical distinctions of the higher and the lower, are key: the feminine 
looks down and the masculine looks up; the feminine is modest when she turns away, the masculine is 
assertive, looking directly into the three-dimensional space projected. Yet the results do not reflect this




















































































Chi ~ 9.0518, df= 8, there is not significant relationship
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dichotomous organisation of the direction of the gaze with ease. In fact, the distributions further 
undermine this logic. This striking absence of difference comes from small frequency numbers, equally 
distributed, of male and female sexed models that had their eyes closed or were looking out of the 
frame, and so forth. Thus the largest majority, 33.33% of the female sample, compared to 35.47% of 
the males, were gazing out at the viewer. This is the direction that connects directly with the camera 
through which the image positions the viewer within the model's field of vision. The data shows that 
the largest frequency assumes only a third of the sample. The next largest frequency, for example 
'looking away', barely reach 10% of the sample. Relationally speaking, this means that gazing at the 
viewer is by far the most frequent code used. An image is three times more likely to be codified as 
staring at the viewer than not. This further displaces the marks of the gender dichotomy onto the 
expression of the gaze itself. Thus, while the variable showed that there is a degree of variation as to 
which direction is adopted, this does not detract sufficiently from the homogeneity that is increasingly 
coming to define the core visual order. Moreover, this homogeneity is registered with the codes that are 
least open, interpretively speaking, that is, they are not based in the esoteric nature of my interpretation, 
but by the corporeal impositions of the body. I will return to this.
Hence the central markers of sexual difference within the Symbolic must include the 
expressive gaze and the expressions of the mouth, perhaps two of the most important areas of the face 
with regard to how the face is sexualised. Therefore, these have the capacity to offset the emerging 
neutrality, one might even say banality, that is increasingly defining many of the other codes. In 
particular, if the neutral body stance is offset by the use of overt forms of sexualisation, which are also 
categorically distributed, then this would provide empirical evidence that legitimates the continued 
assumption regarding the nature of the Symbolic. What sort of evidence does figure 22 furnish 
overleaf? Firstly, staring, the most neutral expression descriptively, is shown to be the most frequently 
used for both the male and the female sexed models; secondly, it accounts for a higher proportion of 
the female sample. This has to be attributed, in part, to the minimal cues of location, body posture 
props, which are joined now by this neutral expression. Moreover, without more complex cues, it is 
impossible to 'read' or key (Goffman:1979) an expression.
The second most frequent code is 'assertive'. The proportion of females from the total is 
31.42%"4 . Contrariwise, only 3.72% of 296 female models were recorded as expressing coyness. This 
combines with the other codes that have also registered a significant decline in the representation of 
passive femininity; for example shyness and dreaminess. At least here there is some remnance of the 
former division insofar as the female model is three times more likely to be coded as 'dreamy' than the 
male sexed model. Another element worth noting is the decline of'to-be-looked-at-ness', that is, the 
form of display and self-objectification that functions to attract the gaze. Just 13.85% of the females 
from the proportion of 296 were clearly marked by this look of invitation and display. Nor could it be 
clearly stated that this is strictly confined to the feminine, if to a much lesser degree, since 10.04% of 
the male sexed models also marked their address with the invitation to consume them voyeuristically.
114 Note that this is a multiple variable so that each percentage represents its share of the total 
independently of the other distributions. Therefore, the sum total of percentages is greater than 100. 
This is produced from the possible of repeats from codes like 'frowning' 'semi-concealed' and 'raised 
eyebrows'. See Appendix B.
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Much more in keeping with expectation, when guided by the order of the Symbolic, is that the male 
sexed models register nearly one in five images were they are asserting their gaze. Yet, just as with the 
female models, the males were mostly staring, with no particular expression and certainly no particular 
'insight to the soul' (Hillel: 1998; Magli: 1989; Schmitt: 1989). Note also that there is not that marked a 
difference regarding the use of Dyer's 'other-worldly'. Note finally the extent to which the male body



























































































































CM = 24.4863, df = 14, there is significance at 5%
has been coded as seductive, with male sexed models register nearly twice as many instances as 
females. It is through differences like these that the variable shows up distinctions. However, this does 
not provide evidence for the Symbolic order, because the difference is in the wrong direction, that is, 
that the male is codified using the seductive gaze more frequently than the female. This cannot be 
offset by calling upon the narcissistic context of the seductive look, thereby displacing the seduction to
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self-love because other codes have identified the high degree to which most images are free of any 
clear narrative contextualisation. Only by undertaking the sorts of theoretical contortion critiqued 
earlier can this evidence be read as confirmation of the postmodern/feminist description of the 
Symbolic. Note also the low frequency with which the 'other-worldly' gaze is used by the male sexed 
model to resist or negate the objectification. The evidence suggests that the notion of the Symbolic 
being ordered through the universal categorical opposition is increasingly difficult to sustain.
Given that the gaze did not produce the categorical organisation of the sexed body according 
to the active/passive dichotomy, it is therefore left to the expressions of the mouth to reflect this 
dichotomy. The mouth is significant not only through its central place as expressive through speech as 
well as smiling, laughter, sneering and so forth, but also because of its psychoanalytic significance as a 
sexual stage of development. The phallic mouth is therefore profoundly important in securing 'phallic 
femininity'. For example, Kubrick's 'Lolita' pictures the nymphet sucking a lollipop. Therefore, 
symbolically it carries the sexual connotations of an orifice of pleasure and invitation. If the 
postmodernist/feminist model has some descriptive base, then it should express itself through the 
phallic possibilities that the mouth offers.
The table below identifies that this expressive element is statistically significant: the sex of the 
model affects the form the mouth takes. Both the male and female model register similar frequencies of 
an open mouth, which implies that men appear to be represented smiling broadly or laughing just as 
often as women. However, the male sexed models are more likely to have their mouths closed (nearly 
70% of the sample, compared to 55.45% of the female models). The second noted difference is that the 
female sexed model is twice as likely to have her mouth semi-open. What could be the symbolic 
significance of this? I propose that the closure of the mouth seals it off as an orifice, while the mouth









































Chi = 15.0210, df= 2, there is a strong association at 1%
half-open sets up the potential for erotic consumption because it brings into view a space, which can be 
filled. The open mouth does not seem to be able to do this because it has lost all the essential sexual 
suggestiveness. This brings two elements to bear: first, the corporeal base is essential for tracing the 
symbolic elaboration of the body, rather than presuming that symbolic operations fully determine the 
fleshy matter; second, it begs the question of to what extent this is undermined or secured through
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expressions. I turn next to the expressions and then to the cross-tabulation of the above with the 
expressions in order to delineate their interrelationship.
The first thing to note from figure 24 overleaf is the overwhelmingly marginal use of any 
expressions at all. 'Smiling', for example, assumes only 23.59% of the female sexed models compared 
to 52.16% of those shown with no identifiable expression. Moreover, these proportions are mirrored for 
the male sexed models. This further weakens the legitimacy of the categorical order of the Symbolic. It 
simply cannot be awarded such causal significance when, in a sample of fashion images, the feminine 
as passive is not ordering how gender is codified. The second striking result is how few images have 
utilised the 'phallic mouth/object' code: only 6.31% of the female sample. This indicates strongly that 
within this sample, clear pornographic codification is not seeping into mainstream images. Not only 
that, but the 'phallicisation of the feminine' (Stratton: 1996) is not established with anything like the 
frequency implied by the Symbolic order. However, despite these similarities, the extent to which the 
female sexed model is represented with the mouth semi-open, alongside the notable absence of any 
expression, may well signify how the mouth is sexualised, that is, by restricting the mouth to a 
suggestive orifice.
From table 24, it is possible to identify whether the mouth, posed as semi open and without an 
expression, is used to secure a specific mode of sexual isation of the feminine, as well as providing 
empirical evidence for the psychoanalytic origins of the eroticisaiton. What the data reveals is that it



































































Chi = 12.5182, df= 6, there is not statistical association
does secure a proportion, but that this must be placed in context with the number of'expressionless' 
images where the mouth is closed, thereby rendering it a marginal mode of representation. 291 is the 
total sample of females of which 116, or 39.86%, are codified with their mouths closed and with no
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expression. This distribution surely secures the move toward a homogeneity between the 
representations of men and women. In comparison, the total number of females with their mouths semi- 
open and expressionless is 22.33%. Therefore, the female model is twice as likely to be captured with 
no expression at all as sexualised with the mouth semi-open. Nevertheless, this sexualising code is one 
of clearest forms so far because if we look at the percentage of the male models codified thus, it


















































































registers 10.74%, that is half as few. The final point of interest furnished from this analysis is the equal 
frequency with which the male and the female models smile and laugh fully, heartily, so that their 
mouths open: 14.46% and 15.12% respectively. Not only is this half as much as when the female model 
has no expression at all, but it also registers the fact that the male and female models are codified 
smiling and laughing more or less equally. Again, the empirical evidence fundamentally challenges the 
notion that the sexed categories are defined by patriarchal Symbolic. On the contrary, apart from key 
areas of the body itself, the data presented simply cannot be said to be defined by categorical sexual 
difference where the 'feminine as other' operates as a mode of representation for the 'masculine One'.
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR:
There is a clear trend that shows that the Symbolic does not operate universally to institute 
sexual difference. In fact, the codes of the body are simple rather than weighted ideological 
complexity:
1. The model is predominately shown alone;
2 There is no specific narrative link between the social environment, nor is there a direct link,
subordinate or otherwise, with props used. In fact, a significant number have no additional props or
social setting;
115 1 have elected not to include percentages because what is required is the proportion of the female 
sample as a sum total in comparison with the male sexed model.
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3. Neither sexed model is defined by their social status in terms of how they occupy space, or with 
whom;
4. Both the male and the female sexed models are equally located within the voyeuristic context; 
neither are visually orientated to the viewer through the narrative;
5. Most of the models, both male and female, are represented using the medium or long shot with
sharp focus. 
Moving on to the body:
6. Most models are represented facing forward;
7. Those body positions that have been associated with symbolic withdrawal from public space or the 
demarcation of public ownership of the female in space proved no longer to define representation 
at all;
8. Neither the male or female was differentiated clearly by whom they touch or how they touch; this 
is limited to the fact that the female touches herself more than the male does, but not in a particular 
way that aligns the nature of the touch to the gendered dichotomy;
9. Both the male model and the female model are most often represented with their faces looking 
forward in the direction of the viewer, but with a neutral facial expression that does not engage the 
viewer directly, be it expression gaze or mouth;
10. The few differences that are registered do not always follow the direction dictated by the Symbolic 
order. As was noted, the male model was codified more frequently using the seductive gaze than 
the female sexed model.
Methodologically:
11. These results cross verify each other as the results for shot length for example correspond to the 
body idiom which likewise corresponds to the registered decline in the use of staring out of the 
photograph frame as a technique to negate the 'to-be-looked-ness';
12. The sorts of results that are expected as guided by postmodernism/feminism were registered within 
the Cosmopolitan sample of 1975.
The marked absence of difference is most significant because codes that aim to establish 'who the 
model is' are in decline, at least according to this extensive sample. The commodification process does 
not seem to draw upon our gendered world of sexual character, yet maintains a 'commitment' to 
ensuring the body is always subject to the appropriate assignment of sex. By this, I mean that the clarity 
by which one could assign the sex of the body is not reflected in assignments of sexual character so that 
one could straightforwardedly say: 'as a female she loses concentration because, as you can see, she 
keeps daydreaming'. Moreover, one should not resign the attribution of the sexed body to the 'realism' 
of the image because, as is well known, this is a construction, a visual accomplishment that the camera 
can undermine at any time. Equally, therefore, the realism must be achieved. As Goffman argues, the 
image is a thing of artifice, not authenticity. How do we make sense of the ease of sexual attribution in 
light of the fact that there is no sexual character and no symbolic signs apparent to secure the feminine 
as passive? 1 argue that the ideological imput of the image rests in the construction of the body, that is, 
in the 'self-evidence' that sex and gender are one and the same thing. Ideologically therefore,
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representations are concerned with underpinning the equivalence of social and biological within the 
production of the facticity of sex. This is why I have left the variables that explicitly tackle 'body type' 
and sexualisation until last, because I suggest that it is here that the significant construction work 
resides.
SEXUALISATION
What does this variable reveal? A number of things, some of which run counter to the idea 
that it is the 'model as subjectivity' that is the discursive target rather than the corporeal body. The first 
thing to note is the high frequency that has classified half the sample as 'non-sexualised'. This is 
startling at first because it challenges both lay and academic preconceived ideas regarding the extent

























































































of the sexualisation process. One may well be inclined to think that this reflects interpretative error. Yet 
if one takes stock for a moment, it is possible to place this in some context. We have noted throughout
" 6 The extent to which the results challenge the orthodoxy was startling to me, particularly as on first 
viewing I 'have no results'. Yet, I began to remember the banality of the coding process, where 1 
recognised how uniform many of the images were. Advertising forms such a large part of the visual 
field, we in fact may only be able to remember the stark examples precisely because they are unusual. 
117 Chi is not calculated because, despite amalgamations, there remains 10% of the cells with an 
expected value of less 5.
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the shift toward the simplification of the image. This was identified by looking at the frequency with 
which the models were facing forward, looking forward, having their arms by their sides, or were 
staring or had the mouth closed without an expression. One only needs to reflect on the proportions to 
also contextualise the extent to which the images appear not to be dominated by the sexualisation 
process.
While most of the female sexed models were fully dressed, they were also encoded as 
revealing the flesh, mostly the thigh or breast. Similarly, the male model reveals or completely bares 
his chest, something that the female model rarely does unless in the context of pornography. We also 
find here that there are equal numbers of cases where the feminine and the masculine direct attention to 
the groin area. There is an equal frequency (6.61% for the female models and 6.77% for the male) with 
which they both reveal the lower stomach and hip bone. I suggest that this does indicate that there is a 
dimorphic logic at work here, but one that is required because sexual difference under-defines our 
gendered system. The codifications operate by defining what is sexy in a woman and what is sexy in a 
man through the apparent differences of the body. Sexiness is defined as being derived from the 
essence of the sexed body; the sexed body produces either men or women. This reveals how we 
collapse the social and the biological as part of our social understanding of gender. For example, bodies 
are natural and have different biological roles in reproduction and yet this so called self-evidence is 
supported by some women wearing padded bras because they have small breasts and therefore are not 
feminine enough. Thus, I am arguing that by drawing attention to the few features of corporeal 
difference (we do, of course, have 26 chromosomes in common and only 1 that this different) we shut 
attention off from the ways in which corporeal bodies are altered to meet the construction of gender 
difference. Hence, I continue to challenge the postmodern/feminist model of the construction of sex by 
rejecting idea that the body is constituted according to the reign of the phallus, which re-introduces all 
those codes that negate lack that have just established as marginal.
Table 27 overleaf adds to that the dimorphic logic of sex by building up further the common 
sense notion that one physical attribute, say the penis, corresponds with another, for example the 
presence of muscle. Moreover, what this construction seemingly ignores is that far from being a 
reflection of the primary attribution, secondary and tertiary features, such as muscle or having pert 
breasts, are organised and managed in order to produce a regime of gender (Connell: 1987) that is 
common-sensically treated as natural. Society is not involved in 'making babies' and so is not involved 
in making the adult males either. This status of'nature' means that no social activity is required. 
Therefore little attention is paid to the normative definitions of'male' as this is outside of the domain 
of society. Equally, if we look at the hands, almost one in three images have drawn attention to the 
hand, not so much by the nature of the touch, but rather by the 'look' of the hand. In particular, the 
tendency for the female model to have her arms bent, thus bringing the hands into the centre of the 
image, may enable the hand to be displayed, and with it, the practical accomplishments that mark that 
hand as 'female'. I have in mind the nail varnish and manicure, which 'naturally' is something a 
woman does. Thus we are beginning to trace the reversal of what is proposed by 
postmodernism/feminism: what is deemed to of the body is being understood through the matrix of the
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social. In contrast, my aim is to contribute to an emphasis that includes ideas of construction but 
equally draws the corporeal into this process.
The second element that emerges from this table is the extent to which both the male and 
female models fall into the codes that trace the body beautiful, the singular difference being that the 
male body had muscle and the female was invariable slim. Both the male and female models are 
classified as tall. There were twice as many men who had no chest hair (presumably removed) than had












































































































































visible chest hair. Women were just as likely to have short hair as long, but very few men had long 
hair Again, the painting of the nails, while not being a significant proportion of women, nevertheless
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marked the female models out from the male. Thus marked difference is appearing in terms of bodily 
display, which is significant by its temporariness and its ongoing accomplishment This is the practice 
of masculinity and femininity. When chest hair comes back into fashion, re-gains its sex appeal, so this 
particular style will vanish. The ideological requirements demanded by the postmodernist/feminists 
will struggle to deal with these shifts as they require something more continuous in order to be able to 
construct subjectivity through representation.
It has been noted that the female model is consistently codified occupying a third of the two- 
dimensional page, and filling the page from top to bottom. This projects the body into the length of the 
page, which then makes her appear tall. This can be achieved irrespective of whether the model is 
actually tall or not. Thus the appearance of the body as beautiful is a manifestation as much of how the 
image functions within its two-dimensional plain (Goffrnan:1979) as it serves any ideological 
movement. It is an accomplishment of the artifice of the image more than a result of the pressures of 
ideological reproduction.
I have elected to suspend any of the sub-categories that targeted the tertiary level of 
personality" 8 as part of my examination, namely those that traced the active/passive dichotomy and its 
associate forms. This is because I abandoned these codes toward the end of the data imputing as I 
became increasingly aware that the criteria by which I had expected to assess the sexual character could 
not be applied with any consistency. This was in part a result of poor operationalisation. In particular, 
the variable was too big without sufficient internal organisation, which assists greatly in applying the 
criteria with regularity. However, equally important, if not more so, was the significant decline in the 
realist codifications. Gone from the images were the social space and the sorts of objects and goods that 
characterise different spaces. There was no formal use of status cues, nothing in fact that we could use 
to 'read' the presentations of self people offer. I could not code this particular female model as being 
'weak' or 'emotional' or of a 'soft' nature because there simply were not enough cues by which such a 
judgement could be made.
The simplification of the image meant that 1 was faced with a beautiful body, clearly marked 
as female, but which did not tell me anything about 'her'. For example, without the props of the private 
domestic setting, one cannot get an idea of the sorts of things she likes. With the ritualisation of social 
life, we are able to glean from the staged nature of the image, what sort of 'person' she is constructed 
as being. This level of meaning does not characterise the advertisements sampled here. In addition 
therefore, despite the poor codification of variable 26, which sought to identify the core dichotomies, it 
was always going to fall at the same hurdle: there simply were not enough social cues to abstract with 
any consistencies whether this particular model could be said to be defined by an element of the core 
gendered dichotomies. I argue that my results have clearly established the extent to which the image 
has been greatly simplified so that the inability to read the image necessarily leads to this conclusion.
118 See Appendicies B and C
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SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of improvements that could be made to the taxonomy, particularly in the 
light of the results found here. The most apparent improvement would be to have a considerably larger 
sample size. As it stands, once the initial distributions are in place, there were insufficient cases to 
cross-tabulate 3 or more variables. The aim was to develop multiple perspectives on the body whereby 
various positions could be examined in terms of other expressions or gestures. Figure 23 gives an 
indication of what this would have looked like. However, the effect of the small sample size was 
exaggerated by the distributions identified. For example, in many of the variables, most of the sample 
(usually about 60%) clustered around one core sub-variable, which left the remaining 40% to be 
distributed amongst the remaining sub-variables, often about six or seven. Consequently, some cell 
values were often split further so as to rule out this comparative analysis. The second central feature 
would be to develop a number of codes from variable eleven. This would include many more 
secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics so that one could build a picture of the macro features used 
to secure the facticity of the dimorphic sexed body.
AND THE IMAGES THEMSELVES?
I conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of a number of images, the aim of which is to 
recontextualise the codes used to quantify some of the images in circulation. The images included do 
not represent a collection selected from the random sample but rather reflect: a) those images that 
caused me to question the assumption that the Symbolic is ordered by clear gendered dichotomisation 
only; b) those images of women that emerged from my results and appear to represent a drop in the 
intense ideological production of the 'feminine as passive'. I have chosen these because I think these 
two elements represent the central findings that challenge the adequacies of the semiotic descriptions 
taken to task above. I begin with the images of the male models.
From plates 1 and 2, one can glean that the production of the body as male is central despite 
the poses. In plate 1 " 9 the male model is located within a plain brown background. I have argued that 
this significantly reduces the ability to anchor him in the public social world, which is a key element of 
the Symbolic. The second element to notice is the angle of the head. His face is looking downwards, 
away from the viewer. Ideologically speaking, this is supposed to align the model with the passive 
because the angle of the head prevents a direct engagement with the viewer. This is consolidated by the 
addition of the downward gaze. Furthermore, there is no expression on the mouth, which makes the 
face very still and somewhat isolated. The shirt that he is modelling is position to reveal the breast 
bone. Here the light catches and emphasises the glossiness of skin. Codes such as these usually codify 
the feminine. The chest may have been waxed, as there is no indication of any chest hair, so there is 
also some indication that this form of masculinity results, in part, from a social practice not ideological
construction alone.
His hands are concealed by placing them in his pockets; something that is conventionally 
associated with men. However, this also conceals one of the central anchors we immediately use in
119 Esquire magazine, Feburary 1995.
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everyday life to assign the sex of the person. Hands can reveal elements about the social positioning of 
the person; for example, labourers' hand as opposed to office workers. In conventional gender terms, 
we look to the size and the presence of veins to assist in sex assignment. Combined, these elements 
undermine a clear production of masculinity. However, his sex is secured in other ways. For example, 
the angle of the camera draws attention to the jaw and, in particular, to the fact that he is not clean 
shaven. This deliberate codification sets the body apart from women's, where facial hair is always 
removed. The presence facial hair stands in contrast to the hair on his head, which has been stylised and 
opens up the potential to draw reference to the 1930's haircuts some women had. I am referring to the 
curl placed over the forehead. I argue that while these elements are sufficient to secure the body as 
male, they do not unambiguously locate him within the conventions of hegemonic masculinity. The 
placement of a pink scarf suggests that this image is aimed at a specific market, namely the gay men's 
market. Perhaps then, the source of the variation of images is derived from the market sector at which 
the product is self-consciously pitched. Therefore the codification of an image such as this depends 
upon combining the traditions of the feminine with a sufficient number of makers that secures a male 
sex assignment. This assignment presents some fundamental problems for the notion of feminisation 
because the codes do not construct this body as female despite the presence of a 'to-be-looked-ness'.
Plate 2 120 is predominately coded via the lighting, or brownish tinge that makes the chest 
appear very velvety. This makes the skin the central focus of the image. Note also that soft focus has 
been used to create that sense of velvety skin. The central lighting draws attention to the muscle of the 
body, particularly the breast. His torso fills the page thereby bringing the surface of the skin close to the 
eye. This reflects Goffman's notion that we are able to imaginatively connect a codification to an actual 
embodied position. However, active interpretation is not to be treated the same as the meaning created 
by the interpellated subject. The viewer is placed so as if he/she were standing in close proximity to 
him. Again, the smoothness seems to suggest that he has waxed his chest. However, this may in fact be 
an outcome air-brushing the image and draws are attention to the artifice of the image. Either way, it 
removes the image from the actual embodiment of most men. He has his hands folded across his chest, 
which recalls the way arms are used to conceal women's torsos. In addition, this withdraws the arms; 
combining the codes to connote modesty. However, the position of the arms also draws attention to the 
distribution of hair, which assists in securing the body as male. The emphasis upon the chest bone does 
this also. The second crucial feature is the position of the head. He too is looking downwards, as well 
as appearing to have his eyes closed. This codification reduces further the capacity of the model to 
impose his subjectivity thereby making the viewer the subject of the gaze. This is effectively how 'coy' 
is visually produced. Another additionally element to this image is the fact that the only object in 
colour is the bottle of beer. The position of the head assists in drawing the gaze directly to the 
commodity. Moreover, the downward angle of the head implies that the body is subordinate to the 
object. Conventionally, this would be defined as an objectified body and I suggest that this ought to be 
extended the male body also, given the evidence presented here. Along side the elements of the body 
that draw upon our common sense ways of assigning sex, there are a number of tensions included 
within the image. One is the thumb that indents the skin on the arm holding the bottle. This does
120 Arena Spring 1995.
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convey some uneasiness in the image. The most explicit is the pun 'Poor Homme', which alludes to the 
French 'pour' or 'for'. This is referencing the wide use of pour homme' in perfume advertising, for 
which the bottle of bear is substituted. Equally, however, it means that the male model is to be pitied.
I have included this image because it directly draws upon the theoretical and empirical critique 
offered. The semiotic analyses analysed in chapter two would 'deal' with the clash of the male body 
and the abundance of feminine codification by defining it as an example of feminisation. Yet, to do so 
is to implicitly acknowledge the prior assignment of the sex of the body because without that prior 
assignment the notion of feminisation would not be required because the production would reflect the 
Symbolic order (Mathieu:1996). Furthermore, the instabilities that have been self-consciously included, 
but applied to the male body, making them ironic. To use irony in this way is to disrupt the free flow of 
ideological meaning (Rorty: 1989). The postmodernist/feminist model has no means to account for this 
because the constructed subject is the outcome of meaning and never a user of meaning. 1 refer back to 
Benhabib's critique here. Ultimately, what is crucial to both these images is the extent to which 
beautification and commodification define the image. Hence, 1 argue that these processes should no 
longer considered processes that target women only, or even predominately.
In contradistinction, I have selected an image that reflects extent to which the images of 
women have become less riddled with ideology. I argue that my results have unambiguously shown the 
extent to which the explicit positioning of the woman as passive has declined. This introduces a tension 
in that the beautification and commodification continue but that this is placed directly on to the body, 
rather than the construction of a 'character' or the alignment with the private domain, for example. 
Thus, they supply 'information' only on what a woman looks like, not on how she should behave or 
feel. I have selected one from Cosmopolitan November 2002 on order to give an indication that these 
sorts of images persist.
Plate 3 exposes, I think, the ways in which a significant proportion of images are composed to 
draw one's attention directly to the artifice of the image. Just as above, the image is marked by the 
absence of any social context with which we can glean something as to the 'who' of the model. It was 
as a result of images like these that I was unable to apply the variable that traced the core dichotomies. 
She is caught in the middle of an artificial posture that self-consciously draws attention to how the 
image is constructed. It does not function via naturalistic mock-up; on the contrary, it reveals what 
actually takes place to compose an image. Her arms extend outwards and her body is captured in 
movement. A mock-up of a dance move perhaps? At best, one could say that her posture displays the 
clothes, but then would not one expect that if one were to seek out such advertisements? I think that 
what is critical for me is how banal the image is and how much the image is ordered around the 
necessity to the display the clothes; hence the movement. Her hair is held back by fingers, which gives 
us sight of her face. Her eyes look downwards, but without the symbolic effect of the images above 
because the angle is a result of the movement and thus does not carry the 'staged' quality of those 
above. How is one to make an identification with such an image? Perhaps, identification is secured by 
imaging oneself in the suit? However, this seems a little vague. Or at least it is vague enough to query 
whether such an image could secure the reproduction of the Symbolic and the subordinated 
subjectivities it constitutes. Again, it is the explicit commodification process that stands out in this
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image, and yet it is so explicit, how could you miss it? 1 think that if this image is going to be found to 
make an imput in the reproduction of the social order, then we must turn to the how social interaction 
mediates between ideological construction and the subject. I query that asserting that it operates at an 
unconscious level is sufficient to explain how an image of this kind operates in the social world. This is 
important because the data has shown that simplistic images like this that are in circulation.
A SUMMARY
The content analysis undertaken here has provided a set of data that stands in opposition to 
much of the description and analysis of representation. I think that there are four basic reasons as to 
why:
1. Unlike much of the research conducted on gender representation, [ did not organise my data in 
such a way that it set out to establish difference, the problem then developed is: what kind of 
difference is being looked for. 1 sought to avoid this by allowing the distributions themselves to 
furnish difference, usually defined as 'the findings', or as has emerged, to 'fail' to establish any 
substantive relationship of difference at all.
2. However, what has emerged from this is an introduction of what unites the images of men and 
women. I identified that the image has moved, for both men and women, toward a significant 
simplification, and thus I simultaneously traced the decline in the use of realism; secondly, and 
most importantly, by not emphasising difference, I was able to identify the extent to which the 
forms of representation are in fact characterised by homogeneity.
3. Combined, these two shifts undermine the legitimacy with which one can continue to assume that 
the categorical differences of the Symbolic continues to describe the actual images in circulation.
4. By using a series of codes that are relatively closed, interpretatively speaking, or are guided by 
clear delineations of their operations, I have generated a bank of empirical data with which to 
challenge the assumptions of the Symbolic. I argue that this makes the case for the need to return 
to content analysis so that ideological concerns are linked to how representative, or not, the image 
subject to semiotic analysis is.
5. The images are organised by taking the gendered body and using the body itself, separate from 
sexual character, as system through which to commodify and promote the item. 1 argue that this 
contributes to the demise of the detail of the social setting and props.
Finally, I return to an issue raised when delineating the difference within postmodernism/feminism. 
The data has shown that the Symbolic is simply not sufficiently dichotomised to secure the identification 
patterns that the theory asserts. What is the consequence for the theory from these cultural applications 
are drawn? I suggest that this evidenced weakens the claims that they make theoretically and 
substantiates the necessity to engage both theoretically and empirically.
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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODIES, SEX AND 
GENDER
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I conclude with a reiteration of the general theoretical problems identified with regard to the 
strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its application within the visual cultural sphere. I 
follow this with an introduction of how a model that incorporates the corporeal body, as well as 
maintaining a sharp eye on ideology, might proceed. I return here to Goffman (1979) and integrate this 
with Garfinkel's explication of how naturalisation within the practice of gender occurs. Garfmkel 
(1967) assists in showing the various ways 'genital sex' underdetermines the social, everyday 
understandings of sex. This provides the background to a model that seeks explore the social activity 
that exists between biological sex and gender roles and/or identity, that is, practices common-sensically 
said to be derived from or rooted in chromosomal sex. What is important to me is that within the social 
and everyday background, sex and gender do not operate as a semantic distinction. This distinction 
resides largely within the academy. Garfinkel attends to how sex and gender are linked in the lived 
embodied world, given that the biological category underdetermines the social operations of sex. 
Moreover, this offers an alternative to the dualistic logic that has tended to limit the analysis of the 
sex/gender distinction, yet without ejecting the corporeal; a charge which I have lodged against the 
Lacanian postmodern feminists throughout this thesis.
I will then extend this analysis by linking it to Lakoff s( 1987) notion of family resemblances. 
This does two things: first, it offers a non-unitary and non-objectivist classification scheme so that the 
varied practices undertaken to sustain sex (resulting from the failure of biology to achieve this) can be 
brought more clearly into view; second, by developing the notion of sex as a family resemblance, we 
are better able to keep a handle on its manifold forms; we do, after all, often mean much more than 
chromosomal sex when we speak of'sex'. In particular, we can treat the various elements, for example 
differing conceptions of motherhood, as an integral part of the cluster contained within how a category 
of this complexity works because we no longer treat these as objective properties.
I conclude with a research framework that seeks to explore the relationship of representations 
to social gendered action. What is of central importance is the extent to which representations continue 
to visualise the normative body, and thus address ideological formations, but emphasise how these are 
incorporated into everyday actions, rather than treating images as determinants of that action. I argue 
that only this emphasis can account for the variability of being women and this is why we need a 
conceptualisation, like Lakoff s, that can accommodate a much more flexible form of classification so 
that central, marginal and marginalized forms and practices of being a woman can remain the central 
theoretical focus.
THEORETICAL CONTESTATIONS
I highlighted what 1 consider to be a series of fundamental problems with the model offered by 
the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism. I focused on the over-emphasis on the constitutive 
function of discourse that, when combined with a certain deployment of Lacanianism, produces a 
number of problematic theoretical closures. They are:
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1. An inadequate theorisation of the subject derived from an over-reliance upon the mirror phase 
and the concept of interpellation.
2. The model is ahistorical, as it has neither a subject capable of bringing about change, nor a 
model the Symbolic that can interpellate new subjectivities.
3. A self-evident treatment of the body as object and root of subject positions.
4. A coterminous, but contradictory, reliance upon a disembodied subject; leading to the absolute 
negation of active female heterosexual ity.
5. A restricted model of how an image functions and what images are in circulation.
These closures, brought about by structural determinism, reduce the human condition to a series of 
structural oppositions, which relies upon defining femininity and masculinity by identifying their 
various fixed properties: active/passive, subject/object and so on. These dualisms are said to be 
contained within the language that we speak and thus organises or interpellates the subject. A key 
example discussed is the prescription that if a male model is photographed looking down and away 
from the viewer, 'he' is feminised, thereby maintaining the connection between the feminine and the 
passive. This logic is equally operative when the viewer is addressed. If a woman is to gain pleasure 
from an image she can only do so by oscillating and assuming masculine patterns of desire. Hence, a 
subject and/or representation cannot be both feminine and active. Anything identified as 'active', 
however vaguely, and is born by the female falls outside of this fixed and unitary classification and is 
either masculinised or pathologised. Such an analysis reveals the ambiguous place of the body in the 
writings by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. Only if the subject is disembodied could one 
really contemplate theoretically ruling out the possibility that some women may experience active 
heterosexuality, or at least something more complex than elaborated by the postmodernists/feminists 
discussed here. I suggest that if one concludes that all active desire is masculine desire, one is left 
wondering about the body because their analysis of desire feels curiously disembodied. Desire is, in 
fundamental ways, corporeal and is experienced at the level of the flesh, regardless of the fact that 
desire has social origins.
Yet, I have offered the argument that their theoretical delineation of the disembodied subject 
operates coterminously with their use of the 'body as a self-evident object'. Hence Lacanian 
postmodernists/feminists treat the body as an unexamined presupposition upon which the culturally 
structured process can be 'read'. Oscillation, masculinisation, and so on, are all process that assume 
sexual dimorphism. Without treating the body as self-evident, they are unable to trace the domination 
that is said to reside within the visual domain. 'He is feminised' in no way critically targets the primary 
assignment 'he'. Masculine and feminine are placed 'on top of the body' so that deviation at the level 
of cultural construction can be traced. In effect, masculine and feminine become patterns of desire that 
refer to the order of the mind - the construction of the subject - and this has the effect of ensuring that 
the body remains the sole raison d'etre of biology. It therefore reproduces the mind/body dualism, and 
thus fails to tackle its implicit genderisation (Lloyd: 1984). In essence, postmodernism/feminism of the 
kind evaluated here aims to treat the body as a discursive object, a product of cultural forces, but can 
only do so by ignoring the body at the corporeal level, that is, by accepting the body as self-evident. 1
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have tried to argue that this effectively re-introduces the sex/gender distinction, but in a far le
ss 
interrogated way than under Oakley for example. Yet, they equally depend upon the body as 
self- 
evident, one that underpins the identification of psychic shifts.
A direct consequence of the fact that these structural dualisms maintain their integrity above 
the empirical world they are supposed to describe is that it effectively denies individuals the 
capacity to 
reflect, challenge and alter the social world through potentially transformative practices. This
 is why 
theory of this kind is charged with ahistoricism. There is no social change to account for beca
use they 
lack a social subject or motor from which social change can emerge. For if we do not act on the world 
but are only subject to it, then, this seriously limits the quality and variability of action. As I argued, we 
are merely cultural dupes acting out our roles. This model is forced into a position of ahistori
cism, 
produced by its structural determinism, because the Symbolic is said to speak through the sub
ject. 
Therefore, postmodernism/feminism lacks a 'motor', as it were, to bring about new Symbolic
 
formations. The specific form that this structural determinism takes is particularly problemati
c, in my 
view, for this reason: it is dangerously idealist in its resonance. Language systems seem to be
 
immaterial, free standing and fully independent of the embodied subjects that utter the words. One gets 
no sense that the language system is alive because it forms part of the speech acts we do m T
he 
strictures that the language system imposes is also the frame through which speech acts eme
rge 
(Cavell:1995; Goffrnan:1974). Moreover, the voice of the speaker is as disembodied as desire. One 
develops no sense of the 'entity' doing the utterance, so consequently, those who recognise th
at it is 
'real' bodies, with voice boxes, who speak, find themselves in a perverse situation of seeking
 to 're- 
establish' that bodies are 'real'. The postmodernists/feminists reviewed here extend a sense o
f the 
Symbolic universe that is confined to the (re)presentations made of it. Thus, from their theoretical 
stance, substantive change need not be of any concern.
The problematic theorisations of the subject and its relationship to the body render the 
theorists discussed here unable to account for their own consciousness. At best they call upon
 pre- 
Oedipal desire. This effectively re-essentialises their own desire and places them back into th
e order 
that says they lack sufficient moral regulation to engage in the public world. As Gadamer (1975) 
argues, seeking to valourise the subordinated term merely achieves the re-affirmation of its s
ubordinate 
position and thus the patriarchal dualisms that are allegedly their theoretical target. Hence, 
postmodernists/feminists, and the cultural applications they undertake, have not deconstructe
d the 
essence of the woman's body at all, but operate within the very logic they profess to be the o
bject of 
their critique.
METHODOLOGIC1AL CONCERNS AND EMPIRICAL REFUTATION
My theoretical critique highlighted a number of theoretical weaknesses in the theorisation of
 
the body offered by Lacanian postmodernists/feminists. I then went on to challenge directly 
the 
ideologically over-determined description of the Symbolic by conducting a content analysis. 
My
121 This in part reflects the loose application of the term 'text', which elides all the difference
s between 
these texts, including the visual, linguistic, books and bodies.
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central theoretical challenge was to suggest that a sign must be sufficiently stable if it is to perform
 an 
ideological function. These signs are supposed to make the world recognisable and, for that reason,
 are 
not self-consciously elliptical and difficult to pin down as they slip across a web of meaning. In 
contestation, 1 simply offered the following proposition: if the universal Symbolic is the source of 
gendered subjectivity, then it must be characterised by the active/passive and masculine/feminine 
dichotomies. Thus codes of this kind are straightforward, conventional and quantifiable. However, 
the 
data furnished by my content analysis, which used many of their forms of codification, simply does
 not 
make the postmodernist/feminist position critiqued here a tenable one. Empirically, women are not 
repeatedly encoded with variables that define her as passive, coy, shy or confined to the domestic 
sphere, for example. In fact, the contextual anchor of most of the images was so vague that applyi
ng 
the coding criteria with regard to femininity as character consistently proved difficult; I abandoned 
my 
attempt, suggesting that this is largely because the use of realist scenes to anchor the expression hav
e 
disappeared. I was unable to consistently code the images along the contours of the gendered 
dichotomy and I included two images that illustrate how images of men cannot easily be recuperate
d 
into the domain of the mind (Dyer: 1992). In fact, the emphasis on the skin and the use of light indicates 
that the body is encoded as desirable through its physicality. This theoretically implies that men are
 
codified and positioned in the same ways as women. The content analysis has furnished evidence th
at 
there is an emerging trend that indicates an increasing homogenisation of the images of men and 
women, which signals that men's bodies are increasingly the target of the processes of 
commodification and sexualisation. This may open up new patterns of desire, both active and passiv
e 
for men and women.
In contradistinction, semiotics is the preferred method of analysis of postmodern Cultural 
Studies precisely because it can trace the interaction of the signifier/signified in the production of 
meaning. Yet, when language and symbols are made to serve an ideological position, all signs com
e to 
mean the same thing, in this case, 'the feminine as lack'. This is encapsulated, I think, in their exten
sive 
deployment of the neologism '(re)presentation'. This theoretical closure makes the necessity to 
uncover, and account for, new forms of representation redundant. The subtlety of the semiotic meth
od, 
attentive to how meaning is constructed, is gone. Instead, we are left with only a few images analys
ed, 
whose selection is made without any systematic rigour. This is, I argue, one of the reasons why the 
manifold shifts in representation have gone by 'un-decoded'. The shifts discussed above create a 
cultural space to consume the images of men differently, since the image is no longer located withi
n 
situations that offset or negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of the male within the image. The 
postmodernist/feminist 122 emphasis upon the spoken means that they rule out the need to consider t
he 
speaker and thus the potential variation he or she introduces. There is no scope for irony (Rorty: 1989) 
or for users to mobilise the inherent instability of language and potentially produce new signs. The 
models assessed here are fundamentally ahistorical, both in terms of the construction of the subject and 
in terms of the production of the sign.
122 1 refer here to the cultural analyses critiqued and their broader location within the strong 
programme.
157
Moreover, my argument proposes that it is not possible to recuperate the phallocratic order, 
namely via feminisation, because all the images clearly establish or mark the body as male. Moreover, 
where codes were shown to have a high frequency of use, for example the voyeuristic gaze, which is 
particularly important here, the codes were equally distributed across the male and female models. It is 
worth noting that the core feature of the voyeuristic coding was that the gaze was not reciprocated. This 
result cannot be put down to interpretative prejudice on my part because the position of the head 
determines whether or not a gaze can be returned. This is imposed by the materiality of the body; it is 
not the outcome of discourse constituting the materialisation of the body (Butler: 1990). My critique, 
combined with this evidence, means that it cannot merely be dismissed as a difference in theoretical 
orientation. 1 suggest that this empirical data fundamentally weakens the claims made by the 
postmodernism/feminism criticised here. However, I do not wish to imply I that I consider the image to 
be free of ideological construction, rather, that the ideological target has shifted to the body itself, to an 
intensified production of the dimorphic body.
BODIES, IMAGES AND IDEOLOGY
To reiterate, one of the central conclusions drawn from the data is that the ideological content 
of the image appears to target less 'what kind of woman is she' than that bodies are strictly and 
absolutely dimorphic. So how should we make sense of this? Garfmkel's (1967) analysis of the 
relationship between the normative distributions of sex into the dimorphic body and the social practice 
by which this is accomplished, alongside Goffrnan's model of the image, seem to me to be pertinent. 1 
begin with Goffman (1979).
As Goffman argues, we are prepared to suspend our knowledge that the image is a construct in 
order to engage with it. The consequence of the suspension of disbelief is that, as a society, we accept 
the patterns of the body beautiful as natural and eternal at that point in time, despite it shifting 
according to the whims of fashion. Goffman has shown that in order for an image to work, it has to 
hyper-ritualise the scene so that it brings into focus the taken for granted background upon which it 
depends. Goffman suggests that the essence that makes the image function is its artifice. This carries 
significant implications in the light of the evidence furnished by my content analysis because the object 
of codification is not the naturalisation of the social setting, but the naturalisation of the body. This 
opens up a place to identify the ideological function, namely the production of the normative body, 
which acts as a yardstick within the social background. The paradox is that when we accept the 
naturalness of sex within the visual image, that acceptance is an outcome of hyper-ritualising, that is, 
making visible the cultural rules we use to assign sex. Moreover, it allows us to negate the practice 
involved in the production of the 'natural sexed body', namely the hours spent in the gym by the model 
to produce the right contours to reflect the lighting and shadows best (illustrated in plate 2). In turn, 
these contours then are treated as a natural, and thus naturalised, aspect of the body, that is 'men are 
muscular'. Another example can be found regarding the technique of airbrushing, which removes all 
the small 'imperfections' of the body - a pimple here and flesh 'out' of contour there. Most people
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'know' that this takes place, yet it does not affect how the image is read. I suggest that this is where the 
normative body makes its entry because the standard is largely unattainable yet operates as the 
yardstick by which society judges the bodies of its members. Thus, within these images, we can trace 
the ideological formation of the body, which is then naturalised as the essence of man or woman. In my 
view, muscle and facial hair are particularly important features of bodies which are used to secure the 
body as self-evidently and unambiguously male or female. For example, in plate 1,1 suggested that the 
evidence of facial hair was crucial in ensuring the correct assignment, but does not negate the potential 
for homoeroticsm. 1 suggest that thinking about images within this framework allows for a more subtle 
understanding of how they are encoded and naturalised, than drawing upon a structurally determinist 
model.
Garfmkel, while not occupying an identical theoretical domain as Goffman, nevertheless 
begins to explore how a cultural background organises ambiguity to anchor or stabilise our notions of 
'sex'. In a sense, Goffrnan uses the notion of hyper-ritualisation and Garfinkel uses aberrant cases to 
bring the background into view. I bring the two together to link images as a source, but not 
determinant, of the practices to naturalise sex. By anchoring cultural patterns to sex, society conflates 
the sociological distinction into one: they are one and the same thing, a 'symptom' of being a man or a 
woman. Garfinkel addresses the normative order by arguing that what members within this society 
deem 'the normal', and thus the morally sanctioned, is to be either female or male and that membership 
to one or other is permanent. His exploration of how such a world is constructed looks not to the 
material reality of sex, but to social accomplishments by which the moral normative position is placed 
at the centre of all interaction. One of his points, adopted by Kessler (2000), is that we largely assume 
that the performance corresponds to the physical level of reality: we operate believing that we 'know'. 
However, what the knowledge is of is the enculturation and embodiment of the meanings of sex and 
gender. Thus, for Garfinkel, the distinction of sex and gender makes no impact within everyday 
practice because they are treated as one and the same thing. Therefore, Garfmkel is not suggesting that, 
for a significant proportion of the time, a person having one set of genitals will not correspond to the 
public performance demanded of those with a specific genital sex. He does not doubt that in most cases 
the physical classification of genitals is real. He does not sit alongside radical constructionists who 
argue that the margins, most notably the intersex (Kessler:2000), make a mockery of the bimodal 
distribution, whose theories force one into the strange position of having to insist upon the extra 
discursive qualities of bodies.
Garfinkel is examining the exceptional not to cast doubt on the fact that there are two types of 
bodies with two differing roles in reproduction, but because the exceptional reveals the background that 
'the normal' does not recognise. The naturalisation is complete because the genitals match their 
performance. Garfinkel does, however, make the case that the exceptional, those who fall out of the 
normative order, reveal something of the social, discursive regime that makes sense of what these body 
differences mean and how they are embodied; that is, having this set of genitals 'of course' means that 
you sit with your legs closed, crossed, or tucked under the chair. From the example, we already have a 
woman in mind. When a person's genitals match the gendered performance, the social practices that 
sustain that relationship become obscured. Thus, what Garfinkel likes about aberrant cases is the extent
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to which they have a "remarkable awareness and un-commonsense knowledge of the organisation and 
operation of social structures that were for those that are able to take their sexual status for 
granted...seen but not noticed backgrounds" (Garfinkel: 1967:118). Encapsulated within this statement 
are, I think, all sorts of social practices that are important to sustaining bodily dimorphism, while 
negating corporeal commonality, and merging these with the assumptions and practices of social 
dimorphism so that it is treated as a universal, ahistorical 'fact'. I think that the fusing of the biological 
with the social, thus rendering invisible important parts of our social conduct that is undertaken by both 
men and women, and diverting attention away from the physical properties men and women share, is 
what the ideological function of naturalisation is all about. The biological difference, which forms part 
of the body, is merged with social differences, which are understood to be so different as to be deemed 
opposite. Kessler and McKenna (1978) also draw attention to the social requirement that gender be 
made culturally visible through core codes like hair, muscle, deportment and such like. It is here that 
the significance of the visual domain makes its entry, as social practices draw upon the representations 
as a source for the codes of hair, muscle, facial hair, eyebrow shape and so on. Kessler and McKenna 
target the commonsense attitude, namely that one is a woman by virtue of a set of genitalia. They ask 
then, why should there be such an intense focus upon magnifying that 'fact', for example the 'Wonder 
Bra'. Their answer is that genitals are simply insufficient to secure the assignment of'woman' to the 
body that has female genitalia (see also Connell:1987).
Throughout this thesis, there have been on-going references to the sex/gender distinction and 
its tendency to operate dualistically, so that the body is deemed fully independent of society. One of the 
issues addressed was the propensity for the social/gender to become more and more peripheral in the 
explanation for the lived patterns of being a man or a woman. The social element is lost because 
current practices are 'lived' as pre-reflexive embodied features. Consequently, explanations that state 
that the body has fixed innate features gather favour because they reflect seemingly the fact they are 
'felt' in the body. This, for me, is a central reason why sex and gender as a distinction needs to be re- 
thought as the analytical axis because it fails sufficiently to tackle the ideological tendency to relocate 
'embodiment' back into the biological (Delphy: 1996) One of the possible reasons is because one 
'lives' the two elements, interacting and combining them into a seamless sense of self as a woman or 
man. For example, our emotions 'feel' in the body and thus 'feel' as if they belong to sex. The outcome 
is that aggression is naturalised and becomes an innate quality of a man's body. Equally, the translation 
of an emotion into the disposition of a specific bodily sex reflects the ideological function that operates 
when producing absolute dimorphism. For example, within these structured contexts, an aggressive 
woman transgresses the moral character and its social sanction because, like her body, moral character 
is deemed to be absolutely dimorphic. As Connell (1987) argues it is the social management of gender 
that produces categoricalism so that an emotional propensity rapidly moves from particular men, to all 
men, united by their bodies; it has become a natural and permanent feature of 'being a man' and thus 
stands outside of society. Categoricalism organises the practices so that we come to see genital 
difference in terms of absolute gender oppositions. Hence, practices move back and forth between the 
two dualistic terms and manage the ways sex and gender is lived.
160
What is required then is a model that theorises the relationship between body and society
 by 
'bringing the body into society' (Franks: 1991). I offer here a preliminary sketch about how we might 
move more effectively between the elements of the body and those of the normative orde
r. I draw upon 
the theoretical space between being in a body, knowing that one is unequivocally male, a
nd the sense 
of feeling masculine or feminine. I am persuaded by Connell and Garfinkel alike that onl
y a theory of 
practice can meet this criterion because it is social practice that produces the organisation
 of the body 
and the embodied identity that emerged from the body. Practice intervenes so that each m
ember of a 
social order, no matter how varied these are, can utter the following statement: 'I have the
se kinds of 
feelings because I have this set of genitals'. This assumption is not disrupted by the varia
tion in the 
ways of 'being' a man or a woman, located within various social orders. I believe that on
ly a notion of 
social practice can manage this.
THE UNPUNISHED BODY
One of the issues that leads me to hesitate in accepting the distinction between sex and ge
nder 
is that the category of sex is thoroughly filled with social content, as well as the bodily fa
ct of genital 
difference. So much about our gendered practices are based upon the social classification
 which 
reflects the ways we organise the signs of sex. We can see this when pubescent boys and 
girls are 
trying different ways of being a man or a woman, which runs conterminously with the de
cision of what 
sort of a man or woman 'feels' right, if it 'feels' right at all as in the case of transsexuals
 for example. 
What is important is that this practice, the learning to incorporate or inculcate the variou
s ways of being 
a woman, is that it is then naturalised and treated as a naturally occurring disposition of th
e body. The 
'fact' of this process is largely forgotten once naturalisation is complete. Alternatively, w
e naturalise 
the assumption that women don't have facial hair- a fact that is 'corroborated' in everyd
ay life. We 
naturalise the practice and ignore the fact that it is an outcome of an intervention on the b
ody, namely 
plucking. We allow our transformative practices, those that monitor and manage the body
, to slip into 
the taken-for-granted background. Curiously, this inverts the causal direction: women do
n't have facial 
because we pluck becomes 'I pluck my facial hair because women don't have facial hair'
. This 
example can be extended to gestures, deportment, posture and so on. Garfinkel's model s
hows how 
much of being a natural woman resides in the social background.
Examples such a this tell us that the body is unfinished Therefore the difference in genita
lia is 
a factor in the negotiations of gender rather than the base, however determining, of gende
r. For me, 
emphasising the unfinished nature of the body means that we must attempt to theorise be
yond the 
ranking that implicitly organises our commonsensical understandings of gender. Our soc
ial background 
fuses the scientific knowledge of chromosomal sex so that the assignment of genitalia is 
said to define 
something 'primary' of the body. From this follows our sense that the body will go on to
 produce the 
corresponding secondary characteristics. This forms such a significant element of social 
background 
that we cannot 'understand' practices that fly in the face of this 'truth'. We cannot, for ex
ample, accept 
the practice of 'berdache' (Herdt: 1993). To us, this is really about a man pretending to live as a woman 
because we cannot really understand a social background that does not define men and w
omen through 
the possession of a particular set of genitals. Transsexualism is a practice that stems fro
m our cultural
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background where sex and gender must be aligned if one is to be treated as a woman, as opposed to a 
man pretending to live as a woman.
I would like to offer a model of sex and gender that seeks to trace the interactions between 
having a set of genitals, which throws that body into the structured paths of gender, and the 
negotiations that are then subsequently undertaken. These negotiating practices do something to 
manage the fact that commonsensically we treat sex and gender as one and the same thing. The 
practices we undertake slip into the taken for granted parts of our social world, and thus, in 'normal' 
cases, they go largely unnoticed. Those who fall out of the normative order will be more conscious of 
the practices that intervene between sex and gender, exposing the ontological relationship that is born 
from being in a body. A young man's first nocturnal emissions, a sign of the emergence into male 
adulthood and all shifting physical and ontological issues this implies, may be precisely the point that 
triggers a profound sense of alienation, and a sense of self that is far stronger than any potential 
biological dispositions of sex. Thus, it is possible to link the current social practices, the meaning these 
confer onto the body and individual's sense of dislocation within them. In my view, this draws out 
nicely the notion of the body as unfinished (Shilling: 1993). Having a 'sex' that is material and extra- 
discursive does not make the body free from these discourses that make sense of it, or the individual 
negotiation that is undertaken within these discourses. In one respect, Giddens (1991) is right. In 'high 
modernity', the number of ontological questions that face an individual expand and are rendered more 
complex by the loss of tradition. Moreover, the massive expansion of technological control of the body 
offers new sources of embodied self. I think this stands even if Giddens' analysis is not sufficiently 
embodied (Shilling:1993; Lash and Urry:1994).
IN SUMMATION
By linking naturalisation to the production and content of the image, it is possible to keep an 
eye on the normative content of an image, without making the act of doing and being a woman a 
product of the internalisation of the normative content contained in an image. I propose that images act 
as frames of reference. This emphasises that images offer the normative as a visual standard, which go 
on to 'merge' into the background so that they can become a naturalised part of the accomplishment of 
gendered practices. However, this relationship is not a deterministic one, where the macro 
unambiguously determines the micro-practices. Agency and negotiation intervene between the 
normative discursive content and its utilisation in practice. Moreover, the space between the normative 
content and the process of incorporating all or some of its elements helps to explore how and what 
performances one takes up as opposed to another. Yet, neither is the relationship between the two 
component parts voluntary. Essentially, our practices draw upon the visual images a society produces 
and thus lodge within those practices, in some shape or form, the structures, discursive or economic, 
that underpin those actions (Bourdieu:1990; Goffrnan: 1979). Structures thus provide stable contexts 
from which the background of the lifeworld flows (See Taylor in Calhoun et al. 1993). Images, 
conventions, bodily gestures act as resources, rather than determinants, to be incorporated in embodied 
performances. This operates both pre-reflexively and in a consciously motivated way. Most
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importantly, the corporeality of the body is central to the production of self; not overridden by the 
Symbolic. A dynamic exchange is introduced between the discourses to which bodies are subject and 
our ability to do things with discourse and change what that discourse means. Discourses are not fixed 
because they operate within the actions we undertake. Thus they do sit outside of action but are 
reproduced or potentially challenged by what we do. It is in this sense that 1 think it is possible to locate 
these practices within the schema Shilling (1993) offers. It keeps in focus the discourses to which 
bodies are subject. It integrates the meaning of body upon which people act. It leaves open the potential 
to transform those meanings. And most importantly, it tackles the body directly.
LAKOFF'S VITAL CONTRIBUTION
I argue that the complexity of the relationship between the body and the feeling of gender 
cannot be appropriately theorised within the classical ideas of how categories work. This is because the 
objectivist and unitary basis of the classical way of thinking about a category fails to accommodate 
most socially based classifications. One of the aims of using practice to fill the crucial area resulting 
from underdetermination of sex by biology is that it brings into view the intervention that takes place 
between the flesh and the social accomplishment of gender. This is why 1 continue to think that one of 
the most persuasive elements of Connell's Gender and Power (1987) is his examination of the 
limitations of categorical logic. Connell suggests that categoricalism (54-6) came from a number of 
sources, one of which is structuralism. He argues that it is both possible and necessary to make 
generalisations, of which categories like 'women' are essential. However, he argues that serious 
problems arise when the generalisation is substituted for a normative standard. He argues that this logic 
is the reason why feminism found itself charged with ethnocentricism. He suggests that feminism 
leaves itself open to this charge because categoricalism prohibits the necessary integration of other 
forms of embodied existence. I have proposed that this equally applies to Nayak's analysis and is 
demonstrated by his theoretical inability to combine gender and ethnicity. Connell argues that the more 
categories that are included, the more internally regular each category must become. It seems to 
promote the following notion: I am like you in this respect, but different from you in another. To be 
with those to whom 1 really belong, we must be the same in all respects' 23 . This is because the model of 
the category is based upon a notion that there should be a single essence or property that unifies all 
members. I suspect that this is one of the reasons why some postmodernists/feminists are sceptical 
about the category 'woman'.
Using Lakoff' 24,1 suggest that it is possible to reclaim the category, that there is something 
called 'woman', without having to work out the singular property that defines all those contained 
within it. Lakoff s work (1987) offers a framework to draw these elements together. He does this by 
theorising coherently what categories are. He offers us an application of Wittgenstein's early 
formulation regarding family resemblances to more empirically vital categories; in this case the
123 Calhoun offers a cogent and stimulating analysis of this logic in his assessment of feminist stand- 
point theory. He suggests that the politics of recognition would serve better than a politics based upon
identity.
124 Lakoff also offers a definition of the basic realism that underpins his analysis, and this equally 
comes to underpin mind. See pp!58.
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category of 'woman'. As stated, one of the elements that differentiates the various feminist 
engagements with postmodernism is what the category of'woman' might mean (Riley:1988; 
Braidotti:1991; Bordo:1993; Butler: 1990; Gatens:1996; Fuss: 1990; New:2003). The debate hinges on 
whether the body can be treated as a point of political unity, or whether 'woman' is purely a product of 
discourse (Butler) or a terroristic meta-concept that negates difference (Riley). What underpins this 
debate is the assumption that to function politically, there needs to be a set of properties that unify all 
women all of the time. Lakoff s model offers us a way out of this by suggesting that no category is 
unitary in this way.
Lakoff argues that family resemblances can operate in many different ways, depending on the 
complexity of the category. He suggests that complex categories such as 'mother', which is only one 
element of 'woman', functions as a cluster. His challenge to classical theory (pp. 74) is that this 
concept cannot be defined as a set of clear, necessary and sufficient conditions into which all cases will 
fit. Instead, categories as complex as 'mother' work as a cluster which places the various kinds of 
mothers in a relationship to the normative 'real' mother. For example, the centre point around which 
different mothers cluster is the birth model: the person who gives birth is the mother. This initiates the 
normative model of the biological root of motherhood. Yet, Lakoff shows that this is already 
insufficient to cope with the number of variations that have become part of our contemporary world. 
Take for example the development of egg and embryo implants; suddenly the biological root is 
problematised. Here are some of the variations he offers:
The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.
The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that
child.
The marital model: the wife of the father is the mother.
The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother. (Lakoff: 1987:74-75)
His point is that linguistically, we manage various different kinds of mothers all the time and we 
manage these variations, drawing them from the background where the cluster resides. Important, for 
me, is the sense that the political can be drawn upon to work through what type of mothers are in the 
centre or periphery of the cluster. I am strongly persuaded by Lakoff s model as it opens up discussion 
and draws in the multi-various ways of being a woman. The ranking comes from the normative, not 
from the contested terrain of experience. Moreover, he clearly posits this within a background, where 
the social and linguistic reside. Therefore, it offers a theoretical space to fuse Garfinkel's emphasis 
upon the social as background with Lakoff s development of a linguistic background. Therefore, the 
pertinent criticisms of some of the fallacious claims by subject centred reason can be tackled head on 
without risking ejecting the embodied entity that acts in and on the social world. Nor does it lose sight 
of the fact that linguistic practices are equally involved in the social interactions of gender, reproduced
through practice.
The crucial link is that Lakoff s model no longer depends upon the unitary definition of 
woman, based upon a fixed number of objective, essential properties (Delphy: 1996). I am persuaded
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that a theorisation of categories, based within the notion of family resemblances, means that we can 
pull various structures together so that inclusion within a category is no longer dependent upon identity 
- being the same as another woman or as Reiley questions 'Am I that Name? (1988). Equally, the 
categories are no longer dependent upon biology, with its resulting determinism. Its strength, I think, 
resides precisely in its ability to provide theoretical frameworks that operate outside of that dualism by 
pulling both into categories defined by their clusters and family resemblances. It is no longer either 
society or biology, but rather that these are components within social and linguistic systems. Thinking 
about being a woman places emphasis upon the fact that it must, by definition, contain variability 
within it; a variability that is sustained and managed through practice. Thus, practice intervenes and 
alters how we can conceptualise our world but also alters the body itself. The most 'natural' of facts, 
namely that women give birth, has become altered, and with it the conceptualisation of the woman's 
body, namely through IVF programmes. The unfinished body is acted upon to create a form of 
embodiment, notably something between fertility and infertility.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Lakoff s model demonstrates how it is possible to integrate an internally differentiated 
category to our understanding of some of our most fundamental categories. He opens up space to pull 
in apparently marginal instances and reveal how they combine to secure the centre, and potentially 
normative, definition. I am interested in exploring how we might extend his model within empirical 
research that specifically targets centre and peripheral cases. My chosen axis is between young and 
older women, as it draws upon issues of beauty and issues of reproduction. It also opens up space to 
examine the heterogeneous nature of discourse. Thus, young women are targeted in terms of producing 
the body beautiful and thus must cope with the inevitable failure (Bordo:1993; Davis: 1995). 
Conversely, older women must construct a sense of body image from a discourse that deems the body 
redundant (Featherstone and Wernick: 1995). Their exclusion from the body beautiful is total and from 
this they too must build up a body image. Additionally, these two groups are linked via their 
relationship to reproduction and their bodies. Younger women are bound by the discourse that the body 
is always aging and thus their reproductive capacity is draining away. Older women belong to this 
continuum but theirs has already 'run out', and with this, so has their purpose, normatively speaking. 
Both groups are, therefore, subject to specific but interrelated discourses from which a sense of one's 
embodied self has to be constructed (Mead: 1934). Both represent a differing element of'woman' 
within that cluster (Lakoff: 1987). Moreover, it is possible to layer an additional normative element of 
the cluster concept of 'woman' by drawing upon the ideological position that reproduction plays in 
rendering some women 'more womanly' than others.
I aim to explore this by asking the respective cohort, from a sampling group gathered through 
snowballing, to keep a diary of daily events that focus upon where their embodiment as young and old 
women were particularly marked. The diaries will be kept up for three months. This aims to bring into 
focus elements from the pre-reflexive background, and to do so, time is needed to build up the 
reflections on a number of interactions. Alongside this, they are to note what images they consume and
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from which sources during this period. The interest here lies in the differing strategies between those 
who are culturally invisible with those targeted by a cultural over production of how' to be a woman, 
with all its changing fads. Again, this draws upon the interplay between the commonsense notion of the 
'facticity' of sex and all the strategies that will 'make a real woman out of you'. My focus is not what 
pleasures they derive during the consumption of the images (Hermes: 1995) but how long the images 
remain with them and how this alters their presentation and sense of self (Tseelon: 1995), particularly as 
the older women's embodiment is deemed to be the antithesis of the 'real' woman (de Beauvoir:1985; 
MacDonald:1983). The aim is to bring into relief where the sense of self is derived when one is largely 
without these sources, at least in comparison with the younger women. Conversely, with regard to the 
young women who are intensively targeted, how does this impact upon their ability to maintain a 
sustained sense of self. This is particularly important because it draws upon the imposition corporeal 
body makes upon one's location within the cluster as the body itself alters biologically. Here we can 
emphasise the corporeal facticity of the body.
The evidence furnished will be thought about in terms of the negotiation all individuals face 
between the T and the 'me' 125 (Mead: 1934), and the particular structured contexts the body imposes. 
The second element is to use these diaries as a resource as part of an interview in which the 
interviewees will reflect upon the entries. 1 deliberately seek to integrate reflexivity into the research 
process (Bourdieu and Wacquant: 1992) because I am interested in the formation of self over time and 
the specific interpretative practices required to generate this. Lastly, I aim to bring together the younger 
and older groups so that the respective discursive positioning to which each group is subject can be 
discussed and brought into stark contrast. This is the reason for wanting to use snowballing sampling, 
as I am then able to gather the perspectives between how the individuals see themselves and the 
performative projections they make, as compared to ideas held by the friendship network. The data 
therefore aims to target the role of discourse, particularly images, and the negotiations and practices 
these groups of women undertake to manage the discourse. Potentially, there is a space for the groups 
to discuss their understanding of their relationship to the normative and the feelings generated by 
inability to 'live up to them'. Most importantly, the 'talk' generated can then be mapped into a cluster 
concept, examining where potential points of unity emerge and when difference defines the discussions
undertaken.
Methodological guidance will come from Plummer's (1995) decisive and cogent work on life 
narratives. The diaries aim to pull together reflexive narratives about the lived reality of the various 
social positions within which their bodies locate them. Thus, it calls upon narratives to produce a series 
of reflections that pull together structure and action through an engagement with the micro-practices 
that people do with the system. Plummer's use of stories produces a narrative as well as a means to 
identify their own vocabulary through which they view the world. Stories produce for the narrator a 
sense of themselves over time, with the shifting patterns of identity that this necessarily entails. 
Moreover, from the textual nature of the data, it is possible to pull out the central tropes that not only 
guide the research as to how, as social subjects, we make sense of the world but also reveal the 
normative order and their relationship to it, that is, how they categorise their world.
125 This sets quite a different theoretical context for the research in comparison to Tseelon (1995).
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Thus, the research pulls together an understanding of the self that is de-centred, but without 
locking the self into the Oedipal complex. Mead's understanding of the interplay between the T and 
the 'me' offers a cogent alternative to the discursive model that defines the subject as a discursive 
outcome. It also offers a more sensitive understanding of the self as existing within a time trajectory, 
which always throws up new things and sees what were once vital parts of self fade. However, this is 
not free from the influence of structure, but locates the dilemmas of aging as located within the 
discourses that awarded it meaning. Thus structure and action can be analysed as a dynamic brought 
together through the practices that people undertake as part of their negotiation to construct a 























































































































































































































































Definitions of Content Analysis Variables
The framework below contains the guidelines to the definitions and evaluative criteria of the 
variables. Most of the categories are bound to the social background that defines them conventionally 
and at their most simple. In such cases no additional explanatory discussion will be given. When 
clarification is required, the evaluative criteria will be provided so that alternative manifestations can 
be ruled out. Where necessary, I have included some of the symbolic associations that the category 
holds. Note: all variables include "other" unless otherwise stated and all those cases unaccounted for, 
or esoteric cases. Note the following:
1. There are a number of automatic exclusions that have been pre-programmed. Where relevant, these 
will be included in the tables, denoted N/R (no reply). All figures will be excluded here.
2. As a result of a number of marked distributions, certain codes have been amalgamated with other 
logically compatible codes so that the figures presented can be subject to statistical analysis. All 
such cases are listed below. The new code is given first, and the merged codes second.
3. There have also been 8 codes that I have discarded simply because they do not add anything to the 
analysis. Again these are listed below.
4. Most of the codes listed below are categories that we rarely treat as anything but self-evident, 
which results in a high degree of uniformity in their application during the coding process.
Ql SEX: Sex of the model(s).
female '
male i ! 2
androgynous 3
other I 4
Codes 1 and 2, "female" and "male" refer to the sex of the models. Code 3, "androgynous", was 
only assigned if, after intense inspection, no significant feature was present through which a secure sex 
assignment could be made. For example, the use of the face alone, when combined with a neutral facial 
expression and blurry focus, conceals the hair follicles to such an extent that a clear conventional 
marker of sex is missing. Therefore, the coding is weighted toward re-establishing the social stasis of 
assumed and categorical sexual dimorphism. A single code would secure sex assignment rather than 
emphasising the other ambiguous codes that brought it under consideration initially. Code 4, 'other', 
was confined to those cases where the photographic style meant that little could be discerned. This 
could be because it was too out of focus, for example.
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Q2 NUMBERS: Refers to the number and sex of bodies contained within the photographic frame.
single I i i
single sex couples \ 2
single sex female 3
mixed couples ! i 4
crowd i i 5
other ! i 6
Derived Q29 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3=4; code 4 = 5, code 5 = 6.
The aim is to trace the extent of the emergence of homosexual codifications, both implicit and 
explicit, and the extent to which the heterosexual imperative determines the basic feature of the 
codification. Code 1, 'single', refers to the single model/body. Code 2, 'single sex couples', refers to 
those images that contain not more than two models of the same sex, thus establishing the potential for 
overtly gay or lesbian codings. This is adopted from Lewis and Rolley (1997) who argue that single sex 
coupling is a direct means to establish lesbian codification and pleasure. They refer to the coupling as a 
means through which identification can be positioned. Code 3, 'mixed couples', refers to the 
heterosexual couple. Any image that contains one male with two females is also coded as a 
heterosexual couple because, I suggest, it references the 'hyper-masculinity' model; for example, a 
'James Bond' figure who can "satisfy any or all women". Code 4, 'crowds', refers to those cases that 
have three or more bodies of any combination of sexes in the frame.
Q3 BLACK/WHITE BODY: To identify if the total absence of black bodies within advertisements has 
decreased.
white ' ' '
Black/Black Asian ' ! 2
other • 3
Code 1, 'white', is anything not defined as black. Code 2, 'Black/Black Asian', refers to all 
those that would not be defined as white in a society that normalises 'white' and white experience. The 
combination of colour and 'Black features' was used to assign ethnicity. This category examines the 
assignment of 'otherness' that Blacks undergo and how this visually interacts with sexualisation. 
Again, this involves seeking to unpack 'self-evidents' that are fundamentally socially constructed. 
Code 3, 'other', is for those cases where the assignment cannot be made.
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Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.
clothes 
perfume
The items which were classified as clothes included trousers, shirts etc. as well as underwear, 
tights, swimwear and shoes. The classification did not include items such as watches and sunglasses. 
The classification for perfume referred to scents only. It did not include those advertisements 
promoting cosmetics sold under the same label.
Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and 
subjugation.
model i 1
model and object ! i 2
model and obj/s i ! 3
object and model I : 4
object/s and model 5
other 6 
Derived Q28 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = 6
The relationship between the model and the commodity is represented in the order of the 
words in the code: the first value is dominant over the second. It seeks to trace the collective production 
of control with regard to the props or a central commodity. Therefore, if the man were driving the car 
we would conventionally associate that object/prop as being under his command; conversely, if the 
female is draped over the car this is classified as subordinate to the prop. Code 1, ' model ', refers to 
those cases where the model was either photographed in a neutral setting where there was nothing 
additional in the image beyond the model him/herself, or was photographed in a situation, for example 
in the street, where there was no specific relationship in the narrative between the context and the 
model, by which I mean the model/subject was merely 'passing through'. Code 2, "model and obj/s\ 
refers to those cases where the model is in control of the objects, props or commodity. Code 3, 'object/s 
and model\ refers to the opposite cases where the model is being subjugated or contorted by the 
objects and/or commodities. Note that the power relationship is implied by the word order of Codes 2 
and 3. Code 4, "other", is for those images that cannot be clearly coded in any of the above.
Three basic principles were applied to secure regular coding. First, if the model was deploying 
or manipulating the commodity or props, and therefore it is implied that the model knows about these 
objects, then this would be coded as controlling the objects. Conversely, if the model was lying on top 
of or underneath, the props or commodity, this would then be coded as being subjugated to the prop. 
Additionally, if the model was being shown how to use something, for example in an office, the person
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who is being shown is coded as being subservient to the other model and props because the model is 
not in control or command of the objects. Conversely, the model as tutor is classified as being in 
command. Second, if the model was highly sexualised with regard to the commodity or surrounding 
object, this is also coded as being subjugated to the prop. An example is if the (female) model is 
virtually naked or positioned in a compromising way with regard to the various props or commodities. 
Third, if the body is represented only as a body part to display the commodity, this would also be 
automatically coded as being subjugated to the objects. A classic example of this is for underwear or 
hosiery where only the pelvis or legs are shown. Often this is secured by having the legs extended in 
the air, thereby anchoring the sexualisation further.
Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how models are spatially represented - higher and central being related to 
being in control and dominatory, and lower and periphery being related to subjugation.
Q6A
dominates frame entirely ill 1/3 11 4
3/4 I i 2 1/4 115
1/2 113 less 1/4 (1 6
The variable has been split into parts, each referring to the specific features of space and the 
ways it is affected by the photographic process. Note: it is possible to cross reference the consistency of 
the common sense criteria by cross tabulating it with 'body parts', shot length and so on. Code 1, 
' dominates frame entirely', covers those cases where the body of the model has occupied the full frame 
of the image so that almost no background can be seen. Code 2, '3/4', refers to those cases where the 
frame of the images is also dominated by the body with the exception of some surrounding area; three- 
quarters of the page will be filled with a body. Code 3,' 1/2', refers to those cases where the body 
occupies approximately half of the frame. Thus, there will be roughly equal quarter parts of the page 
remaining unoccupied by the model's body. Code 4, '1/3', refers to those cases where the body 
occupies approximately a third of the frame. If this code is used, then the model's body ought to be 
able to fit into the frame three times. Code 5,' 1/4', refers to those cases where the model's body can be 
fitted into the frame four times. The divisions are used to aid the coding process. Code 6, 'less 1/4', 
therefore refers to those cases where the space depicted in the image is such that the model's body has 
little impact upon the space within the representation and is thus peripheral to that image. Alternatively, 
the model is framed within a crowd.
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Q6C ABANDONED - it does not make any 
signficant contribution that is not better served by 
codes elsewhere.
centre i ! 7 perspective I i 9 
off centre I i g non-perspective I i 10
This second cluster, Q6B, refers specifically to the central focal point of image and 
interaction. The coding procedure for this variable requires that the centre or foci of the image be 
pinpointed, and from this the model's position regarding the centre be judged. The third cluster, Q6C, 
refers to the 'realist' modes of constructing an image. Hence code 1, "perspective", will follow the 
order of perspective within the natural world so that everything moves back to a single point within the 
image. The code of''non-perspective', code 2, refers to those images where the distortions and 
alterations have been added to the image, or if the body 'occupies' the full spread so that the body no 
longer appears located in space. It can be produced through non-realist editing, camera angles or 
doctoring the image later. In each case, it disrupts our presumption that the photograph captures things 
as they 'really are'. The model's feet, for example, do not tally with the rest of the body because the 
camera angle is situated at the model's feet. This has the effect of placing the body along a perspective 
line so that the head appears to be very far away. Alternatively, the image may not respond to the 
established rules of representative visual perspective because the image has been removed from its 
original context and edited onto another background altogether.
Q6D
in front of ' 11 behind 1 17
level with I 12 beside I! 18
above/higher i I 13 opposite i l 19
below/lower i ! 14 periphery 1 i 20
seated/on top of ii 15 other ' 21
The coding of this sub-category employs the following procedure: in the case of two or more 
models, the one currently being processed will dictate the code selected. Thus, if the female model is 
taller than the male model, she would be classified as 'higher' and he would be classified as "lower', 
which is coded separately as a distinct case. To reiterate, the 'above' sub-variables are applied as they 
would be according to the background knowledge. They are entirely dependent upon the conventional 
use to which "behind' or "underneath' is put within everyday activity. Thus higher and lower refer to 
the relative height of the models to each other or to other objects. "On top of refers to those cases 
where the model is lying down, perhaps on a bed.' Underneath''', "behind", "beside' and "opposite' are 
coded as according to common sense. "Periphery' is the additional sub-variable to the spatial measure 
of'less than a 1/4' and thus has marginal occupancy of space relative to other models or objects.
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Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have traditionally been photographed - soft focus 

















This variable is related to the standard photographic techniques and how their application 
varies according to the sex of the model. Code 1, 'close up\ refers to those images where the detail of 
the body can be discerned. These have tended to be areas such the legs, or the use of profile and so on. 
"Close up' is read as intending to emphasise a particular detail, and excludes the rest of the body from 
the frame. This contrasts with code 3, 'long shof, which refers to those images where there is 
considerable detail of the context of the scene, and thus the model appears to be further away from 
viewer. Consequently, one would expect the full body to be represented here. One would also expect a 
significant difference in the gendered use of these codes. This draws directly upon the notion of 
isolating a body part and transforming that part into the fetish. Code 2, 'medium shof, refers to those 
cases that lie in between the two. One expects this to be used in shots that depict scenes inside rooms of 
various kinds, and the torso in particular.
The second cluster, Q7B, refers to the sorts of focus used. Again there has been exploration as 
to the ways in which the focus used has come to denote different sorts of gender associations. Based 
upon the existing debates one would expect the use of 'soft focus' to be more prevalent when 
representing female models than male. Code 4,''sharp focus', refers to the focus that has been 
associated with actual vision, under normal conditions, and is thus widely used within representative 
realist formats. Thus, there are clear distinctions between the background and the model, and the 
perspective would also be naturalistic. Code 5, 'soft focus', refers to those shots where the outline is 
slightly blurred so that the contours of the face are less well defined; hence the detail is removed. The 
general appeal of this sort of focusing is its softening of the appearance of the body, particularly the 
skin. Code 6, 'out offocus\ refers to those images where the image was exactly that, out of focus. This 
appearance can be recreated by squinting so that the clear boundaries between the environment and the 
body are completely blurred. Code 7, 'other\ refers to those cases that fall outside the above sub- 
variables.
Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation.





The categories relate to the various modes through which photography engages in 'realistic 
representation'. Thus, Code 1,'naturalistic mock-up', refers to those images that represent 'real life' 
both from the 'naturalness' of the setting, and the naturalness of the narrative taking place within that 
environment. One can imagine the same such scene in everyday life because it has been exaggerated or 
staged so that presentational features appear mundane and ordinary: i.e. visible and unmistakable. It is 
central to this form of encoding that the viewer/reader looks in on the scene, via the position of the 
photographer, without the narrative being directed to the viewer 126 . The viewer is, by definition, 
excluded or absent from the model's fictional world despite being positioned within the fictional world. 
In general, the model is surrounded with props and prompts that aid the reader's social classification of 
the model or the fiction. The commodity, for example hair spray, is promoted in a scene where, strictly 
speaking, the model's hair is now too shiny and too bouncy. Code 2, 'stylistic', refers to those images 
that are surreal in resonance. It refers to those styles that are self-consciously anti-naturalistic; for 
example, where the model is photographed doing an odd action or movement or an ordinary gesture but 
set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be acting in a sexualised yet 
child-like fashion in an industrial wasteland, or be in a fake beach scene wearing winter clothes and 
pretending to 'feel cold'. These codes often self-consciously expose the staged nature of all images, 
which I argue limits the identification process. Code 2 is therefore 'anti-realistic'.
The code 3, 'neutral', refers to those cases whereby the model is being photographed in the 
studio in front of a plain background, a background that is devoid of any props or markers of any kind. 
It provides no context, surreal or otherwise. The emptiness of the 'scene' means that there is very little 
visually going on apart from the model photographed in the clothes and the body idiom assumed. All 
these features must be present if the image is to be coded as 'neutral'. Therefore, the variable is 
weighted to find the conventional content of images as suggested by the established debates and 
positions regarding photography and advertising.
Q9 GENERAL IDIOM: This variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained 
within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 corresponds with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 
shows half the body.
full body
face only 5
legs cut off ' 2 chest area only ; 6
head cut off 3 legs only ii
cut at waist ' ' 4 other '
7
Code 1, 'full body\ refers to those cases where the whole body can be seen. It includes all 
those images where the top of the head and the feet are visible. The feet and the lower shin can be
126 1 have purpose'l^a^d^rTusing voyeur as I wish to distance this analysis from the 
psychoanalytic model that equates images with identification and des.re.
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edited from the frame, but the knee must be visible. The forehead too must be visible if the image is to 
be included in this variable. Code 2, 'legs cut off, refers to those cases where there is no knee visible 
and it is likely that the majority of the thigh is excluded from the frame. The pelvis must be visible. 
Piloting established that the image tended to either show the knee or remove a majority of the thigh 
from the frame altogether. Code 3, 'cut at waisf refers to those cases where there is no leg visible and 
no pelvis identifiable. The head must be visible. This fragmentation of the body has the impact of 
making the torso and head the primary focus of the individual and reader/viewer. Code 4, 'face only', 
refers to all those cases where only the shoulders and above are shown. Code 5, 'head cut off, refers to 
all those images where the head is cut from the picture frame or has been concealed in some way. If 
this is the case, it must override all other parts of the body showing, except for Code 5 and Code 7. The 
concealment or removal of the head has been given priority over the rest of the body depicted because 
the removal of the head, while parts or all of the body are showing, is an extreme example of total 
subjugation to the image and commodity. Code 6, 'chest area only" refers to those cases where the 
body has been reduced to the area below the shoulders and above the pelvis. This code will be treated 
as equally dominatory as 'head cut off and for some of the same reasons. In particular, it emphasises a 
key area that genderises the body, namely the breast and chest hair. Therefore, the coding has opened 
up a potential for a specific form of fetishisation of the male body. The same fetishisation process is 
applied to code 7, 'legs only', as is the same logic regarding potential distributions. Code 7 refers to 
those cases where the only parts of the body shown are the hips and legs of the model.





twisting away R or L
back facing camera
twisting towards R or L
profile
torso leaning forward
Derived Q30: code 1 = codes 










1-3; code 2 = 4; 
code 8 = code 1
torso leaning back
propped BY arms I 1
propped ON object 1
bowing from the waist 1
bent down
bowing from head I 1
on all fours 1
other i 1
code 3 = code 6; code 4 = codes 5, 7 1 









27 ; code 5 = 8; code 
13-17
Code 1, 'lying on side', refers to those images where the body is lying down on the side of the 
hips. The body would usually be positioned horizontally to the viewer. It is possible that the body may
127 These can be combined because each instance would only be classified as one or the other. In 
addition, they have been combined to facilitate interpretation; the results do not require the specific 
detail of the direction of the turn.
215
be placed in profile, and this would tend to make the focal point of the image the soles of the feet, the 
top of the head or the side of the body. The focus will distort the perspective of the body in the frame. 
This anti-naturalistic style ought to be recorded as 'stylistic' in variable 8, Code 3. Codes 2 and 3, 
'lying on back' and 'front', refer to those cases where the models are either lying on their chests with 
their bottoms facing upwards, or with their backs on the surface with their chests facing upwards. Code 
2 is defined by the visibility of the sternum which will be facing upwards towards the top of the page 
or, in terms of the images reality, 'up to the ceiling'. Conversely, if the sternum is concealed and the 
bottom is visible 'to the skies', one would classify this as Code 2. Code 4 is 'facingforward'. One 
would classify an image thus if none of the back is visible. If there is a little twist in the body, it will be 
classified as facing forward providing that nothing more than the arm socket can be seen on either side 
of the body. If the beginnings of the shoulder blades can be seen, then the case is not to be classified 
here. Likewise, one would expect the feet, if included in the frame, to be facing forward also. It is a 
relatively static posture. Code 6, 'backfacing camera', refers to those cases where the face is out of 
view and, from the spectator's point of view, the back of the head is visible, as are the buttocks and the 
back of the knees. The same rule applies as for facing forward, whereby anything that exceeds the 
visibility of the arm socket is not to be classified as an instance of this variable.
In the case where there is some back or shoulder blade visible, the image is to be classified as 
either Code 5 or Code 7, depending on the positioning of the twist from the perspective of the 
viewer/reader. Therefore it is of paramount importance that the coding of this variable be based upon 
the position of the model from the reader's point of view. Code 5, 'twisting away R or L', refers to 
those images where the body is facing forward, and thus the kneecap is facing forward. The result of 
the twist is to make parts of the back visible. The extent of the twist must appear to be about 90 degrees 
to qualify as an instance of twisting. Note: this degree of twist is only a guideline for marginal cases. In 
most cases one ought to look for the feet position, the amount of movement, the extent to which the 
knees are bent and the extent to which the previously concealed part of the body is becoming visible. 
Code 7, 'twisting towards L or R', refers to those where, from the point of view of the reader, a 
majority of the back is facing them. Correspondingly therefore, if the feet are visible, one would expect 
to see the back of the heel. It was decided that to note the direction of the twist was of no particular 
relevance to the research question. However, the starting position from which the body began is of 
importance since it plays its part in the relationship of the assertiveness of the model to the viewer. For 
example, if the model is facing forwards and physically turning away, this could well be an instance of 
the avoidance of the male gaze. Conversely, turning toward the viewer could be an instance of 
attempting to engage the viewer and thus 'receive' a positive evaluation from the viewer as part of the 
fiction of the frame. Code 8, 'profile', also includes those cases which abide by the common-sense 
features of the profile shot. With regard to boundary cases, one must not exceed the partial visibility of 
the side of the nose. Likewise, one ought not to be able to see a substantial part of the shoulder. Again, 
this code is considered to be a feminised one and thus synonymous with 'woman'.
The next two variables have been selected on the basis of their embodied view of the 
attentiveness of the model to the spectator. There are some occasions where this does not apply, but 
pilot sampling showed that these were infrequent. They have been included because they represent the
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simplest forms through which body position can radically alter the embodied posture. The two sub- 
variables refer mostly to those cases where the model is seated. Code 9, 'torso leaning forward1 , refers 
to those cases where, as the chest moves forward, it will hang over the legs or lap of the seated model. 
Based upon existing debates, one would again expect this to be a highly feminised code. For example, 
leaning forwards toward the spectator causes the body to overlap itself. This makes the body smaller in 
terms of the space that it occupies. This physical occupation of space is also accompanied by its 
'behavioural' aspects whereby the act of leaning towards the spectator is an embodied impression of 
being attentive and engaged with the spectator. This is the opposite to Code 10, "torso leaning back\ 
where the body is extended out into space. To lean back is not only a statement of being at ease in 
space, and therefore having the desire to fill the space, but it also moves the person's face and upper 
body away from the spectator. It is a form of disengagement, or at least gives an impression of 
neutrality. Thus, these two positions are marked by their different physical occupancy of space, as well 
as the different confidence being embodied. Extending the body out into space is a sign of being 
confident within the body. This is drawn from the sheer physical openness of the body and therefore its 
potential vulnerability. There is a marked difference between the open body and the closed one which 
is adopted in times of fear and threat. Therefore, one would expect this body position to reflect the 
gender dichotomy.
Code 11, 'propped BY arms\ refers to the sexualisation of Codes 3 and 10. In the case of 
women, it has the effect of emphasising the bust, and brings with it the sense of seeking to be sexual. 
This is partly why it is a posture that is often assumed on the beach. One would expect this code also to 
be significantly genderised. Code 12, 'propped ON object', refers to those cases where the body is 
supported by or leaning against something. This sort of image clearly gives the encoder the opportunity 
to furnish phallic symbols.
The other series of codes refer to other forms of ritualistic subordination, many of them also 
conveying deference to the superior body (of the masculine). Code 13, 'bowingfrom waist', is self- 
evident and is to be used to class all sorts of bowing except where it is only the head that is 
bent/bowing. The latter has been designated a separate category, Code 15. Code 14, 'bent down', refers 
to the visual forms of status display, as physical low-ness has become bound with moral lowness. 'On 
all fours', Code 16, has been included not only because of its sexual connotations, but also for its 
connotation of the animality of the subject; the latter form may connect it to the Black body. Code 17 is 
'other'.
Ql 1 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working definition of
physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings.
Any code that remains unmarked cannot be reliably ascertained from the photograph either to conform
or contradict.
strong ! 1 body hair id 15
weak 2 body hair unid 16
tal] 3 dyed/sculpted hair 17
small i 4 short hair ! 18
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muscular I! 5 longhair ! 19
slim i 1 6 tough \ i 20
skinnv 1 i 7 emotional II 21
emaciated , . 8 deiicate } 22
au naturale \ \ 9 soft II 23
stylised make-up M 10 macho II 24
normal make-up i I 11 fat ! i 25
painted nails n u sporty ! 26
long nails M 13 physically able i! 27
short nails I 14 other II 28
This variable was only a partial success, primarily because I could not consistently codify 
those elements in italics that reference the tertiary elements of sex. Below is an explanation of the 
conventions I expected to be visually present.
Code 1, 'strong', refers to those common-sense meanings stereotypically attributed to the 
male. Its content includes those elements that have been associated with Parson's 'instrumental role', as 
well as those characteristics applied to the male by Tiger and Fox (1974). This characteristic relates to 
the independence of the autonomous subject. He has the courage to stand alone, to protect the weak and 
infirm, displaying those characteristics that combine the essence of man's strong body with his strength 
of character. Conversely therefore, 'weak', Code 2, refers to the opposite, namely all that is feminine 
and 'expressive'. Thus the feminine is emotional, usually to excess, unstable, dependent, open to 
persuasion and a poor judge of character. Note also that both codes refer to the physical state of the 
body. Likewise, this links the essence of the gendered subject to its location in an essential body. Codes 
3 and 4, 'tall' and 'small', refer to an additional stereotypical association of men and women's bodies 
in terms of each other. As Goffman argues, selecting a female model who is smaller than the male 
carries the connotations of status difference metaphorically encoded through size. Code 5, 'muscular', 
is the stereotypical state of the masculine body. It refers to the physical embodiment of the power that 
masculinity promises. One ought to be able to see the shifting contours in the skin defined by the 
muscle. The body is toned, free of loose skin and with minimal exposure of boniness. Therefore, this 
not only anchors masculinity, but also potentially racialises the body (see chapter 3 'Content Analysis: 
A Resassessment, variable 4). This also brings into view the extent to which Bordo's model of the 
disciplined body can be said to be categorically divided along gender lines. 'Slim', Code 6, delineates 
the body that is free from fleshiness, fat or other untoned or undisciplined bodily-ness. The skeletal 
frame is apparent and, unlike the muscular body, cannot rely on the flesh as a protector. The collar 
bone is prominent, as is the absence of flesh at the top of the jaw and below the ear. The stomach is 
likely to be relatively flat, and so on. Code 7, 'skinny', is for the body where the elbow sticks out and 
the hip bone also has the appearance of protruding so that the stomach appears to hollow inwards. The 
ribs will be visible through the skin. Often the lighting forms shadows on the angles produced by the 
bone. Code 8, 'emaciated1 , refers to those bodies where the arm is considerably thinner along and 
around the bone than it is at the elbow. The shoulder blade is highly visible and sticks out. The absence
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of flesh is such that the model appears seriously malnourished, so much so that the ridges of the breast 
bone are visible through the skin. The upper thigh is also extremely thin, so that the pubic bone is 
always visible even when the legs are together. It is images like these that have courted so much 
attention regarding the 'harm' the image can do to young girls' body image.
Code 9, 'au naturals', refers to those models who have the appearance of not being made up 
at all: the beauty lies in their purity. The naturalistic mock-up achieves the look of nature; it is known 
that this must be achieved. The code references the ideological patterning of the mock-up as well as the 
deeper ideological patterning of the feminine as nature's beauty espoused by the Pre-Raphaelite period, 
for example. Conversely, "stylised make-up" refers to those cases where the make-up is drawing 
attention to itself by its strangeness, its apparent stance against natural beauty and the wholesome 
woman. This style of make-up is akin to punk styling and is not necessarily aimed at making the 
woman look beautiful. It is much more about the creation of an eclectic and esoteric form of imaging, 
which in part contributes to the self-referential styling of the image. Code 11, "normal make-up', is for 
all those cases where this styling could conceivably be worn within the life-world. It is the sort of style 
that one would associate with the women's activity of producing prettiness as an ongoing process. It is 
the fashioning that belongs to the naturalistic mock-up. Codes 12, 13 and 14, 'painted nails', 'long 
nails' and 'short nails', are self-explanatory. Just as with the above, the use of nails is a means through 
which the gendered body is produced as an ongoing activity. Thus, just as shaving, plucking, make-up 
etc. is performed every day, so the preparation of the nails is another means through which the 
obviousness of sex is produced on a day-to-day basis.
'Body hair id', Code 15, refers to those cases where one can clearly see the presence of body 
hair, be it on the legs, chest, face or armpit etc. This ought to be highly gendered. Body hair is 
something that is ideologically bound to the masculine just as testosterone is bound to the masculine, 
and yet both are present in all bodies. Conversely therefore, one would expect there to be a marked 
gender difference here in 'body hair iinicf. This is to be used if all the flesh exposed is free from the 
appearance of body hair.
'Dyed/sculpted hair' is an additional code (number 17) which seeks to make the presentation 
of the body anti-naturalistic. One is not viewing this image in terms of it being applicable in everyday 
life. It is best to consider such hair styles along the lines of a punk-like presentation. 'Short hair', Code 
18, must be short on the neck to be classified as such. Therefore 'long hair', Code 19, one would 
associate with the feminine and must conceal the neck in some way. Combined, these codes trace the 
prevalence of conventional presentations of gender.
'Tough', 'emotional', 'delicate', 'soft' (Codes 20-27) have been included as these were 
additional codes used in the existing content analysis on gender. They have been taken from REFS> 
and are to be understood as the more detailed versions of the masculine and feminine stereotypes 
defined by the likes of Tiger and Fox. These are also applicable according to their stereotypes and are 
thus not to be used in any problematical sense as to what these words mean to us. 'Physically able' was 
introduced as a result of observations made during piloting. During piloting, I became increasingly 
aware that while the models were often slim, it was not the case that most of the models were unable to 
move through public space, to mobilise their bodies and space and be directed toward their utilitarian
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aims. While it was the case that the models were rarely lifting something, it did not follow from my 
observations that feebleness was a permanent feature of their embodiment. Code 28 refers to those 
cases that fell outside this bodily agenda.
Q12 CONTAINED BODY: 128 Containment of the body is aimed at illiciting the degree of self- 
determination; whether the model is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is 
autnomous.
contained by self
contained by man [
contained by woman I













N/A = Q 9 = 5 removes 63 counts
This variable aims to explore the relationship between the body and its inhabitation of space, and is 
concerned specifically with the ways that a contained or confined body relates to the status ascribed to 
that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. Of particular concern is 
the gendered dichotomy that places the occupancy of space as masculine and the withdrawal from 
space as feminine. The latter, for example, has been used to denote modesty and combines with the 
child-like status ascribed to the feminine. Moreover, this has a direct connection to the corresponding 
public/private dichotomy. This variable seeks only to classify who or what is doing the containment; 
the specific postures that embody containment are described in Q13. "Contained by self, Code 1, 
refers to those models whose bodies are withdrawn from social space by holding or containing their 
own body through various body postures. For example, making oneself small by holding all the limbs 
close to the chest. Alternatively, the model's legs could be pulled up in some way with her own arms 
hugging her body. Often this body position is accompanied by a complicit gaze, a 'god's eye that 
monitors her modesty'. This is regarded as an example of minimal self-determination. The timidity 
within social space and, by implication, social activity, means that this is an example of active 
passivity 129 . There are no external coercive factors at play which can be drawn upon as an explanation 
for the withdrawal. Rather it is established as part of the model's 'feminine habitus'.
Code 2, "contained by man\ refers to those cases where the demarcation of space and thus, 
following Goffman (1979: 54-56), ownership of space, is coded through the relative positioning of the 
man's and woman's body. Goffman argues that the ownership and control of space is established
128 Note that question 11 has not been included here as it was abandoned during coding. This has been 
discussed in detail in the above methodology section.
129 The notion of active passivity alludes to the fact that all kinds of femininities are practices. 
Therefore they must be done. They are not a state of being, but something that must be 'performed'. 
They are an aspect of the social constructed habitus. This will be discussed in more detail when the 
alternative to post-structuralism is discussed later.
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through the extension of limbs into space. For example, the arm will be placed in front of the woman 
and will therefore act as a barrier to her movement, as well as being a symbolic appearance of 
'protecting' her. Additionally, this code establishes the man's right over the woman. The bodily barrier 
limits where she can go and what she can do. Thus, the key coded features that need to be identified 
here are whether the masculine body is producing and constructing the masculinity of the space. Other 
examples of this include the woman being held by the man from behind. This can be compounded by 
having the woman seated while the claim is made.
Code 3, "containedby woman\ refers to those very same features and seeks to trace whether 
the control of space through bodily positioning has been transferred onto the feminine body. Thus, 
another female or male would have to be blocked in some way by her embodiment, her relative 
authority, thereby according her control of the space. This would usually be carried within the narrative 
of the advertisement, for example by her teaching him what to do in the office. Effectively, this sub- 
variable seeks to address whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As 
repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this 
association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. Note that both Codes 2 and 3 are secured 
further if the body that is contained is also positioned lower in some way, thereby coding status through 
its relationship with things higher. Codes 2 and 3 can be cross-tabulated against the single sex couple 
thereby producing some indicative data as to whether explicitly heterosexist postures and relative body 
positions have been mobilised or rejected in potentially homoerotic scenes.
Code 4, "contained by object', is a slight shift from the relationship between embodied states 
and other bodies. It refers instead to the relationship that the model has to the commodity or object. 
This is a slight departure from Goffman's particular analysis of how hyper reality is presented. Here, I 
am referring to those images that have reduced the person to a means of sexual display. Thus, the 
model can be placed leaning against phallic symbols, or worse still adopt a posture that codes the body 
as on the verge of being penetrated by the phallic symbol. Other sorts of image that are to be coded 
within this category are those through which the body is fetishised by being cut down to 'legs only', as 
for example in a hosiery advertisement. This has taken the notion of containment and the negation of 
autonomy to its extreme as it is either reduced to mere penetrative flesh, or to an objectified means of 
display. Within these contexts, there is no self with which to view the spectator. Again it would have 
been beneficial to differentiate between those objects that confine and those phallic objects that 
penetrate. Code 5, 'contained by other/object', seeks only to count those cases where the above ritual 
subordination is compounded by the presence of the active masculinity. Potentially, because of the way 
the topography leads the image to establish the boundaries of gender distinction, there could be equal 
distributions of men and women coded in these ways. However, a sceptical position would expect this 
to be an unlikely outcome.
Code 6 is "mutual containment/embrace'. Coding such an image for heterosexual couples 
requires that both the male and female are present in the image, that they are embracing, kissing and 
possibly engaging in minimal foreplay. However, the central element must be that the sexual activity, 
of whatever kind, is mutual and thus reflects active engagement by both. These must be codings where 
the embrace appears to result from mutual initiation. Thus, the bodies must be moving towards each
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other and both bodies must be either going to embrace or already embracing. Therefore, both of the 
woman's arms must be raised towards the man and not by her side. Any image that is to be classified 
under this code must be free of passive body positioning such as described above. The female must not 
be turning away, blushing, looking down, concealing her mouth, or appearing to be moving away from 
the man.
Code 7, 'non-containment', refers to those images where the body may be single or with other 
bodies but is able to move freely and act instantly upon a choice or decision or whim. Thus, it would 
suggest that non-containment relates to the autonomy of the body to move through space at will. The 
body will not be withdrawing from the social space, nor be directed or guided through the social space. 
There must certainly not be any physical or symbolic barriers to its movement or occupation of space. 
Therefore, there are no arms around the body or across the body, for example. Code 8, "-other', refers to 
those cases that do not apply to any of the above or are too ambiguous to be coded consistently and 
confidently.
Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of some of the ways in which the idiom could visually portray 
containment.
legs held in by arms
legs crossed and pulled in
held in and hugging self












other's arm round neck 1 !
other's arm round waist 1 !
held protectively i '
embracing other/obj !









This variable seeks to trace the central means by which containment is coded. It seeks to trace 
the very embodied means through which withdrawal from social space is encoded. The aim is to cross- 
tabulate this with variable 12 in order to see how the different genders mobilise space using which 
particular gestures and postures. Code 1, 'legs held in by arms', refers to the embodied posture where 
the legs are pulled up towards the chest and kept in place by the arms clasped around them. Not only 
does it make the physical space smaller, but the limbs also protect and conceal the chest. This posture 
tends to be adopted when seated on the floor, thereby visually encoding the body as being of low status 
by being low down. Code 2, 'legs crossed and pulled in by arms', refers to a similar posture, but rather 
than the legs being clasped to the chest, they are just pulled up and thus withdrawn from the occupancy 
of social space. The crossed legs are held there by the arms. This posture suggests slightly more control 
within social space as it is not such a closed posture. However, it nevertheless continues to suggest low 
or little status, again by being on the floor, as well as invoking a child-like posture. Another variation
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of this child-like posture is Code 3, where the woman is holding her legs in and hugging herself. Again 
this withdrawal is conventionally disconnected from confidence and public life.
Code 4, 'clinging to other\ can only be used as a classification if there are two or more 
models in the frame. The word clinging has been purposely selected to refer to the fact that the model is 
embracing, or holding on to, the other, without it being reciprocated. Additionally, the word clinging 
has been used to refer to the clutchiness of the grasp, as if to let go would mean imminent danger. This 
continues the theme of childishness that these postures suggest.' Confined by product', Code 5, refers 
to those cases where the model is unable to move through social space because of the barrier that the 
product is imposing. This could be referring to shoes that are so immensely high that mobility is 
seriously impaired. It could be that the model is captured while they are getting undressed, thereby 
objectifying the model. Alternatively, the body may be bound. This category aims to distinguish those 
images where the body is confined from the sub-variable in Q12 which refers to those images where 
the body has been dissected by the frame and thus is merely the legs upon which the tights are 
displayed.
The next cluster of three codes seeks to classify those images where one model is claimed by 
the other as personal property. Thus, it seeks to trace the encodings that take place to trace how 'his 
woman' is visually proffered. Goffrnan has described the ways that these sorts of relative statuses are 
coded through visual barriers or the spacing of the bodies. For example, 'contained demarcating 
ownership', Code 6, is where the man stands, the woman is seated and the man has his hand placed on 
her shoulder. The woman, however, is likely to have her hands cupped in her lap. This makes sure the 
hands do not touch anything and, through its stillness, gives the posture a degree of passivity. Note that 
this mock-up of the professional man and his wife is an over-conventionalised mode through which her 
subordinate status regarding class is conferred. By the same token, it is also the same convention 
through which her status is understood to be conferred by her husband. Thus, this code is to be used if 
there are extreme differences in the relative placing of the models, if there are distinct features to the 
narrative whereby she is visiting his office, for example. Usually, the narrative provides explanations as 
to why she is out of the domestic setting.
In cases where such narrative aids are absent, one must apply on the codes using the body. 
The two commonest forms are 'hand around neck or shoulder' and 'hand around waist', Codes 6 and 7 
respectively. It is important to note that these classifications require the woman to have her hands either 
folded or hanging down by her side. This suggests non-reciprocation and again gives a degree of 
passivity to the embodied position. By positioning the arm around the neck or waist, one is following 
the custom of holding on to one's personal possessions in public so they do not go astray. "Held 
protectively' refers to those images where the demarcation of containment is made in other ways. 
Usually, these are supported by a narrative where the public arena is perceived to be a dangerous place 
for the female, and thus the male must continually touch or stand in front of his companion, or shield 
her, for example. This can be seen in the ways that politicians conduct their wives through public space 
and was a particular favourite of John Major, although he was/is not alone.
The next pair refers to who is doing the embracing and what they are embracing, and refers 
specifically to what Goffrnan describes as the child-like 'snuggling' women do when cuddling men.
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Goffrnan describes it as child-like because it gives the appearance of the female seeking protection, b
ut 
also the comfort and re-assurance a child receives from its parent's body and size. Piloting noted that
 
this was applied to the product so that the product afforded comfort as part of its appeal. Again this 
code has been operationalised to be potentially coded to both male and female models. Thus, Codes 1
0 
and 11, 'embracing other/obf and 'emracED by other/obj\ traces who embraces in an attempt to tra
ce 
those occasions when women are able to embrace and empower the product or other. 'Other* is used 
for those cases that were unanticipated.
Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree 
to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By 'reveal' I mean that the clothing is lifted o
r 
moved or cut to draw attention to and overtly sexualise that part of the body which would 
conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms 
etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.
non-sexualisation 1 underwear M 10
fully dressed 2 see-through clothing ! I 11
reveal shoulder 3 covered towel : 12
reveal stomach/hip bone II 4 naked self-concealment i 13
reveal upper chest : 5 naked except commodity i 14
reveal thigh 6 naked upper chest i I 15
reveal/accentuate breast 7 fully naked i 16
flies up/down i 8 other ; 17
getting dressed i i 9
Includes some preprogammed exclusions: Q9 = 5. This automatically excludes 63 cases.
Q14 = Q4]: code 8=15, code 9 = codes 8, 9,11,12,13,14,16
This variable seeks to explore how the sex of the model affects what parts of the body are 
eroticised as well as whether the sex of the model affects the degree to which the body is fetishised. 
The variables contain an implicit scale of degree beginning with non-sexualisation where there is no 
visible markings to make the body sexy (although the bodies always remain sexed) through to complete 
nakedness or naked self-concealment. Nakedness is interpreted as being an extreme form of 
sexualisation both through the revelation of the flesh and the subjugation to the product. This is a 
complex variable as it hits at the heart of the multiplicity of the body. It is possible to reveal various 
parts of the body simultaneously. Therefore there are very few ways in which the variable could be 
tackled. Note that while there is an analytic scale implicit.in this variable, it is not statistically testabl
e.
'Non-sexualisation' refers to those images that have no visible codings of sexiness. The 
models must be fully clothed with no flesh being revealed. It is likely that there are no visible signs t
hat 
the model seeks to incite the viewer by pouting, licking the lips, staring up through the eyebrows
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especially if the head is slightly tilted. Conversely, one would expect the mouth to be still as well a
s the 
eyes looking forward. 'Fully dressed", Code 2, refers to those bodies where the sexualisation is eith
er 
due to a facial expression like those listed above, or because the flesh of the body is being revealed
 in 
some way. The revealing of the flesh has been located to five key areas of the body. These tally wit
h 
the commonly understood erogenous zones of the Western body. They are: revealing the shoulder, 
revealing the stomach and/or hip bone, revealing the upper chest, revealing the thigh, and revealing
 or 
accentuating the breast. The means through which Codes 2 to 7 are represented in the image are va
ried 
but follow common-sense expectations. Thus, revealing the breast is a more detailed version of 
revealing the chest and is generally achieved through having a shirt loosely buttoned. Alternatively
, the 
chest in general could be revealed by the model getting undressed or dressed. Likewise, the revelati
on 
of the thigh is dependent upon the skirt being blown, or the ways that the model is being seated, 
especially with shorts on, for example. The means by which the flesh is revealed is not the particula
r 
focus; rather this variable seeks to address mainly what is being revealed.
Not until one comes to more extreme means through which the body is sexualised does one 
find excessive visibility of flesh. Code 8, 'flies up/down', and code 9, "getting dressed", refer to the 
specific means by which the genital area can be focused upon, without using explicitly soft porn or
 
page 3-type codes. They draw directly from Moore's paper where she argues that one of the shifts 
taking place in the codification of the male body is catching him dressing, as for example in the now
 
infamous mass-audience Levis 501 advertisement where Nick Cayman undresses explicitly in an 
almost identical way to a strip tease. Additionally, there is the extensive use of highly sexualised bo
dies 
to sell underwear, hence Code 10. These sorts of products have extensively used the naked body 
beautiful. These images often use the mundanity of underwear as a means to sell through explicitly
 
sexualised images. Code 11, 'see-through clothing", traces those items of clothing that explicitly 
objectify the body. This, along with underwear, is the most unproblematic example of the way fashion 
as an industry is exploitative of people's bodies and images for financial gain. Code 12, 'covered 
towel', refers to those images where bathroom scenes are used as a means to stage the body within 
a 
naturalistic setting, but one that also allows for the legitimate exposure of flesh. Cologne 
advertisements in particular use narcissistic grooming scenes as a means to reveal the flesh of the b
ody 
beautiful. Again this has been drawn directly from Moore's article where she argues that "it is now
 
possible to represent the male body as a pleasurable object on condition that this pleasure can be 
contained within a narcissistic/autoerotic discourse." 130 It is from the extensive use of these sorts of
 
code that some core data will be drawn. Is this something that differs explicitly between men and 
women now? And if this is no longer the case, what sorts of empirical problems does this pose Scre
en 
theory and other feminist critiques?
Ol 5 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is 
touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 corresponds to cases where t
he 
hand is active but not touching anyone.
130 Moore S. (1988) 'Here's Looking at You, Kid!' in Gamman, M., Marshment, L. (Ed) The Female 















hand is active/not touching i
no touch/neutral
other





Q15 = Q31: code 2 = 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = code 6; code 5 = codes 7, 8; code 6 = code 9.
Code 1, 'touching own body', is straightforward and refers to all parts of the body. Codes 2 
and 3, 'touching a man's body', refer to those images where a male or female touches any part of the 
male model's body. Conversely, "touching a woman's body' refers to those cases where the male or 
female is touching the woman's body. This allows a number of aspects to be traced. Firstly, it traces the 
extent to which heterosexual couples are visually encoded or determined through the seal of a touch, as 
well as whether this is entirely secured through the feminine. Additionally, it can be identified whether 
single sex couples are shown to be touching, and therefore potentially making the 'relationship' 
between them more explicit. This has a specific gender divide. Firstly, it examines the extent to which 
males alone are allowed to touch and whether this still invokes the homoerotic and therefore must be 
repressed between straight men. Conversely, it also allows us, on those occasions where women are 
touching, to trace the extent to which an element of the homoerotic surfaces and whether it is repressed 
through the presumed asexualness or sexual passivity of heterosexual women.
Code 6, 'touching commodity', is self-explanatory. Code 7, 'hand is active/not touching', 
refers to those cases where the hand is visible within the frame and is active in some way but not 
touching. For example, the fist could be clenched, the hand could be held closed as a result of a 
sporting activity or used to maintain balance. Additionally, the hands are used to stage a stylistic pose 
and thus can be used to form impressions like holding a pretend gun, for example. Code 8, 'no 
touch/neutral', refers to those images where the hand is included in the frame of the images but is at 
rest and not holding anything. Examples where this code would be used are cases where the hands are 
at rest and the arms hang loosely beside the body. 'Other' refers to those cases that do not apply to any 
of the above.
O16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specifiy what is being touched, which again feeds back to notions 
concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded, this means that 
both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means either that one hand or arm is 
concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.





hand on/through hair 
hand on hip(s) 
hand on leg(s) 
hand on torso 
hand on face 
hand on neck 
hand on bum 
hand on breasts 
hand on genitals 
hand behind back
3 hand forcing ribs forward
4 clenched fists
5 hand at rest
6 leaning on
7 holding hands














This variable includes the automatic exclusions Q9 = (5,7) and Q15 = (6,7,8). This totals 328 cases 
unaffected.
Resultant amalgamations: Ql6 = Q38: codes 9= 15, 10= 16, 11 =16, 13= 19, 14 = 8-13,22,23.
This variable seeks to break down into greater detail exactly what parts of the body are 
touched, and to what extent those postures and positions are gender differentiated. This provides a 
means through which the areas available to touch, and by whom, can be traced. It allows one to identify 
which areas of the body are barred to one sex, but available to feel and touch to the other sex. The 
underlying theme being traced here refers to the convention that women are able to touch much more 
than men. On a more extreme level, women can treat their own bodies as objects. These objects can be 
caressed and stroked so that the reassuring warmth and pleasure that is gained from women's bodies is 
also experienced from the woman's own body. It is a pleasure that is gained from women's 
objectification.
Codes 1 and 2, 'one hand1 and "both hands\ refer to whether the hands are doing the same 
thing or different things. The relationship between these two aspects does not relate directly to the 
debate concerning the association of the feminine with the tactile. Rather, it is a means through which 
the visual symmetry can be traced. To have both hands doing the same thing conveys within the image 
a simplicity through symmetry. Conversely, having the hands doing different things makes the image 
busier and tends to make it more active, since there is actually more going on. The relationship between 
the symmetry and business can be grafted onto the notion of the active and the passive. Since the 
dichotomy has to be visually elaborated, it is dependent upon the possibilities and potential of
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visualisations. Note that because there can potentially be hands touching two different objects or bodies 
or body parts at the same time, there may well be a considerably larger base number for this variable.
All of the categories are self-evident, with no exceptions. The various parts of the body have 
been coded. Code 3, "hand through hair', refers to those images where the hand touches the hair as if 
the hair is a source of pleasure and fulfilment for the model. These images usually depict the model 
with long and extremely glossy hair and, like the 'naturalistic mock up' referred to above, the hair will 
tend to be extremely shiny. The hair is given the connotation of being an object of pleasure and 
fulfilment for the model who touches it. It is almost as if the hair comforts the female as a cuddly toy 
would. The hair is desirable in itself. Psychoanalytically, it is considered that the presence of long hair 
on women rather than men, and the fact that women continually touch their hair, is a means through 
which disavowal is achieved for the male. Thus women with long hair are considered to be more 
attractive, and this is why they draw attention to their hair (see Flugell930; Millum 1975).
Code 4, 'hand on hips', refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body 
posture to convey the notion of confidence. It suggests a certain impatience. However, this 
assertiveness could become sexualised by being combined with a phallic facial gesture. We can 
combine the two to trace exactly how the gesture is anchored. This must be borne in mind, as 
assertiveness will constitute a shift toward becoming a femme fatale. The pattern that is of interest is 
whether it is a very gendered gesture and, if so, how this assertiveness is combined with other gestures 
and whether it is supported or undermined. It refers to those images that are using this conventionalised 
body posture.
Code 5, ''hands on legs', will be used to explore the extent to which legs are gendered through 
touch. Arguably, if the prevailing approaches are accurate descriptions of the masculine and the 
feminine, one would expect the legs to show up substantial gender differences. The legs have been a 
long-standing area of the female body that has been eroticised, and since hegemonic patterns have been 
organised to exclude women from this eroticism, to touch a woman must be part of an emotional 
relationship cast within romantic discourse. Thus part of the purpose of touching a woman's leg is to 
display the access that the man is presumed to have to the woman's body. Additionally, since access to 
the erotic zones of a woman's body is presumed to be open to men, part of the symbolism of touching 
the leg is that it secures the man's ownership of the woman in a similar way to putting his arm around 
her waist, as discussed above (Q13).Therefore it is likely that there is a higher frequency of men 
touching women's legs than vice versa. Conversely, if Code 6, "hands on torso', corresponds to 
expectation then one would expect the torso to be touched by the female model. This does two things in 
particular. Firstly, it confirms the male model's masculinity as sexually appealing, thereby connecting 
this appeal to the muscularity of the chest. Secondly, the comparable size of a man's chest to a 
woman's means that by touching the chest, visually it can appear as if she gleans protection from him. 
The combinations of their relative size visually encodes the promise of the power of male muscularity. 
It also confirms that women require such protection.
Codes 7 and 8, 'hand on face' and 'hand on neck', refer to the extent to which the face is 
made a central feature of the codification by leading the eye to it through the touch. According to the 
existing literature, especially the codes isolated by Goffman, the touching of the face is a distinctly
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feminine gesture. The reason is that it moves to objectify the face by conferring its softness on to the 
softness of the commodity, for example the softness of the smell. If the man does touch the woman's 
face, this has the effect of conferring significant status differences between the sexes, because such a 
touch coming from a man is associated with fatherhood, and therefore relegates the female back to a 
childish status, as so many other codes do.
Code 9, 10 and 11 detail those images where the hand is touching either the bottom, the 
genitals or the breast of the model. This variable traces to what extent these are considered areas 
available to touch equally by both sexes or are gender divided. One would expect this to follow a strict 
pattern of gender difference, especially in the extent to which men would touch these areas 
considerably more often than women as part of their display of active sexuality.
Code 12, 'hand behind back', is self-explanatory. It is being interpreted here as part of the 
ongoing codifications that remove activity from the frame. Code 14, 'clenchedfists', seeks to trace 
whether hyper-masculine poses are still being widely applied, and whether this is being used as a 
means to portray masculinity in a surreal and stylistic setting by women.
Code 15, 'hand at rest', is a neutral hand pose and refers to the sorts of ways the hands are left 
when not in use. One usually either lets them hang down by one's side, or leaves them flopped or 
resting in the lap. Henley (1997; 1981) argues that men touch women much more than women touch 
men. This she based upon observation of intentional touch (Major and Williams 1980:20). If this is the 
case, one would expect to find neutral hand poses to be a predominately feminine gesture, as well as 
one that also defines the Other, namely the Black models. It conveys a certain passivity, since the hands 
are understood to be the major part of the body for skilful manipulation. Code 16, 'leaning on\ refers 
to those images where the body is being propped up by or leaning on the hands and has straight and 
locked arms. This form of posture has quite different meanings according to the gendered body. For 
example, this position is not in any way formal, and is often associated with a nonchalant and therefore 
male attitude. It has not conventionally been associated with femininity. Added to this is the fact that 
such a body posture draws attention to the breast by pushing the breast bone forward. Thus for the 
female body, it is not only 'speaking attitude' but it is also a sexualised position. It is therefore 
somewhat contradictory and may suggest a type of posture that is assertive and consciously sexy. Code 
17, 'holding hands', seeks to trace the frequency with which this heterosexist hand gesture is used. It is 
possible to see the extent to which this may have been adopted by same sex couples as a means to bring 
gay and lesbian relations into popular visual culture. Code 18, 'neutrally touching own body", is a 
variable that seeks to trace the possible presence of the ideologically neutral gesture. One would use 
this code if the touch had the appearance of being a lackadaisical gesture, certainly pre-reflexive and 
possibly random. This sort of gesture is such that it falls outside those semiotic gestures that aid the 
classification of passivity or activity. Examples of this could be a hand that appears to have just fallen 
beside the chair. Code 19, 'holding ori, seeks merely to trace the extent to which men and women 
touch and hold onto things. One would expect, following Goffman, that this has a considerable gender 
difference as it has been a long standing convention to have women cling or hold on to a man's body 
for protection. This variable seeks to identify how much that is still the case. 'Hands covered', Code 
20, refers to those cases where the hand is concealed, for example by being placed in a pocket. Again
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this is an informal gesture and suggests a degree of nonchalance that is not associated with passive 
femininity. 'Aggressive gesture'. Code 21, seeks to trace the extent to which aggressive masculinity is 
present and if any cases of femininity as aggressive are ever represented. It is likely that if there are 
some cases they will be located within the stylistic photographic format. 'Other', Code 22, is included 
for unanticipated cases.






















)9 = (5,7), Q15 = (8). Total number of cases excluded is 207.
This variable builds upon the preceding one, identifying how the object or body is touched. It 
introduces greater descriptive detail regarding the gendered nature of touch. The categories compiled 
develop those initially identified by Goffman. Goffman's codifications of the visual forms of 
ritualisation pay particular attention to the child-like positions and gestures given to women in order to 
place them in a subordinate position relative to men. As alluded to above, the key distinction Goffman 
makes centres around the gentleness or weakness with which women touch things as opposed to men. 
The masculine form of touch could be described better as being more of a grip, firm and confident. 
Conversely, the feminine touch fondles or fiddles, never really directing or controlling that which is 
touched. Goffman almost regards it not as a touch, but rather as a caress, as stroking or petting. He 
argues that it has the effect of reducing all objects to a form of cuddly toy. This is very different to the 
atmosphere associated with the masculine touch, which is firm and confident and able.
Coding these descriptive categories must be accompanied by background and therefore is 
culturally embedded. For example, if one was to code the touch as 'utilising' one would use the 
common-sense meaning. The meaning is unproblematic in the sense that we use the word rather than 
problematise and ask how it comes to be meaningful. Additionally one can use the accompanying 
narrative. This is the most general category and refers to those cases where additional detail is excluded 
from the frame. Alternatively, if one was to code 'expert', Code 2, one would expect the model to be 
using a prop to demonstrate that the model was giving advice, teaching and so forth. There are likely to 
be other markers that establish the status that can act as a guide. Code 3, 'grasping', refers to those 
images where the hand is clutching the object roughly, with a great deal of strength. The touch ought to 
come from the palm of the hand with the fingers apart and tightened. The veins may even be visible. 
'Manipulating', Code 4, refers to those images where the object is being applied to something. This 
ought to take place with the finger tips, but the object touched is functional. Again this kind of touch 
may in part be dependent upon the narrative of the image. If the conventions of touch are still in use, 
one would expect these forms of touch to be masculine and thus applied when featuring a male model.
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The next cluster of codes can be thought of as the 'feminine touch' and the operationalisation 
of the codes has been heavily influenced by Goffman. Code 5, "fiddling 1 , refers to those images where 
the hand holds the object idly. Much of the touch is confined to fingertips, with the fingertips close 
together. It is touching for the sake of touching and without an aim, perhaps through boredom or habit. 
Again, this sort of fidgeting is associated with children, thereby lowering the status of the female 
model. Code 7, 'caressing', refers to those images where the fingers stroke the object that is being 
touched. This can be done with both the front and the back of the hand. The fingers will tend to be 
close together and lie flat on top of the object or body. There ought to be an appearance of lightness of 
touch. '•Embracing', Code 8, refers to those images where the object is cupped in the hands. For 
example, this could include those images where the perfume bottle is embraced within the cupped 
hands. The impact is to make the hands a part of the object or commodity. It reduces the hands to the 
ornamental.
Code 9,'-holding/'neutr-al', refers to those images where the hand is not expressive in any way. 
For example, the hand holds onto a banister but it neither grasps it nor fingers nor fiddles with it. The 
hand uses it, and the hand gesture is almost absent. It is merely one of pragmatism and application. It is 
not being suggested that this is without significance and therefore signification. In cases where the hand 
is holding something neutrally and it can be identified as a woman's hand, this has both a significance 
and a signification. It suggests something about the ideological traces circulating regarding 
'emphasised femininity'. Code 10, 'other', is included for unanticipated cases.





relaxed by side !
folded
arms bent i









resting on leg(s) !
over the head i
hugging the body '













Q18 = Q36: 1 = 1,2=2,3=3,4 = 5,6=7,7 = 8,8= 10, 9 = 11, 10 = 21, 11 = 13, 12=4,9,14
This refers to the use and positioning of the arms within the frame. Part of its significance lies 
in the extent to which the female body is coded through symmetry and stillness compared to the male 
body. It also seeks to examine the extent to which the body is used actively and framed through 
movement. The 'feminine as passive' is visually coded through lack of movement, particularly within 
the public domain. Conversely therefore, it is possible to associate active, moving bodies with 
masculine codes. Physicalness has been conventionally applied to male bodies. Most of the arm 
positions selected are a result of piloting, and have been drawn predominantly from naturalistic body
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postures. The forms of body postures relate in various ways to the negotiating of spac
e, the occupancy 
of space and how, through the positions of the arms, the space can become sexualised
.
Codes 1 and 2 examine whether the arms are used to achieve a symmetry of image or 
whether 
the images tend to be more complex by varying the activity of the arms. This is not sp
ecifically 
concerned with gender difference, but it may prove important regarding the extent of 
the codification 
that women's bodies undergo compared with men's. This is not overtly connected wit
h gender. 
However, part of the existing debates concerns the objectification of the woman's body through 
display, of which a still, symmetrical, almost unlived body forms a part.
Code 3, 'pointing up/outwards', refers to those images where the arms are sticking up
 in the 
air and above the head or out into space, away from the body. This classifies all those 
positions that 
may be framed as a result of movement from dancing or sport. It can either be used as
 a naturalistic 
pose or as a stylisation. By combining this variable with photographic style it is possib
le to identify 
whether the images that seek to 'reflect real life' tend to use less movement of the bod
y, so that those 
images that seek to define their style against this prevailing position adopt movement.
 Code 4, 'relaxed 
by side', refers to the arm position at rest when the body is culturally defined as being
 in its 'natural 
biological state'. It is considered the most neutral position for the arms to adopt. It wo
uld again suggest 
changes to the nature of the dominant ideological patterns if this proved to be a) a frequently used pose 
and b) equally coded upon male and female bodies.'Arms folded"', Code 5, is regarded as a closed 
gesture rather than an open one because it prohibits the possibility of other gesticulatio
ns. It can be 
used in two distinct ways, depending upon the additional information. It can be either 
used as a means 
of being aloof, particularly when standing, or as a barrier or protection, especially if a
ccompanied by 
other codes of a closed body. As with many of the other preceding codes, the issue of
 the gesture's 
specific meaning is not central to the coding process at this point. The differing contex
ts that affect the 
meaning assigned can be ascertained through cross-tabulation of the data.
"Arms bent', Code 6, refers to those images where the arm is bent, producing an angle 
at the 
elbow. This is also considered a neutral body movement and is not considered to be g
endered. Thus, if 
there is a high frequency of this code, again it would seem to suggest that there has be
en a shift in the 
hegemonic formations of patriarchy. "Resting on legs', Code 7, refers to those cases w
here the arms are 
lying or resting on the lap. There is no activity and the hands are relaxed with a slight 
bend in the 
fingers. There ought to be a floppy appearance to both arms and hands. Code 8, 'over
 the heacT, refers 
to those cases where the arms have been held up, with the arms bent so that they close
 over the head. 
This use of the arms has the effect of revealing the armpit and thereby sexualising the
 body. Code 9, 
'hugging the body', refers to those images where the arms are wrapped around the bod
y. Again this 
posture relates to what Goffrnan describes as the child-like poses in which women are
 depicted. 
Additionally, the gesture of hugging the body is one means whereby the objectified body is used in its 
objectified form by the woman herself. Thus, the body is a source of pleasure for her as it would be for 
another. 'Arm in action' refers to those images where the arms are framed in moveme
nt. This code is to 
be applied when the action that has been framed is a 'realistic one'. By this I mean th
at it is not difficult 
to envisage doing the movement in the life-world as part of the activity. Conversely, 
Code 11, 'in mock 
movement', refers to those cases where the movement that has been photographed is a
 pretend action. It
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is a sort of clowning. It can be considered as a mock up of the already hyper reality. 'Leaning' refers to 
those images where the arms are being used to prop up the torso. Potentially, this has a slightly 
different connotation if used by the male or female, in that the act of leaning on the arms can be 
sexualised by drawing more attention to the already accentuated breast. Conversely, assuming that 
there is an absence of other codes that undermine this, the posture could be considered an occasion of 
hegemonic masculinity in that it opens the chest up and therefore leaves it open to attack. The same 
could also be said for the female, thereby making any sexualisation features present part of the 
codification of the femme fatale. Code 13 is 'other'.
Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs. 
Q19A ABANDONED: Does not add anything to the analysis.
one leg '< 1 
both legs i I 2
Q19B
open when seated 3 bent fully at the knee il 13 
closed when seated ! 4 extended outwards : 14 
open when lying down 5 running M 15 
closed when lying down l 6 walking ' 16 
crossed and pulled in 7 pretend movement 17 
crossed and extended
outward M 8 standing open n 18 
astride 9 standing closed ' 19 
intertwined with obj/other 10 kneeling ! 20 
knee slightly bent point
forward :l 11 other ' 21 
knee bent sideways ' ! 12
There are a number of pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (2,4,5,6). This automatically removes 274 
counts.
Q19 = Q35: 5 = 7, 6 = 9, 7 = 11, 8 = 12, 9 = 13, 10 = 14, 11 = 16, 12 = 17, 13 = 21, 14 = 22, 15 
5,6,8,10,15,18,19,20,23,24
Codes 1 and 2, 'one leg' and 'both tegs', again refer to the notion of the symmetry of the body 
as defined above in Q18. Code 3, 'open when seated', refers to those images where the body is seated 
but the legs are apart, therefore the knees must not be touching. The knees ought to be separated so that
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the distance between them is greater than the width of the hips. Conversely, Code 4, 'dosed when 
seated1 , refers to those images where the body is seated and the legs are closed, or close together. If the 
knees are not quite touching, they must be close enough to be the same width as the torso. The 
meanings that surround these postures connect with two elements. Firstly, to sit with the legs apart is to 
extend the limbs into space, occupying it and imposing the body onto it. This has not been a feature of 
femininity as historically understood. Also, the posture takes on a moral dimension for it is said that for 
women to sit with their legs apart invites sexual advances and the condemnation that comes with them. 
To sit with the legs apart is immodest since it entertains the possibility of revealing the thigh or 
genitalia, thereby rendering the woman a tart, femme fatale or slut. Thus, it is necessary to trace the 
extent to which those cases, if any, of a woman sitting with her legs open fell outside the non- 
sexualisation category.
Codes 5 and 6, 'open when lying down' and 'closed when lying down', are self-explanatory 
and use the same pointers for identification as Codes 3 and 4. Goffman noted that the predominance of 
women featured lying down was another visual codification whereby their low status compared with 
men could be confirmed. In addition, it has very close associations with sexual intercourse. Lying down 
has been a regular pose used in porn. Thus, this posture is marked very heavily by the gender of 
embodiment. It is also the case that the passivity of the body suggested by the body position adds to the 
convention that women cannot actively deploy their bodies effectively. Goffman has connected this to 
the child status with which women are coded. It is considered here that if there is a high frequency of 
women lying down and with their legs open, possibly not wearing much clothing, then this is an 
extremely patriarchal image. Code 7, 'legs crossed and pulled in', refers to the sitting position that 
children use in school. Once again, Goffman's notion of the childishness of hegemonic patterns of 
femininity could well come into effect in this posture. The low status of the sitting position is also 
associated with the fact that one would tend to sit in this way if one were sitting on the ground. This 
can be placed in opposition to Code 8, 'crossed and/or extended', where the legs are stretched out. This 
seems to suggest that the person is at ease with their environment and confident. Again, such obvious 
occupation of space is something that has been associated with the embodiment of masculinity. 
'Astride', Code 8, is self-explanatory and is also suggestive of someone confident and at ease with their 
environment. Consequently, one would expect that the male body be marked by these codes. Plus it 
goes against the convention of associating femininity with physical stillness.
'Knee slightly bent forward" is identified in the following way: one of the legs must be 
straight, with no bend at the knee. The other leg will have a slight bend at the knee which has the effect 
of lowering the hip on that side of the body. This emphasises both the hips and the bottom area. It also 
draws attention to the legs. It is a classic pose and has often been used when a woman wants to entice 
and incite sexual desire. The sexiness of the pose has been added to by being used when standing in 
doorways. This acts as a kind of frame for the pose. This pose has been used almost exclusively on 
women, and correspondingly one would expect there to be marked difference in its use here. 'Knee 
bent sideways'. Code 10, is a variation on the above code. However, having turned the knee outwards, 
more attention is given to the leg and more of the thigh is potentially revealed.
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'Fully bent at the knee\ Code 11, is basically the same as squatting. The body ought to be 
lower than it would be if it was standing, with the knees nearer the face. 'Running', Code 12, is self- 
explanatory, as is 'walking', Code 11. One would expect these to be used to photograph men more than 
women because of the action that is necessarily implied. 'Pretend movement', Code 13, is the same as 
the 'pretend arm movement' definition above. An example could be a pretend karate kick. 'Standing 
open' and 'standing closed refer to the most basic body stance. Those cases coded as standing closed 
must have the knees either touching or very close together. Conversely, legs that are coded as being 
apart must have quite a large space between the knees. The model must be standing still. These codes 
are taken to be relatively neutral postures that are not widely used in the visualisations of gender 
difference. It is therefore expected that this will not be a particularly frequent posture, but any cases 
that are identified will tend to apply to the male body, since women are positioned lower than men, by 
being seated for example. 'Kneeling' is self-explanatory. It is a highly ritualised means to convey 
deference. However, its associations with courtly behaviour or religious genuflection suggest that this 
will be a masculine posture, but performed mostly to other men. The variable also includes 'other'.
HEAD: Head position
head back




head in profile ! i








head tilted to side
head hidden
back of head i
head pushed forward
other






Q20 = Q42: 1 =1,2 =2, 3 =3, 4 = 4, 5 =5, 6 = 6, 7 = 8,8=10,9 = 7,9,11
This variable addresses the direction of the face and the position of the head. This is of central 
importance, as it is fundamental to determining the relationship of the body posture to the sorts of 
expressions commanded by the facial area. The position of the head not only establishes certain limits 
to the direction of the gaze, but can also determine the hierarchical relationships between the viewer 
and the model. Thus to have the head looking down is to impart a sense of the model's deference and 
respect to a higher authority. To turn away from the viewer's gaze suggests modesty and coyness. The 
direction of the head position is a relatively common-sense means through which certain status 
relationships can be coded in relatively indisputable terms. To stare directly into another's eyes is 
assertive, whereas to turn away from the gaze, to avoid the gaze in this way, is reactive. Head on, direct 
facial and eye contact are regarded as the most prominent means through which autonomy is asserted 
facially. Conversely then, to turn away, to avert the gaze, is seen as reactive and a means through which 
that person is defined by others.
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The definitions of this variable are relatively straightforward. It does not employ any unusual 
features that contravene common-sense understandings. Therefore, there should be little need for 
clarification regarding the direction and position of the head. Code I, 'head back', refers to those cases 
where the head has been allowed to flop back against the neck. Consequently, the chin will be pointing 
upwards, and there will be large amounts of the neck showing. It is the position adopted when one 
wants to look straight upwards to the sky. This position is not expected to be frequent. Any use of this 
position is expected to form part of the image-maker's bid to establish an anti-realist image. One would 
not expect there to be any eye contact made. If the head is described as "head down", Code 2, one 
would expect the viewer to be able to see the crown of the head. Much of the face is concealed as a 
result, and the chin ought to be touching the neck or thereabouts. 'Head straight ahead" refers to those 
images where the head is facing directly forwards. Both eyes are facing forward, both ears are equally 
visible. The head should be fully upright. The chin should not be turned towards either shoulder in any 
way.
'Head turning away\ Code 4, is coded for those cases where the body is predominantly 
facing forward, the shoulders may be twisted slightly, much of the side of the neck is visible, as is the 
side of the head. One would expect to able to see one ear. The meaning of this turn can best be secured 
when considered in conjunction with the direction of the gaze. If the eyes are turning away also, one 
would conventionally accept this as being the response of someone who wishes to avoid the viewer's 
gaze. However, if the eyes are looking toward the viewer, it is much more ambiguous because it 
suggests that the model is looking but contravening the conventions or looking against the grain. 
"Turning towards camera" refers to those images where the body, particularly the shoulders, are 
twisting towards the position of the camera. Thus the hips would tend to be facing in the opposite 
direction, causing the torso to twist. Additionally, one would expect the eyes to be looking in the 
direction toward which the body is turning. Therefore, if the body is turning toward the camera, one 
would expect the eyes to also be looking in that direction. One would use this code too if the head 
movement is introducing a greater percentage of the face. If it is the case that more of the face is being 
concealed through the movement, then one would use Code 4. "Profile" is self-explanatory. The margin 
for the codification comes when both eyes can be seen. If this is the case then one would code it as 
either twisting away or towards, depending on the other features mentioned above. One would expect 
this code to be a feminine one, for it both removes the moHe] from the possibility of engaging in eye 
contact with the viewer, and has the impact upon the face of rendering it artifice. The head becomes 
statuesque, still, objectified.
'Head hidden" refers to those images where the head is concealed in some way. It may be 
concealed under a hat, hair or a towel etc. The 'back of head" is self-explanatory, and as a result there 
ought to be no facial features visible. Both these variables have been theoretically conceived as being 
extremely objectifying poses, since there is no possibility of asserting the personhood of the model, no 
means through which to facially engage or respond to the narrative set up. It is a visual way of blocking 
the models' narrative from the space in which they have been located. Similarly the child in the 
classroom is made to turn their back and face away. It removes the person's possibility to engage. It 
also has the effect of making the person vulnerable to the events or activities that are taking place
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'behind their back', as they are unable to see what is going on. Code 10,'head pushedforward'
', is not 
expected to be a common pose, but is potentially a head position nevertheless and could be use
d as an 
anti-naturalistic code. It is identified by the presence of the chin being positioned away from th
e neck. 
Code 11 \s'Other\
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The mouth has been identified as being critical to the overall evaluation of the sexualisation 
process, since the mouth is a central erogenous zone. The expression of the mouth can also be a
 central 
focus whereby the other erotic features that may be present on the body are negated, or it can a
t least 
establish contradiction to or conflict with the general embodiment. This can be done through ei
ther 
being expressionless or adopting an assertive or aggressive gesticulation while at the same time
 
revealing flesh. Clearly, this is one of the areas where one would expect there to be a marked d
ifference 
in the gendered expression. One would expect a high prevalence of 'phallic mouth' expressions
 for 
those images that seek to adopt and codify the body as a femme fatale. Conversely, one would 
expect 
there to be a high frequency of expressions that seek to engage the viewer, thereby establishing
 
emphasised femininity. By seeking to engage the viewer/other, the female is responding to the 
power 
difference in social interaction whereby she must entice, engage and respond to please the subject, and 
by implication therefore please the normative male subject. One would expect the male models to have 
a very low frequency of expressions that are overtly sexual. This code can be a valuable source
 of data 
through which it is possible to explore the extent to which one can talk about feminised male b
odies.
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Q21A seeks to identify whether the mouth is simply open or closed. This has an effect upon 
the possible mouth expressions used and when. Code 1, 'mouth closed1 , refers to all those images 
where the mouth is firmly shut with the lips touching. Code 2, 'mouth semi-open", refers to those 
images where the lips are slightly parted. It may be possible to see the tips of the teeth. It is also 
possible to see the tip of the tongue in the mouth. The inside of the mouth may be slightly visible. If 
this is the case, the back of the mouth will be concealed through the lack of light that can penetrate into 
the throat. Code 3 is "mouth open", and designates those images where the model's mouth is fully open. 
One ought to be able to see all of the teeth and tongue. Also, the inside of the mouth ought to be 
visible. It is debatable as to which of these codes is the one most open to sexualisation. I have elected to 
take mouth closed as the least sexual. The sexualness of the other two codes will depend upon what 
other sorts of codes are taking place. For example, having the mouth semi-open when the eyes are 
looking up at the viewer through the eyebrows is conventionally taken as being more sexual than if the 
mouth were to be fully open. Conversely however, if the mouth is fully open with a phallic object close 
by, one could reasonably argue that this is more sexualised than if the mouth were semi-open. Thus, 
these codes are considered to be potentially equally sexualised.
Q21B identifies in more detail the sorts of expressions that are predominantly used and on 
whom. Code 4, "expressionless", refers to those images where there is no particular expression used at 
all. There is no noticeable evidence of any of the muscles contracting to produce a smile or a grimace. 
The lips are not being pushed forward to produce a pout. This non-expression results in there being a 
stillness to the mouth area. There should not be too much attention paid to the code variable. It is not 
being suggested here that an expressionless mouth is not 'expressive'. It is just that the label aims to 
denote those times when the mouth has not adopted a particular expression, like smiling or laughing 
and so on. It is understood here that adopting a non-expressive facial gesture is to express a certain 
distance or disengagement from the viewer. There is no attempt to entice the viewer or to turn the 
viewer on. It suggests a certain emotional neutrality or ascetic disposition, since the absence of another 
expression also means the absence of a mood expressed. Smiling means one is happy, for example. An 
example of an expressionless mouth as a form of expression is photographs from the turn of the 
century. In these photographs, the subjects rarely smile and this conveys a certain formality to the 
proceedings. It is not the case that the same formality is conveyed now, especially considering the 
naturalistic mock of feminine pleasure that has been so clearly identified. Here the non-expression is 
expressive by virtue of the absence of the incessant need for women to be rapturous in advertisements. 
Therefore, in the context of contemporary fashion advertising conventions, one would expect this 
emotional withdrawal to be something that signifies the masculine.
Code 5 is "smiling" and is used as commonly understood. Thus one would expect the ends of 
the mouth to be turning upwards. It is not necessarily the case that the teeth are visible, but they will 
tend to be so if the person is modelling 'happiness'. Code 6 is "laughing" and in these cases one would 
expect the teeth to be fully visible. Thus one would expect there to be higher frequency of laughing 
when the mouth is open. "Smirking 1 , Code 7, refers to those cases where the model is laughing through 
their smile. "Half smiling", Code 8, refers to those images where there are traces of what could become 
a smile. This would be associated with less enthusiasm and greater reticence. Code 9,'pouting", refers
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to those images where the lips are puckered together to make them appear full and more fleshy. 
Puckering the lips in this way is a key expression used to sexualise the mouth. This classic pose has 
been identified as one way through which the female body has been encoded to become an erotic and 
pleasing object to the viewer, and remains so. 'Licking lips' refers to those occasions when the tongue 
is used to increase the sexualisation of the mouth. It draws the viewer's attention to the mouth and the 
tongue, both of which are highly sexually charged parts of the body, but it reconfirms this association 
by introducing the moistness of the mouth. Thus it is considered here to be a highly objectifying 
codification, especially if coupled with 'looking being looked af defined below. 'Kissing' is taken to 
mean different things according to the relationship of who is doing the kissing, who is kissed or 
whether it is the result of mutual embrace. This relationship can be identified by cross-tabulating with 
Q12 as defined above. However, it is expected here that most of the occasions when the model is 
kissing will be examples of the visual display of the heterosexist imperative. The kiss is therefore 
bound both by the sexual normalisation that it implies and by the hierarchical essence of'romantic 
relationships'. For example, some of these power relationships could be visually displayed by the male 
kissing the female upon the head, as a parent kisses a child. This sort of visualisation is a development 
of Goffman's notion of the 'feminine as childish'. Alternatively, it could be the case that the female is 
kissing the male; if so, it would be interesting to identify the various codes used to establish this as part 
and parcel of general sexual servicing by women. For example, if the kiss is also accompanied by the 
gesture of cuddling, or holding onto the male for physical support.
Code 12, "sulking", is a broad category to include all those facial expressions where the model 
is in a bad mood, etc. One would expect the mouth to be twisted, or turning down. This has the effect 
of tightening the muscles on either side of the chin. It is likely too that the eyes are turned away and 
therefore seeking to 'avoid eye contact'. 'Snarling'1 is an expression where the model has pulled one lip 
up at the side, thereby making the nostril flare. This is a variation on the possible expressions of 
aggression and not just non-engagement, but rather active withdrawal from the visual relationship with 
the viewer. One would not expect these to be widely used within the naturalistic mock-up frame. 
However, they may well be used to mobilise the face for a stylistic, anti-realistic format. If one follows 
the analyses under scrutiny here, this format should not affect the deployment of such expressions as a 
masculine position, and therefore applied to the male model.
'Phallic mouth\ Code 14, is seeking to examine the extent to which this pornographic code 
has been assimilated into wider cultural production. Thus the mouth symbolises the act of fellatio. This 
code is a development of the pout. The pornographic code can be compounded through the use of an 
object as a substitute phallus. Thus Code 15 is 'phallic mouth with objecf. If this is being used on the 
male model, this may well suggest that there has been a decrease in the almost obsessive need to assert 
hegemonic masculinity, for such a sexualisation upon the male body surely introduces the homoerotic 
into the public visual domain. 'Finger naive\ Code 16, references Goffman's observation that the 
hands have been a decisive way through which the passivity and childishness of femininity has been 
conveyed. Goffman identified that the tip of the finger was often placed into the mouth and sucked, or 
surrounded by the lips. He argues that this effectively reduces the woman to the status of the child 
because of the basic childishness of the action. Note that one would use this code for such an image if
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the finger was in combination with a coy facial expression. If it is accompanied by a deep look through 
the eyebrows, or a girlie dress with suspenders, one would classify it as Code 15. 'Finger anxious', 
Code 17, is an expression that must be accompanied with a frown. The combination of the two work to 
establish the finger as providing some sort of security. Also, part of its passivity stems from the fact 
that the person is unable to deal with the situation, and thus devoid of the skill of decision making. It is 
therefore fundamentally associated with the feminine. 'Clenchedjaw' refers to those occasions where 
the muscle is seen to be taut and the mouth is firmly shut tight. It is an aggressive pose and suggests 
annoyance. Thus, working in combination with the visible muscle, one would expect this to be used 
extensively on the male. 'Tonguesticking ouf, Code 19, is an additional means through which the 
childishness of the model is ascertained. If accompanied with a pout, or the revelation of flesh, or the 
eyes looking up through the eyebrows, this code can also become sexualised. 'Heavily painted lips' 
seeks to trace those examples where the use of lipstick has been applied to sexualise the mouth. It must 
be very thick and pink or red in colour if it is to be coded thus. It would usually be accompanied by an 
excessive sheen. Code 21 is 'other'.
Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the 
photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mise-en-scene = an 
active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of the model's gaze. Code 2 = looking, but in a 
way that implicates the viewer within the narrative. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer 
and is thus more straightforwardly unproblematic.
public addressing viewer 1 private voyeur i - 3 
narrative address i : 2 other i 4
N/A = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7. This excludes 31 cases automatically.
Spectatorial address is seeking specifically to capture the extent to which the mise-en-scene of 
the image combines with the positioning of the model in a frame and the viewer. It directly references 
the ways in which cultural studies, especially those informed by psychoanalysis, argue that passivity is 
both visually structured and negated if the model is male. This variable seeks to trace the possible 
exchange of looks that take place in this 'realistic' medium. It is directly referencing Mulvey's 
arguments regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the 
myth of representative realism.
The central means through which the codes are to be applied regards the exchange of looks, or 
lack of them. Thus for Code 1, 'public addressing viewer\ one must have an exchange of looks 
whereby the model looks directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer into the 
place of the camera. The gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she 
positions themselves in relation to the image. To look at such an image is to engage with the model. 
The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or 
her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or
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desire for the viewer. However, it could equally be one whereby the model appears to be the initiator, 
through their adoption of a gaze that makes the viewer an object in the exchange. This compares with 
what has been described as 'narrative address'. Code 2 refers to those images where the viewer is 
implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchanged looks 
between one of the models and the viewer. For example, where the female model is looking into the 
camera and therefore at the viewer while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby making the joke at his 
expense and between the viewer and model. The central protagonist in such a mise-en-scene is the 
female model since she commands the viewer's gaze as well as duping her boyfriend. Code 3, 'private 
voyeur', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as 
being oblivious to it. Thus the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer 
into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocal behaviour and free to see what they want. 
It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing, and as a result one would expect this to be much 
more prevalent when used to photograph women. If such a frame is used to represent men, it is usually 
accompanied by a gaze of the model that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic. This is what 
Dyer refers to as the instabilities contained in images of men. In order to disavow the latent passivity of 
being the object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity, for example 
displaying their cerebral superiority over the female model by looking up to the heavens, thereby 
making the body inconsequential to their true being. Alternatively, argues Dyer, the male model can 
look off, thereby referring to an activity that is beyond the frame of reference of the viewer. To look off 
to the side is to demonstrate to the viewer that they are of no interest and of no consequence. 131 Such a 
denigration of the female viewer is compounded by the use of muscle both as a means to signify the 
power of embodiment that the male body is synonymous with, as well as a means to shift the passivity 
back onto the viewer. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could 
suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus of looking is gendered.
Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/passivity.
looking up
gazing out at viewer
looking down
looking away
staring out of photo frame














This automatically excludes 47 cases.
This variable is concerned with tracing the direction of the gaze in terms of the position with 
the viewer. Eye contact, who can look at whom and when, is intensely reflective of the power 
relationships that determine and characterise interaction. Thus, if this is combined with the general
131 Dyer R. (1992) 'Don't look now: the male pin-up' in The Sexual Subject: The Screen Reader' 
edited by Caughie, J. and Kuhn, A. Routledge, London. pp267.
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composite of the look in the above variable, one will be able to see the ex
tent to which the relations of 
looks are built around the active and passive nexus. For example, if there
 is an equal distribution of the 
voyeuristic pose because the model is looking down, then this would rep
resent a considerable shift in 
the ways that gender is visually and expressively pinned to the dichotom
y. If this is not the case then 
one needs to examine exactly what it means to be able to unequivocally i
dentify the body as male and 
identify a variety of codes, some of which used to be the preserve of the 
feminine. The central coding 
rule that must be followed here is that all judgements made with regard to the direction of the g
aze 
must be done so from the position of the viewer. It is the most consistent
 position with which to gauge 
the direction of the look. Secondly, it is the relationship of the gaze with 
the viewer that is of interest 
and importance. Again this draws us back to the attention that has been p
aid to the gaze in feminist 
psychoanalytic theory.
Code 1, 'looking up\ refers to those images where the model's eyes are l
ooking upwards 
towards the sky. This tends to have the effect of making the person look 
up through their eyebrows. 
One ought to be able to see a little more of the bottom of the whites of th
eir eyes. Code 2, "gazing out 
at viewer", refers to those images where the model is staring directly out 
of the photo frame at the 
viewer. This relationship of looks is achieved by making the model look 
into the lens of the camera. 
Consequently, the model will always be looking at the viewer no matter 
where the viewer stands in 
relation to the model. This gives the viewer a sense of being the object because no matter wher
e they 
stand and look at the model, the model will always be establishing eye co
ntact. Within the social 
relations that have existed, this conforms to the classic established and p
atriarchal relationships of 
looks. 'Looking down' refers to all those models whose gaze is turned do
wnwards towards the floor. 
The direction of the eyes will mean that the model is looking down, almo
st as if they are looking down 
the nose. Looking down has been associated with a number of passive po
sitions with regard to the other 
subject. It has been associated both with shame, and with deference toward one's elder and bet
ter. 
Additionally, looking down has been associated as a means to avoid a ga
ze. Thus, if there is an 
insignificant gender difference here, this may indicate a substantial shift 
in the formations of an 
'emphasised femininity'. 'Looking away' refers to those cases where the 
eyes are looking in the 
opposite direction from that of the viewer's position. Thus for example, 
if the camera angle is from the 
left side, the model would be looking towards the right side. This code d
emonstrates clearly how the 
rule of the viewer's position is vital to the assignment of the codes.
'Staring out of photo frame\ Code 5, is another eye position that can only
 be coded with 
regard to the viewer's position. The best way to assign this is to consider
 oneself as the viewer standing 
against the model's horizon. Thus the origin of the perspective is to be f
ound in that fictional, visual 
world. The effect is to make the model's gaze appear to be fixed upon so
mething in the distance. It 
appears as if the gaze goes over the viewer's head to something much m
ore important beyond. 
'Looking out at other/obf refers to those looks in which the viewer is bo
th visually and narratively 
positioned as a voyeur. Effectively, what this achieves is to marginalise 
the significance of the viewer's 
gaze by making the narrative axis exist within the photo frame and betw
een the signifying elements 
within the frame. Thus, the model's concern lies not with the viewer but
 with that upon which the 
model's gaze is resting. Piloting established this was a relatively infrequ
ent code and as a result it was
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decided not to differentiate between whether the object of the gaze was another model or a prop. 
'Looking straight aheacf, Code 7, refers to those images where the model is merely looking straight 
ahead of her. This takes two distinct forms. Firstly, if the head is not facing the point of view of the 
viewer, but is in profile for example, then the direction of the gaze would be straight ahead from the 
viewer's position. Secondly, when the model looks into the camera directly, but is staring deeply so as 
to appear not to be aware of their surroundings, the implication then is that the viewer would also be 
glossed over as the model daydreams, being unable to concentrate and fix her gaze upon something in 
particular. 'Eyes closed', Code 8, applies according to common-sense rules. It is considered to be a 
passive form, since one is vulnerable to that which cannot be seen, as well as closed to signification 
regarding who or what the model is to the viewer. There can be very little performative potential if one 
has one's eyes closed. 'Other' is Code 9.
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8. This excludes 84 cases.











'Authoritative' refers to those occasions when the viewer is situated below the model 
regarding the camera position, and when the model tends to look down along their nose at the viewer. It 
has the effect of making the model appear haughty, or irritable regarding the meaninglessness or trivia 
of the activity. If the expression is secured through the camera position relative to the gaze, it must 
either be connected with the relative status position, or in command of action. On these sorts of 
occasions, the active masculine ought to come into play. Conversely, an 'assertive gaze', Code 2, will 
be one where the stare is held and is hard. There is a sort of gloss generated through the held eye 
expression, which is unresponsive to the imagined viewer in the room. Hence, the viewer is diegetically 
built into the frame which the model's gaze is asserting himself or herself towards. There will tend to 
be few engaging gestures on the face or the body. The model does not seek to show interest or concern 
with the 'outside world' through expressive gestures. In addition, the model may well be employing 
other assertive body positions. 'Staring', Code 3, refers to those cases where the eyes stare somewhat
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blankly into space. It is not necessarily directed at the viewer as one would expect with Codes I or 2, 
especially 1. The effect is to produce a glaze over the face in general and eyes in particular.
Code 4, 'other worldly', refers directly to Dyer's article where he delineates specific forms of 
codification that are effective in negating the objectification that the male model must undergo in pin- 
ups. He argued that by drawing upon the metaphorical convention of'up' with the mind, the model 
tends to look up and out of the frame in order to thoroughly disengage from the 'admiration' received. 
Code 5, 'dreaminess', connects to the sense of the model as mentally adrift. Thus the focus is in part 
suggested by the tension around the eyes which is lacking, as is any formality to the scene depicted. In 
particular, this code will often use the soft focus to assist in securing the notion of the daydream. Code 
6, 'glancing', refers to those images where the look is characterised by a rapid engagement. Therefore, 
the direction of glance will be staged so that it appears contrary to the direction of movement. This 
signals the brevity of the look. Code 1, 'surprised', is classified by the combination of the narrative, as 
well as the tendency for the mouth to be open and for the eyebrows to be lifted so that the eyes appear 
bigger. This has been combined with the ' raised eyebrows'. Code 9,' looking being looked at', relates 
directly to Mulvey's notion and to the presentation of the feminine that is consciously ordered 
according to the desires of the onlooker. Therefore, the look is one of response to the active and 
powerful gaze of the other. 'Seductive' is identified by the tendency for the model to look up and 
through their brow directly at the viewer. Therefore, the position of the camera and the viewer tends to 
be above the model in question. Often this is accompanied by a half smile or a closed mouth. Code 11 
operates in the opposite way, in that the model will tend to have the head positioned down, but also at 
an angle which tends to turn the returned look back to the viewer while also looking up. Code 12 seeks 
to address those cases where the eyes do not appear to suggest an expression or disposition. In part, it is 
guided by an absence of muscle use in the face. It represents those occasions, which are rare, when the 
eyes do not appear to contribute to a meaning generated in the image. Code 13, 'shy', is close to coy 
but the return look is less apparent. Here, the face is turning away and looking down so that no 
reciprocal exchange is present. 'Frowning' refers to those cases where the eyebrows are brought 
forward in disapproval. The last codes attend to those cases where the eyes are concealed, each 
suggesting or accomplishing a degree of anonymity.
Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is 
divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral, thus it is difficult to 
identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers that it would be difficult to 
say for example that the model is a working-class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph 
Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read, and so with private
min.
smoking I lovers sexual 12
drinking/bar ''• 2 house chores 13
car/driving i 3 comforting/care work 14































Q25 = Q51: 1=2,4,7, 2=1,3,6,3=8,9,12,4=5,11, 5=16, 6=18, 7=20, 8=19, 9=10,13,14,17
The purpose of this variable was to add a generalised context within which the pose was 
taken, as well as to identify the extent to which the location of gender in space is still marked by gender 
difference. The object of this variable is not to examine the detailed significations and the relationships 
between these elements, for example, how they work to make us all instantly recognise this scene as a 
pub scene. The object is to examine the sorts of settings, which act as stage sets, are frequently used 
and in what sorts of space gender can be performed. The key difference to which this is referring is of 
course the public/private dichotomy. The location of gender within these domains has been identified 
within the feminist movement as one of the key areas through which patriarchal relations are 
maintained. As argued previously, it was one of the key successes of the massive number of content 
analyses conducted that they were able to repeatedly show the consistency with which the 
stereotypical, ideologically laden contexts were used. The consistency of results was such that it 
became very difficult to dispute the extent to which women were located within the private domain 
and, not only that, were submerged underneath the massive number of domestic props. The second 
significant staging that was identified was the extent to which women in these images had become 
synonymous with mothering. Conversely, men were regularly found within the public domain, 
particularly in work places. If women were in the public arena they were invariably supported and 
accompanied by a man. Another key difference between men and women photographed was that only 
men were staged with leisure activities that took place,outside.
Gofftnan again confirmed the extent to which women were predominately located within the 
domestic sphere in a majority of the adverts he examined. Additionally, many of the images he 
examined were fashion advertisements. Clothes can be staged in almost any environment, since most 
occasions involve clothes at some point. This is because they have become a central resource for the 
presentation of self or the staging of self within the naturalistic mock-ups of the advertising industry. 
The central importance that Goffman's work plays here is in establishing that fashion images are not a 
block for staging the feminine within the private or domestic sphere.
However, from the piloting stage it became quite apparent that there was not the same 
proliferation of domestic contexts as had been identified before. It is because this was established early 
on that there are so few codes detailing a range of domestic situations. However, the possibility that the
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piloting was inaccurate was taken into account. As a result, there are two distinctly feminine codes 
which are defined below. These have also been supported by a more general category that is used for 
those situations with some domestic prompts, for example, but which are marginal in their relationship 
to the model.
The other central contextualisaton that has been explored here is that of the heterosexist 
imperative. Thus there are a number of narrative situations which directly draw upon the 
persuasiveness of heterosexuality within culture, as well as the extent to which these act as 
normalisations. Effectively, if these series of codes are cross-tabulated with the codes that identify who 
the models are photographed with, this gives a good indication of the sorts of general features that we 
are dealing with. The central proposition that is being presumed here is that while the single model may 
still be encoded with the heterosexual imperative, it is of a weaker kind compared to those images 
where the woman must always be standing, hugging, caressing the man, her protector. The premise 
remains that those images where a single woman is eroticised, without context and without prompts, 
provide the basis for far more open readings.
Some of the situations are not so much contexts or places, but rather classic presentations. 
Thus Code 1, 'smoking, refers to those occasions where the man or woman is focused around the act 
of smoking. Part of the importance of smoking is that it has been a central means to draw attention to 
the mouth and to eroticise it as well. The cigarette has often been a phallic symbol and its extensive 
use, especially marked by gender difference, would demonstrate a persistence in the centrality of the 
mouth in sexualising women. Conversely, in most of the images where men are smoking, the cigarette 
is not near their mouths. On those occasions where the cigarette has been placed near the mouth, the 
above sub-variable of 'Phallic mouth with object' will be coded. 'Drinking/bar', Code 2, refers to all 
those cases where the stage is in the public arena of a bar. Again, if compared to those cases where the 
model occupies or withdraws from the space, this will aid the identification of the extent to which a) 
women are present in public bars at all, and b) if present, they are dependent upon the masculine to 
protect and secure their safety. Code 3, 'car/driving', refers to those cases where the woman is 
subjugated to object. The car has been specifically drawn upon because it has been conventionally used 
as a phallic symbol with which to subjugate the female. This code also allows us to identify whether 
this symbol remains highly gendered in terms of who is photographed at the wheel, but in a much more 
extreme shift, the extent to which men undergo sexualisation via the car. It seeks to identify how some 
symbols may have been appropriated by gay imagery, and the extent to which it has infiltrated 
mainstream culture. 'Cafe/restaurant\ Code 4, is the first of the specific scenes that seek to identify the 
extent to which the heterosexist imperative is almost omnipresent. To eat with one's loved one is a 
classic and conventional form through which to frame patriarchal heterosexual ity.
' Washing!grooming, Code 5, refers back to the semiotic analysis done by Moore and seeks to 
identify the extent to which such contexts have been applied to reveal the flesh of the male models. 
Additionally, it may show the extent to which this is also applied to women. It would be interesting to 
identify whether the direction of the gaze shifts the nature of the contextualisation. For example, the 
camera position could act as if it were a mirror so that the point of view of the viewer is to be directly 
voyeuristic. It is this sort of codification that marks the scenes with female models, compared to
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naturalistic mock-ups where the male will be seen from an angle and thus a much weaker act of 
voyeurism.
'Sport', Code 6, refers to those occasions where the activity of the body is located within the 
construct of sport. This brings certain contours of the hegemonic construction of masculinity as being 
both about the skill to which the masculine body can be used and, equally as importantly, about the 
power that this activity encompasses. This is diametrically opposed to the forms of embodiment that 
are given over the feminine body. The feminine body has instead been associated with stillness, display 
cum self-objectification and weakness. The location of physical movement within this context brings 
into play a whole number of significations and associations that are beyond the scope of this project to 
decode. However, the central relevance here is that the central feature of hegemonic masculinity as 
physical prowess is brought into centre stage. Thus, if there are a number of images where it is the 
female that has been located within the context of sporting activity, as well as being located within 
naturalistic mock-up, this may signify a shift away from the dominance of the feminine as weak. It is 
probably unlikely to be the case that there are equal distributions, but it may be that the frequency has 
nevertheless grown.
'Partying' is again self-explanatory and is to be judged according to common-sense 
categorisation. Its inclusion is based upon the question of whether there has been a move toward 
groups. Its inclusion is partly to provide a context in which those group photographs can be 
contextualised.
Code 8, 'romantic scene', refers to those images where the couple are located within a 
romantic context. Again only those images that deploy the commonest features conventional to the 
codification of romance are coded thus. These features include staring into each other's eyes, holding 
hands, and so on. Another central feature associated with the codification of romance is to have the 
female clinging onto the male by hugging his arm for example, and perhaps even leaning her head upon 
his shoulder. Again this traces the extent of the normalisation of heterosexuality, and the power in 
equalities inherent within this ideology. These images are not overtly sexual in nature, but rather 
establish an emotional pattern. Conversely, code 9, "lovers' tiff, refers to the alternative but related 
side of romance - the temporary break-up. Part of the conventional content of the break-up is the 
implicit resolution, the happy ending. Thus this scene is marked by the couples disagreeing, usually 
with the female being dismissed by the male. It is through her dismissal that her passivity is confirmed, 
as well as confirming the female as being more emotional. Therefore, part of the resolution entails the 
male coming to his senses and realising that she is after all what he wants. The resolution is marked by 
the male achieving what he wants, thereby making his happiness what the female wants. Thus his 
emotional state becomes the subject of her activity, simultaneously securing her passivity. Her 
contentment is dependent upon becoming the passive object of the man's desire.
The above two scenes differ from 'lovers/sexual' in that this scene establishes a different 
relationship between the male and female because of the absence of the implied domestic bliss. The 
positioning of the body/bodies is much more explicitly sexual and will tend to 'borrow' codes from soft 
porn. Thus the wholesomeness of romance has been dropped. Part of what makes these images more 
overtly sexual is the fact that there is little other to the image than the sexual pleasure on display. Thus
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it has a much greater narcissistic element to it. The object of the liaison is sexual gratification, not life- 
long happiness.
Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations 
there are, and to what extent the common-sense understandings within the academy concerning the 
body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm 
the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, 1 mean that the mode 
of representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered 
masculine.
subject/object i ]
activity/passivity i I 2
doer/done to and for I : 3
talker/listener i i 4
sprawled/draped ' ! 5 
occupying/passing through i 6
protector/protected ; I 7 
decision maker/decidED for ll 8
professional/non-prof ; 9
manual/office \ '•• 10
desirer/sexual object : 11
subject/prostitute 12
subject/virgin I . 13
thinking mind/body •' 14
object/subject 'I 15
passive/active I 16
done to/doer ; I 17
listener/talker it 18
draped/sprawled I '  19
passing/occupying ' I 20 
decidED/decision maker ' 21
non-prof./prof i 22
body/thinking mind i 23











i-d 1990 i 5
i-d 1995 i 6
arena 1987 i i 7
arena 1990 : ! 8
arena 1995 i 9
cosmo 1975 I 10
cosmo 1985 11
cosmo 1990 112
cosmo 1995 i ! 13
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APPENDIX C
WHOLE NUMBERS INCLUDE FIGURES FROM 1975, 1985-95





Q2 NUMBERS: This allows any analysis to relate the issue of how the idiom alters according to the 








Q3 ETHNIC: This variable attempts to link possible patterns in the representation of the body idiom 




Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.
clothes 628 
perfume 75
Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and 
subjugation. The relationship is counted according to the first value. For example, if the model 
preceeds the object then the model is read as dominating the object.
model 607
model and obj 41
model and objs 1
model and group 0
object and model 40
objects and model 11
other 2
Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how Q4 is spatially represented - higher and central being related to 
control and domination and lower and periphery being related to subjugation. Higher is supposed to 
relate to the models and above and below to relate to the object. The extent to which the model fills the 
picture space can also be related to domination. The greater the space taken by the model the lesser the 
model is subjugated.






















Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have been traditionally been photographed - soft 






out of focus 50
other 7
Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation. 
This will feed in later regarding what people actually do with the images that they know are not 'real'. 
Code 1 refers to the mock-up of everyday life which effectively renders it a stylisation; code 2 is pure 
style and its conventions are not about the representations of'real life'; code 3 refers to whether the 
photographic background is blank.




Q9 GENREAL IDIOM: The variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained 
within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 correspond with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 
shows half the body.
full body 409
legs cut off 79
head cut off 8





Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: The variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.
lying on side 7
lying on back 17
lying on front 10
facing forward 428
twisting away R or L 105
back facing camera 42 
twisting towards R or L 57
profile 146
torso leaning forward 76
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torso leaning back 37
propped BY arms 62
propped ON object 55
bowing from the waist 8
bent down 1
bowing from head 3
on all fours 3
other 7
Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working defintion of 
physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. 
Any code that remains unmarked it is because it cannot be reliable ascertained from the photograph 















body hair id 32













Q12 CONTAINED BODY: Containment of the body is supposed to illicit the degree of self- 
determination; whether it is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is non-contained.
contained by self 36
contained by man 25
contained by woman 9
contained by object 13




Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of the some fo the ways in which the idiom could visually portray 
containment. Note that for codes 7 and 8 arm is in the single because both implies an embrace. One 
arm demarcates ownership more clearly. Note that 1-4+10 if Q12 = 1 self contained; if Q12 = 4 then 
Q13 = 5; if Q12 = 2 or 3, then Q13 = 6-9+11
legs held in by arms 7
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legs crossed and pulled in 6
held in and hugging self 19
clinging to other model 1
confined by product 18 
contained demarcating ownership 16
other's arm round neck 6
other's arm round waist 2
held protectively 3
embracing other/obj 2
embracED by other/obj 3
other 7
Q14 TITILATION: Refering to the titlation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree 
to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By reveal I mean that the clothing is lifted or 
moved or cut to draw attention to overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be 
concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used 




reveal stomach/hip bone 41









naked except commodity 4
naked upper chest 38
fully naked 2
other 4
Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is 
touching whom, espcially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 correspond with whether the 
hand is active but not touching anyone.
touching own body 268
touching man's body 31
touching woman's body 26
own and man's 8
own and woman's 6
touching commodity 28 
hand is active/not touching 142
no touch/neutral 90
other 31
Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specifiy what is being touched which again feeds back to notions 
concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded this means that 
both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means that one hand or arm is either 
concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.
hand on/through hair 26 
hand on hip(s) 60 
hand on leg(s) 47 
hand on torso 87 
hand on face 24 
hand on neck 21
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hand on bum 12
hand on breasts 3
hand on genitals 6
hand behind back 10
hand forcing ribs forward 3
clenched fists 3
hand in rest 43
leaning on 12
holding hands 42 
neutrally touching OWN body 23
holding on 35
hands covered 9
hands in pockets 39
aggressive gesture 2
other 33












Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.
pointing up/outwards 56
extended up 23
relaxed by side 215
folded 30
arms bent 262
resting on leg(s) 45
over the head 12
hugging the body 61
arm in action 24
in mock movement 42
leaning 50
other 17
Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to sjngle and both legs.
open when seated 39
closed when seated 36
open when lying down 6
closed when lying down 4
crossed and pulled in 20 
crossed and extended outwards 12
astride 82
intertwined with obj/other 3 
knee slightly bent point forward 54
knee bent sideways 27
















head turning away 92
head straight ahead 211
turning towards camera 123
head in profile 90
head hidden 11
head tilted to side 54
head pushed forward 12
back of head 16
other 3
Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.













phallic mouth 36 
phallic mouth with object 4
finger niave 0
finger anxious 2
clenched jaw 8 
tongue sticking out 5
other 33
Q22 SPECTATOR! AL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the 
photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mis-en-scene = an 
active relationship with the camera; the veiwer = object of models gaze. Code 2 = looking but in a way 
that implicates the viewer within the narrative, esp. looking being looked at. Code 3 = no exchange 
between model and viewer and is thus more straight forwardly unproblematic.




Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/ passivity.
looking up 31




staring out of photo frame 65
looking at other/obj 70
looking straight ahead 64
eyes closed 37
other 21








raised eyebrows 27 











Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an inidication of the degree to which space 
is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral thus it is difficult to 
identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers it would be difficult to say 
that the model is a working class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public 









lovers lift 9 
narcissistic - sexual 5 











Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations 
there are and to what extent the common sense understandings within the academy concerning the body 
idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the 
stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing interrogation by feminists regarding the interrelationship 
between the female body and the social category of'woman'. Of particular import is the resistance to 
the notion that femininity is a naturally subordinate correlate to masculinity. The subordinate position 
of'woman' is deemed morally legitimate because it stems from natural sexual differences between the 
bodies of men and women. Early critiques, most notably the sex/gender distinction, have been 
criticised for not deconstructing sufficiently the association of the female sex to nature. Lacanian 
postmodernism/feminism has become the central theoretical model that challenges this dualism, but I 
will suggest that their challenge rests upon dissolving the corporeality of the body because they do not 
give the body a material dimension outside of discourse. The influence of the Lacanian model of 
psychoanalysis is crucial here because sexual difference is elevated to the level of the Symbolic. The 
Symbolic is then defined as constituting sexual difference, that is, rendering the body a discursive and 
Symbolic effect. Significantly, the Symbolic is always prior to, and determinant of, the subject and so 
this model is ahistorical; hence it often describes the Symbolic in terms of the 're-presentation of the 
feminine'. Therefore, it follows that if gender dimorphism is solely an outcome of the Symbolic, 
dichotomisation must be the key feature of the Symbolic. Bodies and representation must directly 
correspond to that dichotomisation. I challenge this description of the Symbolic universe. Using 
evidence generated by a content analysis, 1 demonstrate that a large number of the signs, said to mark 
sexual difference, simply were not present. The evidence derived from the content analysis shows that 
conventions used to construct an image are significantly less dimorphic than this model can allow or 
account for. I suggest that this has major repercussions regarding this particular model of the formation 
of the subject.
I develop this by suggesting that drawing attention to corporeality need not lead to the re- 
naturalisation of specific historical and social formations of gender. I offer an alternative, suggesting 
that sexual difference ought to be understood as an element, amongst others, of the category of sex. 
Only by engaging directly with the body is it possible to identify where and when the body fails to 
determine the discursive category of sex. In this way, 1 think it is possible to begin to understand 
corporeality as an entity that has some existence outside of discourse, yet equally, the body is not 
wholly independent of such discourse. I think it is necessary to attempt to theorise outside of the 
constraints of the dualism established by sex and gender and what is therefore necessary is a model that 
does not give causal priority to 'sex' or 'gender'. Essentially, I think that the category of sex 
incorporates much more than genital difference. Until the body is tackled directly, the ideological 
position of the body and/or sex as fundamentally and absolutely distinct from society will continue. 
Thus, I suggest that postmodernist/feminist theorising, especially that underpinned by Lacanianism, 
will tend to be confined within dualistic strictures that it politically identifies as a target. Therefore, 1 
will be placing emphasis upon practice so that the practices that intervene on the body to help produce 
'sex' can be examined. I suggest images, and their potential influence, need to be included as part of 
the practice of gender, not the determinate of gender. This opens up a vital space, in my view, to 
theoretically emphasise that discourse is not uniformly effective. This is necessary if a move toward a 
non-reductive version of gender is to be achieved.
Guillaumin encapsulates the issue regarding the relationship between 'natural bodies' and 
'social selves' thus: 'all human beings are natural but some are more natural than others' 
(Guillaumin: 1996:72). Her rhetoric endeavours to undermine the singularly important maxim of 
patriarchal ideology: the natural order is just and thus sacrosanct. Implicit within her rhetoric are the 
principal aims of the feminist project: 1 to de-naturalise the current patterns of femininity by exposing 
their constructed form; to delineate the power and inequality inherent within them in order to break 
apart 'natural sex'. Initially, this theoretical and political project was elucidated through the sex/gender 
distinction, which theorises by making an epistemological differentiation between the body and 
society: sex is the objective biological category and gender is the social correlate (Oakley: 1972). The 
distinction also elucidates the causal relationship between the constituent parts by radically inverting 
the direction of causation upon which the ideological maxim depends: gender becomes the mechanism 
through which feminine identity is formed, not sex. Essentially, the aim was to understand femininity 
as being produced in the body, not the essence of the body.
The sex/gender critique offers a dual attack. First, that our cultural representations are not 
about the actual cultural lives of women. Ostensibly, therefore, these representations are, at best, mis- 
representations and, at worst, blatantly ideological. Second, that women's cultural lives are not of the 
fixed biological body, but are cultural patterns and thus are open to being undertaken differently 
(Oakley: 1972). This normative challenge culminates in the following forceful conclusion: there is 
nothing natural about women's subordination. By taking up the distinction between the biological body 
and the social category of gender, the critique was able to establish a social connection between 
representation and women, namely that the restricted nature of the representation was unduly limiting 
the potential social roles women could fulfil.
Paradoxically, however, the sex/gender distinction cannot keep the body in view because 'sex 
as an objective category' remains, thus effectively attributing gender to the domain of personality or 
mind (Connell:1987; Spelman:1982; Fuss:1990). Consequently, essentialist versions of the body re- 
emerge and reassume a primary role in the constitution of gender. Delphy (1996) argues that this is 
because an order of sex is established by means of a classification of its essential properties that are 
deemed independent of, and prior to, any social practice. The problem of'sex', argues Delphy, is that it 
leads us to treat as objective properties things that are socially and historically constituted. Herein lies 
my critical endeavour. I argue that the radicalisation of this distinction by the postmodernist/feminist 
programme cannot keep the body in view either, and therefore, the postmodernist/feminist position 
depends equally upon a body that falls outside of the forces of social construction. In short, I argue that 
their political programme depends upon essentialist foundations from which to theorise the feminine; 
the pre-Oedipal and/or jouisscmce often fulfil this role. Only then can they 'find something outside' of 
the comprehensive forces of cultural reproduction. Thus, the critical principle that Guillaumin weaves 
into her rhetorical device is paradoxically the very logic from which postmodernism/feminism 
theorises. Postmodernist/feminist theory has failed to overcome the dualistic nature of the sex/gender 
distinction (Cealey Harrision and Hood-Wi!liams:2002; Burkitt:1999: Lloyd: 1984), which it claims to
' The initial parameters, which questioned directly the notion that biology is destiny, were set by De 
Beauvoir: 1975.
have deconstructed (Butler: 1990; Flax: 1990). Essentially, within both approaches, the body remains an 
un-interrogated, self-evident unit upon which discourse sits. Thus, the body 'disappears' 
(Ostrander: 1988) or slips underneath the discourse that is allegedly constituting it. If the body is 
immaterial, what places us in the world?; what gives us a perspective in and on the world? We have a 
point of view because we are our bodies (Burkitt: 1999). I propose therefore that the body is not 
reducible to discourse and ought to be thought of as an unfinished entity (Shilling: 1993)
Therefore, I suggest that sexual dimorphism is a consequence of intervening and 
transformative practices, which contribute to the naturalisation of sex in a significant way. These 
practices are, however, treated as the natural and inevitable outcome of the primacy awarded to sex. 1 
have the following example in mind: 'women don't have facial hair, therefore I pluck mine'. The 
unintended consequence is, of course, to confirm the initial socially based assessment that 'proper' 
women are hairless. Thus the practices aim to manage the secondary sexual characteristics, like muscle, 
breasts, hair and so forth. What is crucial is that practices naturalise current patterns of gender 
appearance. Thus, while these secondary characteristics are deemed to be a direct, unchangeable 
biological disposition of the body, it takes various social practices to achieve this (Connell: 1987). 
Essentially therefore, the variation of secondary characteristics is measured and regulated against the 
normative body. My central proposition is that 'natural sex' ought not to be placed outside of the 
social, as if the biological and social spheres are readily separable, but seen to combine the body one 
has with the social practices that sustain it, be that in terms of health or gender practices. Thus I seek to 
include the social intervention upon the body as a part of'making sex' (Laquer: 1991) and that sex 
needs to be included within the ontological assessment of self (Giddens: 1991; see Lash and Urry 
(1994) for a cogent critique of Giddens' reproduction of the mind/body dualism).
Finally, there is that part sphere of sex that pins sexual/personality characteristics to a set of 
genitalia. This is what was initially referred to as gender. These characteristics vary a lot as many 
personality traits belong to the condition of being human rather than derived from the 
genitals/chromosomal/genetic. Again the normative body makes its entry here because, while it is 
recognised that a woman can be aggressive, she ought not to be (Franks: 1991; Garfinkel: 1967). One 
can hear the residue of the ideas of the 'fairer sex' here. Essentially, therefore, by stressing that 
practices have an equal role in the functioning of the category of sex, I seek to explore how 'sex', be it 
genital or chromosomal, underdetermines the social category of sex. Moreover, I believe it offers a 
space to explore how practice intervenes to reproduce bodily appearance and character that is then 
naturalised. Images, I suggest, are best understood when they are located within this dynamic rather 
than being treated as determinates themselves.
I address these questions across the following chapters. In chapter 2,1 offer a detailed account 
of the shift from the sex/gender distinction to the formation of the subject via the semiotic operations of 
meaning. I argue that this model ejects the body from analysis by over-emphasising the determining 
effects of meaning. I suggest that this is problematic for a number of reasons: first, the body loses its 
corporeality in the world and becomes a symbolic effect; second, this ejects the very entity we have to 
act in and on the world in order to transform, resist or continue current social practices; third, because 
the subject is reduced to an ideological effect, postmodernism/feminism of this kind cannot account for
their own consciousness without calling upon the residues of non-socialised desire, namely an 
essentialist notion of the feminine. Hence, postmodernism/feminism of this kind, and its associate 
semiotic deconstructions, depend upon certain Lacanian psychoanalytic models with which to 
formulate a model of the subject. I will present the case that utilising Lacanian concepts in this way 
leads the postmodernist/feminist critique to depend upon functionalist logic, despite the polemical 
language in which this logic is embedded. Likewise, they eject the body from the social domain, just as 
Parsons (1951) did before them.
In chapter 3,1 offer a methodological defence for the use of content analysis as my chosen 
method. Drawing upon the work of Goffman (1979), I argue that codes operate conventionally and that 
this establishes sufficient stability within which to quantify the contents of the images. Moreover, 
conventions guide how we use codes and signs so that, providing one is attentive to these conventions 
during codification, the quantitative data generates a macro view of the modes of representation that 
semiotics cannot achieve. The content analysis consists of 25 variables, which contain some 350 sub- 
variables. Using this coding frame, I assessed the manifest content of 500 images. The data is assessed 
using the Chi test of association. The sub-variables reference the ideological features that are said to 
secure the 'feminine as passive'; for example looking away aligns the gaze with the passive (Dyer: 
1986; 1992). It also looks at the formation of the image and how it functions so that a representation is 
accepted as an 'authentic version of myself 2 .1 draw upon Goffman's Gender Advertisements again 
here to establish that the flow of social life has to be over-emphasised to make it visible to us. He also 
draws attention to the symbolic effect of representing a three-dimensional world in a two-dimension 
frame, which allows me to examine the symbolic relationship of space projected within the physical 
limits of an image.
In chapter 4,1 analyse the data generated. My data shows that representation is sufficiently 
ambiguous to raise serious doubts as to the explanatory adequacy of the postmodernist/feminist 
position. The data furnished shows that many of the variables said to anchor femininity as lack or 
passive or 'the other' are simply not present. Thus I conclude that, far from quintessentially defining 
the feminine as passive, these codes are regularly applied to codify men's bodies. Consequentially, the 
categorical description that aligns the passive forms of codification to the production of femininity is 
undermined. I conclude that the codifications are sufficiently ambiguous as to be unable to define 
whether the woman represented identifies with the Symbolic order and thus her own subordination; in 
fact, it was often only possible to code the body as female. Thus images target the dimorphic body. 1 do 
not make any inferential statements as to the actual lived patterns of femininity, as I do not award the 
image any causal affectivity independent of its location in practice. This requires empirical research 
(Bourdieu:1997; Waquant:1993) and I will address this in the conclusion.
Lastly, in chapter 5,1 offer some tentative steps that might be taken to resurrect the 
sex/gender distinction, by emphasising the dynamic between the body and the social order, so that 
neither entity is given undue theoretical significance (see for example Douglas: 1966; 1969; 
Mauss:1973; and more recently Waquant:1993; Davis: 1995; 1997). Most importantly, I wish to 
emphasise that sex and gender are not distinct objects but are, in fact, fuzzy because the body interacts
1 This is necessary if the images are to operate within Lacan's mirror phase.
with the social and is modified by the social. Shilling's (1993) notion of the 'unfinished body' is 
pertinent here. I explore how we might theorise 'gender' in a way that maintains an eye both on the 
differences and similarities between bodies. I do this by drawing upon Lakoff s work (1987), which 
offers an opening that can integrate various social practices with the corporeal as a normative object 
targeted by discourse and as the living entity that places us in the world. Most importantly, I think, is 
that Lakoff s development of the concept of 'family resemblance' does not force us to hierarchise these 
elements, replacing this with concepts of maps and sets that stress the interaction between the elements. 
This way it is possible to examine the body in a way that integrates internal differences amongst 
women yet maintains equal attention to the public, normative classifications to which women are 
subject. His model explores the social and embodied implications of the category 'woman', without 
having to capture the essence that unites all embodied 'women', alongside the complex ways a 
category is lived. I am particularly interested in the ways that this maintains an emphasis upon the 
dualistic abstractions, which align the masculine with the active, for example, but equally renders this 
construction mythical: the average man is no more the 'One' than the average woman is the 'other'. 
I conclude this thesis with an overview of how I seek to develop this research empirically. I 
have emphasised that my theoretical priority is to explore 'women' as internally differentiated at 
certain points, brought together corporeally at other points, and collectively targeted by the discursive 
productions of the normative. My engagement with the image is based on accepting that they are 
influential but not causally determining of the individual. I aim to extend this analysis by examining 
two groups of women in order to tackle the differences within the category head on. These are young 
women, who are intensely targeted by images produced within the cultural sphere, and older women 
who are largely absent. I aim to examine how a sense of oneself, as a woman, is negotiated within two 
differing contexts, focusing in particular on the contrast between being an overt target of the normative 
body as the body beautiful and a potentially reproductive body and those who are defined as the 
opposite, in the sense that they are deemed to be in the 'twilight' both in terms of reproduction and 
beauty. Theoretically, this provides a context within which to explore the explanatory efficacy of the 
notion of family resemblances.
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This chapter explores the alleged radicalisation of the sex/gender distinction offered by 
postmodernism/feminism. Representations are made up of signs that collectively make up the 
Symbolic. The Symbolic is understood as constituting or producing subjects, which is theorised 
through various mechanisms derived from the psychoanalytic model. Thus, bodies become subjects 
within the pre-existing cultural formations and, because these formations are ordered by key patriarchal 
hierarchies, they go on to order gendered subjectivities hierarchically. Thus, the theoretical target of my 
critique is the model of the Symbolic constitution of the subject, which is highly dependent upon the 
psychoanalysis of Lacan (1977), as well as Althusser's (1971) concept of interpellation. Proponents 
argue that this de-centres the subject, deconstructs the myths of the speaking T, and, with it, the 
fallacious notion that the subject is the source of meaning rather than the product of meaning. Their 
concern is with the constraints that language as a system, that is the Symbolic, imposes and the various 
ways language organises the polymorphic desires of the infant. Hence, this axis integrates the social 
system to the production of complicit sets of identities and aims to account for how they feel fixed, 
personal, instinctual, that is, how cultural formations come to feel 'of the body'. Neither masculine nor 
feminine subjects belong to the realm of nature but are demonstrably cultural products. This is what I 
will describe as postmodernism/feminism and I examine, in particular, those who seek to apply this 
within the cultural images that subjects consume. I propose that Mulvey's work (1975;1993) continues 
to hold a paradigmatic position in terms of those who seek to deconstruct cultural images in the light of 
the above critique as to how a specific image of the Symbolic determines subjectivity.
However, I contest that this model effectively de-naturalises the Subject because the 
dependence upon interpellation and the linguistic construction of the T, at best, displaces the body 
and, at worst, dissipates the body. Without tackling the body head on, it is not possible to tackle the 
cultural dimorphism by which bodies are said to be naturally organised. Therefore, this model has not 
tackled the constancy of sex and its association with an ahistorical natural order. On the contrary, I 
propose that this model is utterly reliant on the constancy of sex, by pinpointing the ways the body is 
drawn upon when postmodernists/feminists theorise even though they never directly address this 
dependence. While postmodernists/feminists appears to be offering a radical model of the constitution 
of the subject, through signs and discourse, their dependence upon psychoanalysis reveals how they are 
dependent upon the body: what throws the girl into the Oedipal crisis is the sight of the penis. 
Therefore, this model fundamentally problematises fleshy ,tforporeal bodies. In theoretical terms, it also 
continues to theorise within the dualisms it claims to deconstruct, emphasising instead the cultural over 
the biological. Arguably, postmodernism/feminism fails therefore to go beyond the strictures of 
sex/gender dichotomy.
In order to do so, I trace some of the weaknesses identified regarding the sex/gender 
distinction, which entails focusing on the theoretical challenges that postmodernists/feminists have 
launched against the distinction. This necessitates concentrating upon the critique that the sex/gender 
distinction does not sufficiently challenge the nature/culture dichotomy, which aligns the feminine to 
the domain of nature and thus legitimates the exclusion of women from the social, economic and 
political realms. Essentially, the postmodernist/feminist charge is that these realms are not sufficiently
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interrogated historically so do not sufficiently de-naturalise our sense that our current order is related to 
nature in some way. (Guillaumin:1996; Lloyd: 1984; Gatens: 1996).
Having outlined the central weaknesses of the sex/gender distinction, I trace how 
postmodernism/feminism has sought to go beyond these limitations. A particular focus will be upon the 
shift to a notion of the Symbolic and the idea that culture and/or language is largely responsible for the 
constitution of the gendered subject. Equally, the Symbolic is deemed to be largely responsible for the 
discourses of the nature/culture dualism. This requires that I present the briefest of overviews of 
Lacan's reconfiguration of Freudian psychoanalysis in order to provide a context for both how it is 
used and where I think it fails. I will then explore in some detail how theorists, such as Mulvey (1976), 
Doane (1991) and Cowie (1997), describe the Symbolic and how the Symbolic goes on to (re)construct 
masculine and feminine subject positions and provide an account of the structural negation of active 
female heterosexual desire. Since only the feminine is passive, all sexual objectification is done to the 
feminine, irrespective of sex assignment of the body in question. By implication, all active heterosexual 
sexual desire is masculine. A particularly important concept used to (re)present the masculine and 
feminine is psychic oscillation (Mulvey in Easthope:1993), which aims to mobilise the polymorphic 
directions that desire can take within the gendered dichotomy. In this way, when a body assigned as 
male is sexualised, the Symbolic3 determination of that body is feminine. (He) is said to have 
undergone the process of feminisation (Neale: 1992). I ask what, then, is the body? A container?4
I argue that Mulvey continues to hold a paradigmatic position viz a viz cultural analysis and 
the formation of the subject because her work remains central to the semiotic engagement with the 
Symbolic, that is, how meanings construct the feminine. Her work began with the inscription of the 
masculine/active and feminine/passive into our Symbolic universe. Developments have not superseded 
this but have merely added to the number of structural positions available by working through the 
possible combinations. Hence, central to my critique is the assumption that the semiotic function of the 
sign maintains a determining function between femininity and passivity and its associate dualisms. 
Moreover, I argue that this is central to its explanatory adequacy because without it the Symbolic 
becomes heterogeneous and thus too varied to secure 'sex as a discursive construction'. In other words, 
this model must remove interpretative indeterminacy of culture if culture is to reproduce the social 
order.
The way that these structural positions are theorised deploys what Connell (1987) has 
described as categorical logic. These categorical units reorganise the examples that, on the surface, 
contest the validity of this model's explanation. The emphasis upon construction means that a sense of 
possible social or cultural change is lost, as is the possibility of variation in representation. By 
describing the eroticisation of the male body as an instance of'feminisation', this model is able to 
maintain the coherency of the key sexual hierarchies; that is the permanent denigration of the feminine. 
Note that this explanation only works if the self-evidence of the male body is presumed. Primacy is 
awarded to the structural ordering of the Symbolic, which reconstitutes the body as a circuit of subject 
positions. In order to do so, it must eject the body, while implicitly drawing upon it in an uncritical,
3 Capitalisation of this kind reflects the embedment of such theory within the Lacanian paradigm. 
4 1 argue that there is a worrying echo of the mind/body dualism here and I suggest that this is derived
from their central dependence upon psychoanalysis.
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common-sense way. 5 Hence, current forms of codification go by unrecognised, both politically and 
empirically. Furthermore, using Nayak's (1997) examination of the Haagen Dazs advertising campaign 
(1997), I show how the categorical logic that informs the feminist analysis of this kind equally orders 
the analysis of the representations of'race'. Moreover, introducing the postmodernist analysis of'race' 
reveals the extent to which theory of this kind is unable to combine two or more structures at any one 
time: does the white woman hold the gaze or the black man!
Finally, I conclude with an analysis that suggests that this explanatory model implicitly draws 
upon functionalist reason, as outlined by Parsons (1951; Parsons and Bateson:1956). Parsons also 
turned to psychoanalysis to explain how a specific set of values, working for the collective good, 
operate on a deeper level than rational choice: social actors fulfil various social roles because they feel 
bad if they transgress such obligations. Parsons argued that what are effectively socially contingent and 
historically specific practices must be internalised and made one's own, and he looked to stereotypical 
representations to fulfil, in part, this function. Therefore, both models have made identification a 
system problem, and within both models, the social order is structurally over-determined. The influence 
of Althusserian thought6 on postmodernism/feminism is particularly important to my argument because 
Althusser's concept of interpellation connects directly the ideological requirements with the formation 
of the subject, effectively ensuring that the system requirements correspond to the actor's motivated 
actions. It effectively plays the same role as internalisation. This is the point where the normative 
departure from Parsons makes its entry. Likewise, both reduce the social order to an internalised 
psychological state thereby failing to provide an adequate account for both the sources and occurrence 
of sustained, rational resistance, and the instrumental manipulation of norms according to the 
expediency of the social context (Goffman: 1969). I suggest that 'subject position' and 'social role' 
perform the same explanatory function and therefore both models fail to address action that falls 
outside the social order and its norms. At best, action is non-conformist or transgressive, that is 
temporary, and by implication pathological. One is only left with those residues that have not been 
'successfully' socialised; a melancholic performance perhaps?7
Equally, therefore, I critique this model arguing that it treats signs as functioning in much the 
same way as stereotypes. By this 1 mean that the meaning of the image is homogeneous, determinate 
and possibly monolithic because anything other than a structurally homogeneous Symbolic cannot 
secure identification. Furthermore, I argue that signs operate on behalf of the subject position in much 
the same way as stereotypes were thought to function on behalf of the social role. Thus, I argue that 
what differentiates postmodernist/feminist cultural analysis from Parsons is not the 
postmodernist/feminist creation of a radical alternative but merely a difference in their respective 
normative orientation.
5 Therefore, this model draws attention to the uncritical upon the background that naturalises gender
patterns rather than making this their object critical analysis.
6 1 was alerted to the comparative logic by A. Frank (1991). He addresses Turner's analysis of the
body. He argues that because Turner addresses the body as a social order problem, the contingency that
the socially produced body can force into the interaction is removed from view. The outcome is that the
body tends to be a passive receiver that fulfils the system's needs.
7 See Riviere (1929)
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However before I proceed, a delineation is necessary as to who and what is meant by the 
cluster 'postmodernism/feminism' because this is by no means a self-evident set of headings, and 
conceals what is, in fact, a dauntingly heterogeneous movement. I have used this cluster as an 
abbreviation for those who adopt and apply the psychoanalytic framework to the de-centring of the 
subject and combine this framework with the concept of interpellation. Thus, theoretical framework of 
the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism is applied to the cultural visual form. Semiotic 
analyses attempt to explore the operations of the subject position already constituted. Thus they draw 
heavily on the strong programme and, in my view, reveal some fundamental weaknesses in that 
programme. Thus, the emphasis upon Lacan has tended to mean that the theorists I critique here 
concentrate upon the semiotic and ideological formation of the subject by the sign, visual or linguistic. 
This therefore sets these theorists apart from other feminists who engage with the postmodern, who, 
like Benhabib (1992) or Scott (1992) consider subjectivity in non-naturalistic ways and yet maintain a 
distance from some of the stronger claims of postmodernism. I have in mind here the rejection of meta- 
concepts by Riley (1988), or the rejection of the material base to the world, for example Harbord and 
Campbell (1998). Adams (1996), for example, consistently explores the production of sexual difference 
through its Symbolic signification, which continues to be organised by the hierarchy imposed by the 
Phallus, while Gatens, seeming to offer us a de facto position on the body, reconfigures it through the 
Oedipus complex. She states:
Given that in this society there is a network of relations obtaining between femininity and 
femaleness, that is, between the female body and femininity, then there must be a qualitative 
difference between the kind of femininity 'lived' by women and 'lived' by men. 
(Gatens: 1996:10)
All well and good. This is certainly something that strikes a chord with a proponent of corporeality as 
'in' and 'affecting' the world - as something other than real through its discursive materialisation 
(Butler: 1993). But then she goes on to state:
Freud's neglect of the effect of the menses on the pubertal girl's psyche is significant. That the 
flow of blood would have profound psychical significance for her is clear and that this 
significance would centre around ideas of castration, sexual attack and socially reinforced 
shame is highly probable. (Gatens: 1996:10)
Why should the menses be linked psychically, or otherwise, to castration, when she previously states a 
de facto reality to sexual difference? It is the real beginning of the possibility of reproduction, a 
corporeal possibility, and thus its symbolic significance should surely be rooted in the material base of 
the body. The use of psychoanalysis, both theoretically and in terms of its semiotic application, rules 
out other ways of experiencing, visual experiences included. I cannot reconcile the facticity of the body 
with the psychic determination of the body through castration, an act which has never been carried out 
or is even close to the corporeal experience of that body. Moreover, I hear a strong echo of Doane here,
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who unreservedly asserts that the sight of the penis by a little girl secures the knowledge of her lack. 
Hence, my main target is those united by their commitment to a strong programme of postmodernism 
(Benhabib:1992) operating in combination with psychoanalysis and who seek to trace this via semiotic 
analyses of visual culture.
Equally, I do not wish to unite political aims of those who theoretically contribute to the 
ongoing debates regarding the 'postmodern', one of the core dividing lines being the sense in which 
'women' as a political category should be maintained as the focus and purpose of theorising (Harding: 
1990; Gatens: 1996; New: 2003; Scott: 1992; Guillaumin:1996 for example) or whether it is overly 
homogenising and thus potentially dominatory through the negation of difference (hooks: 1981; 
Young: 1995; Flax: 1990 for example). I therefore aim to challenge the explanatory and political 
efficacy of a model that places a singular emphasis upon the causal determination of the cultural 
domain. Thus, part of what emerges from this analysis is the exposure of the theoretical tenet of 
postmodernism/feminism that is forced to combine psychoanalysis with the immaterial operations of 
the Symbolic in order to have a distinct field of analysis. To quote Harbord and Campbell, it requires:
a continued dialogue between cultural theory and psychoanalysis...(because) without 
psychoanalysis, cultural theory has little to challenge the discourses of materiality and with it 
the rational.... In the absence of a psychoanalytic framework, cultural theory lacks a model of 
subjectivity, a model that is crucial to understanding the way in which culture is produced and 
operates. (Harbord and Campbell:1998:l) (my italics)
I argue that using a quasi-transcendental and idealist notion of the feminine - this is what remains, after 
all, once the material and the rational have been ejected - leads to the inversion of the sex/gender 
distinction, rather than the surpassing of its limitations. Thus, theorising of this kind reproduces the 
very sort of dichotomous essentialism it nominally rejects. The crux of my critique targets the 
postmodern/feminist assumption that the body is 'in the world' through its Symbolic signification only. 
In contradistinction, we need to hold onto a body that can act in and on the world so that we engage 
directly with the entity that materially, empirically places us in the world (Shilling: 1993; Crossley: 
1996). As thinking bodies (Burkitt: 1999), we negotiate structures and meaning by incorporating and 
managing them within the micro-practices we undertake.
To reiterate, the combinations of postmodernisms/feminisms is often bewildering, almost to 
the point that the area where these cohere can only be stated negatively, that is, one can best come 
away with a sense of what they are not. However, the result is that one is left with a troubling, vague 
idea of what they actually are. What is the relationship between those who explore these themes in 
terms of their cultural application and those who pursue them theoretically? What links the cultural 
application of Riviere's story (Doane: 1991) and those who utilises it theoretical and in a more complex 
way (Butler: 1990)? Theory ought to engage in some way with the subjects on whose behalf it theorises, 
namely women and the discursive constructs that target them. Mulvey's work does undertake an 
analysis of what the strong programme 'looks like,' in terms of its cultural contours, and the subject 
position the Symbolic is alleged to form. She is, in some senses, attempting to apply the theoretical
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targeted: it considers how the various processes order a specific notion of the 'feminine as role' and 
how these are integrated with the body to produce the appropriately socialised subject. Parsons' 
response is that the system's norms become the individual's values and norms. Most importantly, 
Parsons has adopted Freud's concept: internalisation is the mechanism by which the system is 
inculcated into the individual. Therefore, the feminine is an internal state made up of the norms and 
values required to sustain the social system.
The descriptive detail concerning gender can now be grafted on to this model of causation. 
Hence, role theory 10 is the approach to social structure which locates its basic constraints in stereotyped 
interpersonal expectations. In this sense, the space or split between biology and society with regard to 
gender can be identified. It is not our biological make-up that makes us the women and men that we 
are, but rather the interpersonal exchange of role expectation and role sanctioning that is internalised to 
become subjective states. Thus, internalised social norms become the reason individuals give for 
action, which again re-emphasises the importance of representation as a means to convey the social 
norms to be internalised."
Oakley's distinction mirrors too closely the notion that the natural cannot be changed. To 
borrow from Cearley-Harrison and Hood-Williams:
Oakley simply echoed and exacerbated what we 'knew' already....Talcott Parsons' (1949) 
attempt to argue that the purpose of sex-role differentiation was to minimize the potential 
strain produced by the occupation system in a mobile class-divided society - which is a 
wholly and self-containedly sociological explanation - rests finally upon the allegedly 
biological 'fact' of the bearing and nurturing of children. Two separate explanatory principles, 
the sociological and the other biological, are at work and the latter constitutes the ultimate 
basis for the former. (Cearly-Harrison and Hood Williams:2002:18)
Hence, we have come full circle because we find ourselves faced with the following: how much is 
social therefore?
This reveals the fundamental flaw with the sex/gender distinction, argues Delphy (1996), 
because it does not sufficiently tackle head on the notion that biological aspects of the body are socially 
determining in a profound way. Thus, it continues to operate within the field that is her object of 
critique. For example, in the much quoted introduction, Oakley asks: "(I)f biology determines male and 
female roles, how does it determine them?" (Oakley: 1972:15). Men and women's natures need to be 
worked through in order to sort out the residue of culture that is left. This pushes culture into a 
derivative, secondary position, thus the naturalisation processes of culture go by unchallenged. This is 
the part that is open to political transformation because only this falls outside of the (presumed) 
transhistorical features of natural bodies. The issue has been locked into how much of the social is a
10 1 recognise that the distinction can be applied in other ways, for example psychoanalysis. However, 
its application within role theory has been central. As New (2003) notes, the realist model lost its way a 
little for not being sufficiently critical.
" Although, deeply embedded in this is the struggle between the sense that action is voluntary 
(Parsons' allegiance to Hobbes) and internalised action (Parsons' indebtedness to Freud).
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result of our natures, which is demonstrable by the endless debate regarding nature/nurture. Hence, 
bodies are defined as unproblematically 'there', constituting the solid, unquestionable common sense 
entities we call men and women. Bodies are free from symbolic elaboration and thus free from the 
discursive effects these may have. The cultural domain, which is open to dispute, is thus the world of 
representations and learning, that is the domain of socialisation. We are socialised into roles; we leam 
through scripts and stereotypes. This represents an insufficient analysis of culture and its relationship to 
bodies.
The sex/gender distinction carries over the mind/body dualism also. Again, this reflects, in 
part, a reliance upon social role theory. For example, Parsons' (1951) logic brings him to the 
conclusion that norms are the causes of social action; hence, consensus becomes the primary feature of 
the social order. The effectiveness of role theory 12 is dependent upon accepting that actions are 
motivated by reasons, and that reasons are, in effect, society's beliefs and norms, which produce the 
appropriate motivation for action. 13 Consequently, Parsons needs to explain how the system's 
requirement for consensual public norms, and thus a functioning society, become internal subjective 
dispositions 14 . Thus, socialisation only targets the mind, while the body is left fully outside of the social 
realm.
The circularity is repeated with regard to the social order. In order to sustain a social order, it 
must reproduce its population. Therefore, it is necessary to socialise two distinct sets of people into a 
functional division of labour: those who reproduce the population and those who reproduce the social 
structures, the aim of the division being to stress that sexual division of labour was not an outcome of 
biology but of social functions. However, this becomes even more unconvincing when the notion of 
universalistic and particularistic values are integrated 15 . It rapidly mirrors the constructs of women's 
natures and thus their affinity to this role. The bodily realm is feminised and the realm of the mind 
masculinised. Oakley's notion of the role struggles against this conclusion as the sexed body remains 
firmly separated from the culture and thus she fails to tackle a core dualism that denigrates the 
feminine.
Therefore, Delphy argues that while Oakley aims to move beyond the remits of biological 
determinism, she ends up operating within it because she has not tackled head-on the constructed 
features of the nature/culture dichotomy. Fundamentally, Oakley has awarded ontological primacy to 
the field of nature. For example, 'women's biological roles* are placed as the foundation upon which 
issues of gender are placed. I think that the sex/gender distinction falters because it assumes a strong 
causal connection between a bodily function and the cultural understanding derived from that function. 
I argue that this is far more indeterminate than her framework permits. There are examples where the 
understanding or meanings that construct gender do not neatly map onto the sexual difference - 
male/masculine and female/feminine. One need not look to the exotic but to our histories where we can 
trace the emergence of sex as dualistic and opposite (Laquer: 1990). Significantly, the distinction tends
12 Be it gender role or social role more broadly.
13 See J. Bohman (1991) for a more detailed explication of how norms become reasons for action - esp 
p. 77.
14 This attacks head-on the social order problem as defined by Hobbes: that society must overcome the 
randomness of individual desired ends and conflicts of interest.
15 Most clearly formulated in Parsons and Shils (1962).
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to treat sex and gender as autonomous spheres when perhaps fluidity, or a sense of their 
interrelatedness may have been, and potentially is, a more fruitful form of theorising. In fact, left as 
distinct spheres, the distinction tends to mirror Levi Strauss's notion of the raw and the cooked.
This strikes me as central as I aim to open up a space between the historical constancy of sex, 
things like the process of reproduction which requires both a man and woman who are both able to 
produce healthy sperm and ovaries, and the huge possibilities regarding what that might mean for a 
society. Not all bodies, unproblematically defined as man and woman, are allowed or should engage in 
reproduction, according to society's values. For example, are two bodies, both unambiguously female, 
awarded the moral sanction to proceed with reproduction?; or, indeed, teenagers who become pregnant 
or older women who also become pregnant; what does this do to the 'experience' of being pregnant? 
Alternatively, we can look to menstruation where the cultural symbolism that engulfs it fundamentally 
alters how it is understood and possible even felt. For example, does a woman within the West 
understand and experience menstruation in the same ways as a woman who must enter Purdah during 
this part of her cycle? Within this is the discursive intervention that constructs the natural, but the 
discourse is not 'making the body'. 16
In this sense, I wish to move further than the sex/gender distinction allows. I aim to consider 
that the cultural is more than the political, in the sense of the rights due a respective body (New:2003). 
I aim to use this as a means to move issues of corporeality and culture from the strictures of sex/gender 
and nature/culture dichotomy. This represents part of the postmodernist/feminist challenge, a challenge 
that I argue is unsuccessful. They merely reverse the causal direction so that culture becomes the 
paradigm from which 'sex' emerges. Consequently, the body is 'silenced' so to speak; for example an 
infertile woman cannot be materialised through discourse into being fertile (Butler: 1993). Moreover, I 
argue that postmodernism/feminism, and the accompanying cultural analyses, refer to the corporeal 
body as obviously and unambiguously sexed, that is in common-sense ways. They use the apparent 
self-evidence of the body when they need to anchor ideology and its discursive constructions. Without 
this, one cannot describe semiotic function as feminising; feminisation requires that one carries over 
ideas about the dimorphic body.
Despite the problems outlined above, the feminist movement, using the sex/gender distinction, 
produced a formidable critique of the supposition that the division of labour, based upon gender, was 
equitable or functional. Emergent evidence, and critical reflection, merged with political action to 
delineate the position that the division of labour was in fact an outcome of sectional interests; those of 
men's at the expense of women's. This position proffers a number of fundamental challenges to the 
consensus model of the social order. It stipulates that these respective sets of interests are in conflict 
and therefore the presumed reciprocity of interests is broken; this problematises the presumed natural 
basis of rights. In addition, the space between biology and society that the sex/gender distinction forged 
meant that the relationship between current patterns of representation and gender formation could be 
the cultural contours were traced and contested 17 . This provided a significant critique to many of the
16 This is where Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams and I part company. They move too far away 
from the corporeal, and that elements of the body are extra-discursive.
17 1 recognise that these two contributors do not flow from the same methodological or theoretical 
position, but the interrogation of culture undertook many forms.
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structuralism, namely that "in order to make sense of the epistemic object one need (not) appeal to an 
epistemic subject at all." (Benhabib: 1992:208) This anti-humanist position has been very influential. 
Now language is the source of our sense of self- it is prior to us and limits and constrains 
fundamentally what it is we can say. De Saussere (1972) offers a model of language that sees meaning 
operate through difference. This meaning is relational in the sense that it requires the combination of 
the signifier and the signified. These often work as a set of structural opposites: masculine/feminine for 
example. The signified then builds up into chains of connotive associations which work through 
substitutions: the rose a sign of love, or coyness as a connotive element to the feminine. Such patterns 
are traceable through semiotic analysis. But the significance reaches further than this; it offers the 
possibility of discarding notions of human nature and replaces it with an entity that is an effect of 
various historical, social and linguistic structures. This de-centres the subject as, unlike Descartes' 
thinking subject, we cannot stand outside of these structures from an Archimedean point, and neither 
can we pledge that the source of what we know or think is derived from an application of an objectivist, 
rationalist system of knowledge.
This departure is fundamental. 'Man' is not a unitary thinker but an outcome of competing 
structures. 'He' is the outcome of language and competing desires. Gone is the 'myth' of a self- 
transparent entity, reaching for full autonomy. The Subject is replaced by subjectivity   a product of 
competing discourses, controlled by desires, needs and forces whose effects shape and constitute the 
make-up of subjectivity. This is a fundamental attack upon the presumed unity of the Cartesian subject, 
therefore it also provides a framework to undo the dualisms that are said to have locked women into 
subordination. There is no Subject from which women are excluded because of their bodies. Instead, 
the Subject is rendered fictitious and thus both masculinity and femininity are products of social and 
discursive forces.
What is of central importance here is the affinity between the de-centred subject and the split 
subject as theorised by psychoanalysis. To reiterate, this is theoretical context within which the cultural 
analyses critiqued here were conducted. The human psyche is not unified but fundamentally split. 
Lacan (1977;1984) argues that the T is a linguistic construct, the outcome of the organisation of desire 
into its socially sanctioned form. The residues are locked into the unconscious, ever present but never 
directly utterable. Thus, Lacan's radical re-reading rests with conceptualising the unconscious as the 
structuralist system of language. Meaning, coming from the«mconscious, is contained in the material 
signifier, or conscious speech. These signifiers are cast out from the signifying system, as they cannot 
be integrated in conscious discourse since patterns of desire of this kind are socially taboo. In 
particular, Lacan and Freud are concerned that the incest taboo be repressed 19 . Thus desire can only 
operate through displacements or substitutions of the signifiers that attach the forbidden desire onto 
something else. For example, the fetish is said to operate in this way. The fusion of Freudian analysis to 
structural linguistics leads the symptom, as an expression of the unconscious, to be treated as a signifier 
which fixes the subject to another signifier. This fundamentally undoes the pretension of the Cartesian 
Subject because the subject is a construct through which language speaks and therefore the object of
19 Although they both recognise that such repressive practice induces trauma, hysteria and other 
patterns where the unconscious erupts into conscious life.
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analysis is the formation of identity as a linguistic function. Importantly, speech is not treated as 
intentional expression because the constellation of signifiers does not signify for the subject. Thus, the 
unconscious is awarded priority as the core of subjectivity.
The next important element to consider is that language is now the system through which 
Oedipalisation occurs. Thus, Lacan places equal emphasis upon directing desire toward the genitals and 
toward heterosexual ity. Thus, the formation of the T is an outcome of the Oedipal complex that 
organises sexual drives so that the primacy of the genitals is attained to secure heterosexual ity20 . Lacan 
de-centres the process by elevating language as the mechanism through which we enter the Symbolic 
and assume a subject position within that Symbolic universe. Hence, Lacan's model offers a non- 
rationalist explanation of how sex is translated into sexed subjectivities. Equally, it provides a paradigm 
with which to connect the formation of the subject to the cultural representations semiotically 
deconstructed. What is most crucial here is that the Phallus becomes the core signifying mechanism 
that institutes the normative order of heterosexual ity. Subjectivity is formed under the rule of the 
Phallus which forecloses the possible characteristics the feminine/heterosexual can assume. Lacan 
concludes the two following problems are crucial to the formation of subjectivity: what is it that 
produces sexual difference and how does this fix the relationship between the sexes so that gender 
dimorphism comes to be experienced as an asymmetrical and unequivocal fact of existence? As Grosz 
states:
For both sexes, though in quite difference ways, the phallus serves as a means of access to the 
'domain of the Other'. The Other is understood here in two senses: as a socio-symbolic 
network regulated according to language-like rules; and as a psychical structure, 
representative of the social Other, internalised in the form of the unconscious. 
(Grosz: 1990:117) '
What a formidable challenge. It offers up real possibilities for challenging the dualism that naturalises 
current forms of femininity. Moreover, it offers a frame work within which to embed the images that 
are critiqued here. Sex no longer stands outside of the culture but is drawn in and constituted by 
culture. Thus the political focus remains on culture but the system through which culture was 
interrogated has changed. Culture is formative of the subject find thus the content of that culture is 
intimately bound to the subjectivities it constitutes. Philosophically, this model offers a system that 
profoundly challenges the naturalisation of inequality, which ideologically construes that inequality as 
a natural outcome of sexual difference.
Yet, there remain normative issues here because the order of the Symbolic, which elevates the 
phallus as the core symbol of sexual difference and the social law through the Father, has been 
definitively identified as patriarchal. It was noted above that Lacan seeks to structure the unconscious 
like language and that language operates through difference: thus the phallus is symbolically functional
20 This gauges Butler's insistence that gender is meaningful only through the heterosexist matrix 
(1992).
23
because the feminine (body without) symbolises lack. 21 This poses some problems for feminist politics. 
What of those sectional interests served by the various cultural constructions, for example? The current 
cultural and linguistic configurations dominate women, organise inequality and mark the feminine as 
the other to masculine. The feminist re-configuration of Lacan seeks to work through the consequences 
for feminine subjectivity. One of the central ways this is done, in terms of cultural analysis at least, is 
by combining Althusser's (1971) model of culture as ideology to the formation of the subject through 
interpellation. The mirror phase and interpellation combine mechanisms that make self-identity 
something that comes from the outside and the concept of interpellation makes the exterior culture 
riddled with ideology. Again, this demonstrates the extent to which this theory provides the theoretical 
context for the assessment of the image. In fact, ideology is said to operate in the very constitution of 
the subject.
What will now follow is an account of the incorporation of semiotics as the method with 
which to best interrogate culture, alongside the integration of interpellation to link the cultural 
constructions to an ideological position compatible with feminism. Thus, the aim of the cultural 
analyses was to incorporate Althusser's notion that cultural configurations are ideological with Lacan's 
model of the mirror phase. The combination ensures that identities are formed through the 
identification with cultural configurations. Crucially, ideology is engaged with directly and placed at 
the heart of the formation of subjectivity. The reign of the phallus is deemed to be an ideological 
construction rather than a necessary structuring to ensure gendered subjectivity and heterosexuality, as 
Lacan would argue (Fink: 1995). Thus, what is crucial here is the normative departure between the 
feminist application and that of Lacan.
SIGNS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY
One of the problems that stalled the political development by the sex/gender distinction is that 
it failed to tackle sufficiently critically the issue of whose reality is the real one. The challenge offered 
by the cultural and linguistic turn is that it re-defines all images as false, thus removing the need to deal 
with the various realities of women's lives and images that depict this. Moreover, the analyses critiqued 
here are able to move directly from the theory upon which it draws to the formation of subject, thereby 
by-passing issues of action and the social practices that potentially resist the current ideological 
patterns that subordinate women. Despite paradigmatic shift, they nevertheless took the following 
questions from the analysis facilitated by the sex/gender distinction: if femininity was not inevitable, 
what other ways could the feminine be constituted?; what does the symbolic system contribute to this? 
These questions were best interrogated by semiotics, which offers an analysis of how the signifier and 
the signified combined to produce the sign.
Semiotics defines representation as a form of cultural practice that belongs to the overall form 
of discursive production, a normality that allows a strictly de-limited range of variations that are based 
upon a network of mutually referring references (Barthes:1972; Eco:1976; Panofsky:1970). These 
references came be seen as legitimators of the hierarchical relations that justified and naturalised
21 Lacan's notion of A: not A, the 'not A' denotes the feminine as 'without penis', that is castrated.
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gender patterns. The move to examining images within a semiotic framework means that the image is 
not treated as an icon, dominated purely by a figurative element. Rather, the sign consists of signifying 
elements that have to be decoded as part of their interaction within a specific visual configuration. In 
making such an interpretation, one must connect the implied meaning directly to the material signifier 
through which the meaning is generated.
This shift implies that careful analyses of the single specific construction of the feminine 
body, the specific modes and sites of representation, as well as discussion of how the signs address the 
imagined spectator, made a superior contribution than content analysis upon which so much of role 
stereotypes relied.22 'Woman' is defined as the sign that functions in the (re)production of sexual 
differentiation for which a certain body image is a signifier. Representation was identified as one of the 
many social processes by which specific orders of sexual differentiation are ceaselessly constructed, 
modified, reconstituted and potentially resisted. The adoption of semiotics was based upon the 
Saussurian model of language, its omnipresence and synchronic structures that are prior to the subject 
and hence, 'woman as sign' aimed to transcend the idea that representations are symptoms of objective 
causes external to them. Thus, it aimed to bring the body into the process of cultural signification. 
Signs were analysed in their active role in the production of the categories of sexual differentiation. 
Thus signs constitute sexual difference - not bodies. Corporeality is not confronted and as a result the 
ideological elements that are bound to that corporeality are not confronted either. 23 Given this emergent 
theoretical environment, the appropriation of Lacanian analysis, particularly by merging of the 
synchronic system to the order of the Phallus, provided a system to integrate 'woman as sign' to a more 
thorough model of subjectivity.
The notion of 'woman as sign' is an attempt to bring together the fact that 'woman' is already 
a category constituted in society and thus subject to the various signifying ideological practices that 
sustain this category. The project has now been identified as one that explores the relationship between 
'woman' and sign in signification systems like film. Pollock summarises the endeavour thus:
Images of women places the emphasis on the problem of the images with regard to the 
contested ideas about what women are like or would be like. The concept of'woman as sign' 
makes us doubt that images signify women at all, though they undoubtedly circulate the sign 
Woman incessantly - and with the purpose of seducing persons of the female persuasion to 
recognise themselves in these signs and places. Visual images that proffer iconic figurations of 
the feminine body through rhetorics technically and ideologically aiming at the reality effect - 
this is, the disavowal of their rhetorical character behind the illusions of direct reproduction, 
transcription and replication - play a particularly important role in this masquerade. The 
visual signifier 'woman' is potent precisely insofar as the forms of representation, especially 
those associated within photographic processes, naturalise their constituents and presents
22 The debate in part reflects the broader discussions concerning the appropriateness of the positivist 
method that dominated at that time.
23 See Kessler (2000) for an empirical investigation of the normative sexed body. My concern here is 
that the dichotomy is not tackled and thus the fact that bodies do not secure that dichotomy is left 
unaddressed.
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themselves as mere description of a neutral content. Woman can therefore be simply seen, that 
is, in 'images of women. (Pollock: 1991:205).
The shift to semiotics integrated the critical discussions of ideology, forcing the question of 
how an all-pervasive ideology functioned within a culture. Specifically, Althusser's influence (1971) 
extended the reach of ideology beyond its initial remit of the 'ruling ideas of the day' to its permeation 
into every level of society, even down to a handshake. Henceforth, ideology was understood to serve a 
system of domination in four key functions. First, legitimation extends sectorial interests so that they 
become society's interests. Second, the various state institutions (ISAs) function by targeting and 
forming the subject so that identification with the social order operates at an unconscious level. Third, 
culture interpellates the subject: ideology consists in the very process of constituting individuals as 
subjects of effects of recognition and identification, the outcome of which is that individuals recognise 
themselves in those ideological patterns. Finally, ideology provides a bridge between the imagined 
representations, which project a set of conditions that are not really one's own, and the actual material 
conditions of the subject. False-consciousness belongs, therefore, to the cultural domain: the cultural 
domain is coterminous with ideology. Mulvey attends to this by examining how an image or mise-en- 
scene24 can be semiotically decoded so that the meaning and the subject position identified.
Mulvey (1975) combines Althusser's definition of ideology, that is, the 'imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real relations of existence' (1971:164) with Lacan's theory of the 
subject's constitution in language. By connecting the two, the relation between power and the subject 
could be explicated. For example, the reason given why women were not embracing the politics of 
feminism was because of the connection between ideological cultural patterns and the ideologically- 
constructed patterns within the unconscious. This position, in particular, is the object of my critique. 
Thus, my analysis is fourfold:
1. I aim to demonstrate the degree to which Mulvey's initial work continues to set the parameters of 
the debate, especially with regard to the use of codes and their structural determination and their 
consequent incitement to pleasure;
2. I challenge this model because it theoretically blocks any notion of a feminine heterosexual desire 
that is not masochistic and passive in form. 1 will argue that this reveals the extent to which much 
of this theory remains dependent upon the notion of the subject position;
3. I will explore how this feminist normative critique is sustained by deploying functionalist logic as 
the mode of explanation; without it, there is no need or possibility for feminist critique, given the 
theoretical closures within which this model operates;
4. I will show that their reliance upon psychoanalysis displaces the body by shifting emphasis upon 
the internal organisation of desire and, with the body lost from analytical view, that such analysis 
is dependent upon categorical logic to sustain 'the female' as coherent entity;
24 1 have not attended to the shift in cultural form because this paradigm does not attend to its potential 
consequences.
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THE DOUBLE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION OF 'WOMAN' IN FILM
Mulvey addresses the structures of identification and the mechanisms of pleasure that 
accompany them. She argues that the cinematic use of classical narratives, which are modelled on 
realism, stimulate and satisfy scopophilic desire. The position of the spectators in the cinema is one of 
repression of their own exhibitionism and the projection of that repressed desire on to the performer/ 
character. The cinema reproduces the mis-recognition of the mirror phase, thereby stimulating both 
narcissistic and scopophilic desire. Scopophilia is essentially active since its pleasure is derived from 
subjecting the object to a controlling gaze. This is said to parallel the spectator's position regarding 
realist film: one is able to look into a social world without the reciprocity demanded by belonging to 
that world. Voyeurism is therefore said to define the functioning of the filmic form. Thus, filmic form 
stimulates narcissism because the spectator projects the desire of self love into the more perfect image, 
for example the hero who has full diegetic control over the other characters. Mulvey extends the 
homological analysis by arguing that the narcissistic desire is satisfied through the identification with 
the alter-ego so that the screen image stands in for the subject's own image. Thus, the film image 
mimics the more perfect view of the self identified in the mirror phase, which stimulates identification. 
Most crucially, identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order that articulates 
desire.
At this point, the phallocentric binary opposition is shown to be essential: scopophilia is an 
active pattern of desire and therefore bears the mark of the masculine, thereby instituting female as 
passive. The subject whose scopophilic desire is satisfied is the man and his selected object is the 
female. The libido, defined as the active erotic function, is equally aligned as masculine. The identification 
process is based upon rendering the female form fearless to men by representing it using codes that 
satisfy in themselves to and for men. Woman becomes simultaneously looked at and displayed. Her 
appearance is marked with strong visual and erotic codes and she is reduced to being a passive, erotic 
spectacle, while the man comes to connote narrative or the active subject. With each step, Mulvey 
builds upon the dualisms: masculine/feminine; active/passive; subject/object of the narrative. The 
castration complex is central to Mulvey's model because it requires that the image of the woman be a 
fetishistic one in order to disavow the threat of castration that«her body symbolises.
Mulvey goes on to assert that the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of sexual objectification cannot be 
borne by the male figure because those who are 'already in a state of castration' cannot disavow phallic 
presence. This is why the main narrative is deemed masculine; in addition, it provides space for the 
identification with the ego ideal, which further demonstrates her dependence upon the mirror phase, 
reflecting the conception/recognition of the ego. Filmic structures thus give the (male) spectator the 
pleasure of omnipotence. The male star personifies the more perfect, more complete, more powerful 
ideal ego. He is never the object of the erotic gaze; he is never iconic, unlike woman. Here we see the 
uncritical use of the female body as castrated. This needs to be critically addressed and the relation to 
the corporeal tackled - the female body is the male body minus the penis. Moreover, no attention is 
paid to the shift from the male - a pre-discursive entity - to the cultural inscribed masculine
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spectatorial position. If sexing the body is a discursive process, then these elements need to be 
problematised.
The process of objectification, which fetishises the female body, provides an avenue of escape 
for men from the fear of castration; therefore they cannot transcend it. Castration does not act upon 
woman's psyche as a threat but as a real lack of her penis. The desire to make good that lack makes the 
phallus symbolic: 'she is said to speak of castration and nothing else'. This inability to transcend the 
castration complex means the woman is rendered 'other', bound by symbolic order in which man can 
live out his fantasies through the linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of the 
woman.
Mulvey's original piece, by instituting a generalised dichotomy of the active/passive structure, 
identifies the negation of female spectatorship contained within realist film. The polemic of her 
analysis establishes the masochistic nature of feminine desire constituted through the identification 
between woman and the objectified woman on the screen. In 'Afterthoughts...inspired by Duel in the 
Surf (in Easthope: 1993), Mulvey begins to explore whether the female spectator can experience a 
deeper, more complex relationship to the filmic text, and whether there is a substantial change in 
spectatorship with a woman lead. However, Mulvey makes it explicit that she has a particular spectator 
in mind, namely one who is 'masculinised and is secretly enjoying the freedom, action and control over 
the diegetic world that identification with the hero provides' (Mulvey:1993:126).
Mulvey draws upon the inherent instability of femininity, which is said to be a direct 
consequence of a woman's inability to fully resolve the Oedipal and castration complexes: femininity 
as a subject position is produced by the condition of being 'castrated', therefore the feminine cannot 
develop fully the regulative function of the super-ego. This is ambiguous: is the state of castration 
metaphoric or the real psychic determination of the feminine? Freud describes the woman's 
recognition of castration as an awareness of her wound of narcissism. This produces a sense of 
inferiority: the clitoris is likened to a scar. I argue that this presents the feminine with three structurally 
determined options:
1. If she holds her mother responsible for her castration and her lack, this will cause her to despise 
women as men do, which makes her neurotic and inhibited (defined as pathological);
2. She can refuse to abandon the pleasure of the active clitoris, the amputated penis, but must remain 
masculine (defined as pathological);
3. By exploiting the passive elements of her instinctual drives (reflecting that bodies have the propensity 
for both the masculine and the feminine) she can transfer her sexual attentions from her mother to her 
father, first wanting his phallus and then analogously his baby, thus requiring the transfer of pleasure 
to the vagina (defined as normal).
Therefore in seeking out the masculinised woman in 'Duel in the Sun', Mulvey is exploring a female 
protagonist who has no stable sexual identity. The feminine subject is seemingly resistant to the 
Oedipal norm, torn between passive femininity and regressive masculinity. This is played out through 
her position as determined by her two brothers: passive femininity is established through the brother
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who has fully resolved the Oedipal complex, satisfied with his heterosexual object choice and marriage, 
with the Symbolic at his disposal; regressive masculinity is explored through the brother who struggles 
against the Symbolic and revels narcissistically in the desire to embody phallic omnipotence. Thus the 
female protagonist must oscillate between her acceptance of her 'correct' feminine position, via the 
first brother as object-choice, and her narcissistic brother who guarantees her resistance to femininity. 
Already, the pre-Oedipal is being drawn upon. Her inability to follow one of the paths fully, to achieve 
a stable sexual identity25, is said to reflect the positioning of a certain female spectator, namely the type 
who relinquishes femininity and engages in the masculinisation of identification. Here is another 
example of the confusion regarding the corporeal. She describes the spectator, which is a social entity, 
as female and yet uses female in the sense of the objective category of sex (Delphy: 1996).
Psychically, oscillation draws upon the inherent instability of the feminine by returning to the 
active phallic stage before its repression. The 'lack' of the penis renders the feminine unstable because 
she lacks the necessary capacity for psychic resolution that the castration complex provides. This 
reflects the positioning of the female spectator, for if she is to receive pleasure she must also engage in the 
masculinisation of identification. If a woman is to access this desire in the language of the text, she must 
oscillate uneasily in her 'borrowed transvestite clothes'. Hence, Mulvey's interest in the 'Duel...' lies in 
what she describes as a 'series of transformations that comment upon the function of "woman" (as opposed 
to "man") as a narrative signifier and sexual difference as personification of "active" or "passive" elements 
in a story' (Mulvey, in Easthope: 1993:129). Combining of the Lacanian model of the subject and the filmic 
form works to give desire cultural materiality by inscribing desire in the language of the text. Yet, the terms 
are all over the place, with corporeal and the cultural used interchangeably - is the absence of the penis an 
instance of real lack?
To reiterate, the Oedipal complex offers three options, two of which are pathological, offering 
only temporary transgression's from the passivity of heterosexual femininity. The concept of oscillation 
encapsulates this by defining the feminine as open, since she is unstable because she cannot frilly resolve 
the Oedipal complex. I suggest that this reflects the normative order of psychoanalysis insofar as the 
feminine is not properly formed, which directly invokes the dichotomous order that defines the masculine 
with Reason. Thus, the formation of heterosexual femininity is defined by the absence of active desire. 
Only within the masculine are the residues of active phallic26 desire to be found, therefore showing how 
fully operative the phallocratic logic is. The dualism of subject/otyect is being re-inscribed into the 
explanation, and is thus failing to operate outside of terms that are said to contribute to the subordination of 
women.
DEVELOPMENTS OF MULVEY'S PARADIGM
Doane's work further contributed to the dichotomy of the feminine as passive by adding the 
iconic to it. The conceptualisation of'femininity as iconic' is defined as the "over presence of the image -
25 If she is already in the state of castration, and thus cannot fear the law, then her patterns of desire are 
more free not less surely? What threat prevents transgression of the already castrated body?.
26 Note that this ought also to imply the clitoris, but this element is left out when the 'phallic feminine' 
is discussed.
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she is the image." (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn: 1992:223) Theoretically, Doane supports this assertion by 
drawing upon what she describes as the significant degree of congruence between certain theories of 
images and theories of femininity. Doane argues, following Freud, that woman is too close to herself and, 
hence, she is unable to establish a critical distance between herself and her image that enables her to 
achieve a 'second look'. This closeness is likened to the closeness of iconic sign systems, for unlike 
language where a superior distance is created between the signifier and the referent, the iconic cannot 
disengage itself sufficiently from the real. Thus, woman is a writing in images, but a writing that is not for 
her, only of her. Woman cannot mobilise the gap or distance that voyeurism requires. The proximity 
between femininity and image is a direct result of the immediacy of knowledge that the little girl gains 
upon the sight of the male anatomy. 'Freud claims that the little girl, upon seeing the penis for the first time, 
"makes her judgement in a flash'. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it. 
(Doane in Caughie and Kuhn: 1992:223).27 This writing of images assigns a special place for woman in the 
cinematic form and representation while denying her access to that system. Again, there are issues about 
what the subjectivity is. Is the corporeal involved at all? If so, what are the consequences to describe the 
feminine as the image? This seems to me to be moving further away from a model that seeks to explore the 
cultural inscription of the body. Instead, it feels more like the disembodied 'signifying interior' that 
Berthelot (1995) identifies. This model moves ambiguously between the fleshy penis and the symbolic 
phallus; consequently, is castrated feminine the state of woman? If so, what lies behind this construction? 
From where or how do they gain the critical distance for their analysis? Something that lingers beneath the 
constructed perhaps? If their model is to move into the analysis of the formation of the subject, then I 
suggest that they ought to address these issues.
This shifts language from being the Master of subjectivity to being the tool of the Masculine 
Master. Hence, Doane follows Mulvey in arguing that the masculinising of the female spectatorial position 
through the process of oscillation is necessary if Woman is to gain access to the cinematic pleasures. 
Hence, the feminine proximity to her own body, the image of the body on screen, can only remind her of 
her castration that cannot be fetishised away. Doane is arguing that the dual effect of the sublimation and 
repression of femininity has come to determine the cinematic form, both in the plot and the mise-en-scene, 
which psychically re-enacts the dual effect, placing the feminine figure in situations of fetishistic 
idealisation or voyeuristic punishment. The moment of knowledge for the girl is the initial sight of genital 
difference and, therefore, Doane is not theoretically floored, in psychoanalytic terms, in developing the 
notion of femininity as iconic. The nexus of recognition that defines femininity is not signified in language 
at all because only masculinity can achieve that essential distance to enter the Symbolic and language; the 
Symbolic (or socially sanctioned) order is again masculine. Thus the structural logic orders the feminine 
with the passive and now the iconic. This merely extends the dualistic logic and further condemns the 
feminine to the passive. Where fluidity is integrated, it exists only insofar as unconscious desire shifts
27 This draws directly upon Freud's analysis of the constitution of femininity within the girl child. In 
contradistinction, the little boy considers his first sight of female genitalia as insignificant. Only with the 
threat of castration does he re-read the image he has seen and endow it with a meaning in relation to his 
own subjectivity. The boy experiences a distance between the look and the threat, and thus his knowledge 
is achieved through that all important distance. The gap between the visible and the knowable enables him 
to disavow what he has seen and enables him to fetishise what is fearful later on in adult life.
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between the structural positions. Moreover, this fluidity stems directly from the inability of the feminine to 
form a stable subject position. Hence, this merely reasserts the logic of the phallocratic dualism.
Thus, Doane extends Mulvey's position regarding the instability of femininity: by mobilising 
this instability, woman is able to use femininity as if it were a mask. Riviere's (1929) case study of an 
intellectual woman showed that in order to compensate for her assumption of the position of the subject 
(masculine, according to the binary opposition) of discourse rather than its object, she had produced 
herself as an excess of femininity. 28 Doane sees masquerade as a method whereby the woman can 
achieve some distance, or 'a simulation of the missing gap or distance' (1991). The masquerade is 
described as being subversive in its ability to use the space available to destabilise the male gaze by 
destabilising the image, but it is not an escape because it is a 'pathological response', according to the 
Symbolic order. It renders the image, femininity, as artifice. Lacan suggests the instability of 
femininity, its pathological elements, leads to women experiencing desire in a mediated form as 'desire 
for the unsatisfied desire', while Doane coins the phrase 'the desire to desire' (1991). As Butler notes, 
resistance, through masquerade, is an ambiguous experience, in the sense that the simulation Doane 
alludes to is partial and temporary, therefore is not a subject position as such, but rather a transgression 
that is always melancholic (Butler: 1990:104-05).29 It also brings to mind Irigaray who attempts to 
imagine a femininity that would emerge in a language that was not of the Masculine Master, but rather 
would let the female body speak (1985a,b). While offering varied critiques of patriarchy, their 
emphasis upon language, as structure, leaves little outside of discourse. Increasingly, the body is known 
only as a discursive product. How do they achieve the distance to develop such a position within 
language?
The detailed discussion of these two highly influential writers shows how the narrative is 
defined as masculine: only the masculine can assume the position of activity in order to drive the 
narrative forward; conversely, the feminine subject position provided by the narrative institutes a 
spectatorial position that is masochistic and pathological in orientation. 30 Moreover, the iconic status of 
the feminine renders the active female spectator a mere simulated, masculinised position.
Other writers have attempted to correct the feminine as passive but because they remain 
within the psychoanalytic paradigm, this is limited to expanding other subject positions, notably the 
homoerotic. It therefore stays firmly within the existing paradigm. This entails two distinct avenues: 
first, by turning to the specific pleasures that women can gain from the images of women; second, by 
attending to the various modes by which 'masculine as active' is constructed. Byars (1991) and Stacey 
(1988; 1995), for example, turn to Chodorow (1978), while Studlar (1991) turns to Deleuze as a 
potential source of pleasure, which necessarily entails accepting the feminine as a fetishistic object. 
Others, like Erens (1990), Seneca and Arbuthnot (in Erens) examine the pleasures of the subtext. Re- 
examining the 'masculine as active', but still within structural categories, includes the possibility that 
the male body may be erotica!ly encoded, which institutes subversive subject positions. Neale (1992),
28 Note also that the notion of transgression as a form of resistance is also limited because to transgress 
is implicitly to re-affirm the institutional isation of the Law.
29 Note also that the extent to which transgression is temporary is revealed by its reaffirmation of the
law.
30 1 refer back to Freud's model that only passive femininity is normal.
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for example, argues that this cannot be adequately attended to without looking at how the 'masculine as 
active' functions visually. My interest concerns the scope of this model to integrate, or at best offer a 
theoretical space for, an active heterosexual pattern of feminine desire. However, before I turn attention 
to this, I briefly discuss the structural relationship between the feminine subject position and the 
feminine (homoerotic) image.
THE PLEASURE OF THE (FEMININE) TEXT OR THE WITHDRAWAL INTO THE PRE- 
OEDIPAL
The central facet of this alternative approach stems from the narrative structure of melodrama. 
Byars (1991), for instance, argues that the female-centred narrative, when combined with a distinct 
mode of camera work, produces points of view that provide specific and positive expressions of female 
desire. This structure operates in two ways: first, it is assumed that they are watched by an all-female 
audience; second, the emotional intimacy played out between the characters stimulates 'feminine 
connectedness'. 31 The ordering of desire that is produced by same-gender exchanges produces an 
outlook based upon its relationship with the other rather than disconnected to it. This sense of 
interconnection with others is reflected in the narratives of melodrama. Melodrama draws upon the 
remnants of the feminine attachment to the mother, left over from her tenuous resolution of Oedipus 
complex. The recognition evoked by the women on the screen produces pleasure that can be considered 
a specific form of female gratification constructed out of the dominatory formations of the family. 
Identification between subject and text remains vital to the analysis. This is why I argue that the mirror 
phase, instituted by Mulveyian paradigm, maintains its centrality. Moreover, by turning to 
'connectedness', Byars seeks to utilise a distinct pattern of desire derived from within the pre-Oedipal. 
However, this leaves intact the hierarchies of the Oedipal order that has locked the feminine to 
'connectedness', that is, the connection between subject and Mother as one, into the pre-Oedipal in the 
first place.
Arbuthnot and Seneca (1990) examine the capacity for these texts to be read against the grain. 
The chosen text is Gentlemen Prefer Blondes. While they recognise that the surface of the story 
concerns the quest to find a husband, the main characters are independent and strong, and the 
exchanges between them reveal a subtext in which they struggle to maintain their intimacy and resist 
male objectification. For example, while Monroe and Russell are constructed as objects for the male 
gaze, nevertheless, they always defy the objectification by staring back, assessing the potential 'market' 
of husbands. However, this assessment is done with solidarity and genuine affection; they point to their 
tactile intimacy. Moreover, the primacy of this affection is secured by the double wedding. This 
closure, they argue, secures their relationship and thus makes this film feminist via its subtext. 
Therefore the pleasure is derived from reading against the grain. Yet, this marks a return to models of 
thought that Mulvey sought to correct: if reading against the grain is that 'easy', then representation 
ceases to be of such a central concern.
31 This draws upon Chodorow's reconfiguration of Freudianism, as well as potentially integrating the 
concept of jouissance by reflecting that the feminine is less individualised that the masculine.
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Stacey also looks at the desiring interactions between two females. In 'Desperately Seeking 
the Spectator' (1988), Stacey examines the fixation by a housewife upon the formidable counterpart in 
the film 'Desperately Seeking Susan'. The anchor is derived from the housewife's assumption of her 
'mirror image', brought to life by Susan; narratively conveyed through memory loss. In return, Susan, 
in seeking to identify her impostor, occupies the domestic sphere from which the housewife has taken 
flight. The narrative concludes when the two characters are finally united. Most importantly of all, this 
resolution is not accompanied by violent termination of one or both characters. Stacey argues that such 
a narrative fundamentally undermines masculinisation by centralising the lesbian basis of desire. 
Therefore, the narrative and visual codes do not allow pure identification or erotic codes of one or other 
- the exchange exists between the feminine. However, whether this overcomes the problems posed 
remains uncertain. First, it remains unclear to what extent Susan is in fact the mirror image since the 
housewife uses Susan as an avenue of escape, not identification. Second, it centres on the potential for 
lesbian-based desire between women which has had its pathological elements ejected, replaced by a 
somewhat Utopian bond. Third, the centrality of Madonna as Susan locates the film within a wider 
cultural terrain, at a time when she was intensely heterosexual. It remains to be seen whether the 
foreground given to the subversive readings maintains the political momentum that initiated the 
examination of the relationship between representation and the social order in the first place. Does it 
not in fact suggest that patriarchy is quite a different entity if so many plural positions, readings and 
pleasures are possible? Perhaps we ought to be thinking more carefully about who are doing these 
readings (Hermes: 1995).
There are a number of points that need to be raised at this point:
1. The notion of the subtext is introducing an empirical subject through the back door because
different interpretive elements are being brought to bear that fall outside the psychoanalytic remit;
2. Moreover, the clash between the empirical and the unconscious is more evident when the potential 
for the homoerotic is pitted against a 'star' with a specific and, in this case, explicit heterosexual 
persona;
3. Yet these manoeuvres do not deconstruct the phallocratic binary but instead they retreat into a 
Utopian sense of the connectedness developed from the normative departure. They are merely 
championing what is usually dis-privileged. This invokes tfce second tenet of liberalism: 'different 
but equal', which fails to undermine the phallocratic order implicit within it (see Heckman's 
application of Gadamer here: 1990:16);
4. It still empirically blocks active heterosexual femininity, since the structural regime remains intact.
Cowie equally seeks to move away from what she argues is a premature foreclosure of the 
Imaginary. The Imaginary fixes the subject but it is also the point at which a central mis-recognition 
takes place. The outcome is that the subject is never fully fixed and so the subject is able to mobilise 
this instability in fantasy. 32 Thus, the mise-en-scene of desire can produce multiple places for the 
subject of the fantasy and for the viewing subject, who, through identification, may similarly take up
! Cowie is equally drawing upon Lacan and Rodowick (1982).
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any of these multiple positions. These may be defined as active, passive, masculine, feminine, parent or 
child, mother or daughter, father or son. Cowie argues that the complex of identifications arising for the 
subject are a result of the castration complex, but that Oedipal relations are not determined by active 
and passive aims, instead they emerge as passive or active as a result of exigencies of the subject. 
Cowie in effect asserts that, within the unconscious formation of fantasy, the subject can assume any 
subject position, thus the feminine is able to oscillate within the unconscious so that desire can assume 
multiple forms. However, Doane (1989) counters this by arguing that if pleasures within fantasy are 
accessible and multiple, despite the patriarchal nature of much of the imagery, there remains little for 
feminism to critique. She argues that feminising (the position) must deal with the constraints and 
restraints of reading with respect to sexual identities - in effect, the question of power and its textual 
manifestations resides with the closure of these free forms of fantasy. Cowie's position not only places 
the (constructed) subject in a spurious position, but it also effectively forecloses both the necessity and 
possibility of feminist critique.
Each time, the feminist model develops more complex models to 'find' feminine desire, while 
remaining silent about an obvious source, namely the erotic images of men. Does this open up patterns 
of meaning that secure different identifications? Apparently not. Moreover, Cowie leaves us with 
nothing other than a retreat into the unconscious, which negates the conscious level of existence, 
namely, the patriarchal order which is the source of the problem in the first place. The corporeal body 
is rapidly being replaced by a cluster of desire that moves between subject positions defined by 
representation, and yet sex as an objective category continues to be utilised in order to make the 
'subject position' coherent and to remind us of the object being represented.
THE CODING OF THE MALE BODY AND ITS PROPENSITY FOR PLEASURE
I begin with Neale's 'Masculinity and Spectacle'. 33 Neale turns his attention to the various 
codes that produce the male body as an erotic spectacle through the use of close-ups. He argues that the 
male gaze is turned upon the male protagonist who incites narcissistic identification through the 
fantasies of power, omnipotence, mastery and control. Therefore, the close-up triggers desiring 
patterns in the male viewer. The central figure remains the male hero, upon whose will or project the 
external world can impose no limits. Neale argues that narcissism is integral to the fantasies produced 
by the narrative and its source is the exhibition of the phallic power displayed by the body in action. 
Most importantly, the close-ups concentrate upon the body in action, in movement, that is, as the 
embodiment of power. Thus, the narcissistic identification with a hero is a strategy of fantastic 
identification with the power of the phallus, which the male lacks. Note that this position is 
fundamentally different to that of the female because feminine narcissism is pathological, because its 
source of the desire is produced through identification with the passive object on screen. Also, the 
codes used to make the body erotic are fundamentally different from the feminine because they remain 
bound to producing the male body in action.
33 See also Jon Stratton (1996) Nixon (1996)
34
By implication, an additional dimension to the pleasures experienced is the repressed 
homoerotic desire satisfied by the erotic codification of the male body. Neale argues that the repression 
of any explicit avowal of eroticism in the act of looking at the male is structurally linked to a narrative 
content marked by sadomasochistic fantasies and scenes. The organisation of fetishistic desire dictates 
that the male spectator will desire to internalise, consume and possess the phallus. In essence, the male 
body must be combined with violent action in order to assist the disavowal. He concludes by arguing 
that, given that the central spectatorial axis is organised for the male, it is necessarily the case that the 
relationship between the spectator and mainstream cinema is repressed and disavowed. If not, 
mainstream cinema is faced with the spectre of invoking homosexual desire.
Combining the erotic spectacle of the male body to narrative control by the masculine subject 
leads Neale to argue that the female spectator still cannot look directly. Again, women must experience 
their desire in a mediated form in order to make good that lack. Any desire that is contained within the film 
tends to be built up around the diegetic ambiguities between the male protagonists using masculine body 
codes of representation that are implicitly homoerotic. So, men can be sexual spectacles to women in 
certain instances, but only via implicitly homoerotic spectacles. Once again, if the female experiences 
actively-structured desire, she must assume the masculine subject position and thus undergo oscillation.
Alternatively, argues Neale, the male body can be feminised in order to incite the repressed 
homoerotic desire in men. He singles out Rock Hudson as the object of an erotic look in films usually 
identified as being aimed at the female audience. He gives an example of a scene in which Rock Hudson is 
framed in a doorway, caught with his shirt off. However, Neale argues that Hudson is not masculine in his 
moments of eroticism for women, but rather has become feminised, has adopted the feminine 'object' 
position. In this approach, the man must undergo an act of oscillation to become feminised so that he can 
become passive. The character/actor/body is secondary to the structures into which they are inserted, no 
matter how improbable the structures may be. Neale argues, in confirmation of Mulvey's perspective, that 
the codes of eroticism are such that 'only women can function as the objects of an explicitly erotic gaze" 
(Neale: 1992:286). The commitment to the structural order persists despite a growing number of examples 
that appear manifestly to contradict the Symbolic order. This requires ever more complex layers of theory 
to reorientate or, perhaps, contort the meanings to fit the structural order. I will show that such gymnastics 
are repeated in order to a) maintain the central axis of the active/passive dichotomy and b) impose the 
number of subject positions from which the inferences regarding the formation of subjectivity can be 
drawn.
Alternatively, one can turn to Finch's (1990) development of gay pleasures from programmes 
organised along a heterosexist diegesis. Addressing the convention that defines melodrama as a 
feminine genre, Finch asks whether the male viewer can occupy the feminine subject position in order 
to access the desire organised by a feminine textual form, namely, take the male as an object of desire. 
Hence, he must implicitly attend to whether oscillation is necessary for a male viewer to gain pleasure 
for a narrative such as Dynasty. My interest stems from whether the absence of the masculine narrative 
drive where action is controlled by the male lead allows access for feminine desire. Finch develops the 
nature of the address by introducing a negotiation between 'textual subject place' and the 'spectatorial 
social position'. This is explored in two ways: first, by assessing the subject positions constructed by
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the diegesis; second, through the empirical considerations of how the gay audience use camp to queer 
their viewing. Having established that the melodrama is on the surface aimed at women, he queries the 
capacity of Dynasty to operate directly for women's pleasure. This is partly attended to via his analysis 
of hyper-realism of the narrative drive, which blocks the usual structures of identification. 34 For 
example, the character Fallen nearly dies several times, and when she is finally dead, doubt is re- 
introduced because the body cannot be identified, leaving open the possibility of her return once more. 
Most importantly, Finch established that, contrary to filmic conventions, men are in the state of undress 
in Dynasty, not women, yet he rebuffs resolutely the notion that this establishes the male body as an 
object of erotic consumption by women; such an assumption is defined as 'naive' (1990:68).
Finch argues that Mulvey's model explains the various modes through which the codification 
of the body is produced, especially the use of fragmentation and fetishisation. However, his emphasis 
upon the spectatorial social position would apparently lead him to reject the way she maps pleasure. In 
this way, he argues that the pleasure that women gain from Dynasty is not from erotic contemplation, 
but from the mirroring of the codification practices so that men's bodies are treated in the same way as 
women's. He rejects the idea that heterosexual women can experience an active desire from men who 
are 'caught in moments of undress'. Therefore, the exposure and eroticisation of the male body can be 
dealt with only through the gay man's position.
Finch identifies the weaknesses of Mulvey's position as the initial negation of a distinct 
address to women within the woman's genre and the exclusion of extra-textual constructions by the 
spectator, especially in the determination of sexuality. Usually, when women are eroticised textually, 
lesbian and heterosexual male spectators are most easily accommodated. The lesbian's transgression, 
achieved through oscillation, is blurred by the fit of conspiring in the eroticisation of heroines, 
alongside the masculine spectator. Hence, the lesbian develops the modes of address to access the 
erotic construction of the feminine. He follows the logic of the Mulveyian paradigm by arguing that
for the female heterosexual spectators, a non-masculine position is an impossible one, for 
along with gay men, they have to work to convert the hero's actions into spectacle. But 
women are not trained15 to objectify bodies as men are, which implies that Dynasty's 
codification of men along a Playgirl/Cosmopolitan discourse enables a gay erotic gaze at men 
through the relay of a woman's look....... [I]n a hierarchy of erotic pleasure, the gay male
spectator who occupies a culturally constituted feminine position is perhaps the one for whom 
the (erotic) system works. (Finch: 1990:69) (my italics)
This produces a somewhat anomalous outcome: despite the overt heterosexism of the diegesis, as Finch 
identifies through his analysis of the surface liberalism introduced through the characters' exchanges, 
the most problematic formation of desire is for women looking at the men's bodies, even though they 
are manifestly on display, and a direct outcome of that very narrative. I argue that it is only if the
34 Note that this point reveals the broader acceptance of the Mulveyian paradigm.
35 Read socialisation?
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organisation of desire, as defined by Mulvey, is assumed to operate can Finch state that it is the gay 
male who has the most ready access to the codification of the male body.
Finch and Neale examine the codification of men with the aim of tracing the potential for a 
homosexual gaze of men by men. However, despite considering the feminine subject position, neither 
can provide access to the male body from the feminine subject position. Others have sought to correct 
this by taking up the issue of masochism introduced by Rodowick (1982). Each time, new levels of 
complexity are engaged with in order to 'find' pleasures that are blocked because of the ways in which 
they have defined the Symbolic and its structural organisation of identity. Moreover, because these 
structures are primary to the formation of the subject, they cannot look directly to what the subject 
might do. They have excluded the possibility of action from the frame, and thus must look to 
unconscious circuits of desire to find something other than total domination - except, of course, if the 
subject identifies with feminine heterosexuality, when she must resign herself to the desire for desire.
Studlar (1991) draws upon the pairing of fetishistic scopophilia with masochism36 by 
juxtaposing the identification of the masculine spectator with the hero who has diegetic control over the 
action with the subject position produced when the narrative does not create control over the object. 
Usually, the masculine character carries the narrative forward through his command of the objects and 
events, thus serving both the male gaze and the narcissistic desire of the ego-ideal. However, when the 
narrative is not driven by the command of the hero/ego-ideal, the subject position produced is 
masochistic because it signals the inability to ensure that control of the sexual object/woman. Studlar is 
keen to avoid the implied positioning of the woman in the sadistic role and thus turns to Deleuzian 
notions of masochism because it locates masochistic desire back into the pre-patriarchal symbiosis of 
plenitude between the mother and child. 37
In effect, Studlar's model removes the necessity for the mediation of the male gaze and thus 
establishes a direct look between the woman-to-woman gaze, invoking pre-Oedipal, and thus non- 
patriarchal sexual pleasure. Studlar concludes that:
Although Dietrich may be constructed according to a masochistic male gaze, the absence of 
male mediation of the look, as well as the sexual ambiguity of Dietrich's erotic image, 
encourage a female looking that defies heterosexual norms and the accepted 
dominance/submission agenda of patriarchal sexual poetics. The mechanisms of masochism 
disturb the power of the 'phallic' gaze to create space for an erotically charged female gaze 
fixed on the woman star. The result is a system of looking that elicits both the female 
spectatorial identification with and desire for the powerful femme fatale. (Studlar: 1991:248)
36 Studlar is also drawing upon Rodowick here.
37 Within Deleuzian psychodynamics, the masochistic unconscious fantasy aims to disavow the father, 
thereby re-instituting the connections with the all powerful pre-Oedipal mother. Therefore, unlike the 
sadist who pursues Oedipal negation of the mother through her destruction, the masochist idealises her, 
submits to her so that he can be punished by her thereby symbolically punishing and denying the father 
in himself. The rejection of the father within himself is simultaneously the rejection of phallic 
sexuality.
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The structural determination of the subject/object relations and the positioning of subjectivity it forms 
categorically block any consideration of the positioning of the male star in Marlene Dietrich's films. 
Hence, there is little consideration of the erotic potential of Gary Cooper in Morocco. Where he is 
discussed, his visual codification is defined as feminised. Therefore, if the female viewer is to access 
Cooper erotically, and if she is to 'remain' feminine, she can do so only by accessing the 'pathological' 
patterns of self-objectification. Alternatively, the female viewer can submit to the filmic form, undergo 
oscillation and access Cooper from the masculinised position. Yet, despite the introduction of the 
Deleuzian twist, the structural determination persists. Again, the turn to pre-Oedipal does not disrupt 
the categorical order, but rather introduces ever greater contortionist moves in the endeavour to find a 
way out of categorical determination of the subject position that defines the feminine as passive.
Ultimately, the turn to Deleuziuan analysis merely emphasises the pre-Oedipal elements of 
psychic formation, which leaves the Oedipal operations intact. I argue that this reflects the broader 
political normative position: Deleuze's revolutionary position seeks to find a space through which the 
domination of the Oedipal organisation can be undermined; in contrast, Lacan and Freud look to the 
formation of psychic energies that supports the current order. The oedipalisation of desire, with the 
concomitant organisation of subject positions by the Symbolic, is always put beyond question by this 
model. Thus, to accept the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity is necessarily to accept the emphatic 
subordination of the feminine because psychoanalytic applications cannot escape the primary and 
privileged status of the phallus/penis. The dispute rests with the normative evaluations made of the 
various levels of the psyche; is the inculcation of the social order necessary to avoid the destruction of 
unlimited desire?38 1 draw parallels with the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism here 
because, in my view, their mutual reliance upon the Oedipal complex, recast as a structuralist 
operation, necessarily produces these various closures brought about by the structuralist determinism 
upon which they rely.
Another strategy to wrest Mulvey's paradigm away from these closures is offered by Lewis 
and Rolley (1997). In '(Ad)dressing the Dyke: Lesbian looks and lesbians looking', they trace the 
possible lesbian visual pleasures offered by fashion imagery in a field of cultural production that targets 
exclusively the female and overtly heterosexual audience of 'Cosmopolitan' magazine. Their aim is to 
explore critically the convention of understanding the process of women's consumption of images as 
one in which women passively identify with the 'woman-as-sign,', subjected to the active male gaze. 
They contest the over-simplification of the forms of identification and desire inherent within Mulvey's 
initial theorisation, suggesting that it can be re-configured, by differentiating "desiring to be' from 
'desiring to have", thereby introducing new identifications.
This is explored via women's capacity to assess other women's bodies developed by the use 
of women's magazines. They argue that the effectiveness of the image is dependent upon a sexual 
exchange of looks between the photographer, mostly male, and the female model and is initially 
structured by a heterosexual exchange. This implicitly references the assumption that the manifest
38 This reflects the continued engagement with the Hobbesian problem of the social order.
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features of the image will 'obviously' be those that objectify the female model for the male gaze.39 Yet 
it is known to be consumed only by women, that the female model's desiring looks are consumed by 
women. This emphasises that the images and the codifications that aim to incite sexual desire are 
constructed with women in mind; the heterosexual pitch is thus marginalised. The lesbian is able to 
draw upon the codes in themselves, alongside the knowledge of other lesbian readership and 
community. In contradistinction, the heterosexual woman has to relocate her gaze back into the 
broader structures that codify the woman's body ultimately intended for the male gaze and thus 
identification must take place among erotically charged images. Again, the broader location of the 
psychoanalytic model is central, for it offers a means to treat as secondary the empirical or conscious 
identification replacing them with 'real' lesbian identifications.
This is theoretically substantiated by the core concept of distanciation, understood as dealing 
with both objectification and narcissism. First, it is concerned with the distancing from the male gaze 
that objectifies and implicitly dehumanises the woman represented. Thus, the core structural position, 
namely the passive objectification of the woman in the image, remains of integral importance. Second, 
it addresses the over-identification that organises the relationship between the female viewer and the 
image. Ultimately, if she is to remain a part of her conscious identification, the female viewer must 
place the image and its associated desires back into the heterosexist logic that orders the representation. 
Only then can she negate the problematisation of her sexuality inherent with women looking at women. 
She imagines herself into the position of the model and thus projects herself as the passive object of 
(male) desire. The structural operations work to ensure that the female gaze is defined as masochistic 
because she submits to the objectification by which her subject position is defined. Therefore, from the 
heterosexual feminine identification position, the woman can desire only to be the passive object, 
which suggests that Doane's dictum, 'to desire to desire', remains pertinent. The objectification in her 
case is complete for she can desire only to be the object of desire. The central point of differentiation 
between this and the lesbian gaze is that the latter can encompass the tabooed position denied the 
heterosexual woman because the lesbian is able to embrace the desire to have the woman. Moreover, it 
reflects also the narcissistic desire of the active stage; implicitly, the subject position is both active and 
masculine. This illustrates the primacy of the psychoanalytic theory to their model of subjectivity.
However, the feminist normative position leads Rolley and Lewis to seek an escape from the 
pathology assigned to the (heterosexual) female viewer. Hence, their argument is forced to make 
another turn. Despite defining this relationship as psychic fantasy, they must reintroduce the conscious 
level in order to redefine the heterosexual woman's pattern of desire as lesbian, thereby ejecting the 
pathological elements. This is achieved by emphasising the empirical context of a fashion magazine 
where the viewer is known to be almost always female. Since the image is produced for women's 
magazines, Lewis and Rolley argue that this viewing context undermines the heterosexual fantasy 
because the model is knowingly looked at by other women. The conscious knowledge of who 'owns' 
the gaze secures the pleasure as lesbian: the narcissistic projection of the self as the model, coupled
39 Again, this means that the images in general circulation will be marked overtly by the gendered 
active/passive dichotomy.
40 This seems to me to be rather important insofar as it introduces the issue that meanings are derived 
from practice, in this case lesbian practice, and it is here where their efficacy is derived.
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with the desire to be loved as that object/model, is undertaken even when the (empirical) viewer is 
'known' to be a woman. They are able to conclude that the pleasures gleaned from women's magazines 
are lesbian in structure by reproducing the conscious level, thereby negating the dubious political 
consequences of the unconscious operations of the heterosexual feminine subject position.
Stacey (1995) offers another example of the clash between the empirical and the unconscious. 
She attempts to synthesise the empirical descriptions of the pleasures women experienced when 
watching Hollywood melodrama with the deeper psychoanalytic identifications. The outcome is that 
the two elements of the book remain thoroughly disconnected insofar as she fails to relate or integrate 
the unconscious subject positions to the actual explanations given by the women interviewed. This is 
important for were one to provide some empirical evidence, confined as they be must within conscious 
utterances, these would be dismissed for they fail to fit with the 'real' unconscious structures. For 
example, public utterances of active female heterosexual ity found in many problem pages, in 
'Cosmopolitan' for example, would not be read literally but as utterances that disguise the actual source 
of the desire as defined by the primary axes within the unconscious. Interpellation and the mirror phase 
define how the subject is constituted. The Symbolic is ordered by the Phallus, therefore active feminine 
sexuality is not possible. Once constructed, the subject is fixed and thus the Phallic symbol must reign, 
which renders the model ahistorical. The Symbolic constitutes a re-presentation. This axis constitutes 
the subject and thus is awarded primacy over utterance.
In summation, we find the same problems reappearing:
1. When is the empirical or conscious feature to be treated 'as it is' and not a deeper unconscious 
substitution? The problem of dealing with the empirical leads postmodernism/feminism to talk of 
'women as women'.
2. The structural order is sustained so that the subject position is also sustained. Psychoanalysis can 
be used in this way as the base to imply the actual desire of the subjects and the identifications 
formed.
3. However, this ensures the continued negation of the active feminine heterosexual desire: it does 
not exist because it is always redefined as another psychic position.
I suggest that active heterosexuality simply cannot remain a subject position known only through 
negation, never embodied or lived within the practice of heterosexuality (Jackson: 1995). Moreover, I 
argue that this emerges as a problem only if one fails to recognise that the 'Masculine heterosexual 
Master' is an ideological fiction just as the absolute negation of active heterosexual femininity is. I 
argue that this negation is upheld only to sustain a political agenda that seems hell bent on ensuring that 
patriarchy, as a system that structures the psyche as well as defining the language system in its entirety, 
dominates at all time, so much so that Harbord and Campbell, for example, are prepared to reject both 
materialism and reason as the illusions of such a master. I suggest that this is an inevitable outcome of 
embedding subjectivity within a psychoanalytic paradigm, particularly when the sole emphasis is 
placed upon identification.
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THE PRESENTATIONAL FEATURES OF THE MALE PIN-UP
In contradistinction, I argue that any empirical examples that unambiguously and 
unquestioningly present an erotic masculine/male figure must present problems for the dichotomous 
logic I have critiqued. I turn therefore to Dyer (1992) who presents a direct analysis of male images. 
Dyer addresses the block between the heterosexual woman and the male body. What makes Dyer's 
article of particular interest is his attention to the empirical evidence of the way in which looks are 
produced and situated in the context of an interaction. If, asks he, the interaction between the viewer of 
the image and the subject of the image is constituted through power, how exactly is the relationship 
within the interaction played out?
Dyer argues that women do look at men, which is at least a break with the structurally led 
categorical ism that defines the Mulveyian paradigm, and singles out the male pin-up model and the 
male 'star' as two key instances. The images of male stars are defined by a certain instability, 
particularly when model is encoded as sexual spectacle because sexual objectification of men by 
women is a violation of the codifications that differentiate the male from the female. He argues that the 
codification is altered through the personalisation of the mode. By this, Dyer means that each star has 
his own look defining how his presentation is to be viewed. Therefore, he centres his analysis on how 
the model organises the looking axis while he is being photographed.
The first codification traces that men do not look modestly away (Berger: 1972), but rather 
look up and off from within their position in the visual environment. Looking off outside the 
photographic frame, Dyer argues, signifies the lofty heights of the soul and intellect, something that the 
female cannot reach: 'higher is better than lower; the head is better than the genitals below' 
(Hoch:1979: Nayak:1997). In addition, Dyer acknowledges cases where the model does not avert the 
gaze but that the returning stare of the male pin-up differentiates it from the coy, partial but submissive 
look of the female model. The stare reaches beyond the boundaries of the field of vision established 
within the frame of the image, asserting his subjectivity. In contradistinction, the female gaze stops at 
the boundary of the field of vision between the viewer and the model. He then attends to the potential 
desire available to heterosexual women, noting what has previously been missed, namely that 
heterosexual women, as 'already castrated', have nothing to fear from transgression since there is no 
threat. 41 How then is the phallologic order of the image sustained? First he argues that the male gaze 
utilises the semiotic to block such identification patterns; hence the importance of the lofty stare. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Star's embodiment, contained within the pin-up, calls upon 
conventional codes of active masculinity; for example, the man must be doing something.42 Dyer 
identifies how structural relations can be made to work visually and using the most mundane sources to
41 Again, this draws on a common-sense, unequivocal corporeal fact and leaves unattended the 
relationship between the corporeal, as flesh, and the fact that this fleshy entity underdetermines the 
category it is naturalistically supposed to mirror or determine.
42 Neale identified that display is often combined with the narrative, often during moments of 
aggression, so that the spectre of homosexuality is disavowed. Likewise, it has been noted that in 
Dynasty, men were often 'caught' in a moment of undress. Hence the predominance of grooming on 
these occasions. Suzanne Moore notes this when she addresses the female heterosexual pleasures; see 
Here's Looking at You, Kid! (1988).
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codify. Alternatively, the muscular body is emphasised, through lighting and posture, thereby 
connoting the promise of activity and power. He talks of the strain shown on the body, often signified 
by the visibly bulging veins. I will return in detail to these elements in my taxonomy as they trace the 
performance of masculinity and the body rather than defining the image through its relationship to the 
Oedipus complex. Dyer develops the argument further stressing the integration of the discourses of 
race with physicality. He notes that this embodiment is one that is 'of the jungle', impetuous and 
unreasoned. These themes will be taken up again with Nayak's piece (1997).
CRITIQUING THE PHALLIC SIGNIFIER AND THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION
In summation, I began with a critical account of the sex/gender distinction, identifying that it 
continued to use sex as an objective category in an insufficiently critical way. To this, I traced the 
broader re-evaluation of language, the central importance of which is the prior-ness awarded to 
meaning. The significance is that the analysis of language aimed to deconstruct the subject/object 
dualism, rendering both the subject and the object fictions generated by meaning. This built upon the 
existing ideological critique and its causal effect through representation. The development is premised 
upon the omnipresence of meaning and its active role in category production. To this, 
postmodernist/feminist critique fused a model of the subject, as defined by Lacan to Althusser's 
position of the ideological role of culture. Henceforth, this causal nexus aims to trace and explain a 
number of elements:
1. The unconscious and the sexual desiring patterns thus formed ceased to be treated as pre-given 
facts, as something essential to the human form. Instead, they must be thought of as constructions, 
as objects that have histories within and from which the subject is to be found.
2. This institutes the following order: the body is born into language and it is within the terms of 
language that the human subject is constructed; language is always prior to and constitutive of the 
subject.
3. In consequence, speech never belongs to the speaker, rather, the T is the outcome of the position 
within which we emerge in language.
4. Therefore, the Cartesian subject is displaced by the production of subjectivities within the matrices 
of the structural positions within language. This encapsulates the fundamental appeal that Lacan 
has to feminist critique. It positions the subject as outcome, as construction, rather than essence, by 
placing language at the heart of what subjectivity is.
5. This integration of meaning to the social order, organised under the patriarchal banner of the 
Father, marks the entry of the first structural organisation of meaning: the feminine is passive.
6. Mulvey has applied the dialectic logic of Lacanianism to the seeing/seen axis and integrated into 
this the second axis of the active/passive.
7. Via the mirror phase, Mulveyian paradigm asserts that the feminine image of the screen must 
reflect the feminine position of lack. Therefore, the feminine must present itself as the object of 
desire, but equally disavow the lack that is her symbolic function. Therefore, the feminine as
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sexual objectification is categorised as universal and permanent because of the Symbolic order. 
The essence of the feminine body is to signify lack since, corporeally, she cannot 'grow' a penis. It 
is this point, in particular, that raises the charge of biological determinism.
This oppositional interplay is played out by the objectification inherent in the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' as 
well as active function of display.









These sets of dualism are supposedly dislodged by the introduction of the tabooed homoerotic desire. 
However, it can do so only by leaving the feminine/passive axis in place. This reflects the central 
importance of oscillation: woman mobilises her desire, which is less fixed than the heterosexual 
masculine subject position, and returns to the phallic stage and disavows her castration. 43 She returns to 
her active stage and the eroticisation of the clitoris, and adopts the position of the masculine. Therefore, 
the pleasure of the feminine is tied to the pre-oedipal stage where the girl child remains masculinised 
by means of the active function of the phallic organ; hence the silence that defines the active, 
heterosexual woman. This is a development of Mulvey's initial paradigm: heterosexual women's desire 
to desire is brought about by their objectification (Doane: 1991). Therefore, the structural order persists 
and has been expanded, further producing a circuit of subject positions:
1. Men actively desire women and are therefore heterosexual and masculine; defined as Oedipalised 
desire.
2. Men actively desire men and are therefore homosexual and narcissistic; the object of desire is 'the 
same' and reflects the narcissism prior to Oedipalisation; it is therefore active.
3. Women actively desire women and are therefore homosexual; the object of desire is 'the same' and 
reflects the active phallic stage which is masculine achieved through oscillation. This represents a 
division between the fact of'woman' and the unconscious desire as masculine.
4. Women that desire to be loved by men are therefore heterosexual, which is an outcome of
Oedipalisation and is defined by passive objectification; she can desire only to be the subordinated 
object of desire.
43 However, this is at the cost of her (conscious) moral development, as define by Freud and Lacan.
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These structural orderings of desire and identification result from the foreclosure of the content of the 
image. By fixing the subject through the Symbolic order, they are able to introduce a series of 
structural relations that stabilise meaning. This emphasises the synchronic features of language: those 
who are formed by a system, those that have assumed the T, are in no position to alter the structures 
because they define who the T is. Identification is therefore defined by either the failure or success of 
assuming the Oedipalised subject position. This effectively removes the potential of history and, by 
implication, social practice to change meaning, which equally reflects the ambiguous position the 
empirical holds in their explanations. At certain points, it is re-configured as another instance of the 
unconscious, for example Cowie. At other times, it demonstrates the identification structures, for 
example Lewis and Rolley.
Hence, the relationship between the Symbolic and the structuralist legacy forecloses 
categorically the forms the feminine may take because the structures are awarded primacy in the 
determination of the meaning and subjectivity. I argue that this leads directly to the overly 
homogenised analysis of cultural forms, thereby sustaining the inferential relationship between passive 
femininity as the subject formed and language as the causal mechanism that secures it. The semiotic 
function combines with the structural legacy to impose the universality of the active/passive.
Second, I return to the example of Harbord and Cambell who argue that the psychoanalytic 
model of the subject is central to the production of culture. They are therefore stipulating that the 
Oedipus complex is primary to the cultural formations we have, which I argue must lead to an 
additional closure: the 'story' of culture is the (re)presentation of the Oedipus complex. For example, 
Cowie (see also Gallop: 1982; Rose: 1986; Emberely:1989) trawls through numerous films identifying 
how each replays the heterosexual relationship via the complex of exchanges between the mother, 
father and child. The postmodern project means that feminists of this kind are bound to the 'end of 
history', but not as synthesis; as Hegel would have it (Descombes: 1980), but as the eternal return of the 
linguistic order. I argue that this is where the idealist model of language is derived. The subject is 
defined as the outcome of the linguistic order, therefore language is awarded causal priority so that no 
subject acts on language, uses or transforms language to alter the Symbolic subject positions. Therefore 
the argument is essentially circular, each element depending upon the other for its coherency. 
Moreover, because the subject does not 'act' 44 they must look beneath the subject to the unconscious 
desiring flows for a trace of non-dominatory desire; hence the naed for the theoretical gymnastics 
(Flower-MacCanneIl:2000: Harbord and Campbell: 1998; Balibar: 1994; Copjec:1994).
To reiterate, the castration complex orders the codification and organisation of the visual 
presentation. The image of the feminine must be coded through fetishisation in order to disavow the 
threat of castration that personifies the feminine. In addition, each form of codification situates each 
subject position. This institutes the third closure. It begins with the location of the feminine as the 
absolute other of the masculine, and the ejection of the third term, namely the Other as language. Lacan 
uses the capitalisation as a means to denote that both the masculine and feminine (men and women) are 
subordinate to the Other, that is, language that constitutes them as subjects. This emphasis reflects his 
position that subjectivity is the outcome of signification through language. This is how language speaks
44 Defined as a metaphorical illusion.
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through the subject. This re-working establishes the two clear subject positions, namely the deadlock of 
the subject/object opposition. The tripartite relationship45, which is fundamental to Lacan's model, is 
reduced to a dichotomy so that the feminine functions through her desire to make good her lack: 'she is 
said to speak castration and nothing else'. The dualism means that only the feminine is subordinate. 
The feminine cannot transcend this state, and thus cannot alter the state or mechanism that defines her 
as lack. Again, I would argue that the corporeal is used uncritically.
Another example of the same reductive logic is the seeing/seen axis. Mulvey et al. remove the 
dialectic operation within the subjectivity and redefine it by, and align it with, the existing dichotomies. 
This dichotomisation further solidifies the structure of'the feminine as the absolute subordinated 
other'. Thus, no subject both sees and is seen, rather the Master masculine subject sees and the 
feminine (slave) is seen. This is how the structural positions emerge when Lacan is reworked according 
to a feminist normative position: the positions are dualistic rather than tripartite. Only by making the 
masculine and the feminine dialectic opposites can feminists overcome Lacan's position that both 
subjects are subordinate to the Law: the power of the Father does not 'belong' to the feminine, neither 
does it belong to the masculine (man). 45 Moreover, this dualistic reorganisation implicitly collapses the 
penis and the phallus because the masculine subject has been conflated with the Law.
Language is treated as a 'quasi-free-standing entity' which is reflected in the 'ness' Mulvey 
awards the feminine. The centrality of culture is given precedence over and above the things the subject 
may do. Moreover, the cultural domain colonises the unconscious, the place from which motivation is 
derived. The unconscious is the source of the real motivations and meanings, thus the truth lies behind 
the surface patterns of speech. Following this, the significations ordered by the phallus prescribe what 
is really going on: the active woman is really masculine, because the linguistic regime orders it so. 
Most importantly, the re-alignment of Lacan's model into a dualistic order introduces categorical logic 
to the postmodernist/feminist model; hence, the centrality of the 'ness'.
The 'dilemma' between the conscious as regulated (ideological) speech and the unconscious 
levels of desire is not something that Lacan faces. Lacan argues that to speak the T is to submit to 
Symbolic order. His normative orientation aims to bring desire that is socially tabooed into the realm of 
what is socially sanctioned. Therefore, his aim is to bring the Real into the domain of Oedipalised 
desire. There is, then, a level at which conscious discourse is central. However, by making Lacanianism 
a proto-ideology, feminists are forced to reject conscious discourse because it is enveloped by what the 
illegitimate social order requires. Therefore, conscious speech becomes the equivalent part to the 
ideological position, namely passive femininity, and our speech acts bring forth the normative regime 
of patriarchy.47 By rejecting the order of the Law of the Father, they seek to lift that taboo and thus
45 Fundamental to Butler's analysis. It reflects that her analysis is considerably more sophisticated.
46 Lacan argues that those men who also make the fallacious assumption that their phallus and the 
Phallus are one often suffer from impotency caused by the latent fear that the penis will not meet the 
power of the Phallus. See B. Fink (1995)
47 The full impact of this is sometimes ignored, particular by those who seek to manipulate Lacan for 
libertarian purposes, by which I mean that they seek to liberate the identities and desire produced 
through the failure of Oedipalisation. Logically speaking, with that failure comes the failure of the T 
that speaks. I argue that they cannot turn to the notion of the non-discursive language because of their 
deployment of Derrida elsewhere. He argues that there is no outside from which the insane can speak.
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release the 'legitimate' desiring flows of lesbian and gay identifications and so forth. However, this 
again merely inverts the phallocratic order; it does not deconstruct it sufficiently.
AND THE WOMAN'S BODY?
I have argued that the structural orientation forecloses the analyses of the representations as 
well as the sorts of identities it is said to form. Most importantly, the ideological over-determination of 
the Symbolic has removed women and the activities they do from the analyses. Thus, the analysis 
cannot be anything other than ahistorical and reductive because, by making the social order reside in 
the psyche, the analysis removes any potential action from consideration, and thus the capacity to 
change things. This is a direct result of the over-emphasis upon the interpretative effects that form 
subjectivity. Consequently, this greatly simplifies the richness and diversity of the social world. In fact, 
as demonstrated in the numbered points above, they have reduced the human condition to four basic 
categories.
The feminist theory addressed thus far turned to psychoanalysis to account for the fixity of 
identity and aimed to inscribe the body into social process. The sex/gender distinction was abandoned 
precisely for its failure to do so. The sex/gender distinction leaves the body outside the domain of 
social organisation by remaining implicitly dependent upon the mind/body dualism. Butler refers to this 
as the 'raw body'. The body is treated as a self-contained and ordered entity that biologically fulfils its 
capacity. Yet, when the sexed body meets with its social organisation, suddenly two essential bodies 
emerge, reflecting the ideology of a natural hierarchical order of Western culture. This process draws 
the body into the 'cooked', a product of the discourses of power/knowledge.48 These discursive orders 
are imposed on and constitute the entity of the body itself. As Butler continues, feminism shows that 
there is nothing but the cooked:
How are the sex/gender and nature/culture dualisms constructed and naturalised in and 
through one another? What gender hierarchies do they serve, and what relations of 
subordination do they reify? If the very designation of sex is political, then 'sex', that 
designation supposed to be the most raw, proves to be always already cooked. 
(Butler: 1990:38)
Discourse as representation is prior to and formative of T; the feminine is therefore that which 
language fixes as a position. This model by-passes the body by submerging it beneath the linguistic 
effect. The absent body, ejected by the discourses of the Symbolic, has been replaced by the subject 
position. The causal force awarded such construction pushes the corporeal body out of view because
We are left, then, with desiring patterns that are absolutely unknowable or a subjectivity that is the 
ideological subject position.
48 The switch to Foucauldian language does not conflict with the psychoanalytic backdrop, because 
Butler (1990) or Braidotti (1991) for example, argue that the two can be synthesised because both are 
fundamentally anti-Cartesian.
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there is nothing to the body apart from the cooked.49 The corporeal is not deemed to bring anything to 
the cultural, bar the raw material. Again, this emphasises the extent to which the subject is merely an 
affect of meaning. The discursive forces appear to take on a form of their own and organise the subject 
position independently of the body. I suggest that if the phallus is, as Lacan (sometimes) argues50, 
merely the signifier of power, rather than bodily difference, then subject position that discourse defines 
is all there is: the mascuVmised is a redundant term because this only signifies that shift to the 
masculinised assumes a female body in the first place. If this were not the case, why is the 'male' 
category always behind any analysis of oscillation if the signifiers have effectively feminised body? 
Why the maintenance of the biological signifier? I argue that the fact we must refer to masculine men 
in order to maintain a feminist position suggests that there is in fact a deeper commitment to the 
biological body than their chimeric vocabulary suggests. Without the biological body, the subject 
becomes a product of language as a 'quasi-free-standing entity', and thus there would be no problem 
regarding the absence of'women as women'. In fact, it ought not present itself as a problem. To 
illustrate, I quote Grosz:
(Irigaray's) aim seems to be the exploration of a new theoretical space and language which 
may be able to undermine the patriarchal and phallocentric domination of the sphere of 
representations, and, more positively, provide a mode of representation for women as women. 
If, she argues, women's bodies are inscribed as lack by dominant representational systems 
which leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity, their limits need to be 
recognised and transgressed. (Grosz: 1990:168-9)
This implicitly refers to the body because without it we are left only with a metaphysical entity.
Returning to Macey's points: to speak is to assume the subject position in language: we are 
where ideology has positioned us. This reflects the earlier emphasis that the postmodernist/feminist 
programme puts on Althusser. This closure is responsible for that the postmodernist/feminists' inability 
to 'find' women as women who could undertake practices of self-determination. Woman, as a 'cooked' 
subject position is always already in the signification, that is, is already constituted or interpellated by 
the ideology. Thus, they have defined 'self-determining woman' as a Utopian moment. By making the 
body a Symbolic entity, action is always in full service of the Symbolic, thus there is nowhere to create 
an alternative subjectivity. Is this not why 'women as women' is such a philosophical conundrum.
Furthermore, postmodernist/feminists owe us another explanation as to how they 'escape' the 
domination of the rational, so that they are able to rationally theorise the source of their total 
domination. Unlike Althusser, they have no myth of science with which to assume a position outside of 
that which language provides (1971:168-70). This is where the essentialist base to their critique is 
exposed: they draw upon their jouissance with which to represent a feminine subject that emerges out 
from under the full weight of the Symbolic construction. Yet, the very moment that thejouissance 
produces representation ironically locks it back into the Symbolic domain. They have not broken down
Reflecting the Levi-Straussian legacy, this institutes another dualism. 
See Fink for a thorough if complex account of this 'ambiguity'.
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the dualistic term that subordinates it in the first place (Gadamer: 1979). Moreover, the absence of any 
sustained methodological reflexivity (Bourdieu: 1992) has caused them to overlook their own activity, 
the social institution from which it takes place, and consequently, their power. This cannot be 
recuperated as an instance of masculinised identity because that would make a mockery of their 
agenda. Perhaps, their inability to account for their own social power stems directly from the fact the 
'empirical woman' is such a theoretical conundrum for them. It leads them to overlook the empirical 
reality of their own lives.
Criticisms of this kind have been registered within feminist debate (Butler and Scott: 1992) but 
the particular offerings of Benhabib (1992) seem to me best placed to identify a space between the 
closures of subjectivity contained within the Enlightenment programme and the closures that appear 
within the postmodern programme. Situating the Se/f explores several aspects that have informed 
directly the analysis provided here. While she engages in the offers made by the postmodernist/feminist 
programme, she queries the efficacy of inverting the dualistic logic formalised within the 
Enlightenment project (Pateman:l988; O'Brien:1989; Gatens:1996) by drawing upon the hermeneutic 
position that explores how this logic merely reasserts the initial direction of the hierarchy 
(Gadamer: 1979; Heckman:1990). I refer here to the essentialist residues of desire that reside beneath 
the construction. Elements of her work have informed my engagement with practice51 , but here I 
merely wish to trace how she creates a theoretical space between the radical constructionism of the 
postmodernist/feminist programme and the philosophic traditions of the Enlightenment. Benhabib 
concentrates on Flax's ideas (1990) but I think this critique equally applies to the work of Adams 
(1996), Adams and Cowie (1990) and Probyn (1996) for example.
Benhabib delineates three spheres that unite the concerns of feminism and postmodernism, 
namely the 'Death of the Subject', the 'Death of Metaphysics' and the 'Death of History'. I will 
concentrate upon the Death of the Subject since this informs the problematic of the active subject 
identified above; in my case, active heterosexual desire in women. Benhabib argues that it is possible to 
take on board the rejection of all essentialist conceptions of human being but only through radical 
situatedness and contextualisation. Furthermore, it is possible to turn away from ideas of pure 
consciousness by engaging in the structures of language without essentialising those structures in 
turn 52 . She argues that the 'Death of the Subject' rapidly leaves the theorist nothing other than a 
fictional entity that has:
"dissolved into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator". 
Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet "another position in language" 
disappear concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity and autonomy. The 
subject that is but another position in language can no longer master and create that 
distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can 
reflect upon them and creatively alter them. (Benhabib: 1992:214)
51 This will be introduce as part of the rethink as to the power of the image.
52 See Eco for a scathing critique of the essentialisation of'la' and Me'.
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1 suggest that the analysis above shows exactly how that dissolved subject is produced within the 
Symbolic. The subject that is left is two-dimensional. Following Benhabib, it is our capacity to 
creatively alter the conditions of existence that makes us human: it is our embodiment that makes us 
radically situated.
Therefore, that radically situatedness need not force a silence on the body. On the contrary, it 
is the body that places us in the world and it is the body that forces a person to take a point of view. 
Bodies are complex and interrelationship between the culture and the body is clearly complex. 
However, in my view, treating bodies and society as interrelated rather than distinct entities offers us a 
hermeneutically sensitive alternative to the raw and the cooked. I am a social being partly because I am 
a body. And as Gatens points out, being a social being is premised on the fact that my body is female. It 
throws me down certain structured paths, but the paths do not determine fully what sense I will make of 
them. My body gives me agency to act not only in the world, but on it, in a transformative way. Thus, I 
challenge the model assessed above by seeking a space between 'sex' as an object outside of society, 
free of discourse and the subject position that fully constitutes my sense of self. The T is not 
independent of either but is a product of their interrelatedness.
AND THE HETEROSEXUAL WOMAN?
Throughout, I have been drawing attention to the theoretical negation of the possibility of an 
active heterosexuality experienced and lived by women. I rebel against the negation because of its 
ahistoricism: I do not have, nor can I ever have, an active form of sexuality. This seems to me to be 
premature. Nor does it tally with the changes within which heterosexuality is being explored by 
women. I do not necessarily think that going to see male strippers is an 'advance' but it seems to 
suggest a shift in the possibilities to experience desire by women in the act of looking. They do not 
watch in silence, alone, unlike the setting of a peep show, but view collectively and experience, what 
may still be transgressive, the desire of looking and are excited by the exhibitionism of the male 
stripper. I do not see that this can be recuperated into the subject positions offered by 
psychoanalytically-based cultural analyses.
There are other theoretical issues to be considered too. I can best engage with these by turning 
to the debates regarding pornography where the link between vision and the erotic is most apparent. 
One of the points that anti-censorship feminists (Snitow et al.:1984) make is that often defining male 
sexuality as active introduces an unhelpful dichotomisation, namely that female sexuality is essentially 
tender and anchored in the connection between mother and child. The ahistoricism of the 
psychoanalytic model tends to accept uncritically the assumption that heterosexual women's desire is 
essentially missing, lodged as it is within the notion of the gentle and tender. The dichotomisation is 
self-defeating. Moreover, it does not really tally with the 'sex talk' documented; for example, Friday's 
(1992) collection of women's sexual stories. Hardy (1998) suggests that there may in fact be much 
more in common between the heterosexualities of men and women than is generally acknowledged. I 
sympathise with this position as it connects with my critique of men and women as opposite rather than 
different in some ways and the same in others.
49
Hardy, I think, offers some insightful thoughts about the heterosexuality, and most 
importantly, he does not shy away from the part power has to play in it. He argues that active/passive 
structures do enter the sexual imaginations of some men. However, his research suggests that thinking 
about patterns of desire within a fixed structure of active/passive re-confirms rather than challenges 
men's thinking regarding the differing sexual patterns of women. Moreover, he argues that positioning 
the variability of men's actual patterns of desire within the hegemonic formations, as structured in 
pornography for example, offers an opening for men and women to generate differing patterns of 
sexual intimacy, rather than locking 'sex talk' to the active/passive structures that Snitow et al. identify 
as self-defeating. Perhaps a part of that ought to be an opening of the notion of desire women gain from 
looking. Moreover, as my results show, there has been a marked shift in the codifications of men's 
bodies, in particular the absence of a social setting with which to negate the objectification implicit 
within the image.
FUNCTIONALISM THROUGH THE BACKDOOR
I have emphasised the extent to which the cultural analyses above stress the structural 
reproduction of subjectivity. Thus, there appears to be no voice outside of the positions offered by the 
Symbolic. Equally, functionalist logic finds itself with the same dilemma. I argue that cultural analyses 
above do in fact carry an idea of the social self but one that is confined to the 'roles' it has been 
assigned. Both end up with a bankrupt version of the social actor, one that is two-dimensional. 
Moreover, both ultimately reside in categorical logic. In order to argue fully how these closures 
implicitly deploy functionalist reason, I will show how this same logic has been transferred to analysis 
of representation of race, exposing again the implicit dependence upon interpellation, and 
psychoanalysis more broadly, in order to connect desire, identification and the social order. By 
showing how this logic applies equally to representations of race, focusing particularly on how a 
subject is unable to hold two positions simultaneously, I isolate how fundamental the functionalist 
reason is to this mode of theorising. I therefore argue that the postmodernists'/feminists' 
reconfigurations of Lacan operate using a functionalist logic, and hence fall at identical hurdles. 
Moreover, the categorical logic and the processes of identification critiqued above can be best 
illustrated using Nayak's analysis of advertisements. The reason I shift to post/colonial theory here is to 
expose how neither model is able to deal with embodiment, that is, the lived patterns of belonging to 
more than one social classification at any one time. I will illustrate this below.
CATEGORICAL LOGIC, IDENTIFICATION AND THE 'SUBJECT' OF RACE
Nayak explores how the black body is seen as a source of unstable, order-threatening but 
intense and extreme desire, as against the moral and order-preserving white body. This discourse is 
drawn upon to mark out the black body as an entity that is beyond regulation and self-control but, most 
importantly, as a powerful force that can seduce and thus pollute white moral regulation. Hence, 
discourse produces 'race' by connecting skin colour to a type of human nature. Yet the mutually
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exclusive categories establish a powerful source of transgression and fascination. Nayak argues that the 
HaSgen-Dazs advertisements encode the black bodies within this discourse, therefore marking the 
black body as intensely sexual and corrupting. This initial delineation already establishes the 
comparative basis of the categorical logic, but also intimates the clash between the subject positions: 
who is occupying which side of the dichotomy and when? For example, an advertisement for the 
campaign, entitled 'Feel Me', displays a black male body unclothed, as 'an objectified figure stood still 
in time' (Nayak: 1997:53). The image deploys codes that freeze the body, rendering it statuesque. The 
back of the body is the 'subject' of the pose, therefore we know nothing about the man: he is his body. 
This permits a fetishisation of the body operating through the athletic and mythological power of the 
natural physique. Presumably, this is derived from the discourse that defines the black male to be much 
more 'of the body'; bound to its capacity for musculature and force. This ideological critique is then 
combined with the notion of the gaze, because, as I argued above, only then can ideological 
representation be shown to matter, since the gaze connects the image to the desiring subject. The pose 
ensures that he remains unaware of the voyeuristic scrutiny of the viewer, and thus the photographic 
subject cannot assert his subjectivity with a returning gaze. 53 The combination of the pose and its 
location within the broader imperialist dichotomy effectively encodes his 'body as object' and the 
'white as the mind'. Again, this draws attention to the possibility that one could substitute male and 
female for black and white, reflecting the closeness of the ideological critique.
Nayak identifies a core code which he describes as the coupling of fear and forbidden 
fascination; the codes draw upon the symbolisation of black masculinity as phallus (p55). He identifies 
the body posture of the black model as arched, hardened through musculature, erect and straining, the 
body itself symbolising a large black penis. Upon his back is a dripping white hand that is losing its 
form. He argues that when this is combined with the hyper-sexuality of the black man's body, it means 
that the white ice cream could stand for semen and the uncontrolled emissions of a primitive sexuality. 
The black man as phallus is confirmed by the removal of the head from the visual frame of the 
reference. This acts as a symbolic form of castration, a timely reminder of where the real control of this 
fantasy lies. Nayak concludes that the phallic construction of black masculinities54 substitutes penis for 
personality, thereby 'eclipsing the negro. He is turned into a penis. He is the penis' (Nayak:54; quoting 
Fanon: 1970:120). The logic is pursued further so that the phallus continues to secure power, but this 
time, the phallus being defined by the black man.
At this point, Nayak shifts the domain of analysis: the movement swings from the semiotic 
domain, with its concern with the constructions of meaning and the broader ideological location that 
gives these signs their weight, to the defining moment of subjectivity:
Significantly, the 'racial' dichotomy is also informative of white subjectivity in a doubly 
defining moment where the construction of the fantastic black Other simultaneously discloses
53 1 will be returning to this because it represents a brief example that encapsulates the slips made
regarding the gaze, image, identity and photograph. Goffman traces this very well, and I borrow from
his complex analysis to support my position that some images, advertisements in particular, are about
'the world' but only partially. He argues that representations of this kind hyper-stylise conventions of
interaction.
54 The first time a plural is used.
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the elaboration of whiteness ... Analysing how such phobic bodily representations are put 
together can expose anxieties that lie within white ethnicity ... For Kobena Mercer, the fear 
and desire surrounding the black body 'not only demonstrates the disturbances and decentring 
of dominant versions of white identity, but confronts whiteness with the otherness that enables 
it to be constituted as an identity as such.' (Nayak: 1997:56) (my italics)
Hence, he has swung from the frame of semiotics into the effects of the meaning. The codification of a 
specific kind of image, aiming to sell a specific kind of product, speaks about the desiring patterns and 
their pathological manifestations as identity. The ideology constructs desire within white ethnicity. 
Moreover, his quote shows that Mercer makes the same errors: he moves from the notion of 'version' 
to the effective constitution of the identity. Implicitly, the dependence upon interpellation remains 
central because only then can the formation be said to produce 'a mental orgasm that the "perverse" 
black body appears capable of inducing [which] is informative of the phantasmal and phobic 
machinations of whiteness' (p55). This mirrors the form of the feminist cultural analysis above. In 
addition, Nayak argues that the use of single black bodies has the effect of positioning the 'male' 
viewer as the fantasy organiser, capable of almost entering the scene and the bodies on display. This 
parallels the fantasy of omnipotence the masculine assumes by having the phallus. The structural 
orientation and positioning of the subject leads Nayak to fail to problematise who is viewing this 
advertisement. If the viewer is assumed to be Black then this problematises the analysis of the black 
objectiflcation insofar as the viewer is presumed to have the phallus and therefore cannot be the phallus 
as well.
This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind is determined by the categorical 
application of the group in question, which is then elevated to the structural organisation of meaning 
and the corresponding identity. The outcome is that they are fundamentally unable to cope with two 
oppressed subject positions at the same time. The (male) black model is defined as 'being the phallus', 
as the object of desire and fear, which is the very entity by which the whiteness and/or white identity 
establishes itself. Yet, despite the fact that the eroticisation of the body is said to serve as a fetish for 
the white imagination, this is reconfigured as an instance of transgress) ve desire integral to the queer 
look. Thus, the single codification is made to serve both the reproduction of the normative white order 
and therefore the negation of the other, yet it also secures the very production of the transgressive 
identification, namely the queer look. Alternatively, how are we to define the subject position of the 
white woman? Does the representation position the white (woman) as the subject who is constituted 
through the negation, or the (white) woman as the very source by which the Master knows himself? 
This is a fundamental contradiction.
In more general terms, Nayak identifies clearly the various uses of black and white to 
commodify ice cream sexually; therefore the ideological map is insightful. An ideological map does 
not have be free of contradiction unless treated as causally effective. However, his analysis falters 
when extended beyond this domain. This is most clearly manifested when the article breaks away from 
the advertisement, as both a constitution of power and a source of identification, to how the formations 
of the body represented can stimulate transgressive desire. Nayak includes here readings by black gay
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men of Mapplethorpe's photographs, which the first example copies, and attends to 'pleasures of 
reading against the grain'. Such examples coalesce to create the 'possibility of subversive readings and 
radical alliance - "evoking female desire, gay looks and affirming black male identity'" (p60). Yet, the 
ideological analysis previously asserted forecloses such modes of reading. Just like Cowie, he ought to 
stipulate where such free subversive readings come from, given the assumption of the interpellation of 
image and subject. Does it not undermine the order of the Symbolic if so many fail to assume its 
positions and pleasures? The issue of agency forces a space between the pervasiveness of ideology, in 
this case racist ideology, and the corresponding construction of identity.
Furthermore, and I am indebted to Connell (1987:185) for pointing out this relatively simple 
inversion, just as the representations do not speak of the real lives of those represented, neither should 
we assume, de facto, that ideological constructions of meaning say anything about those whose power 
it protects. White people, or men, for that matter, may well have access to illegitimate power, by virtue 
of their embodiment, irrespective of whether they seek to act on it. However, the point is, and this is a 
fundamentally empirical point, the power base is there to act on should the occasion arise. In this way, 
the structural ordering of power can be understood as something that exists among a group, without one 
having to argue that this power is dependent upon the unified and homogenised identification. The 
differentiation aims to open up a space for the asymmetry that exists between the structure and its 
relationship to power and those who act within them: the structures of power cannot be assumed 
uniformly to determine those who hold power.
IMAGE, IDENTIFICATION AND THE ANALYTIC DEPENDENCE UPON FUNCTIONALIST 
REASON
I begin with the reflection that the above analysis is united by approaching the body as 
'system problem', namely that its organisation is in line with social structural requirements. Thus, the 
Law, within postmodernism/feminism, or the order of the whiteness, according to post-colonialist 
theory, is the starting point. Borrowing from the long-standing interactionist critique that structural 
Marxists and functional theorists were indistinguishable bar their normative departure, I argue that the 
same critique applies to alleged postmodern shift. Both models struggle to maintain an emphasis on 
social or interpretive indeterminacy. When included, it tends to lead to such variability that the 
(illegitimate) normative order stops the causal mechanism whereby reasons, as defined by the 
normative order, cause action. Ultimately, I argue, this homology is based upon the wholesale failure 
by a postmodern agenda to deal with the mediations of power between action and structure. I will begin 
with each part of Parsons' model and follow with examples and concepts that follow such reasoning.
FUNCTIONAL LOGIC AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
The Parsonsian backdrop has as one of its defining features the presupposition that the 
presence of the normative order is insufficient to assume its determining function in organising the 
social. Parsons begins by addressing the Hobbesian problem of the social order: random or non-unified
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pursuits produce a social order that is dictated by force, fraud and social conflict. The normative order 
is, therefore, the mechanism that removes the discordance of agents pursuing their own individual ends. 
Furthermore, without coordination, the alternative means and action of others would be impossible to 
explain and thus their actions and ends are random. Parsons' development therefore rests upon his 
insight that the ends pursued through individual action must cohere with the actions of others within a 
common framework. Moreover, this common framework must be a collective of larger social and 
cultural processes through which actions can be rendered sensible. To conclude, the normative order 
explains how reasons as causes of action connect individual action to a larger system of actions.
A connection is therefore required between the wide range of values held by individual 
members and a broad system of values necessary for the good of that society. Hence, Parsons requires a 
mechanism whereby the values of the society become an internal position, which motivates individuals 
towards appropriate action. Parsons' answer is internalisation, 55 and through this concept he integrates 
three elements. He begins by defining social integration as the product of the collective subscription to 
commonly held norms and values. Next, he stipulates that such values are 'internalised'. These two 
elements are then combined: the internalised values do not merely limit egoistic tendencies but become 
constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire appropriate for the collective.
Taking his influence from Durkheim and Freud, Parsons requires that actors discriminate 
between the various objects in the situation and that social objects be invested with accordant positive 
or negative cathartic significance (Parsons: 1951:201-26). Following on, the social actor must evaluate 
possible courses of action in relation to them. These three steps are further guided by culturally 
transmitted value orientations or 'organised sets of rules and standards' (1951:60). The social rules, 
once internalised, go on to determine the validity of their cognitive judgements, the appropriate 
cathartic attachments, for example (compulsory) heterosexuality, and the social actions then 
undertaken.
The central principles of social organisation are the following. The primary anchor is that the 
normative rules are the causes of action. By deploying the Freudian concept of internalisation, Parsons 
is able to develop a system in which internalised value standards are uniquely integrated to institutional 
activity. Moreover, the internalised values are constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire. For 
example, in becoming heterosexual, we become subjects that the social order requires and this socially 
determined subject is equivalent to who we think we are, which further motivates us to marry and 
defines our desires to have children.
The homology begins with the parallel descriptions. First, the functionalist and the 
postmodernist/feminist structural models argue that the social values of the order assume an internal 
position, and both depend upon internalisation as a mechanism to ensure that society's values feel like 
my values. This is why I have emphasised throughout the elements of psychoanalytic models that seek 
to look at the formation of the subject in terms of a broader social order problem. The Oedipus complex 
straddles the formation of the subject in terms of familial context and the formation of the super-ego 
that must correlate with the moral order. Second, both establish the correlation between the (external)
55 The concept represents the later stages of Parsons' work at Harvard: Towards a General Theory of 
Action and The Social System.
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values of the social order and the subject. Third, these external social values, once internalised, are 
constitutive of the objects of desire and thus responsible for moral regulation. The 
postmodernist/feminist agenda seeks to intervene in this constitution and its relationship with the 
'moral' order, which leaves the feminine as 'less moral'. I argue that the apparent re-location of the 
Oedipal complex into the domain of language does not alter the broader employment of functionalist 
reason. Lacanian application has merely brought these organised sets of rules and standards under the 
banner of the 'Law of the Father' and made the transmission of the rules operative through language. 
The normative order is not tightly carried through the system of language. Finally, both establish the 
normative order as prior to the subject56 and formative of a subject that acts according to the 
appropriate norms and values; the normative order is inside the subject and thus motivates him/her to 
act accordingly.
Parsons recognises that this process is a tenuous one. Making the social system an internal one 
opens the subject up to the threat or strain of not being able to live up to the demands of the social 
situation and/or role. This causes painful internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. This challenges 
the assumption that only the psychoanalytic model of the subject is able to cope with internal conflict. 
Moreover, Barnes (1979 in Barnes and Sharpin) rightly notes that Parsons' failure was not that he did 
not address deviancy or social change; on the contrary, Parsons' attention to deviancy was extensive 
because he understood that the failure fully to internalise norms and values was ubiquitous within his 
model. Equally, therefore, Parsons recognises that the formation of the 'subject as internalised norms' 
is never complete, which is why a system of sanctions and rewards is required. Hence, the maintenance 
of the social system as subjective disposition is further strengthened by negative sanctioning or threat 
of having love and praise withdrawn. This further exacerbates the threat of internal conflict and the loss 
of self-esteem. It cannot be argued therefore that Parsons is closed to internal conflict. He utilises these 
threats further to stabilise the social system as subjective disposition so that deviation from the standard 
expectations will be immediately met with negative sanctioning, the loss of social standing and other 
disadvantageous consequences. This directly parallels Lacan's function of the 'Law of the Father' 
(1989). The fact that postmodernists/feminists seek to magnify this failure is not a negation of the 
functional reason but its confirmation: the subject position/role becomes an internalised position; 
subject is what the system's normative order stipulates, so we can only look to its failure to find 
'something outside' of the order. Their 'something outside' is tr^nsgressive desire. Likewise, the 
attainment of heterosexuality by the woman is the moment the normative order has colonised the 
subject, which is why there is no pleasure for the feminine other than the masochistic desire that this 
identification secures; hence Mulvey's initial formulation of the male gaze.
Ostensibly, by making social system requirements and the internal subjective states equivalent 
to each other, Parsons has made the social system and the social role mirror reflections. Althusser's 
model of interpellation parallels this model, bar the normative departure. The social system is 
coordinated to meet sectional interests as opposed to collective interests and the social system can 
function with this essential conflict only if the system becomes an internal and subjective condition.
56 Parsons' subject no more represents a natural or essential one than does the 
postmodernists'/feminists'.
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Hence, the subject has a set of internalised values that become their own, which is why they work for 
the system. This forms the basis for the postmodernist/feminist synthesis between Althusser and Lacan 
because theorists define alienation as a primary feature of subjectivity. Ostensibly, therefore, social role 
and subject position are the same thing: the subjective conditions correlate with the social requirements 
of the order; neither includes nor accounts for interpretive indeterminacy.
This exposes the fundamental problem with the postmodernist/feminist applications of Lacan: 
from where is their own normative evaluation made? Recasting Lacanian dialectic from the internal 
position in the subject to structural opposites between the feminine other and the Masculine Symbolic 
Law means they have no speech that is not of the Law, and thus no place to account for how they make 
such a normative departure. Unlike Althusser (1971), they cannot call upon the critical distance 
between subject and position brought about by the objectivity of positivist science. Hence, the double 
effectiveness of the Masculine as the Symbolic locks the feminine as subject into the Real, which, like 
many theories that mobilise functionalist logic for a radical agenda, must look to some 'quasi-space' 
that lies outside the socialised subject. In conclusion, therefore, this feminist model comes face to face 
with failure of normative determinism: making the social action an outcome of psychological 
disposition means that they cannot account for their normative evaluations. Nor can they account for 
the public nature of meaning.
THE FAILURES OF NORMATIVE DETERMINISM - BOTH FUNCTIONALIST AND 
POSTMODERN
In principle, Parsonsian functionalism stresses that institutions can be non-coercively 
maintained by emphasising that normative order assumes an internal position. Parsons was right to 
identify the existence of macro norms and values as universal and thus move towards a model of 
society as containing a normative order. Yet this is precisely where Parsons' problems begin, namely 
that social orders must be explained in terms of the motivation for action:
It is through internalisation of common patterns of value-orientations that a system of social 
interaction can be stabilised. Put in personality terms, this means that there is an element of 
super-ego organisation correlative with every role-orientation pattern of the individual in 
question. In every case, the internalisation of a super-ego element means motivation to accept 
the priority of collective over personal interests, within the appropriate limits on the 
appropriate occasions. (Parsons: 1951:150) (my italics)
Thus, action that is outside the role/subject position is always defined as an instance of temporary 
transgression or deviancy. Parsons and postmodernists/feminists alike simply have no way of dealing 
with sustained, systematic form of resistant action that is persistent and ordered; it can never be 
rational. This action is authentic social action, ipso facto. Barnes argues that his notion of the social, 
being confined to a psychological disposition, is simply too narrow, and with it rational action is never
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dealt with comprehensively. Nowhere does he deal with the interpretive practices that individuals and 
groups bring to the things they do.
Likewise, the postmodernists/feminists have an equally ambiguous position towards action 
and, in fact, this reflects why it is rarely 'seen'. I return to the quote from Grosz: 'dominant 
representational systems ... leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity'. They 
question how, and from where, active femininity may emerge. This is only a problem because they 
have elevated (illegitimate) norms as the causes of the action and, because the subject position is the 
outcome of internalisation of those norms and values, they cannot 'find' any action that is not defined 
by those norms. Therefore, action is characterised by compliance.
By tackling motivation in terms of internalised norms and values, Parsons automatically treats 
them as the causes of action. This remains one of Parsons' fundamental errors. As Heritage succinctly 
defines it:
this treatment inexorably draws attention away from the logic of action, that is the 
interpretative bases in which actions are constructed and understood in terms which are 
meaningful to the actors involved. Starting from a framework which began with the subjective 
point of view of the actor, Parsons had arrived at an entirely external analysis of the norms 
and values which he treated as constraining and determining conduct. (Heritage: 1984:18)
Parsons made what is truly social a condition of acting in accordance with internalised norms and 
values. Therefore, what is truly social in any order must be the outcome of individualised, subjectively 
motivated actions, produced through the internalisation of the appropriate norms and values. 
Furthermore, any action that is to count as social must be caused, via constraint and conditioning, by 
those very same norms and values. In effect, Parsons has reduced the social to clear unambiguous 
psychological states. Again, this parallels the notion that the normative order, redefined as ideology, 
occupies the subject: the subject is that subject position: the paternal law, via the universality of 
language, assumes an internalised, psychological dimension. In fact, by re-casting the normative order 
into a linguistic entity, Lacanianism secures it further by making the very system through which, and 
by which, we speak. It is the determining function awarded to norms and values, equating them with 
the causes of action, that fundamentally failed to integrate the micro-practices that people do with the 
system. Thus, despite this endeavour to integrate the system and actors, Parsons ends up effectively 
with a model of the actor that is unable to undertake social action. Hence his failure to account for 
deviancy and social change. The social order is effective through the psychological make-up of the 
actor; deviation from that order is symptomatic of a pathology or at least, in Parsonsian terms, the non- 
rational.
Nayak's work also introduces an additional problem, which reflects the emphasis I placed 
upon his stipulations regarding the subject positions instituted through the representation. Functionalist 
reason stipulates that the normative order assume an internal position. How then are we to account for 
a body that assumes two subject positions simultaneously? Or rather, how is the actor to perform, in 
accordance with the normative order, in two social roles that conflict? In addition, how is a subject to
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respond? Do I respond to you because you are a man who happens to be middle class like me, or do I 
respond to your difference, namely your gender? Nayak thus finds himself confronted with the 
impossibility of dealing with two structural locations and thus two subject positions that the body 
intersects at the same time. This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind has tended to remain 
silent regarding such intersections. This form of theorising merely extends the categorical logic by 
adding one category upon another. Never are the categories integrated. This theorisation cannot 
consider embodiment, which attempts to fuse together these elements. Rather, the analysis is subject to 
the same problems as the sex/gender distinction by leaving the naturalised classifications intact. It 
neither integrates them into the flow of life nor deconstructs the categorical logic that underpins the 
classification.
Thus, just as Parsons loses sight of action, so too do the postmodernists/feminists when they 
seek to apply their model. Parsons' actor acts on the basis of his internalised position, in accordance 
with an organised set of rules. In parallel, actions that define the feminine are those actions that support 
and reproduce the order. I have argued that only if one adopts Flax's position does the empirical 
problem of'women emerge. They have made the patriarchal normative order the very 'soul' of the 
feminine and, consequently, the motivations and desires are caused by norms of that order. Hence, 
Benhabib's critique that this leaves us without an active and socially-situated subject.
The overly determining function awarded the internalisation of the norms and values extends 
beyond the failure to address sustained and rational resistance; it equally distorts both Parsons' and the 
postmodernist/feminist treatment of regular social action. For example, the creative output of a 
conversation falls outside analysis. One can discuss, one may have a particularly coherent line of 
argument composed before the conversation begins and one may abide by the rules of conversation, 
nevertheless, the exchange and identifying where the conversation ends cannot be defined by adherence 
to those norms. They cannot determine the nuances that really define a conversation (Gadamer:1979). 
Such social interactions are sustained without recourse to a normative order. The conversation, in any 
form, is not the re-performance of the norms. I have in mind here the emerging trend to stress that the 
representation is a re-presentation, thereby re-establishing the feminine as passive and its associate 
identification. Just as with Parsons, such an emphasis simplifies greatly the complexity and depth of 
social interaction and/or interpretive actions which an ongoing activity requires. The indeterminacy that 
Lacan allows through the slipping signifier has to be foreclosed so that the structural relationship 
between the feminine as other and the Masculine as the speaking T can be sustained. The consequence 
is that the signifier returns to the feminine as castrated. The feminist normative criteria require the 
foreclosure of what meanings can be generated and thus spoken. We have two famous instances of this: 
first, Kristeva, who argues that 'strictly speaking there is no such thing as a Woman' (1986); second, 
Spivak (Nelson and Grossberg:1988) makes the same error when she asks whether the Subaltern can 
speak. Therefore, the subject position is even more determined by the normative order than in Parsons.
However, I argue that, on the contrary, feminists are able to make the critiques they do 
precisely because the normative order does not attain an internal position. They have identified the 
capacity of individuals to assume other values where circumstances encourage it, which is precisely the 
skill that confidence tricksters deploy (Goffrnan: 1969). What such examples show is that, far from
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internalising norms and values, which makes them stable and fixed, such stability is the outcome of 
contexts of action, not of the individual. Again this reflects the critical emphasis I have placed upon the 
requirement that a subject submit to the law to assume the T, as argued by the 
postmodernists/feminists. 1 have argued throughout that the postmodern agenda cannot merely seek 
non-identity and maintain the existence of the social order, illegitimate or otherwise. Thus individuals 
move between contexts because they have the rational dexterity to adopt new situations, to more 
situationally appropriate norms. It reveals the extent to which individuals utilise instrumental, rational 
responses to the demands that a context sets. For example, some homosexuals are only out socially, 
which means that they are able to draw upon situationally appropriate conventions to pass at work. The 
normative order cannot be both responsible for the formation of the subject and yet too weak to allow it 
to be set aside if the context so demands. This runs beneath the critique of the assumption that ideology 
is effective in the formation of the subject, yet so weak as to provide psychic capacity so that any 
subject position is available within that circuit. We cannot be both formed through such structural 
positions and yet free to assume any identification our desire demands. Accepting that we live with the 
normative order and rejecting that we are the normative order means that we can account for the 
variability of interpretation without losing sight of the social context that stabilises interpretive acts that 
gives them meaning. Thus, most importantly, the rejection of the notion that the normative order 
assumes an internal position means that we return norms and values to the public domain. 57 Thus, we 
are able to consider representations reflexively, while maintaining their location within the social 
world.
Barnes concludes:
Social action is not co-extensive with normatively constrained action; it extends beyond it. 
Norms and values are not implanted stably in individual minds; they persist in the public 
realm not the private, the social context not the individual psyche. Norms and values have no 
inherent implications which enforce and sustain a social order; on the contrary they are 
provided with implications by interacting human beings, so that what norms imply can in no 
sense explain how people interact. Accordingly, we can conclude, without equivocation or 
qualification, that normative determinism fails. (Barnes: 1979:36)
Likewise, the postmodernist/feminist agenda equally fails to describe social action because it redefines 
the normative order as ideological and seeks to locate the effectivity of the normative order within the 
formation of the subject. This model, in a bid to pursue a radical agenda, equally brings about exclusion 
of social action, replacing it instead with privatised, highly concealed motivations. Moreover, just as 
Parsons ends up with a model of the actor who often is unable to give the real determining or 
motivating forces behind his/her action unless the description happens to correspond with the 
determinative subjective elements (Bohman: 1991:36), the postmodernist/feminist cannot integrate the 
conscious descriptions and meanings that actors award their own action into the model of social
57 1 am indebted to Barnes for pointing out that the internalisation of the normative order signals the 
privatisation of the linguistic, normative domain. I develop this in the conclusion.
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causation. This is why pleasure is addressed via the concealed homoerotic orientation, an orientation 
that is equally concealed from the conscious subject.
IN CONCLUSION
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the postmodernist/feminist model assumes an 
inferential relationship between the representation of the masculine/active and feminine/passive axis 
and the correlated formation of the subject position as subjectivity. By further embedding this axis 
within the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, postmodernism/feminism forecloses the forms of 
codification and meaning that the representation can assume and thus forecloses the subjectivities it 
positions. Moreover, I argued that the broader psychoanalytic context reveals an implicit dependence 
upon functionalist reason that ostensibly organises the structural imperatives of the social order as 
equivalent to the social roles or subject positions performed: the subject is the normative order. This 
description asserts that the nature of the Symbolic operation is such that it will construct modes of 
codification that categorically distribute the feminine with the passive. Only then can the feminine be 
utilised to define the masculine as its opposite, with the consequence that the feminine is defined as the 
absolute Other. I also added that, theoretically, the sign in fact is as the stereotypes were, in the sense 
that there remains an implicit commitment to the notion that the representation could furnish an 
authentic identity.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL REASSESSMENT
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The empirical work undertaken here seeks to investigate the validity of the assumed 
descriptions and codes derived from this inferential relationship. I propose that in order to challenge the 
postmodernist/feminist description it is necessary to trace anew the extent to which the Symbolic, 
which assumes sexual difference is the primary difference, remains the pervasive determinant of 
representation and, if so, in what form. I do so by undertaking a content analysis of fashion 
advertisements because only by engaging with the manifest and generalised features of a collection of 
images can we get a sense of the extent to which the feminine is actually categorically connected to the 
passive. I argue that if the feminine as passive defines the Symbolic, then it must be apparent within 
our universe of representations, fashion advertisements included. Semiotics can readily produce a 
number of instances where the meaning is clearly marked by the gendered oppositions of the Symbolic. 
However, I argue that the increasing dominance of semiotic analyses, which produce intricate maps of 
meaning of a handful of images, is at the expense of the generalisable contours. Resulting from the 
tendency to give disproportionate attention to how meaning is produced at the expense of what 
generalised features are manifest within representation, I propose that we are no longer familiar with 
the manifest features of representation.
Therefore, I argue that we need to readdress the basic features of images: is it still the case that 
core-gendered dichotomies of the Symbolic empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of 
representation? I attend to this by applying a taxonomy of the body that combines specific gendered 
gestures and postures with the broader techniques that construct the image. Together, these 
conventionalised features connect to the discursive features of the Symbolic that produce sexual 
difference. 1 have isolated codes that are paradigmatic to the postmodern/feminist agenda, as well as 
identifying codes that correspond to key elements of their agenda. Hence, the taxonomy is guided by 
two principles:
1. The final meaning ought to ensure that the feminine-as-passive is manifestly apparent.
2. This level of meaning is graspable using content analysis because the meaning attended to is 
conventional and not unduly complex.
I am suggesting that if content analysis is strictly confined to 'what is in the image' it can make an 
effective contribution to cultural analysis.
Principally, content analysis must concern itself with conventional patterns of representation 
that are regular and manifest. By locating the nature of a category within the conventions that form it, 
one can place some distance between its historical association with objectivism and inappropriate truth 
claims regarding a cultural form, while systematically collating generalised forms of representation. 1 
will attend to this level analysis by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, 
regarding the productive codification of gender. Only if the content analysis strongly indicates that the 
categorical distribution is empirically dominant can the strength of their claims regarding the fixity of 
the Symbolic and the sexual difference it produces be considered legitimate. Moreover, I argue that the 
overt interrelationship between the advertisement image and the economic base within which it is 
produced limits the complexity of the 'advertisement as text', because advertisements are first and
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foremost economic: they must secure consumption. Therefore, I suggest that there is a level of meaning 
found in the cultural form of advertising that is conventional, regular and thoroughly public. Content 
analysis is able systematically to access this level of meaning. In fact, it is best placed to analyse the 
manifest features of meaning providing it is confinedto its conventional level.
METHOD AND REPRESENTATION
The chapter begins with a discussion of the principal aims of the empirical research and 
introduces some of the central methodological issues involved. I will draw out from a summary of the 
postmodernist/feminist model the combined theoretical and methodological weaknesses that are a 
consequence of sole dependence upon semiotics. I will then follow this by explaining why my aims are 
best examined using content analysis, despite its weaknesses, particularly positivistic associations, and 
its supersedence by semiotics. Hence, this initial introduction examines the relationship between the 
theoretical aims and the methods chosen, particularly their respective strengths and weaknesses.
I go on to describe why fashion advertisements were selected, the magazines from which the 
sample was taken and the sampling technique and the use of chi-square to analyse the frequency data 
generated. I also provide a description of the statistics package 'Snap for Windows', explaining the 
different formats and the impact that filtering and suspending elements of the sample population has 
upon the results.
A detailed description of the taxonomy58 follows, paying particular attention to sources and 
debates that it references and analyses. Alongside the codes identified by the postmodernists/feminists, 
I have also included a number of variables that draw directly upon Goffman's 'Gender Advertisements' 
(1979). In particular, I have adopted from Goffrnan the way frames draw upon specific features of 
social interaction and stylise them (see Leiss et al. (1986) for an alternative application). In this way, 
'hyper-realistic' codifications function by making seemingly 'realistic' representations of ourselves. 
Through the hyper-ritualistic transformations, images can appear to be 'about our social world' and yet 
fundamentally divorced from that reality; for example, relative positions in space can be reproduced 
within the two-dimensional frame and thus convey the same conventions of status. The same model of 
identifying regular units that guide the composition of the commercial image has been used here. The 
notion of commercial realism appeals because it foregrounds the centrality of the economic function, 
and combines this with the mode of representation it produces.
This is followed by a discussion of the methodological departure that is specific to this 
research. Unlike many forms of research examining sex scales or other stereotypes, I have refrained 
from defining those features that are feminine as part of the operationalisation. As an alternative, I have 
isolated a series of codes that have been used to describe gender, but 1 do not organise, prior to the data 
analysis, which descriptive term reflects which gender. Connell (1987) discusses the categorical nature 
of much of the research on sexual type and character, which I argue equally defines the logic that is 
also present in the feminist studies discussed above. I argue that the alignment of gendered codes to the 
sexed body prior to the data analysis reproduces the 'truth1 that these very same categories continue to
58 For a detailed description of the evaluative criteria used for each code developed, see appendix.
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describe the gender well. My aim is to avoid such closures as well as expand upon the existing 
discussion of the categorical nature of much of the research surrounding 'the feminine'.
The final section presents the reasons why I have elected to undertake a quantitative method 
within a more broadly interpretive model. Attention will focus upon the justification for the 
quantification of meaning, paying particular attention to defending the position that signs can be 
dissected according to specific categories, and that these categories do not merely reflect some form of 
discursive imposition. The notion of the conventional origins, rather than objectivist origins, of the 
category is central here.
AIMS
The taxonomy aims to problematise the assumptions that underpin the dominant explanatory 
models in feminist Cultural Studies and the postmodern philosophical models that inform it. They 
focus upon the deep features of the social order that are determined by essential dualistic terms; terms 
derived initially from Levi-Strauss and reconfigured into essential linguistic structures by Derrida59 
(Delphy:1996; Cowie:1997). I argue that the structural legacy that remains implicit within this model 
removes the prospect that social dimensions can change and shift in a qualitative sense, rather than 
emerging as another example or presentation of the same (denoted the neologism '(re)presentation') 
(Descombes: 1986). In particular, it removes from the view the possibilities that representations of 
gender could converge insofar as they begin to share key presentational features. This would 
problematise the categoricalism that defines their analysis. I have suggested that one of the outcomes of 
this theoretical model is its failure to identify both the extent to which the masculine is now sexualised 
and commodified and, most importantly, that these processes may in fact be converging with the 
feminine so that the male body is codified using the same visual techniques. In the preceding chapter, I 
offered a critique of the reorganisation of an example that 'on surface' appears to contradict the 
Symbolic order as in fact constituting another instance of the Symbolic, often by using the imaginary to 
reassert the binary logic.
Thus, a singularly important element remains the presumed universality of the signs. This is 
partly derived from the content analyses conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s where the 
universality of certain features were empirically demonstrated. Hence, I aim to re-examine the extent to 
which the dichotomies traced still empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of 
representation. I will do this by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, between 
the codification of men and women: how is the body codified and where does the gender differentiation 
lie? Describing the manifest forms of gender display that advertisements put to use traces anew the 
general trends in gender advertisements, and this raises a number of core research questions:
1. Is it still possible to describe the modes of representation in dichotomous terms?
59 This is important because it is also the source that treats the representation as real in a way a 
corporeal body is real; that is, the body dissolves into a discursive register rather than being an entity 
that both limits what that register can be and also limits an individual's capacity to represent a feature 
of that register, under normal circumstances. Berthelot, Body and Society, 1995.
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2. To what extent have these representations remained the same over time?
3. Is the core dichotomy of masculine activity and feminine passivity still the central ideological
feature? 
Together these form the following problematic:
4. What are the relationships between men and women and the codes, props, contexts and body 
positions that maintain objectification and commodification as gendered processes within 
representation?
I cannot stress enough that no inferential statement is made or presumed about the relationship of 
representation to identity. On the contrary, the overall aim of this thesis is to contest this very 
inference. Neither do I claim that the data generated can be generalised to extend to the genre of 
advertisements per se, let alone all representations of men and women. I suggest only that if the 
postmodernist/feminist argument is to hold true at all then the description it provides ought to be 
applicable here. I argue that to make an effective critique of the paradigmatic hold that the 
postmodernist/feminist description and analysis have within the academic community, it is necessary to 
apply systematically their terms to the images in circulation.
CENTRAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Content analysis refers to a standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the 
presence, the intensity or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science. 
(Roberts: 1997:14)
I elected to conduct a content analysis precisely because it aims to trace standard symbols that 
can be systematically applied to a sample population. This goes some way to balancing the current 
dominance of semiotics that attends to the detailed specificities of a single image. By producing 
systematic descriptive data, content analysis identifies the central features that define the 
representations in that particular cultural field or cultural market. This macro perspective furnishes 
patterns that are almost impossible to identify unless large numbers are assessed according to the same 
criteria, and, despite certain issues addressed in a moment, this remains one of its central empirical 
contributions. In particular, without a 'survey' of representation, we face the following dilemma: one 
example is presented as an instance of cultural change and another may be offered as a counter 
example; which application is actually representative of change or social status? In theory, this could 
continue indefinitely unless a context is provided in which we have a sense of how 'representative' 
either illustration is. Conducting a content analysis provides systematic organisation and 
operationalisation of the criteria by which an image is to be analysed. When combined, the systematic 
framework organises the data in ways that separate the material from the impressions one forms and the 
tertiary levels of interpretation (Panofsky: 1970) in which one readily engages. Yet what one loses in 
the subtlety of interpretation that attending the tertiary level provides one gains in critical distance.
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Berelson (1971) has set a number of methodological parameters that guide the application of 
this method. First, Berelson argues that content analysis can best follow the scientific research criteria 
if the operationalisation utilises systematic procedures, which integrate objective practices into the 
coding frame. Second, he argues that this principle therefore requires that the content subject to 
statistical manipulation must be of a manifest form only. Therefore, he argues that there ought to be a 
picture of the general context so that those elements that are factual and their associate meanings can be 
quantified. There is a specific departure that I make regarding the conventions of content analysis. I 
redefine my categories as systematic rather than objective. By making this shift, I wish to import the 
notion that the categories are reflexively constructed so that they connect to both the area under 
analysis and to specific community interpreters. The assumption that meaning can be 
unproblematically divided into its manifest and 'latent' forms illustrates one of the grounds on which 
positivistic applications of content analysis have been so thoroughly rejected. This is why 1 have 
endeavoured to pin my categories to those that have emerged from the postmodernist/feminist analysis. 
Therefore, my categories are not necessarily universal, but they are sufficiently public within the terms 
of the debates and critiques here to be applicable in a systematic way.
There is an additional impact that treating the categories as conventional and regular rather 
than objective has upon the status of the statistical analysis. I recognise that 'statistical analysis is only 
as good as its operationalisation', which is why the contexts, both socio-historical and linguistic, have a 
direct bearing upon the categorisation and that the specific conventions that I draw upon have been 
made as visible as possible. Therefore, I make no claim that the categories contained here are final, or 
'hard facts', or mind-independent features that reveal something 'fundamentally true'. Arguably, such 
claims were always outside the remit of content analysis. I argue only that reflexive and systematic 
application of the codes provides a context so that it is possible to engage in a critical commentary with 
the postmodernist/feminist descriptions of the gendered body.
Next, the results of such analysis cannot be extended beyond the sample population. This 
principle is one that Liess, Kline and Jhally (1986) advocate also. This means that any results obtained 
from the taxonomy cannot be extended beyond the population of fashion advertisements. Therefore, I 
make no assertions that the shifts that may occur reflect some broader shifts in the Symbolic. Abiding 
by this strict principle of application does not affect the critique made: the postmodernist/feminist 
analysis asserts that the gendered dualisms are primary and thus they must be apparent in most 
mainstream, if not all, representation. Therefore, if these dualisms are not found to organise the 
representations analysed here, this undermines their claims for the centraliry and unity of the Symbolic 
and sexual difference. Following Berelson, 1 do not seek to extend the specific features identified here 
to other forms of representation, but argue that the empirically identified manifest content contests the 
presumed universality and categorical distributions of the cultural signs in circulation.
Unlike Krippendorf (1980), Berelson (1971) argues that content analysis cannot furnish 
inferential statements regarding impact or effect of the communication. Again, Liess et al. (1986) 
equally regard this as outside the remit of content analysis. They argue that the most beneficial 
outcome of conducting a content analysis is derived from the patterns that emerge from processing 
large sample sizes. This also stands in opposition to other forms of analysis proposed by Cartwright
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(1953 in Berelson:1971), for example, who advocates the extension of content analysis to behaviour 
observation, such as 'NVC' studies in psychology. This hits at the centre of the debates concerning 
content analysis among its practitioners: whether content analysis should and can provide inferences 
regarding the encoding process and what the audiences do with the product. Following Berelson and 
Leiss et al., I argue this extends content analysis beyond its remit; coding observation removes the 
centrality of conscious intentional meaning that combines with the embodied performance, which does 
not lend itself to quantification.
I have also queried the inferential relationship presumed between representation and identity 
by arguing that the descriptive detail of an image is insufficient to describe the 'effects' on, formation 
of or interpretations of the subject. This reflects both my theoretical concerns of tracing the general 
contours of a group of gender representation, as well as providing defining limits of what a 'survey' 
application can reveal. I will make the case below that advertisements function through simplification 
of the social world and thus do not operate through anything like the same complexity of exchange that 
marks streams of interactions within the lived social world. I make no claims that what is presented 
here is 'a definitive statement' on the representations under consideration. This is not, therefore, the 
only way these images could be approached.
Shapiro and Markoff argue:
the effort to analyse a society or personality, or to learn something of importance about it 
exclusively by means of a content analysis of some of its literary products, is, in our view, 
based upon much more questionable methodological principles than the more modest (but 
sufficiently difficult) effort to measure one or more variables by means of some kind of 
processing of the text. (1997:17)
In other words, grappling with meaning is not a sufficient base from which to make inferences about 
interpretive activities or the formation of subjectivities. This suggests that perhaps what caused content 
analysis to lose favour is not just the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in the model of signification, 
but that it had been extended beyond its proper parameters. Content analysis tended to shift from 
identifying stereotypes to tracing the effects in the formation of sexual character; for example the 
output of the Social Roles journal.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
However, demarcating more clearly the appropriate domain of application may improve 
matters, but it falls short of answering the deeper critique that semiotics launches, particularly those 
regarding the nature of meaning: semiotics refutes that meaning can be captured when communication 
is broken down into discrete categories of form and content. The central methodological departure that 
semiotics introduces is that meaning is an internal structure. The object of analysis is therefore to learn 
how the signifier, or the material vehicle, carries the signified to the interpreter. This is said to 
constitute a paradigmatic departure because it rejects outright the notion that meaning can be manifest
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or on the surface (Dyer: 1993; Leiss et al: 1986). The semiotic model argues that meaning is dependent 
upon the place of any particular item within an entire system. Thus, isolating any element significantly 
alters the meaning of that element, as well as the whole structure. For example, it may well be the 
connotive feature of the sign that is the centre of the meaning, but this connotation is secured only 
through its relationship; 'BEANZ MEANZ HEINZ', for example. This is partly countered by the 
appeal to the distinction between the denotative and the connotative. The denotation aims to trace a 
particular concept or category upon which the connotation was placed. Thus, all significations are of 
this form (denotative) or a derivative of this form (connotative). However, the Sausserian distinction 
that separates the signifier from the signified is a theoretical distinction only: the meaning is both 
elements at the same time (Barthes: 1978). Moreover, as each derivative develops it builds up these 
associations, wherein each single signifier generates several signifies in succession. Thus each concept 
has a chain of potential associations, each one building up chains of its own so much that the 
immediate mental concept or denotation becomes more abstract, in the end, the denotation can be 
impossible to find as it is encompassed by ever more meaning. The denotative object or concept can no 
longer be merely itself. Thus, stable categories cannot be isolated from this chain because they are in 
effect the workings of the content and the connotation. It queries whether the object can maintain the 
meaning of what it merely is.
This is the main area of the critique that is launched at content analysis: one cannot isolate a 
category because it is 'taking over' play of implied, connotative meaning. Moreover, it is argued that 
the connotative meaning increasingly assumes central position, that is, the Symbolic order is primary. 
For example, Sawschuk (1989) examines an advertisement from a Dior campaign and draws our 
attention to two elements. First, she addresses the gendering of the word 'Coloniales', which she argues 
signifies woman as the colonised subject at the same time as she is elevated to the level of the exotic. 
Second, she draws attention to the headscarf, which with closer inspection is in fact the flower 
anthurium. She argues that the centrality of the flower is not one of illusion necessarily but has to do 
with the phallic signification of the stamen. Thus, the connotative takes centre stage, defining the 
meanings by which the woman's face is encoded, which requires both the flower to be the substituted 
phallus and the feminine 'e' to anchor the meaning of the image. This displaces the importance of 
quantity or frequency because the meaning of the items within the message has no understandable 
context, without establishing their interrelation.
However, implicit within this model of signification is the notion that meaning cannot be 
stable. Only the combination of the context and the specific interactions of the signifier and signified 
can trace meaning. This may well be the base from which all meaning emerges once the prepositional 
foundations of objectivist models of language are rejected. However, this needs to be combined with 
the fact that even simple statements are derived from the same interactions, but they are nevertheless a 
stable feature of social interactions, so that we do not treat basic categories of language as problematic 
(Goffman; Lakoff; Eco). If we cannot treat language as regular, conventional and stable, that is, stable 
enough to count certain examples, then we are rejecting the notion that meaning is ready at hand
60 This also gives an indication of the case with which difference has been brought into the analysis of 
commercial culture.
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(Cavell: 1995). This implies that each set of interactions is equally specific. If this were the case, there 
can be no generalisable or conventional features to meaning, each meaning being singular and new. 
This seems to negate the public and conventional nature of meaning, that is, meaning that is in social 
circulation. I argue that convention is central to how meaning operates, in fact, to how anything is 
meaningful at all (Cavell: 1995; Taylor: 1985). It is in this sense that I have emphasised that content 
analysis (a) must be confined to the manifest features and (b) provides no evidence from which to make 
inferences beyond the sample population. To this I add that as competent linguistic users, we can 
practically apply a category at its denotative level, even if in effect this is an artificial distinction in the 
production of meaning (Cavell: 1995). Even if meaning cannot be finalised, this does not mean that 
meaning can never be stable and thus treated as foundational for pragmatic reasons (Benhabib: 1992).
Yet this does not clarify when semiotics is an essential method and when content analysis is 
appropriate. When is the meaning conventional and when is it more complex, thus requiring an analysis 
of its specificities? I turn briefly to the three levels of meaning to which Panofsky (1970) refers in order 
to elucidate how we might differentiate them. 51 The first level he develops is described as that of the 
primary subject matter, which consists of lights, colour, shape and movement, that is, those features 
that contribute to the elementary understanding of representation, whether of people, objects, gestures, 
poses or expressions and the interrelations that comprise events. This level of meaning corresponds 
well with the notion of manifest meaning, which operates on the surface. I argue that content analysis is 
able to contend with this level of meaning. The secondary level is associated with the more complex 
composite and conventional sets of meaning that relate to the wider culture. He gives the examples of 
particular motifs that are linked to themes and concepts. These motifs combine to form sets of images 
and combinations of images that form stories and allegories. Where my codes connect to the wider 
culture they do so because they have been drawn out from the various semiotic readings, and belong to 
and are recognised by a specific community with whom I am in contention. Finally, Panofsky describes 
the level of meaning that is most complex as the intrinsic meaning that combines with underlying 
principles, which reveal the basic attitudes of a nation, a period, class and so forth. This is comparable 
to Gadamer's notion of the interpretive horizon (1975).
This model establishes some boundaries between levels of meaning to which content analysis 
can be applied and the levels of meaning that can be grasped only by semiotics. Clearly, opting for a 
systematic approach to the content of advertisements is necessarily at the expense of the more subtle 
and deeper engagement with meaning that semiotics provides. However, this in itself is insufficient 
grounds to reject content analysis, since it mirrors, in a sense, the 'cost benefit' analysis between 
quantitative and qualitative research: a strength of one is the weakness of the other. When images are 
treated as a population, we are able to identify generalised trends: when images are examined 
singularly, we are able to trace the interactions required for the production of meaning. We exchange 
the 'what' of the image for the 'how' of the image. Yet, despite the strength of semiotics in exploring 
how meanings connect and interact, it nevertheless faces problems also. My main criticism refers to the 
absence of a systematic methodological approach with which much of this form of analysis is
61 Panofsky's study applies specifically to his analysis of paintings, but I think as a guide it is 
applicable to most symbolic artefacts.
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undertaken within Cultural Studies as a whole. One should never generalise from specific and limited 
examples, however valid the data furnished.
Returning to the historical emergence of semiotics within Cultural Studies, I have embedded 
this within the broad contours of representation that the survey of the images, that is, content analysis, 
had established. However, what occurs now is that single images, sometimes a few, are selected and 
analysed in such a way that they are assumed to describe the macro ordering of ideology. The examples 
analysed are then taken as examples of the (re)presentation of ideological forces. At no point have the 
images selected gone through any systematic procedures. Unlike in qualitative analysis in the social 
sciences, those interviewed have been systematically selected from the relevant sample population. The 
findings that are generated out of these unstructured interviews are extended beyond the specific 
individuals; that is, the results are high in validity, because of the strict sampling procedures initially 
followed. Therefore, the small sample co-exists in regard to its relationship with the wider population. 
In no cases during my literature research was I introduced to reasons why these particular images were 
selected. Therefore, there are no checks or balances in place with which to prevent the selection from 
being guided, consciously or otherwise, precisely because they are instances that reflect their model of 
argument. For example, in Krocker and Krocker's Panic Bodies (1988), Faurshou and Sawchuck both 
selected the same Christian Dior advertisement to show that the feminine and the oriental are both the 
Other to the Law of the Father. Alternatively, Doane (1988), Cowie (1997) and Mayne (1993) have all 
undertaken analysis of /Vow Voyager. This surely carries the implication that the advertisement was 
picked because it demonstrates the argument, rather than forming or adjusting the argument as a result 
of the empirical evidence.
Second, I argue that the postmodernist/feminist applications of semiotics, applied as part of a 
broader ideological critique, readily make inferences regarding the effects upon subject (position 
formed). This is why psychoanalysis is central to their model of argument. They use it and the 
meanings produced through the Symbolic both as the base by which the image functions and the base 
by which the image can be assumed to be representative; the latter being premised upon the 
universality of the Oedipal story and its subsequent organisation of the feminine as passive. Therefore, 
they are using an analysis of how meaning is formed and extending it inferentially to describe the 
identification process the subject positions constituted. I argue that this is equally beyond the remit of 
semiotics.
Therefore, the appropriateness of content analysis rests with the following issues: what sort of 
meaning is produced within the form of the advertisement?; how do we get a handle on the various 
levels of meaning to which a systematic analysis is appropriate? First, I argue that advertisements are 
not defined by high levels of complexity and that the blanket term of'text' obscures the considerable 
differences between them and thus the appropriate methods to analyse them. Second, the 
methodological link between the complexity and subtlety of the tertiary level and the regular manifest 
levels of meaning, with which I argue advertisements deal, is convention. A successful advertisement is 
one where the targeted consumer connects the commodifying meaning to the product in question. Next, 
where advertisements tell stories, in this case about what men and women are, they do so by drawing 
from the complex flow of gendered interactions, condensing them so that they are readily identified and
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presenting them back as realistic versions of those interactions. Barthes (1972) argues that this is how 
advertisements contribute the production of modern myths, while Goffman (1979) upon whom I 
explicitly draw, defines this as the hyper-ritualisation. However, before I discuss in more detail the 
relationship between the advertisement and the social presentations made, I will describe the sampling 
procedure and the population source and define the categories operationalised.
Essentially this entails a defence of counting the respective frequencies of the codes as they 
occur on the bodies of men and women. I counter the charge that the categories I have developed are 
merely an interpretive imposition in two ways: first, a significant number of the categories in fact 
identify only the body position, posture and so on that are featured within the two-dimensional frame; 
second, where more complex codes have been used, these draw upon publicly accepted codes that are 
recognised as central to representation of the genderised active/passive dualism. The codes are 
therefore either drawn from embodied categories (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson: 1987) or 
reference directly ideological patterns that the postmodernist/feminist programme identifies as key to 
the (re)presentation of the feminine as passive.
To question the homogenised description of postmodernism/feminism requires attending anew 
to the manifest content of representations. Therefore, I aim to challenge directly the closures identified 
above in three distinct ways:
1. If the gendered dichotomy is operative in the way postmodernists/feminists define it, then this 
ought to be readily available to interpretation, by which 1 mean that it ought to be 'on the surface' 
rather than requiring complex semiotic readings from all readers. The abstractions that stipulate 
that representation is an outcome of a phallic order of signification are the primary target.
2. It is necessary to re-engage with what an image 'is'. Goffrnan argues that in order to understand its 
relationship to power it is necessary to pay attention to its resource, its production, which is 
dependent upon those resources, and the cultural meanings involved in the latter; I therefore query 
that the power lies in the image.
3. The abstractions dissipate the body as an entity and, in consequence, the body as locus of action is 
dispelled. I return the body by examining what the body must do to be self-evidently passive, that 
is, identifying how the body performs the supposedly determining dualism. I therefore seek to 
trace the manifest content by examining how the body itself performs these presentational features.
In this way, the taxonomy pays specific attention to the visual conventions of the body - what is the 
body doing when it does passivity? - which are combined with the specific conventions of the image.
I have organised the masculine and feminine according to the ways the body is conventionally 
positioned and what the body must do visually to perform the semiotic effect of passivity, as well as 
looking at 'who' does that performance. I have attempted to take a step back to see anew what might be 
involved in this accomplishment. This directly reflects the influence of Goffman's examination of the 
'presentation self (1969) when it is re-cast into the domain of representation (1974). By emphasising 
the materiality of the body, I have sought to use it as a base, thereby starting with 'body as action' 
rather than the 'body as system outcome'. I break down the broader ideological contours to identify the
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units of the body that combine to produce them. Therefore, the emphasis is placed upon what the 
corporeal body can do in presentation, instead of treating it as the outcome of representation. I seek to 
shift the emphasis a little by considering the ways in which the body is involved in the representation 
and then locate this representation back into the social world. In this way, I want to think of the 
representation and its impact in terms of locations in social action where poses may be taken up, 
perhaps in different domains of social interaction. This shifts the emphasis away from merely defining 
our postures as the outcome of a prior representation. Thinking about the active body introduces a 
space wherein we transform ourselves, perhaps only minimally by ridding the posture of its artifice, but 
at least acknowledging that we are competent users and interpreters of those presentations. I propose 
that we ought to consider inverting the direction of causes, namely that we have the representations we 
do because they rely upon our conventions of embodied interaction. This is, in effect, what I mean 
when I say that we should not only examine the body as system or structural outcome.
As well as addressing the specific features of the body and its codes, I have also drawn upon 
various codes identified by postmodernism/feminism. My aim here is to apply the codes and turn them 
back upon themselves, as it were, that is, use their own criteria to assess just how frequently the 
feminine is represented and codified using the soft focus, for example. A central defence of the use of 
content analysis rests on the fact that I am drawing upon a bank of established codifications, both as a 
public source by which to apply the codes, but also that the public recognition ensures that the codes 
are not merely a set of (private) discursive impositions. Postmodernist/feminist argument is dependent 
upon anchoring the code of specific sets of meaning that re-confirm the reign of the phallus. Thus, they 
have isolated codes such as soft focus, different forms of concealing the face, different direction of 
looks to demonstrate the symbolic production of the feminine as fetish, for example. The elaboration of 
a semiotic reading from specific codes is not the remit of the content analysis either. I have merely 
applied these codes on the basis that a majority ought to be prevalent and categorically distributed in 
order to make the case they do. Therefore, I mobilise their criteria to trace the potential shifts in 
representation.
FASHION ADVERTISEMENTS
The sample is confined to fashion advertising, notably because if one seeks the specific 
elaborations of a commodified and sexualised femininity within hegemonic cultural forms, one would 
expect to find it within this intensely visual domain. Therefore, I argue that this weights the analysis 
towards re-establishing categorical sexual difference. Hence, I begin with the specific elements that 
relate to feminist critique. First, fashion directly links the presentation of femininity to the economic 
realm. Second, the advertisement can utilise almost any social scene, be it within the public or private 
domain, because clothes are a universal feature of social life. Therefore the image makers have at their 
disposal a whole range of ideological tools (Lash and Urry:1994; Featherstone: 1982:1991; 
Wernick: 1991 Jameson: 1984), for example, placing single women in the domestic sphere and always 
accompanied by men in public space (Goffman:1979). Third, fashion is a central domain for the 
institution of various disciplines imposed upon the female body, particularly dieting regimes. This links
72
directly with other contemporary debates on the health of body, for example the stiletto heel: the shoe 
damages the foot as well as altering the position and shape of the spin, thus placing it under 
considerable strain (Bordo;1993; Sawschuk in Krockerand Krocker: 1989). Fourth, by examining 
fashion one is able to integrate the foundation of postmodernist/feminist critique to the wider normative 
assumptions regarding the essential feminine body. This is the 'real and natural body' that is subject to 
distortion and control in order to meet the aesthetic of extreme thinness that renders the real woman's 
body child-like.
Regarding more broadly sociological issues, considering fashion firmly locates us within the 
problem of the body for it signals the possibilities for intentional elaboration of the body as a 
manipulable, material surface and form within certain social structural possibilities. Not only is the 
latter signalled by the increasing capacity of people to integrate various commodities into a specific 
style, but it also marks the entry of social structure in that this governs the sense that can be made of the 
development of a style. This connects back to the position outlined above that signs are manipulable 
within highly regular and structured contexts. Moreover, it reveals the extent to which the corporeal 
body forms a significant base to these practices (Shilling: 1993).
An additional and distinctly sociological interrogation of the body also makes its point for 
entry here: clothes remain a central and regular practice undertaken to accomplish accurate sex 
assignment. Plucking eyebrows; shaving legs; walking in way that makes wearing high heels possible, 
which impacts upon the muscle development in the legs; wearing skirts which alter how one can sit, 
especially if it is short; colour; the way the shirt buttons up: these are all common-sense, relatively 
unseen features of accomplishing gender. As we all pre-reflexively assign sex where genital 
confirmation is not possible, the detail of'sex' that we read every day is carried by the clothes we wear 
(Kesslerand McKenna:1978; Kessler:1994: Garfmkel:1967). The unquestioning commitment we have 
to 'two absolute sexes, and that I am most definitely one' is carried through the clothes with which we 
perform our gender. For example, breasts are more frequently used to convey a social gender than to 
perform a specific biological function. Thus, clothes play a central role in the discursive construction of 
sex upon which the decisions as to what clothes we wear is built, as well as the kind of femininity a 
woman may want to perform. Thus, clothes are central to 'keying' or practical and performative 
accomplishment of sex.
MAGAZINE SAMPLE
The magazines chosen are Cosmopolitan, Arena, The Face and i-D 62 They have the same 
target audience age of 18 to 35 years. There are no lifestyle magazines targeted solely at men outside 
this target age group and also there are no lifestyle magazines of comparable genre that are targeted at 
both men and women outside this age group like The Face for example. Arena and Cosmopolitan are 
single-sex magazines. Both magazines contain generic features on fashion, style, interviews, reviews as 
well as tips on who should wear what, on what sorts of figures and so on. Cosmopolitan magazine
62 In addition, I could also be assured unrestricted access as they are all held at national libraries, as 
well as avoiding the conditions of use that are often imposed by the magazines' libraries.
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describes itself as 'an intelligent woman's sparkling best friend. Punchy, provocative, and pertinent 
articles that inform and entertain'.63 Thus, it sets up its discourse as being for and about the 
'independent woman'. It is published by National Magazine Company, one of the biggest publishing 
houses in the UK, which also has a sizeable share of the US market. The recorded circulation figures 
for Cosmopolitan magazine are large at 456,131 readers (Willing* Press Guide, 1996). Clearly, then, it 
has significant power within the market, suggesting that it secures the most hegemonic configurations 
out of the magazines selected; defined as such by its market position and the assumption that it serves 
'sectional interests'. Cosmopolitan is, arguably, an example of how the commercialisation of the 
discourse of feminism has co-opted and de-politicised the feminist agenda by making feminism an 
issue of lifestyle.
An additional reason for selecting Cosmopolitan is that it is the prototype of young women's 
magazines. It was launched in 1971 and has been central in the production of the 'young woman who 
can have it all'. This sample has been extended back to 1975, which indicates how the representation 
seems to have shifted since then. The cases assessed will be examined through a number of key clusters 
in order to tease out some sense of shifting formations of femininity in a magazine that has a privileged 
position in defining femininity.
The other three magazines reflect different market shares, as well as supplying both the youth 
and men's markets. Arena magazine describes itself as 'general interest magazine for men on the arts, 
film and fashion'. This magazine has built up a reputation among its target audience as being for the 
professional single man who takes an 'interest in all things cultured' while maintaining his 'straight' 
sexuality (Mort: 1996:Nixon: 1996). The Face and i-D are youth magazines read by both men and 
women. The latter emphasises style and fashion, and concentrates on youth sub-cultures, such as the 
dance scene. Both these magazines are self-consciously stylistic in the sense that they have redrawn the 
boundaries between the mundane, design and mass culture by bringing slick design and presentation to 
the layout and interviews. 64 They do not contain generic features such as problem pages or guides to 
achieving a flat stomach in ten weeks (see Men's Health magazine). Thus, of the four magazines 
chosen, two are targeted at single-sex audiences and the other two are 'style' or 'youth' magazines. As 
stated, the magazines have also been selected on the basis of their varying publishers. The Face and 
Arena magazine are both published by Wagadon Publishing Ltd.
Wagadon was launched in 1980 with The Face. This magazine was considered 'ground- 
breaking' at the time. Since then, it has come to be a middle-sized publishing company, but with 
considerable clout because of its original creative input to the magazine markets. 65 Its circulation 
figures have fallen since its heyday in the mid-1980s because of the growth of similar magazines but it 
still maintains a circulation of 107,192 (Willings, 1996). Arena magazine was launched by Wagadon in 
1986. Some difficulties were faced when it was launched as a result of the fact that men as a group 
were resistant to being identified as such, which is highly significant. As Mort (1996) argues, men were
63 Willings Press Guide, 1996. P.348. All other magazine descriptions are also derived from Willings 
Press Guide.
64 For a non-academic reference see The Guardian, 241 November 1997, or the Independent on 
Sunday, 30th November 1997.
65 See The Guardian, 24th November 1997 or Mort: 1996.
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used to being the 'One' 66 and found the prospect of being defined and identified as having distinct 
interest from cars to grooming somewhat disempowering. The circulation figure for Arena magazine is 
76,879 (Willings, 1996). i-D magazine is published by Level Print Ltd, a small publishing house. Its 
estimated circulation is about 40,000 per month (Willings, 1996). These figures suggest that it is subject 
to fewer of the commercial pressures dictated by the mass-market sector. It is also a competitor of The 
Face. This raises the issue as to whether the images contained are also non-mainstream and therefore 
outside the hegemonic concerns of culture.
Together, the magazines provide scope to analyse the extent to which representations of 
femininity and masculinity are homogeneous, irrespective of the magazine's pitch. For example, is 
there as high a frequency of macho images of men in both kinds of magazines or do the different target 
audiences affect the gendered nature of the presentations of the body? If the magazine is aimed at and 
read by men does it significantly affect the way women are portrayed compared with the way that 
women are portrayed in a women's magazine? This may reveal any differing stereotypes that one sex 
has of the other or, alternatively, how one sex wishes the other sex to be represented and thus 
consumed. Does Cosmopolitan magazine predominantly represent men as romantic heroes or as sexual 
studs, for example?
SAMPLING
The sample is made up of twenty advertisements per magazine and two magazines per year 
taken from 1975, 1985/7, 1990, 1995. The bulk of the analysis will concentrate upon the time span 
from 1985/7 to 1995.67 The sample is selected from the April and September issues. The six-month 
period helps to ensure that the results were not overly affected by the pure stylistics of the magazine, 
thus preventing any results from being an outcome of short-lived trends rather than any substantive 
shift in the modes of representation. If the former were the case, one would expect a high frequency to 
cluster around a single period. In addition, April and September were chosen because this would ensure 
a balance in the amount of flesh revealed, as these months correspond to the 'fashion seasons'. This is 
necessary in order to prevent the variable that traces patterns of sexualisation from being skewed.
The random sample was selected by counting the number of advertisements per issue and 
dividing this number by twenty. The random selection starts with the first fashion or perfume 
advertisement. Thereafter, another image, for example the third, would be selected, thereby achieving 
an evenly distributed sample of twenty images. The sample to be selected from in each magazine 
includes the inside cover through to the back cover of the magazine. The front cover of the magazine 
was not included in the sample as it has a particular semiotic construction that targets the promotion of 
the magazine's features rather than the commodities selected here. Moreover, the semiotic construction 
is more discursive in nature, using headline-like, verbal constructions that connect the magazine to sex
66 Although he provides little evidence for this. Moreover, should this not produce problems for the 
Symbolic order since 'to be the One' is an outcome of being able to define the Other?
67 The starting years 1987 and 1985 differ because the emergence of men's 'lifestyle' magazines did 
not take place until the late 1980s. Arena magazine was first published in December 1986; therefore, 
the first issue was taken from 1987.
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and relationships to broader discourses of sex. These strict selection rules were adhered to so that the 
sampling was repeated across the different magazines, ensuring that the differing magazine layouts did 
not distort the sample.
An important distinction to note is between the sampling unit and the actual cases processed. 
The sampling unit is the advertisement and the case is the individual body. I chose to select the bodies 
within an image in a bid to maintain an eye upon the relationships between them. However, this 
produced an anomaly: while twenty evenly distributed advertisements were selected, the object coded 
was the body or bodies contained within any single image. It went by unnoticed because a majority of 
the piloting had been conducted on contemporary magazines that rarely use more than one model per 
image. Hence, while the sampling frame selected twenty advertisements, this would not necessarily 
lead to the processing of twenty bodies. The outcome was a significant growth in the sample size. It 
rose from the intended 500 to the actual number of 703. However, the random sampling did also 
balance out the case distribution across the magazines. The average number of total cases per magazine 
was 158.25. The largest deviation from the mean was 171. Thus, there is a relatively even distribution. 
To reiterate, the decision to select the advertisement as the unit of analysis stems from the aim to 
identify the relative positions and status between the models within each sampling unit. I sought to 
maintain a holistic sense of the image as a whole. While the method collates the relative distributions, 
an attempt to convey a more complex set of interconnections was inappropriate. This is discussed in 
more detail when variable twenty-four is considered.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The logic behind the categorisations is to produce frequency data from which information 
about the relative distributions of the codes of body elaboration between the male and female figures 
can be ascertained. The object of the statistical analysis is to examine the extent to which the 
independent variable (sex) determines the frequencies of the dependent variables (codes of body 
elaboration). The operationalisation of the taxonomy is such that only nominal frequency data can be 
recorded, consequently, I use chi-square as the statistical test because it places no upper limit on the 
size of the tabulation. This test evaluates whether the difference between the observed frequencies and 
expected frequencies under the null hypothesis can be attributedio factors other than sampling 
fluctuations or to factors other than chance. Chi-square is a test of difference that shows whether the 
distributions are statistically significant. Significance is judged by the score, which if of a certain value, 
strongly states that a relationship exists between the variables measured.
Note also that the variables are unrelated. Thus, the framework does not measure the differing 
response of the same subject to various sets of conditions and this excludes the possible use of stronger 
inferential statistics. Unlike correlation, it cannot describe how one variable affects another, be it in a 
positive or negative direction. The chi-square test states only whether a relationship exists or not. 
Inferential statistics like correlation are able to identify overall trends as to where or with which 
variables the significance lies; chi-square does not. Therefore, where a difference is measurable, it is 
insufficient to secure the endurance of the dualisms in question. For example, statistical significance
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may be a result of marked difference where the masculine has a higher frequency of'looking down and 
to the side', a code that we associate with the feminine. Chi does not describe relationships thus and we 
cannot assume that the difference confirms the persistence of the gendered dichotomy. Therefore, when 
difference is statistically significant, 1 have taken care to relate this to distributions of each individual 
code in order to avoid assuming that the distributions reflect the conventions of the gendered code.
Furthermore, my concern is not to produce inferential statistics as this would entail developing 
a model of sexual scales or stereotypes. These models of sexual scales, no matter how detailed they 
become, are effective only insofar as they rely implicitly upon sexual dimorphism (Maccoby and 
Jacklin-,1975). I reject the operationalisation of sexual scales68 because they most often reproduce the 
integrity of the masculine and feminine sexual types: correlations like 'the slimmer the model, the more 
feminine' by definition maintain the dichotomous sets of associations. Connell argues that the 
operationalisation of much sex scales research is ostensibly responsible for the 'confirmation' and 
endurance of the internal unity of category of femininity.69 Any results found are dependent upon the 
prior legitimacy of the measures, that is, they are dependent upon assuming that only femininity is 
defined and measurable through thinness. As this logic is extended, it means that different measures for 
the masculine are operationalised. At best, scales can describe stereotypical expectations. They cannot 
describe gender because most of the traits selected for analysis describe most men and women at some 
time or other. For example, stereotypically we ascribe aggression to the masculine. Thus, the 
codification reflects the dimorphic logic because the masculine is all of these things and the feminine is 
a different set of traits. Even if this staggered into a scale so that the respondent or image is measured 
by 'more or less' masculine, it still presumes that this trait or code 'belongs' to the masculine and by 
implication is not of the feminine. Hence, the prior operationalisation rules out that the masculine may 
be equally associated with thinness. Different frequencies in distribution are seemingly entrenched 
because the male and the female are always assessed with different criteria (see Millum; 1976). In 
contradistinction, the categories operationalised here are not defined as masculine or feminine prior to 
data collection, instead any potential difference is established by the actual distributions themselves. 
Potentially, therefore, this could reflect either categorical difference or gender plurality. Hence, the test 
of association describes numerical relationships between the distributions produced.
The last departure concerns the convention of refuting the null hypothesis. Quantitative 
research stipulates that the null hypothesis be phrased thus: there is no relationship between the IV (the 
sex of the model) and the DV (the codes used to represent it). The outcome, however, is that 
researchers are bound to find difference in order to have a body of results. This is particularly important 
in undertaking gender research because it has the unintended result of seeking to find sexual difference 
rather than similarity. I do not seek to prove or disprove anything, contrariwise, my aim is purely 
descriptive. I do not claim to explain how ideology connects to the social world by conducting a 
content analysis. I seek only to trace the frequency of use of the categories that 
postmodernists/feminists assume to be universally present and categorically distributed. Thus, my aim 
is not to describe the correlation or make casual connections, but rather to identify if the differences in
68 This aims to bring Connell's analysis of sexual scales to bear on the method.
69 R. W. Connell, p. 171
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the frequencies are due to factors other than chance. Neither therefore do I define what those factors 
may be. To reiterate, the single most important shift to the operationalisation is not to organise the 
codes into masculine and feminine types or groups. I have elected to allow the results to define what is 
a masculine code, a feminine one, or whether, in fact, it is empirically used equally across both body 
types. This research is particularly interested in exploring latter possibility.
DATA AND ITS ORGANISATION
The package allows the coding frame to be programmed in such a way that if certain prior 
cases were recorded it would automatically mean that some questions would be excluded in the future. 
This is one reason for the varying sample sizes across the differing variables. The pre-programmed 
exclusions ensure greater accuracy and save time (see Cottle:1997 www.Soc. Res. Online). As stated, 
the extent of detail in the taxonomy was included to ensure that any potential variability was recorded. 
The detail was also maintained because the package can be re-programmed so that those categories 
with an expected value of five or less could be merged together, which then enables those cases to be 
statistically assessed. Only those categories that are mutually exclusive can be combined. For example, 
twisting away and twisting forward may be merged together because the body can be only one or the 
other. They can either re-group in a more general category or merge into the 'other' category.
Note that the tabulated data included in the next chapter has a slightly different format from 
the original. This is operative only within a previously designated variable. The amalgamated cells are 
entitled 'derived'. It was necessary to do this, as the detail of the coding frame was not required. As 
stated above, the extent of the detail was included in order that the regularity or variability of the image 
could be traced rather than imposed by pre-determined codifications. The rearrangement of the variable 
can be examined as it is included in the appendix. Care has been taken to ensure that any 
amalgamations made are done so in accordance with the logic of the taxonomy. Moreover, I have 
ensured that each of the sub-variables that have been collapsed together is not counted twice as a 
frequency.
KEY PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TAXONOMY
As stated, I have generated a number of codes that target the body in order to examine what 
the body must do to perform femininity. For this, I have drawn heavily upon Goffman's analysis of the 
body and its performance within the visual form, as well as Goffman's notion that the naturalistic 
within representation can function only through its artifice. He argues that this is necessary to make 
visible or accessible the myriad of behavioural styles that we use but do not recognise: 70
these expressions turn out to be illustrations of ritual like behaviour which portray an ideal 
conception of the two sexes and their structural relationship to each other, accomplishing this
70 This reflects Goffman's indebtedness to Wittgenstein's notion of the social and linguistic 
background.
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in part by indicating, again ideally, the alignment of the actor in the social situation. 
(Goffman: 1979:89)
His central tenet therefore proposes that the veneer of social reality in the advertisement is produced by 
the codification practices of hyper-ritualisation. Hyper-ritualisation encompasses the intensification of 
standardised and simplified forms of ritual taken from social life. Moreover, we can take this process as 
real (but temporarily only) because of the absence of complex cues that define embodied social 
interaction that extends through time. Advertisements work, he argues, by condensing social scenes 
that make them available for immediate consumption. They are idealised representations under the 
auspices of the way things really are. So, when a man lights a cigarette for a woman the presupposition 
is that the female is worthy of his assistance, yet this assistance implies that she is limited in some way 
and that she should be helped out with even the simplest things. The fact that this is taken up from 
rituals performed in real life and then magnified is not sufficient to collapse the distinction between the 
social world and the representation. Nor is it sufficient to assume that, because the social act is 
magnified in the ritualisation, the status differentials represented do not draw upon real differentials in 
status within the corpus of display from which the code is drawn. By linking the two fields through 
convention, Goffman introduces a foundation that is sociologically sensitive because he uses our 
standard practices as the stable contexts, which he then transforms, through hyper-ritualisation, making 
them distinct from the resources from which they are drawn.
The notion of ritualisation relates more broadly to the idea that advertisements belong to a 
system of social communication that draws directly upon symbolic forms of behaviour as a resource. 
This genre creates meaningful visual constructs by compressing common sense and familiar features of 
the social world. Hence, they reference, but do not mirror, many of the conventional features of 
embodied interaction that we depend upon all the time. In a sense, one can consider these meaningful 
constructs as part of our vocabulary of body display. Nevertheless, argues Goffman, while realist forms 
make a resource from this vocabulary, they can make the constructs visible only by grossly 
exaggerating them. This returns to the social world because they bring into view things that we 
essentially take for granted. Hence, the rituals are recognisable but they are not the same.
In addition, Goffman draws attention to regularity of the modes of display used. Again, this 
differentiates embodied display from those represented insofar as the conventionalised elements are 
considerably more limited in range. This establishes an anomaly in that the images may 'look' like we 
do, but only by radically simplifying what we do. Goffrnan's formula, which I have used here, argues 
that advertisements use units that stylise a scene'and social display, which key into our systems of 
recognition; for example gestalts, poses, gestures, expressions and props. In effect, we are able to use 
our social competencies, more or less pre-reflexively, as part of our imaginative projections that 
connect primary gestalts to visual and socialised space. Together, these form conceptual units that 
emerge from close visual analysis to produce the identification of recurrent patterns of portrayal. The 
conceptual units in themselves, once formed as part of the coding frame, become 'abstract notions from 
an empirical perspective' (Jhally: 1990:146) and, once abstracted, the codes cannot return to the 
background whence they came.
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THE CODES OF THE BODY
The taxonomy includes twenty-seven variables. The number of codes within each category is 
variable. The sub-categories number approximately 350. All the variables have 'other' included unless 
it could be categorically assured that no unanticipated cases could occur. These included the time span 
of the sample, the sample magazines and the commodities included, namely perfume and fashion items. 
Note that the detail of the commodity promoted was not included, despite recognising that it may alter 
the codification of the image under analysis. This is because a single photograph could have any 
number of items on display on one model. In addition, piloting highlighted that there were instances 
when the particular fashion item for sale was highly obscured. Identification was always possible 
because of the anchorage of the fashion label. Thus, the style of the image is entirely dependent upon 
the model's body, which suggests that there is an intensification of the commodification and 
sexualisation processes in the images. As stated, the operationalisation of the taxonomy was tightly 
integrated to the categories traced by existing and accepted research subject to critique here.
Variable one71 begins with the sex of the body, which is classified as either 'male' or 'female', 
'androgynous' or 'other'. The identification of the sex of the model uses the everyday methods by 
which sex is assigned in social activity, given that genital inspection is not possible (Garfinkel:1967; 
Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:2000). Thus, assignment was fundamentally premised upon that 
background knowledge we use, yet do not 'know', to assign sex. Code three classifies those instances 
where a part of the body is photographed, without any particular phenomenological key to its sex, or it 
excludes other common forms of cultural elaboration that conventionally assign sex. I am particularly 
interested in the codification used to make the gender of the body apparent, namely the secondary and 
territory sexual characteristics by which most sex assignment is undertaken. These are guided by the 
conventions of the sexed body so that if one were to describe a body as having developed muscle on 
the arm and as seated with the legs wide open, we are much more likely to assign the male sex to that 
body than the female sex. If the body turned out to be that of the female, we would tend to treat it as an 
'exception' that proves the rule. This is the basic conventional level to which the taxonomy attends. 
This connects with Goffman's model by drawing upon our social practices of gender and magnifying 
these elements in order that we key the appropriate sex assignment within representation. For example, 
the model with its back to the camera will use a number of overt codifications so that we are able to 
assign the model a sex, when many of these secondary and tertiary features are missing as a result of 
the body position. Thus, they magnify the elements of'normal sexed body'. These presentational 
features, which are treated as evidence for the truth of sex, are conventional practices at the secondary 
and tertiary level that Agnes72 proved to be a master.
Variable two counts the number of bodies included in the image, which includes 'single body', 
'mixed-sex/single-sex couples' through to 'groups'. This variable is central for the identification of the
71 For more detailed description of each individual code and the rules of its application, see Appendix
B.
72 Agnes showed how sex is accomplished in interaction because she successfully passed as a woman. 
See 'Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person, part 1' (pp. 116-85) 
and especially the 'postscript' in Garfinkel, op. cit.
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extent to which advertisements are still noticeably marked by the heterosexist imperative. I argue that 
staging the body within this frame provides the central context that readily anchors both the 
active/passive elements of the dichotomy but also secures the marginalisation of homosexual 
relationships and homoerotic desire more generally. In terms of the latter, I am drawing directly upon 
Lewis and Rolley's (1997) notion of coupling as a means to access lesbian desire. Logically this can be 
extended to gay desire patterns also. Combining the female sexed model with the male sexed is the 
simplest way of securing normalisation of the heterosexuality. From this context, many other elements 
of the gendered dichotomy can be secured with the use of further codification. The ownership and 
direction of the gaze are of central importance here.
Variable three identifies the ratio of white models to minority ethnic models used. This 
variable seeks to identify the extent to which Britain's black population has become visible within the 
frame of the body beautiful and, if so, to trace the extent to which the ethnicity of the body significantly 
affects the coding of the body idiom, especially the extent of sexualisation and nudity (see Nayak:1997; 
hooks: 1981; 1992; 1996; Young: 1995; Hoch:1979; Kaplan: 1997). Potentially, it is possible to trace the 
extent to which the overt sexual codification is also racialised, by combining the language of desire and 
excess of the advertising genre73 to the excess assigned to the black body. The assignment of ethnicity 
in this category again uses the background knowledge through which the Black body is produced and 
labelled in everyday life. White and black are discursive productions that deal with and remove the 
actual ambiguity of embodiment; thus, the background as the criterion for the categorisation does not 
negate that fact that there are an infinite number of ambiguities within ethnicity. The categories are not 
independent of the discourse of the everyday where they function. There is no 'truth' to the categories, 
they are instead the common-sense meanings through which they function, regardless of the fact of the 
black body.74 Again, basic 'keying' or 'common sense' labelling processes are used (Goffman:1974).
Variable four identifies the product advertised, either a perfume or fashion item. This variable 
considers whether the kind of commodity significantly affects the sorts of coding that the body idiom 
undergoes. While it will not be subject to specific analysis, I have included a differentiation between 
the commodities in order to ensure that included in the sample is the specific visual relationship 
between the commodity and the body included as part of the overall sample. For example, it introduces 
the scope for extensive use of nudity, as well as including a particularly intense form of 
commodification in that the smell must be awarded a social and cultural significance. In addition, it 
provides a space to assess the endurance of a codification to which Goffman explicitly draws attention, 
namely the extension of the object, its delicacy, for example, through the combination of the product 
and the fragility of the feminine caress (Goffman: 1979:29). The product placement by means of 
emphasis established by the touch not only enhances the product placement but also genderises the
73 Again drawn from Liess, Kline and Jhally, who historically locate their analysis within the shifts in 
the pitch of the advertisement. In the first half of the book, they address the expansion of language of 
desire that is coterminous with the decline of the functional language. In essence, they argue that the 
shift represents a move from 'what can the product do?' to 'how does this product make me feel?'
74 Again, this reflects my overall resistance to the scepticism that often accompanies discursive 
analysis. There is a materiality to the body upon which racism works, which is quite unlike the 
discursive construction of patterns of desire.
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product and the model. However, these sorts of issues will be examined within the respective 
codifications rather than leading with the product type. 75
The fifth variable, entitled 'model', traces the relationship between the model and any 
potential commodity or prop, for example, bodily subjugation to a perfume bottle. Here the body itself 
is made to shadow the shape of the bottle. The variable seeks only to count the number of cases where 
the model has control of the commodity and the cases where the model is subjugated to the prop or 
commodity. Thus, it seeks to identify only the generalised trends of the positioning of the model 
(Millum: 1975:189). Sampling revealed that this mode of codification is conventional and thus utilises a 
series of standardised visual techniques to commodify the body, of which the example above is one of 
the most common. The second mechanism to define the general patterns of power to objects, space and 
props traces the gendered dichotomy according to the relationship the model has with his or her 
surroundings. As discussed above, the core guiding rule for this variable is the extent to which the 
model could said to be in control of his or her environment. Thus, the male who is located in the office 
is often presented giving instructions to the (female) secretary. To reiterate, the significance of fashion 
advertising is that clothes have a ubiquitous presence within social interaction. Therefore, the potential 
of very diverse settings and narratives is considerable. Note, clothes have not been automatically coded 
as subjugating the model because this tends to conflate clothing items that differ in their potential to be 
dominatory. For example, excessively frilly clothes lock the female model directly into the traditions of 
hegemonic, emphasised femininity, in the way that dungarees worn by a female do not, in the sense 
that they are not conventionally gendered, nor do they hinder or dictate the movement, sitting position 
and so forth (Connell: 1987:183-7). I am not concerned with the particular item of clothing but rather 
the relationship to social status and the presentations of gendered made through it.
Variable six begins by locating the body in the projection of space, if a naturalistic mode, or 
on the two-dimensional pl'ane, if not. The codes range from 'dominating the frame' through to 'less 
than %'. The amount of space therefore reflects the length of shot but also keys into the symbolic 
organisation of the two-dimensional plane. For example, if the woman occupies half of the two- 
dimensional plane and the man occupies only a third, conventionally, we would align this to her greater 
visibility compared to the male. Contrariwise, if the male is made more central, we would expect this to 
be accompanied by additional codification that aligns his position with power. These first sets of codes 
aim to contextualise the other modes of codification. In most normal cases the bigger the space 
occupied, the more central that figure is made. A notable exception to this is that the first code 
'dominates frame entirely'. Here the body dominates the frame of the image, which has the effect of 
bringing the body to the surface of the picture frame. The gaze is able to linger upon the detail of the
flesh.
This is followed by a series of codes that trace the relative location of the sexed model in 
space. The codification is based upon the conventional spatial orientations by which we live; for 
example, we talk of a lowly serf; we look up to role models (Lakoff and Johnson: 1980; Johnson: 1987). 
Likewise, if the male is predominately in the centre of the frame, it places the female in a secondary
75 For the proportion of the sample that is made up of perfume and clothes items, please see Appendix 
C.
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relationship to the space within the image, identified in codes 'centre' and 'off-centre'. The fact that the 
centre is of primary importance remains a part of the cultural tradition of status relations as well as of 
core metaphoric organisation: 'he was at the centre of the affair'. Thus, each spatial classification in 
variable six relates to a certain social position, especially those images that re-create a social setting. 
'Higher' and 'central' express greater control and social standing than 'lower' and 'periphery'. The 
second half of the variable relates to other relative spatial positions between the models photographed, 
'opposite', 'centre', for example. This sort of organisation is readily transferred into our visual 
representation, especially those commercially based that require ready and instant comprehension. 
Socially, we tend to consider the occupation of space, relative to others, the priority of those with 
power. This clearly connects back to the significance given the heterosexual couple and the gender 
differentiation of space. It concerns women's inability to command space, for example, needing 
assistance with the chair to sit at the table.
This is what Goffman describes as the ritualisation of subordination (Goffman: 1979:41) He 
suggests that a classic way that one displays deference, for example, is by lowering oneself physically 
in some form of prostration. Correspondingly therefore, we can visually display superiority or disdain 
by holding the body erect and high, the head looking up, which reflects the metaphorical conventions 
that Lakoff and Johnson trace in Metaphors We Live By. Most importantly, Goffman adds that 
advertisers draw in and endorse the claimed universality of the theme (Goffman: 1979:40). He then 
identifies also conventional spaces through which status differentiation could be seen to 'naturally take 
place'. He isolates places such as beds and particularly floors, where the less clean can be encoded. To 
this, I add that sexual availability has also been conventionally located in such places.
Finally, included in the spatial variable are two distinct codes, 'perspective' and 'non- 
perspective' . These specify in a generalised way whether the overall frame of the image is realist or 
otherwise and thus the extent to which the visual spacing establishes a view within the image that 
'reflects' that of the naked eye. Note, that the analysis of these sub-categories is combined with the 
analysis of variable seven below.
Variable seven relates to the camera work and categorises an image according to the length of 
shot and the focus used. The first cluster identifies the focus length and is divided into three broad 
categories: 'long shot', 'medium shot', and 'close-up'. Moreover, this type of codification is awarded 
central importance to the formation of the feminine. For example- Cowie (1997) argues that this is due 
to the removal of time and space from the frame, which facilitates the transvestism inherent in the point 
of view it establishes. Doane similarly argues that close-up provides the quintessential example of:
the meaningful moment of the close-up, for the spectator, the scale of the close-up 
corresponds less than other shots to the dictates of perspectival realism. And this being-the- 
gaze-for-the-other is, of course, most adequate as a description of the female subject 
(Doane: 1991:47).
Each shot length determines the size of the body within the photographic frame, and thus determines 
how much of the body is exposed. There ought to be a high degree of correspondence between these
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sub-categories and the preceding variable: the longer the shot, the 'smaller' the body and thus the less 
'physical' space the body appears to occupy visually. One would therefore expect there to be a higher 
degree of coincidence between the distributions of the 'dominating the frame' and the use of the close- 
up.
Doane, in particular, has argued that the short-length shot has been used upon female bodies 
as a means to fetishise the female body and thus disavow the threat that this body symbolises to the 
masculine (see also Cowie and Adams: 1990; Cowie:1997; Adams: 1996; Erens: 1991; Doane: 1987; 
1991: Dyer:1992: Kaplan:1997; special issue of Camera Obscura, 1989; Stacey: 1988; 1994; 
Mayne: 1991; 1994). The use of the short-length shot means that the camera is able to move across a 
fragmented body, thereby highlighting the surface of the dissected body and rendering it fetishistic. 
Conversely, one would not expect this code to be widely applied to the male body if it is not available 
to the processes of fetishisation as defined by the male body 'having the phallus'. The man must, 
minimally at least, represent the active autonomous subject and therefore cannot have that subjectivity 
visually negated. If this is not the case, the man is said to have undergone feminisation, thereby 
ensuring that the gendered dichotomy is left intact. However, this poses the dilemma: if the model is 
codified using visual practices that define the feminine, thus is feminised, what are we to make out of 
this feminisation process, if nevertheless the model is clearly identifiable as male, that is, codified with 
the magnified social resources that accomplish the assignment as male? The central issue is the clash of 
the 'feminisation' with the direct and clear codification of male; neither codification is premised upon 
the assumption that the codification speaks 'the truth of his sex', but nevertheless corresponds to the 
cultural production of the male.
Returning to the postmodernists/feminists, one would expect these cases to tally with the other 
sub-variables that code the occupancy of space, as well as to be a determining factor in what parts of 
the body are represented; hence their importance for fetishisation. Following Doane, one would also 
expect that soft focus is predominately used upon the female form as a visual means to encode 
passivity as well as to assist the process of disavowal. Thus, this form of codification is treated as 
quintessentially feminine. The softness of the image is treated as an extension of the translucent veil 
that conceals her lack. Moore (1988) and Wernick (1991) have traced the use of soft lighting but limit 
its use strictly to the contexts of the man's auto-eroticism. Therefore, as viewers, the best we can do is 
peer into his auto-eroticism; hence the extensive use of bathroom and grooming scenes. Moreover, 
these are 'natural occasions' when the man would be revealing his torso anyway. Thus they argue that 
the naturalistic setting defines the moments when the male body can be displayed. Moore concludes 
that it is only in the context of auto-eroticism that the soft focus and mellow lighting can be 
legitimately applied to the male body without erupting the spectre of homosexuality and the possibility 
of an overt active female eroticism (Moore: 1988:44).
Next, the taxonomy traces the use of specific focuses, which again draws on their argument 
that the soft focus is a distinct form with which the feminine is represented. One would expect there to 
be a high frequency of use on the female body. The soft focus is also said to assist the disavowal 
process by contributing to the substitution of the missing phallus by displacing her lack on to another 
object. The soft focus is said to contribute to the codification of the feminine as object of desire. By
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drawing upon Lacan, postmodernism/feminism positions the image as the reflection of the feminine as 
lack so that the image signals her status as the object of desire, but also positions the image of woman 
as threatening. Codifications like soft focus work to suppress the fear through objectification.
These elements are then built upon again in variable eight, which traces the form of the 
photograph. This has been divided into three sections: 'naturalistic mock-up'', 'stylistic' and 'neutral'. 
The first refers to the widespread and much documented use of realism in photography. Note that the 
issue of realism is defined above as operating on two levels. The first aspect refers to the 'realism' of 
the scene depicted. The ideological content has been gauged according to how much like 'real life' it is. 
This would include scenes such as getting dressed in a bedroom or other daily activities like hailing a 
cab. These scenes respond to our common-sense expectations of the features of life. In order for the 
normalcy of the scene to be recognised, argues Ooffman, it is necessary to hyper-ritualise these 
mundane features, thereby bringing them into view as opposed to remaining concealed within the 
background. The scenes 'look like real life' but in no way belong to the realm of the real. Mulveyian 
paradigm does not attend to the exaggeration of the codes in the image, but the medium of the 
photograph is such that it allows the viewer to gaze at it as if it were the more real, more perfect 
reflection of the self during the mirror phase. Furthermore, the Mulveyian paradigm argues that the 
realist and its associate narratives are an essential feature by which the feminine is connected to the 
passive so that the male protagonist is secured in his (sexual) active potency. Thus, this particular 
coding uses the identification patterns that such an image establishes as its primary means to operate 
ideologically. Following Mulvey et al. one would expect this to be a dominant feature of the gender 
representations, and of femininity in particular, confined as she is by her 'to-be-looked-at-ness'.
The second aspect of realism concerns the particular ways that photography can capture 
perspective or three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional frame. One of the particular qualities that 
photography has is its ability to capture a scene 'objectively', as if the viewer were actually there. The 
impression given is that the visual space depicted represents the scene as it would be seen by the naked 
eye. It assumes that the frame and editing have not distorted the view in any way. However, the actual 
framing and editing remain implicit, obscuring the perspective and ideology contained within. This sort 
of construction is more often associated with a voyeuristic position. The Mulveyian paradigm argues 
that this ideological transformation is something that women are particularly subject to, so much so that 
this form of encoding has become synonymous with femininity. I« addition, this variable draws upon 
the presumption of identification that underpins much of the work critiqued here.
This variable also addresses the potential for at least minimally more surrealist, non- 
naturalistic or stylistic modes of photography that was traced during sampling and is treated as anti- 
realist in its form. This is how it resists the construction of ideological identification patterns. It is 
achieved through highly artificial gestures, self-conscious or self-referential codes that quote back to 
the advertisement its naturalistic illusions. These images mock the pose and defeat it as posture or 
gesture that can be adopted as an expressive gesture by the viewer. Also, within such an image there is 
the impression that the model is mocking or satirising the act of modelling. The second feature of this 
code refers to those images in which the model is presenting an ordinary gesture but is set against a 
contradictory background. For example, the model could be in a fake beach scene wearing winter
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clothes and pretending to feel cold. This code does not seek to give this feminine presentation the 
veneer of authenticity. Collectively, these features expose some of the formal features of construction 
of realism and thus they resist securing patterns of identification.
The third refers to those images identified as part of the operationalisation process where some 
images had no explicit setting at all, surreal or otherwise. 1 observed that the background was often just 
white or coloured. If there is extensive use of codes two and three, this poses the question of the extent 
to which identification can be presumed to be a key feature of consuming advertisements. Potentially 
this could undermine Mulvey's argument since not only does this represent the feminine differently, 
but it also acts against the Symbolic and its concomitant identification patterns.
Variable nine refers to those aspects of the debates regarding the extent to which the female 
body is fragmented and therefore commodified and fetishised compared to the male body. The variable 
ranges from the "full body' through to the "head only*. The object of this variable is to trace 
substantively what parts of the body are depicted, how often and what parts of the fragmented body is 
represented. It is a simple and effective way to trace those parts of body that fetishistic conventions 
mobilise. This can then be related to the debates concerning the ideological impact of the framing of 
the body within representation, as well as the extent to which this divides along gender lines. For 
example, one would expect that there would be significantly more images of women being reduced to a 
fetishised leg than of men. 76 Potentially, therefore, the results of this code could confirm Pollock's 
maxim that the fragmentation of the female body is extensively used to sell, as well as confirm Doane's 
argument that the fragmentation of the body as image is a necessary form of representation that seeks 
to disavow the threat of castration that the female represents. The variable also includes the code 'face 
only\ This variable also returns to Nayak (1997), who draws attention to the ways in which the 
concealment of the head is used to transform the body to the object. The dismembered body is free to 
receive any connotations by way of the viewer's 'reading'. The second benefit that this 
operationalisation brings to the analysis is that the coding of the parts of the body is effectively free 
from evaluative influence: the parts of the body are absolutely known within a society. This is a central 
premise of the taxonomy: that, while the body is subject to symbolic elaboration of the most extensive 
kind, within that social background and its historicist roots, those categories and symbols are of the 
most natural kind (see for example, Douglas:1973; O'Neill:1985; Mauss:1973). Bodily metaphors of 
this kind remain relatively stable over quite long periods of time.
Further detail is added by isolating the various potential body positions (variable ten). The aim 
of the variable is twofold: first, it seeks to trace how the sex of the model affects the position taken up 
within the image; second, how these positions relate to the 'subordination' or 'domination' that the 
various positions impose. As argued above, fashion can be advertised in a seemingly infinite number of 
ways and therefore it carries no bars as to the ways the models are required to pose. I argue that, 
because of the universal presence of clothes, the sorts of positions adopted are not determined by the 
restrictions imposed by the commodity, but stem from the conventionalised presentations of the sexed 
body. The proposition here is that if the representations of body positions convey stereotypical versions 
of the sex, thus establishing identification, then these sorts of poses adopted ought to vary markedly by
' See Appendix B, for the ideological associations connected to the other codes.
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the sex of the model. Additionally, the various positions may be organised by the conventionalised 
postures through which subordination and domination are ritualised. Thus, the variable seeks to trace 
whether the sexed dichotomy is linked to the relations of power between men and women.
The variable has, where possible, enabled me to endeavour to capture the movement of the 
body, the displays of the body, as well as isolate body positions that tap into the undercurrent themes of 
the gendering of domination and subordination. Examples of the codes are l lying on the side', "twisting 
away\ "back facing camera' and so on. 77 Theoretically, these positions have been classed as 
visualisation of ritual subordination (Goffman: 1979). Therefore, according to postmodernist/feminist 
agenda, one would expect this to be significantly affected by the sex of the model. Specifically, one 
would expect this to be used extensively upon women because of the implied (sexual) passivity of lying 
down with regard to another (male) gaze. Each position can therefore be referred back to its context 
and the ideological significance attributed. For example, following Nayak, one would expect there to 
be a high frequency of black models whose face was obscured in some way so that the gaze cannot be 
reciprocated.
The next level of detail refers to the embodied presentations of the model and, in particular, 
focuses upon the physical appearance of the body. Many of the codes in this variable are drawn directly 
from the secondary literature, particularly the recurrent codes used within sex scales (Connell:1987). I 
have directly adopted these classifications where the category of sex is combined with sexual character, 
for example ^emotionaP. This variable also traces the detailed ways in which the body is gendered 
and/or sexed. Relating this to my specific concerns, this variable is also where the secondary and 
practically accomplished marks of sex are accomplished. The marks range from painted nails and long 
or short hair to the presence or absence of body hair, musculature and impressions of weight. Note that 
the coding criteria of this variable insists all images are read as they appear, rather than through an 
empirical lens of how the images are actually composed; 78 for example, that 'naturalness' is a cosmetic 
effect. This does two things: first, it avoids speculations concerning the extent of cosmetic intervention 
to produce the appearance of naturalness in each individual image; second, accepting the image in 
terms of its final production is much closer to how the image is to be interpreted if it is to function to 
construct passive femininity. We naturalise the signification process, argues Goffman. If the reader 
approaches the image 'knowing' that the images are highly structured, then ideology as an entity 
becomes an entirely different operation. We read images as they appear: signs function when they are 
treated as they appear.
Variables twelve and thirteen deal with the containment of the body in the represented 
physical space. This builds upon the spatial location in as much as withdrawing from space is 
something that is commonly associated with subordination and vulnerability. The first variable 
delineates who or what contains the model and therefore deals directly with the issue of power. In
77 There have been some adjustments regarding the codification of this variable. The actual results did 
not warrant such a detailed classification. Therefore, some of them have been amalgamated. Note, 
however, those that have cannot be repeated in other sub-variables and thus there is no distortion 
produced by some cases being counted twice. See Appendix B for greater detail and definition of 
application.
78 Again, this reflects Goffiman's analysis that as consumers of an image, we are quite happy with this 
blurring between the real and the fake.
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particular, a body contained or confined relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level 
of autonomy that body is constructed as having. In particular, the ascription of status is often marked 
by the use of the body as barriers to demarcate ownership. Goffman (1979:54-6) argues that often the 
man will extend his arm into space in such a way that it effectively prohibits any 'intrusion' by another. 
The variable progresses from the most patriarchal to the least. As it indicates complicity on behalf of 
the woman, the most dominatory position is classified as the woman who voluntarily contains her own 
body and therefore withdraws from (public) space. This is followed by the code "contained by man\ in 
which a series of blocks may be placed in front of the woman, thus constraining her ability to move 
through space freely. This is classified as less dominatory because of the woman's potential resistance 
to his confinement.
I have also included a variable that reflects the potential reversal of this form of containment. 
For example, it may be the case that the female is now the boss and imposes the same limitations on the 
lower male workers. Therefore, it would usually require that this reversal be bound by a narrative in 
order that the relative differences in social status be included as part of the scene. In effect, this sub- 
variable seeks to consider whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As 
repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume the dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this 
association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. 1 have also extended the logic of Goffman's 
analysis to the concerns of the cultural critique in that they have been effective in demonstrating that 
this same restriction or domination can be symbolically carried by an object, usually phallic. Lastly, I 
have addressed the various codifications that address the mutual containment, in which case all of the 
above must be absent and both models must be embraced by the other. The sexual consumption of one 
body by the other, usually male of female, must also be absent. The evidence of sexual gratification has 
to be equal, as well as the absence of relative positioning to secure differential status and so on.
These cases whefe heterosexuality meets with patriarchy and heterosexism refer to a complex 
web of social relations and structures and remains a contentious issue within the feminist movement. 
However, following Stevi Jackson (1995), it cannot be assumed above all else that heterosexual 
relationships can mean only domination for women and that correspondingly all representations of 
heterosexual relationships are entirely ideological and therefore pernicious to heterosexual women. It is 
of course difficult, as the ideology of heterosexist romance is often bound up in the images of equality. 
However, also within those images, there must also be the codes in which his authority, the primacy of 
his pleasure and her willingness to please it are manifestly present. It remains to be seen how pervasive 
these images are, but it is possible that the images represent reciprocal desire, rather than the more 
general relationship of women being desired and men doing the desiring. If there are enough cases to 
make such images a minority trend, but nevertheless a trend, there needs to be discussion as to what we 
think these might mean. Moreover, it may not necessarily be the case that those images that are 
encoded as mutual desire are heterosexual couples. As Lexis and Rolley (1997) have argued, there has 
been a shift in the patterns of desire represented so that an accessible lesbian spectatorial position can 
be adopted regarding 'twin' images. These images are composed of two women entwined and made up 
to look like each other. They argue that this offers a space through which lesbian desire can be 
experienced. In such cases, there would be two women embracing mutually and desire in the women
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would be embodied in toe form of a pout, a smile or semi-nudity. This variable concludes with 'non- 
containment', where the body stance cannot be said to be withdrawing in any sense.
The second variable in this cluster details the most regular body positions adopted to signify 
the various forms of containment. It concerns the embodied positions adopted to perform passivity. 
This is then a central variable that traces how a body may be positioned in social space to 'do' 
passivity. One example of self-containment is to have the woman seated with her arms folded around 
her legs and her legs pulled up to her chest. Another example traces the frequency by which the man 
places his arm in front of or around the woman, thereby marking ownership. Note that there is an 
automatic coding operation here in which if the preceding variable is marked non-contained it 
automatically skips out this variable. 79
Variable fourteen seeks to trace the various codes used to sexualise or fetishise the model by 
means of the dress and the various ways the flesh is revealed. By 'reveal', I mean that the clothing is 
removed, unbuttoned or lifted to draw attention to an area of flesh. This references the psychoanalytical 
contributions as to how fetishism works. Accordingly, those theorising within the Mulveyian paradigm 
must insist that this marks the female body categorically, not only that there be marked differences. 
Furthermore, by including the various ways that the body itself conceals its own nudity, the extent of 
sexualisation within the image can be specified. Examples are ''revealing of the shoulder', 'hip', 
'breast', 'see-through clothing', through to 'fully naked'. The latter example reflects the decision to 
include advertisements that signified through the logo alone rather than restricting the sample to 
advertisements of specific items of clothing. The code 'fully dressecf refers to bodies sexualised by 
facial expressions, for example the pout. The securing of sexualisation via the face is treated elsewhere 
in the taxonomy. The code 'non-sexualisation' refers to those images only where the model is fully 
dressed, devoid of a descriptive background and has no visible facial expressions. In addition, here the 
model must be fully clothed, without any parts of the body exposed. I argue that this is a non- 
sexualised image because there is nothing specifically erotic about the codification. 1 argue that the 
central features are those that commodify the image rather than commodity and sexualise the model.
Variables fifteen to seventeen trace the presentation of the hand. Variable fifteen traces who is 
touching whose body. 80 Also included are codes identifying cases where the hand is inactive; both are 
classified as relatively ungendered. Variable sixteen traces the parts of the body that are touched and 
variable seventeen traces what kind of touch is involved. Again drawing on Goffrnan, women were 
depicted touching things much more than men. The hand is used to trace the outlines of things or to 
fiddle with things. He argues that this mode of'barely' touching contrasts strongly with a competent or 
utilitarian mode of touch, which grasps things or manipulates them. I have applied this by combining it 
with specific codes that trace what is touched as well as how it is touched. This taps into another 
convention in which women are seen to caress much more, as part of the private domain of caring. 
Thus, not only do women touch other people much more but they also touch themselves much more. 
Additionally, this draws specific attention to the gendering of the hand through daily practical 
accomplishments such as nail varnish, manicures, length of the nails and so on. One is able to trace the
79 All pre-programmed exclusions are listed in Appendix B.
80 Note that this includes the commodity itself, following Goffman's observation.
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extent to which gender is secured by practice, and is therefore relatively open-ended, rather than the 
structure or social order reduced to a move in language. The cross-tabulations enable us to trace how 
gendered the touch is by examining who is touched, by whom and where. Each categorisation relates to 
the dimensions of the gendered dichotomy; for example, 'utilising' has distinctly active connotations.
The taxonomy further codifies the body idiom by the positioning of the limbs (variables 
eighteen and nineteen). By tracing the various positions of the arms and legs, it is possible to trace how 
the body is gendered through movement: the active body is conventionally connected to the masculine, 
while the feminine is pinned to a motionless body. Contrariwise, the Mulveyian paradigm has 
emphasised that action defines the masculine. Regarding my separate concerns, this demonstrates the 
theoretical commitment to the material body, that is, what does the body have 'do' visually to represent 
hegemonic patterns of masculinity? Consequently, the taxonomy consistently tackles the material 
embodied positions adopted to convey symbolic meanings that are not innate to the body. Passivity has 
to be enacted, not merely assumed to be symbolically imposed by the Law. Therefore, movement as 
part of the promise of power81 ought to be one of the consistent ways with which the male body is 
encoded. To reiterate, I argue that if the structurally determined dichotomy still organises the 
representation of masculinity and femininity, then this categorical difference must be encoded in part 
by the movement of the body. The taxonomy is able to build upon this by tracing the respective 
positions of the 'performative body parts'.
The next cluster of variables (twenty to twenty-four) traces the various features concerning the 
head, face and gaze and is central to the postmodernist/feminist argument regarding the categorically 
gendered nature of codification of the body. This cluster directly examines the frequency and the 
continuing value of the Mulvey paradigm. I argue that the structure of the gaze needs to be empirically 
present to be operative in the way she describes it. Variable twenty identifies the various positions of 
the head. The position of the head determines, and thus excludes, possible looks and interactions 
between the viewer and the model within the image, which is central if we are to examine the structure 
of the exchange of looks. Again, this variable has isolated the various head positions in detail in order 
that the image dictate the frequency of use. It includes therefore "head back', 'head down' and so on, 
leading to "head in profile'. Its additional significance is that it exposes the materiality of the body that 
I argued is lost in models that trace the Oedipal organisation of the body. The symbolic ordering of the 
body cannot overcome the fact that a structure of exchanges that takes place in looking is negated if the 
head is looking upwards. Even an example like this exposes the categorical nature of structurally 
determined description because to argue that this represents the feminine attempting to avoid the 
masculine gaze is to impose a specific inscription upon the image that reflects the theoretically 
determined normative position implicitly assumed. The image cannot be always reorganised to fit the 
structural imperative imposed and justified by recourse to the Oedipal organisation of the body. I have 
argued above that this is exactly what the notion of'feminisation' does: it negates certain coding shifts 
by recuperating them into the linguistically structural and thus universal dichotomy, while ignoring that 
feminisation assumes a 'common-sense' assign of sex: it has been established 'he's a feminised man'.
Reflecting the analyses of Dyer.
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To the head position the mouth is added (variable twenty-one). Examples include "pouting1 , 
'kissing, "phallic mouth1 , "phallic mouth with object' and so on. This variable explores the extent to 
which the mouth is central to the sexualisation of the body. Arguably, the mouth is subject to specific 
and intensive cultural elaborations, which mark the mouth out as one of the central erotic areas of the 
body. As a result, the mouth is an intensely symbolic domain, which, if the dichotomies presumed do in 
fact order the presentation, ought to be clearly marked by categorical difference. For example, using the 
mouth and cigarette is a central technique for the femme fatale. The eroticisation can be intensified by 
having the head tilted backwards slightly in order that the viewer can look inside the mouth. 
Additionally, it is central to the genderising of the body by means of practical regular 
accomplishments. For example, this variable draws attention to lipstick to produce a clearly gendered 
body. If there is a high frequency, it suggests that there has been a massive inroad of pornographic 
codes into mainstream magazines and, consequently, a marked difference in the expressive mouth will 
be treated as a significant evidence for the continuation of a subordinated sexual femininity as the 
postmodernists/feminists define it. Note also there are a number of codes that have been included that 
specifically target what has come to be known as the 'Lolita effect' (Silver-man: 1994; Stratton: 1996). 
This may be connected to other codes in the taxonomy where specifically child-like characteristics 
have been included. The use of child-like poses also integrates the elements of status back into the 
visual field (Goffmann: 1979). This further connects to the debates regarding the discursive discipline 
of women's 'natural flesh' One would not expect there to be a high frequency of cases where the male 
body is encoded in this way. Therefore, if a high frequency is traced within the female sample, specific 
tables will be built excluding the male population of the sample. It is possible to delineate the extent to 
which the body is securely coded in this way, or whether other childish postures are set in contradiction 
to the gaze.
The next variable in this cluster identifies the direction of the gaze (variable twenty-two) as 
well as the spectatorial address (variable twenty-three). The latter variable refers to the mode of address 
contained within the image. There are three altogether and the coding follows strictly the descriptions 
and definitions provided by the postmodernist/feminist model. The variable moves from the most 
active position adopted by the model towards the imagined viewer to the most passive position between 
model and viewer. Thus, the primary access in this variable concerns the set-up between the model's 
gaze and the imagined viewer at the point when the photograph is taken. This structures the image so 
that the relationship is re-established when the viewer sees the image, even if the viewer reads against 
the grain of the image. Code 1, "public addressing viewer', traces an exchange of looks constructed by 
the model looking directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer in the place of 
the camera: the gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions 
himself or herself to the image. Hence, to look at such an image is to engage with the model. The 
description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. 
Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or desire 
for the viewer, but it need not necessarily be the case. For example, the model appears as the initiator of 
a sexual exchange by adopting a gaze that makes the viewer the object in the exchange. It can therefore 
apply equally to male and female models.
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This compares with what has been described as 'narrative address'. Code 2 refers to those 
images in which the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the 
main axis of exchange between one of the models and the viewer, while clearly excluding the other 
model/character. For example, the female model looks into the camera and therefore at the viewer, 
while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby excluding the boyfriend/model from the central exchange 
of looks. The implication is that the boyfriend/model is being laughed at, therefore making the joke 
private to viewer and model. This draws upon the film form. The central protagonist in such a mise-en- 
scene is the female model since she both commands the viewer's gaze and dupes her boyfriend. 
Similarly, the male model could place the viewer at the centre of the narrative by covertly initiating the 
male viewer's gaze at another women, while in the presence of the presumed girlfriend. Not only does 
such a narrative assert the heterosexist assumption, but it also connotes the convention that the 
exchange is between the men because the object of exchange is the woman.
Code 3, ''private voyeur', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze 
of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus, the relationship of the model to the viewer is one 
where the viewer can peer into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocity and free to see 
or impose what he or she wants. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing and, as a result, 
one would expect this be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. This exposes the 
extent to which psychoanalysis underpins the analyses subject to critique. If such a frame is used 
pictorially to represent men, a male gaze that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic usually 
accompanies it. Dyer defines the instabilities contained in images of men thus: in order to disavow the 
latent passivity of being an object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity. 
For example, by displaying his cerebral superiority by looking up to the heavens, the male model 
makes his own body inconsequential to his true being. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic 
gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus is said 
to determine whether the gaze is gendered.
To conclude, the variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this 
'realistic' medium. More specifically, spectatorial address captures the extent to which the passive 
position of the female model in a frame and the active position of the (presumed) male viewer structure 
the mise-en-scene. It directly references the ways in which postmodernism/feminism, and Cultural 
Studies more generally, argue that passivity is visually structured, which then must be negated if the 
model is male. This directly references Mulvey's paradigmatic position regarding the ways the visual 
form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.
The expression of the gaze (variable twenty-three) adds detail to the above structure of the 
exchange of looks. It details the extent to which the exchange of the gaze is further disambiguated by 
the expressions that accompany them. Some codes target the active side of the gendered dichotomy, 
most notably the codes that identify the 'authoritative', 'assertive' and 'other-worldly' gazes, while the 
passive features are pinned to codes such as 'coy', 'dreamy', 'shy' and so on. 82 The expressions 
encompass both the direction of the eyes and the use of the eyebrows to anchor the meaning further. 
Note also that certain features of the expressive gaze are secured by the direction of the look and the
82 Many of these terms have been lifted from Millum's The Images of Women, 1976.
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head position, which will have been detailed beforehand. The codes used within the advertisement 
itself and the operationalisation undertaken here mean that the reading of the code and its mode of 
display are not treated as synonymous to the gestures used in embodied interaction. The codes of 
display are not a part of a broader flow of interaction that takes place within time, the conclusion of 
which is not controlled by either interlocutor. Each gesture works through its stylisation, that is, 
through the exaggeration of the common features of a gesture. Again, I return to Gofftnan for 
justification: these expressions are not complex like the real material social interactions upon which 
they are based: they function because they are dependent upon conventionalised hyper-realistic forms 
and this is what makes them instantly recognisable. Therefore, I argue that codes contained within 
commercial images are both highly staged and thoroughly dislocated from real time and space. 
Moreover, the staged nature of the image is further compounded by the fact that is seen and 'reflected 
back', via the directions of the photographer, to the model throughout the shoot, which further 
problematises the relationship between the viewer and viewed because the image is mediated through 
the photographer. There are, then, various ways in which the image exaggerates 'naturalistic' 
expressions in order that it be 'read' as intended.
Variable twenty-four is a departure from those that specifically target the body. Rather, it 
traces the use of social scenes to stage the narrative presented, thus further removing ambiguity from 
the meaning. Certain social settings are accompanied by relatively fixed conventions about what is 
understood to take place there. Therefore, it introduces the ideological elements of social space into the 
representation: the feminine is equated with the private/domestic sphere. The codes selected range from 
scenes of a 'lovers' tiff to the 'countryside', 'cafes 1 to 'bars' and so forth. The scenes act as 
ideological contexts within which the body idiom is located and by doing so automatically exclude 
inappropriate keying of interpretive practices. Furthermore, the variable extends the ideological 
grounding of the image within broader sets of hegemonic relations. For example, it provides a 
mechanism to trace those representations of social space that remain highly dichotomised; the feminine 
remaining private, for example. Variable twenty-six identifies both the magazine and the year. When 
used as part of the results, this is broken up into two to facilitate ease of interpretation.
Variable twenty-five traces the macro structural features of the image according to the 
gendered dichotomies. Each sub-variable contains a hierarchised pair: the first value is the one applied 
to the man, the second value is applied to the woman. For example, one would expect the masculine to 
be equated with the assumption of the subject and the feminine with the particular form of 
objectification; hence the masculine is the mind (as defined by Dyer) and the feminine the body (as 
identified by feminist cultural theory). If this relationship is reversed, 'the mind' will be positioned as 
the second value, which has been constructed as the feminine side. The variable contains codes that 
count the potential frequency of both. The aim was to trace two elements simultaneously: first, the 
respective distributions of the masculine and feminine as determined by the theoretical account of the 
dichotomy; second, the interdependence between the active/passive, mind/body, narrative/image 
descriptions. By doing so, it was intended to identify the extent to which visual representation 
contributed to its reproduction, or whether there was emergent evidence that the structural dichotomy 
was weakening.
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However, this operationalisation was not successful because it was too cumbersome and thus 
failed to measure what it set out to identify. This was in part a result of a distinct set of distributions 
that broke up the logic of the dualisms far more significantly than piloting had suggested. Second, it 
underestimated the extent to which the method restricted such relational analysis. It was operationalised 
thus in order maintain a sense of the interrelationship between the two opposites, which was why the 
advertisement was defined as the coding unit. The cumbersome nature of the coding directly led to 
statistically invalid results. Unlike the other variable codes, these do not exist as separate entities, 
which makes the application of chi invalid. I have therefore excluded analysis of this variable. The 
second major problem with the operationalisation more broadly is that a number of the variables are 
simply too long and, as a result, many of the findings are obscured by the sheer size of the tables. When 
this has occurred, I have broken them up into smaller logical clusters. 83
In summation, the central emphasis of this taxonomy is to trace the positions, gestures, 
contexts and photographic codes that, in general terms, produce the images that surround us. When the 
codes have been more descriptive, I have adhered to the semiotics discussed above for the criteria of 
application. However, most of the codes contained isolated body parts: how much is shown, what is 
shown, how the body represents itself in an advertisement in order to 'do' gender. I have chosen the 
most basic features with which to do this. Therefore, while I recognise the critiques to which content 
analysis is subject, I suggest that if we are to treat many of my variables as inherently problematic, then 
we must ask if meaning can work at all. I have sought to restrict the codification to the most basic 
features of an advertisement, aiming to limit any potential ambiguity that characterises the interpretive 
meanings that organise social life. I attend to a level of analysis that Goffman defines thus:
[the book is about] the organisation of experience - something that an individual actor can 
take into his mind - and not the organisation of society. [He makes no claim whatsoever to be] 
talking about the core matters of sociology - social organisation and social structure. I am not 
addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any 
moment of their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in every way and individual's 
current involvements to be second; this report deals only with matters that are second. 
(Goffman: 1974:13)
This informs my rejection of the inferences that regularly emerge from the axis between representation 
as social order and identity. As argued, we should desist from assuming that certain identifications are 
made as a result of the linguistic or representational order. However, I recognise that the adoption of 
such a tenet is insufficient justification for the return to the quantification of meaning. Thus, what 
follows is a detailed exploration of certain public practices upon which more complex interpretations 
are made. I argue that we can treat certain categories as constructed, but nevertheless foundational: the 
construction operates foundationally once it is taken for granted, that is, it belongs to the social and 
linguistic background. To this, I add that these basic categories are dependent upon a certain facticity of 
the body that provides a resting place, as it were, from which language is made meaningful. Therefore,
83 These can be examined in Appendix B.
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I reject the radical sceptical position adopted toward language to which content analysis is particularly 
vulnerable.
To reiterate, GofYhian argues that there is a direct relationship between the meaningful social 
world we live in and the representations that we make of this world. However, he queries the 
assumption that these representations are more than a direct mirror reflection of the social world they 
nevertheless encapsulate. He is, therefore, targeting the very assumption I have critiqued above: images 
can be about the world in which we live in a direct way, but this does not justify the causal leap that the 
postmodernists make, that somehow they are that world. Goffinan is explicit as to how the 
representative and the real are bound to each other, without further pinning this to a structuralist model 
of social reproduction and its formation of appropriate identities; he therefore excludes the reduction 
that culture operates as a psychological disposition. He remains sociological about the image but makes 
fundamental distinctions between the social and the cultural that I think can make a considerable 
contribution to feminist analysis.
METHODOLOGY, CONVENTION AND THE IMAGE WITHIN THE FIELD OF 
COMMERCIALISED AESTHETIC REALISM
Goffman84 begins by asking what sort of a thing is the photographic image. He argues that 
ambiguity in photography lies in our linguistic incapacity to distinguish what the photographic image is 
'of. With regard to the stage, we have the semantic distinction between character and actor to 
discriminate between the real and the temporary, but such a distinction is missing with regard to 
photography. A photograph can be said to be 'of the subject, as well as 'of the model: it merges them 
both by concealing the difference that is then taken for granted. An example of such a blur is the 
instance when the framing of a 'model' is staged so that the 'subject' appears surprised by having her 
photograph taken. Other examples include rigged photographs where the model and the scene are real 
but are brought together to induce radically wrong inferences about what is taking place so that the 
viewer is misled. Photographic forms of representative realism work precisely because the number and 
depth of cues are insufficient to indicate what is really going on. Goffman argues that the result of the 
failure to sustain the semantic distinction is that we treat photography as if we are concerned with one 
kind of problem, when in fact we are concerned with another, substantively ignored. 85 Consequently, 
the staged nature of image is lost when it is successful in staging the real.
Significantly, Goffman links the staging of the 'material world' to the advertisement form and 
defines this relationship as 'commercial realism'. This directly draws together the mode of visual 
presentation to the social field in which it takes place; hence, his considerations are explicitly market 
oriented. Commercial realism employs standardised scenes and props to pass the scene off as a 
potentially real one. Furthermore, it provides a particularly acute example of the ambiguity between 
model and subject. For example, an image that depicts a nude but well-known woman will raise 
questions about the modesty of the model; a picture that features some nuns idolising a car is likely to
84 The following analysis of Goffrnan's contribution is taken from section 2 of Gender Advertisements.
85 Gender Advertisements, p. 13.
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raise questions about the desecration of the subjects. Regarding the latter, we are concerned about the 
image, but this concern is not based within the material instance but with the generic social type 
depicted and the advertisement. Nayak makes this exact slip when he refers to the subject of the 
photograph, which carries with it the assumption that the subject is the model in real life. The semantic 
slip conceals the extent to which the posture belongs to the realm of commercial realism rather than 
black subjectivity. This equally emerges in the feminist analysis of stereotypes which sought 'realistic' 
representation about the 'real' lives of women, to have 'real women's bodies' in the advertisement, but 
at the same time to make a commercial image promote changes to the social order, that is, to make 
them about the promote social change, that is, to produce another reality. Implicitly, I argue that the 
cultural analyses critiqued above have not moved far from this position: the singular emphasis upon 
representation86 means that they are forced to look for 'positive images' to challenge the current 
phallocentric stranglehold. Perhaps this is an outcome of the model of socialisation, upon which this 
model is implicitly dependent.
Therefore, commercial realism encompasses a form of artifice that defines the photograph: the 
simulated scenes represent narrative-based action located within the stream of time and place from 
which inferred meaning is gleaned. The artifice deployed renders the natural expressions crude, 
simulated and frozen. Hence, all models transformed into subjects in the narrative are united in their 
artifice. For example, the exchange of looks can seek to bring the viewer into the frame of meaning; the 
subject makes eye contact, sometimes collusively, as if that someone were there in the flesh. 87 This 
echoes Mulvey's notion of the male gaze. 88 This model does not reject the conventions within the 
image by which it makes sense to talk of the male gaze, rather it rejects the inference that assumes that 
this forms identity and organises patterns of desire. On the contrary, this construction is brought about 
by the slip of model/subject. His point is that we know Brutus didn't really kill Caesar when we were at 
the theatre last; likewise we know that the model and subject are different, that the latter is fictional, 
even if we suspend this in order that the image work. Without this semantic distinction, the social form 
dissolves through such a series of misframes. We 'know' the difference between a social interaction 
and a representation even if we have to 'suspend' this to make the representation work. Interaction and 
interpretive linguistic activity make such a semantic distinction available and brings the effects of 
meaning into the conscious realm where it is 'available for use'. Thus, we abandon the analytical 
distinction so that we can treat the scene naturalistically, that is, accept its subject, despite the fact this 
has nothing to do with what went on to compose the image.
Asked what is in a particular ad, we might say, 'A family fishing.' What makes us think the 
four subjects in the picture are in a family relationship to one another is exactly what might 
make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in real life. So, too, on seeing the 
images of fishing lines in the water. Asked whether we think the four persons who are 
modeled for the picture are really a family, or if there are hooks at the end of the lines, the
86 Moving as it does between the levels highlighted in the introduction to the literature review.
87 This is where I have drawn the code 'narrative address' from.
88 This is important because it suggests a stability of meaning that does not entirely lie with the reader. I
...ill _»<-..«w* +rt 4-ltif in rv»r»fV> H^i"51llwill return to this in more detail.
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answer could well be, 'Probably not, but what does it matter?' The point about an ad is what 
its composer meant us to infer as to what is going on in the make-believe picture scene, not 
what had actually been going on in the real doings that were pictured. This is subject, not 
model. (Goffman: 1974:15) (my italics)
Such a semantic distinction does not ground the semiotic analyses undertaken by 
postmodernism/feminism and so this slip finds it way into the heart of the analyses they undertake. 
This means the differing levels of representation often go unattended. We want our photographs to say 
true things about us, and we are prepared to suspend concern for the artifice that creates it. Is this not an 
interesting way of situating the possible ideological elements of photography while taking the 
utterances people make about the photograph seriously? Moreover, the knowledge of its artificial 
construction suggests that the meaning is not operating within the unconscious because its 
construcutedness is at once recognised and ignored. Thus, while he traces very similar forms of 
exchanges, he locates their operation in quite a different domain from the Mulveyian paradigm: the 
construction is a phenomenological projection from the cognitive reading of the image to the capacity 
to 'see' the photograph as space that the viewer temporarily occupies. Therefore, the photograph 
operates through the phenomenological practices of perception; practices that change over time, up and 
beyond the basic units or gestalts of perception. Furthermore, these practices can be treated ironically, 
and in doing so, it is possible to disrupt the interpretative practice and dislodge the meanings integrated 
to the space the viewer temporarily occupies89 . Moreover, the text is able to present to us a new view 
on the representation. In this way, it is possible to integrate notions of how the text is able to alter our 
interpretative horizons: it can bring to the fore what was once merely taken for granted.
THE REPRESENTATION AND THE COMPETENT READER
Goffman emphasises that commercial images reconstitute social space. Therefore, there is no 
sense in which the space depicted is to be treated as equivalent to physical space, again stressing the 
semantic distinction between model and subject. Goffman singles out the regular features of an image, 
and he is careful to trace the semiotic elements specific to commercial realism that build upon those 
regular units. He examines in detail the relationship between the form and content of a type of 
representation and argues that the combination has a significant impact upon the final product. 
Arguably, he works with the presupposition that we can adopt codes, categories and words that are 
used practically within interaction and transform them so that they function in the visual form, for 
example, but relay the same conventional meanings. Therefore, representative realism must draw upon 
the conventions of the social and linguistic background and reconfigure them in such a way as to make 
them produce those same associations within a two-dimensional frame.
By using Goffman's model, I argue that it is possible to integrate the notion of linguistic 
background into social interaction, and that it is thus public in nature and yet pre-reflexive. The 
background of meaning is central to how we know things, but often we find it very hard to explain
89 A phenomenological parallel is the optical illusion.
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what it is we know. The rules that we follow are so complex that they become opaque. What is required 
is a series of techniques by which we can penetrate certain kinds of meaning to a certain level. By 
'keying', Goffman means that we have myriad rules that we apply pre-reflexively when interpreting a 
text or social interaction. This places an essential distance between the fact that things are meaningful 
to use and the fact that this meaning is not a private internalised entity, as psychoanalysis presupposes, 
but thoroughly public. This technique is something that we use to get a handle on the polysemy of 
social and linguistic life, that is, complex forms of meaning. The process of keying institutes the 
appropriate frames of reference when doing interpretation. It is a process in which we know when an 
instance is an exception and when it is a common daily occurrence, for example. Moreover, it is the 
system by which we differentiate different kinds of texts and recognise the different level of analysis 
that is appropriate to a text.
Thus, Goffman is isolating the social competencies that we as social actors employ as part of 
our interpretive practices. Moreover, the sets of competencies required are bounded by the social and 
cultural order: those who have not become embodied, socially competent actors in this order may not 
have the necessary cultural references or keying structures to understand the gesture fully. For example, 
Russian men can congratulate other men with a kiss on the lips. In Britain, such an exchange between 
non-kin adult men is almost always considered a homosexual act because of the discourses of sexuality 
and counter-discursive constructions established by gay pride. Conversely, therefore, a man and a 
woman in an embrace would generally be assumed to be a couple, particularly if the context is a 
fashion feature in a women's magazine. The stable contexts of meaning combine with the conventional 
and standardised codes to produce the appropriate cues. The differentiation does not lie in the integrity 
of the act, but in the social context and the way these features define what sort of an exchange it is. We 
use keying skills to differentiate these elements. Thus, part of the complexity of this interpretive 
technique is the many social interactions it informs and unpacks: it enables one to trace power 
asymmetry within a social interaction in which the actors participate. Moreover, these interpretive 
activities are conventional in form and operate most effectively in 'normal cases'. I shall return to the 
importance of normal cases and circumstances in a moment.
Goffman departs from other writers concerning the image because, before he considers the 
content, he explores the photograph as a phenomenal object to which he conjoins the 
phenomenological experience of viewing the object. Goffman asks first what sorts of things go into 
making a photograph; only then can its meaning be considered. He argues that these two focal points 
operate prior to the interpretation of the image and are therefore integral to the interpretive practice. 
The significance that is being drawn from this is that it seems to suggest that the image 'works' because 
people are readily aware of the highly artificial context and content of the image's scene. Therefore, the 
fabrication, integral to the fashion image, is an element of the function of the image. He argues that 
photography, as a specific form of representation, has two special elements: first, the apparent capacity 
to capture a perspective as the viewer would see it; second, the naturalistic view of a world presented as 
a controlled, manipulated and staged view. The spontaneity of being caught by the camera is a fake, an 
artifice produced to stage the narrative. Goffman's departure is to make the artifice of realism central to 
his analysis, as well as to the interpretations viewers make. Therefore, we are able to keep a keen eye
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on the artifice of realism, without branding the viewer who consumes it a cultural dupe, as the 
postmodernists/feminists are forced to do because only they, somehow, muster the critical distance that 
prohibits their identification.
KEY PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
Goffinan has outlined persuasively that a condensed form of meaning operates within 
advertisements, and he has put the case that this is highly conventional in form. I attend to this by 
differentiating between texts and the interpretive competency required. I argue that reading most 
advertisements does not require that we attend theoretically to the instability of meaning. 
Advertisements are quite unlike the texts that postmodernists themselves write, in which the polysemic 
features of language are central to even a surface engagement with them. I relate this accomplishment 
to the conventional contexts available for use. Interpretation is a fact of life but this does not mean that 
there are not different sorts of interpretive activities. By this, I mean that we must attend to where the 
interpretation is taking place, what sort of an entity is subject to interpretation and where it comes from. 
Sorting out the varying aspects of interpretation enables us to grasp fundamental differences between 
the interpretation that confronts us within social interaction and the interpretive activities we undertake 
when we read a text. The fact that, as Goffinan readily illustrates, these forms of interpretive 
competencies interact and that the boundaries between them are blurred is not a problem we face as 
users. We have a common-sense background to draw upon that allows us to make the necessary 
differentiations.
Interpretative interaction with others is located in space and time in an immediate embodied 
sense. We are unable to go back and undertake the interpretive activity again. Texts, on the other hand, 
can be re-read, re-interpreted. I argue that we bring different skills to bear when we interact and make 
those interpretations as part of the ongoing chain from those that we use when we approach a text. This 
marks out textual interpretations from social interpretation, even if we metaphorically apply the 
methods of textual interpretation to the embodied forms of social display. For example, we 'read' 
people's display and this can say something about their consumption practices, but this must not be 
taken as an instance of text as body. In this sense, I stress that these meanings are distinctly public in 
form and function because of the structured contexts from which they emerge.
Moreover, we apply different levels of interpretation to different cultural texts because we 
ascribe different statuses to them. In this way, we treat advertisements as relatively rudimentary texts, 
particularly when they are aligned to more complex texts such as novels. Advertisements ought not to 
be subsumed under the homogenising heading 'Text'. Postmodernism has pursued zealously the notion 
of the 'death of the author' and argued that we should cease to consider a text according to authorial 
intention. However, this has been pursued without any differentiation according to the context that 
produces the text. Advertisements are overtly commercial forms and it is of primary importance that 
advertisement successfully achieve the association of the language of desire and the product placement. 
On estimate, a campaign such as that run by Haagen-Dazs can cost about £30 million. If a campaign 
commits this much investment into persuading people to buy the good, surely this suggests that it aims
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to anchor meaning rather than promote a product via the free-floating signifier. My central point is this: 
a campaign cannot be so ambiguous or so complex as to fail to connect the meanings it generates and 
the product. Therefore, I reject the notion that advertisements are so unstable as to prohibit a content 
analysis of their key features. We apply different keying techniques and we expect different forms of 
cultural content and presentation from them. Arguably, this distinction is taken for granted, but it is 
nevertheless fully operative.
IN SUMMATION
Goffman argues that advertisements are representations that are about our world. They are 
condensed representations that draw upon certain socio-cultural features of actual embodied 
interaction. However, he argues that they can operate successfully only if a number of conditions are 
met:
1. Goffman provides us with a semantic distinction between the model and the subject that allows us 
to describe the social reality represented without the epistemological slip that the representation 
encapsulates 'real reality' in some authentic way.
2. The capacity of the advertisement to represent society is dependent upon the artifice of the codes, 
props, bodies and stages.
3. The socio-cultural world that is recognisable in the image yet accomplished though artifice does 
not seem to have an adverse impact upon the reader.
4. On the contrary, the lay reader readily discards the artifice in order that the representation achieved 
can continue to be about our socio-cultural lives.
5. The social world staged is based in artifice, which means that the codes draw upon the background 
of embodied social interaction, but then greatly over-emphasise them. The social conventions of 
face-to-face interaction are 'hyper-ritualised'.
Therefore, the social conventions by which embodied interaction is regularly achieved is drawn upon 
exaggeratedly so that these features are readily understood without any extra interpretive work. For 
example, he isolates the use of the male body as a means to act as a barrier to the women's movement. 
He is suggesting that it mirrors the convention of presentations of the public self. Public male figures 
are notorious for stating symbolically that 'she is my wife'. Through the exaggeration, readers are 
readily able to project the embodied sets of meanings that flow from interaction on to the stylised 
versions in representation. The codes work because of their dependence upon convention, and it is with 
the conventions of representing gender that I am concerned.
Regarding content analysis as a method, the following conditions apply to its application here:
1 It is beyond the remit of the method to draw inferences about the relationship of representation to 
the social order more broadly.
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2. Equally, it is beyond its scope to make inferential conclusions regarding interpretive activities.
3. 1 make no claim to replace the causal mechanism of internalisation with another.
4. If we seek to locate the effect of representation, then I propose that we look to its location within 
interaction. This effectively rejects representation as somehow a causal effect.
5. Advertisements are essentially conventional, which is why I argue that the method of content 
analysis is applicable.
6. I seek only to draw out the body positions and postures and so identify the extent of their gender 
differentiation.
In essence, then, the aim of quantifying the gendered nature of representation is to contest its 
assumed uniformity, which is a direct consequence of the categorical logic that informs the mainstay of 
semiotic analyses conducted. I argue that this requires a move beyond the form of description that 
merely contest a single semiotic reading with another single counter example, which undertaking a 
semiotic analysis of the content would produce. In a sense, the endeavour reflects the need for an 
overview of the representations, rather than attention to the specificities of the meaning. The consensus 
regarding the meaning of representation overlooks two central elements: first, it tends to overlook the 
commodification and sexualisation pressures and the extent to which the markets both target and 
marketise masculinity; second, it forecloses change that could potentially erode the gendered difference 
initially identified in the 1970s. The primacy awarded the gendered dichotomy as both the source and 
the outcome of representation inevitably leads to the reproduction of the dichotomy because there is no 
source, trajectory or subject that can produce sustained and systematic resistance to it.
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GENDERING THE BODY OR CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT?
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The purpose of quantifying the bodily based codes is to contest the assumption that 'the 
sign' constitutes the gendered dichotomy, thereby constituting feminine identity as the absolute other. 
In chapter 2,1 outlined what I consider to be the fundamental difficulties of theory that seeks to define 
or infer patterns of identification, that is, the formation of subjectivity, through a specific semiotic 
decoding of an ideological cultural contour. Here, I seek to challenge their assumptions of what the 
contours of culture actually are. Hence, my results investigate the validity of the following theoretical 
standpoint: the Symbolic is ordered by the core dualisms of patriarchy so that the active/passive 
elements are combined with the masculine subject and the feminine object. For example, a number of 
codes isolate which direction the model is looking: looking down and away is passive and thus 
feminine, whereas looking directly into the camera is active and thus masculine. For these semiotic 
analyses to be good empirical description, that is, good description of the Symbolic, then the Symbolic 
ought to reproduce the structural dualisms of patriarchy. In relation to a content analysis, if the 
Symbolic is thus structured, the tables generated ought to be categorically distributed by sex, 
measurable by chi square (statistical difference). If this is the case, the sex of the model will determine 
the dependent variables; the direction of the gaze, for example. Hence, the codes I have isolated define 
the position of the body, its gestures and expressions, in order to directly connect the Symbolic 
structures to determination of the body, that is, how the body as (feminine) object is visually produced.
In essence, I propose that the content, which I defined as the 'what' of the image, is anything 
but a forgone conclusion and the results offered here therefore aim to contest the assumption that 
culture is something ordered by a patriarchal Symbolic, which reproduces the (re)presentation of the 
feminine. On the contrary, I offer this content analysis as a means to: a) examine afresh the content of 
images; b) to redress the methodological imbalance produced by concentrating solely upon 'how' 
meaning is constructed. I have argued in chapter 3 that this imbalance leads to the loss of any sense of 
the basic description of gendered images.
THE ORDER OF ANALYSIS
The results are divided into two rough groups of codifications, beginning with those that 
identify simple photographic framing techniques, followed by those that pinpoint various forms of 
bodily gender display. I start by introducing the issue of how we raad the body as self-evidently male 
or female. Crucially, how are bodies are represented so that assignment of male or female is made, 
when the genitals are concealed? My interest here resides in issue of how natrualised gender is 
produced within the image, namely that this is what a man 'looks like' Correspondingly, it negates the 
required practices to accomplish what is seemingly natural order of the body. This is important for how 
we think about the causal relationship between genitals and the gendering of the body. I then trace how 
frequently the male and female models are pictured together, singly, in mixed or in homosocial groups. 
The emphasis here is to explore the central ideological anchoring of the image, particularly in terms of 
the heterosexist presumption and its corresponding dualisms. This is followed by the identification of 
the distributions of shot length, the type of focus and the combined effect of codifying the image
'The sign' has assumed the status of a generic type.
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through the generalised form of address. I place particular importance on the extent to which the 
address is defined by the voyeuristic codification. I build upon this by examining the realist 
photographic conventions. This form of codification is then located in terms of the social situations in 
which it is anchored. Here, I identify the gendered contexts of the public and private spheres, as well as 
the prevalence of specific settings for the interaction between men and women, the detail of the how 
the public and private domain is integrated into the production of the image and, in particular, the sites 
for heterosexual romance. There then follows an examination of body gestures. These variables, when 
combined, give us an overall picture of the current modes of gender codification, especially the extent 
to which the gestures remain distinctly gendered. I conclude with an analysis of the composite findings, 
to which I add my own specific concerns regarding the sex/gender distinction.
Note that the presentation of the results will be limited to the sample from 1985-95. This 
restriction has been imposed because, in places, the sample is too small to provide clear indicative 
shifts. Also, taking the body as the sampling unit, rather than the advertisement, produced the anomaly 
of increasing the sample size from the intended 500 to 703. As a result, the sample from Cosmopolitan 
1975 distorts the statistical calculations of chi square because the ratio of women to men91 here was 
3:1, therefore already producing clear statistical difference. As a result, I will examine shifts from 1975 
in terms of the generalised trends within Cosmopolitan. Where possible and relevant, I will include the 
chi score and the degrees of freedom beneath each table. Please note that when a number of cells have 
small distributions, Chi will produce an expected value that is less than five. This is statistically 
insignificant and inaccurate, and so in those cases Chi is not included. In these cases, the evidence will 
be treated as indicative. However, such small values may be indicative of a substantial change in 
themselves when treated as part of the broader semiotic picture provided by the cultural analyses.
Although included, my results will not contain any sustained analysis of the comparative 
distributions of the production of the sexed body and its relationship to ethnic minorities for two 
reasons. First, the overall sample for the ethnic minority groups registers just over 18%92 . This means 
that there is a less than 1:5 proportion of black to white models used. The coding is simply too detailed 
to make any analysis of this proportion effective. Second, with hindsight, this is beyond the scope of 
what a content analysis can provide. To do so requires addressing theoretically the issue of how 
structures are layered but without integrating them and, subsequently, that 1 address the manifest failure 
of postmodernism/feminism to deal with two or more structures at one time (see Connell:1987; 1995; 
Giddens: 1991; Bourdieu: 1977; 1990; Calhoun: 1995). One is able to get a sense of how frequently 
ethnic minorities are used, and that, strictly speaking, this proportion could be said to reflect fairly 
accurately the ratio of ethnic mix currently existing in Britain.
THE RESULTS
As can be readily identified in figure 1 below, the random sample between 1985-95 has 
produced a relatively even distribution of men and women represented: 50.79% of the bodies were
91 Please see Appendix C which shows the breakdown by numbers in 1975.
92 Please see Appendix C.
104
coded as female compared to 47.01% of bodies coded as male. Hence, there is equal visibility of male 
and female bodies within the fashion advertisements sampled. This sits in stark contrast to the 11 cases, 
just 1.73%, where the codes are sufficiently ambiguous to deter a secure assignment, meaning that in 
virtually all cases there are clear conventional secondary or tertiary sexual characteristics with which to 
assign the sex of the body (Connell:1987). This suggests that the sex of the model is visually codified 
so that the body appears as self-evidently one sex or the other, thereby negating those majority aspects 
of the body that are common to both bodies. It suggests that we treat secondary characteristics as clear, 
unambiguous signs of the naturalness of the category of sex. We tend to locate and define the body 
through genital difference first - that sex is the body. In our society, we tend not to think of 'the' body 
but of two bodies, knowable through sex, that produce two oppositional ontological entities. Keying 
functions in such a way that the body without armpit hair is self-evidently female. This form of keying 
seems to occur despite our awareness that shaving is a social activity and therefore, strictly speaking, 
has nothing to do with the "natural body". Likewise, if the body represented has defined muscle over 
the breast bone, again the conventions of keying would automatically produce the classification that




















the body is male. Muscle is a 'natural' feature of the male body, which again ignores the time spent in 
the gym accomplishing that particular muscle development. The central purpose of our cultural 
activities, it seems, is to negate these activities of accomplishment.
Furthermore, keying activity, such as this, indicates that we assume a direct correspondence 
between the secondary characteristics and concealed genitalia. This assumed correspondence is a 
process which, according to Kessler and McKenna (1978), by-passes the 'biological failure' of sex to 
clearly differentiate or dichotomise the secondary and tertiary characteristics into two distinct groups. 
Therefore, even when we encounter the myriad of'exceptions' in everyday life, it does not undermine 
the sanctity of the assumption of correspondence, that is, that certain traits, personal and physical, are 
male traits. We are faced, then, with the dilemma of the body: it is both the most self-evident of things 
and yet it is also one of the most intensely constructed entities. I will refer to the body as the male or 
female sexed model in order to emphasise the visual accomplishment.
Figure 1 indicates that the sex of the body is an accomplished and stable entity that forms the 
bedrock of the representations sampled here. This legitimates the postmodernist/feminist assumption 
that sexual difference is the core discursive product that reproduces the dualistic logic of the Symbolic. 
In addition, postmodernists/feminists would argue that this establishes the initial construction upon 
which the process of identification is founded. However, there is a central issue at stake for the 
postmodern/feminist agenda: to what extent is the universal accomplishment of sex within 
representation sufficient grounds to connect the values of the Symbolic hierarchy to representation and
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the identification representation is said to secure? In other words, is the accomplishment of a sexed 
female body sufficient to assume its place within the Symbolic hierarchy and award to that body the
 
gendered traits of subjectivity? Perhaps one requires more than the mere presence of sexed bodies to 
assume the gendered Symbolic because the production of the sexed body, which is more or less 
universal, does not produce the same sets of correspondent meanings, not just cross-culturally, but also 
within our social order (Herdt:1993). The substitution of the accomplished body with the Symbolic 
organisation of feminine and masculine as subjective identification patterns means that the various 
elements involved in the construction they are addressing remains unclear, since they are used 
interchangeably. Are they delineating the construction of bodies, sexual character or representation?
 
The interchangeability assumes that the accomplished body will secure the passivity of the feminine
 
and that this is self-evident. But does the accomplished body also readily secure feminine traits, or i
s 
such a causal connection another instance of the implicit re-introduction of the naturalised body 
(Shilling: 1993)? I return to this in greater detail as part of the evaluation of the results.
In figure 2 , a significant majority of the models sampled were photographed as single 
models (65.91% of the total sample). Not only does this suggest an emerging trend for simplification in 
representation techniques (Millum:1975; Liess, Kline and Jhally:1986; Wernick:1991), insofar as it 
removes the codifications necessary to link the two models, but it also takes away an important anch
or 
by which the heterosexist imperative is secured. For example, there is an approximate ratio of 4.5:1 o
f 
single female sexed models to those in a couple. This ratio is the same for male sexed models. It is 
now, therefore, much harder to secure the 'feminine as sexual adjunct' since she is predominantly 
photographed without a man. Moreover, she is just as likely to be photographed alone as a male sexed 
model.















































Chi = 1.3915, df= 3, there is no significant relationship
93 See Appendix B for details of which logically compatible codes have been amalgamated. Those 
variables subject to amalgamation are labelled 'derived'.




The extent of this simplification can be demonstrated by comparing the above distributions 
with those of 1975, pictured below. First, there were no cases where women were photographed in 
mixed groups; second, this contrasts with a much higher visibility of men within the magazine95 . Figure 
2a suggests that the numbers of mixed couples, and the extent to which the female could be located as a 
sexual adjunct has significantly reduced by as much as half, down from 33% in 1975 to approximately 
15% between 1985-95. It must be noted that, while locating the woman in the man's presence is one 
immediate and unambiguous way to codify the power or status differentials, there are ways around this, 
for not all forms of sexual objectification require the presence of the male body. Yet it is harder to 
assert the durability of the gendered dichotomies and their organisation through the heterosexist 
imperative if there are so few cases where the man shows the woman what to do, or protects her and so 
forth.















































Returning to figure 2, the last significant finding here is that in only 7.75% of the total sample 
between 1985-95 is the body is located within a single sex couple. Again, this frequency is mirrored 
across the sexed bodies. This indicates a number of things. To begin with, it provides evidence to 
substantiate my methodological critique of the dominance of semiotics. Returning to Lewis and Rolley, 
you will find that they isolated coupling as a key feature by which the homoerotic nature of magazine 
readership is secured. They define coupling as the presence of twe same-sex bodies, which may be 
further connected through the visual narrative. Yet this is hard to sustain when there are so few cases in 
comparison with the single model, especially if one notes that the sampling unit is the body rather than 
the advertisement. The 23 bodies located within a potentially homosexual context translate into a 
maximum of only 11 advertisements out of the 500 sampled. This compares to 218 advertisements for 
the single female sexed model96 . Therefore, a specific feature has been noted as an instance that targets 
the homoerotic and thus produces an unconscious identification with the pre-Oedipal flow of desire. 
Yet without the overview that a content analysis can provide, theorists like Rolley and Lewis have no 
way of knowing how representative such a signification is. Now, we are able to identify that the visual
95 See Appendix A
96 This distribution is mirrored also within the male models: a maximum of 12 advertisements 
compared to 190 single male model advertisements.
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pleasures constructed in women's magazines cannot be organised as Rolley and Lewis have defined it 
precisely because the coupling codification is rarely used. Moreover, this code cannot be disregarded 
by referring to the subjective criteria of the category because it attends to a basic facticity of one or two 
people. Language cannot function at all if ad facto categorisation of this kind cannot be assumed.
I now turn to the variable that traces the generalised relationship between the models and their 
environment insofar as a specific relationship between model and objects and/or props is constructed 
through a narrative (Millum:1975). Figure 3 shows that a significant majority of both male and female 
sexed models are depicted as having no specific relationship with the props or commodity. 
Consequently, codifications that subordinate the female sexed model to objects and props, contained 
within the image, are in decline. Moreover, this trend is also apparent for male sexed models to the 
extent that they do not appear to be in command of the props/objects either. This is important for two 
central reasons: first, it further secures the above suggestion that the fashion advertisement is moving








































Chi = 0.5712, df=2, there is no significant relationship
toward a presentational format that is greatly simplified; second, the passive relationship to the object 
that is said to define the feminine is less apparent as is the masculine association with the active. This 
suggests a decline in the codifications identified by both Goffman and the postmodernist/feminist 
analyses. The feminine is not defined by being draped over the car, nor is a manly fragrance secured by 
the man's ability to control the fast car. The subordination of the feminine to the commodity does not 
seem to be a central feature of the presentation, any more than the masculine doing the subordinating. 
How does this compare with 1975?
If we look briefly at figure 3a overleaf, we can see that subordination to the commodity or 
prop appears to be a central feature within Cosmopolitan in 1975. The small sample indicates that at 
25.49%, the passive relationship to the props or objects remained a central component the conventions 
of codification of the feminine. Here, the active/passive dualism appears to be a more appropriate 
description. Again, this can only be treated as an indication, but one that corresponds with the general 
trends established during the initial politicisation of the image, as discussed in chapter 2.
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The two variables examined thus far begin to alter our expectations of the patterns of gender 
difference. Variable two shows us that there has been a marked decline in the use of the heterosexual 
couple as part of the commodification process and that this has brought with it the predominance of the 
single model. With variable five, we have seen that the single model appears to have no particular 
relationship with the scene within which the body is contextualised, indicating a weakening 
relationship between the passive and the feminine to the extent that the accomplishment of the passivity 
cannot be produced through the props and social cues that surround the female model. Furthermore, the 
male sexed model does not appear to be defined by his command of the mock social environment 
either. Hence, the active/passive structure is not an overt feature of the image when relating gender to 
the props and commodities displayed. On the contrary, this relationship appears to be weakening.
The anticipated reply is that these two facets may be weakened, but there are plenty of other 
possibilities that can and do anchor the gendered dichotomies. For example, if the body is not 
subordinated to a specific prop or object, or if the woman is no longer defined via her association with 
the man, we can look to the broader narrative, the position of the spectator, the clothes themselves and 
so forth. So it is to these variables that I next turn my attention, beginning with shot length and focus. I 
will then address the mode of photography, beginning with the narrative address, followed by an 
analysis of how closely the image is bound to a naturalistic social scene. Of particular import is the 
extent to which realist modes define the centre of the codification and how the spectator is positioned
in terms of the overall naturalism 97
CENTRAL FRAMING TECHNIQUES AND THEIR DETERMINATION BY GENDER
The identification of the kinds of camera work used engages directly with the issue of the 
fetishisation of the feminine Woman through the objectifying frame. It is a central feature to the 
production of feminised and masculinised presentations of gender and the concomitant production of
97 Note: I have rejected an examination of codes 9 and 10, perspective and non-perspective, from 
variable 6 because these issues are better addressed in Figure 12, pp 120-121.
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homoerotic desire. Drawing particularly from Doane (1991) but also Cowie (1991; 1997) Kaplan (1997) 
and Stratton (1996), the short length shot, combined with the soft focus, are the two central techniques 
used to fetishise the (feminine) body in an unambiguous way. They argue that the close-up 'cuts' the 
body so that the male viewer is able to disavow the threat of the female castrated body. The soft focus 
adds an additional form of objectification because it semi-masks the body so that the body becomes the 
central object of desire; soft focus displaces the fact that the lack is real. Following the descriptive 
analysis that the postmodernist/feminists present, one would expect the feminine to be encoded using 
the close-up and the soft focus, both of which best facilitate a lingering and fetishistic gaze, as 
established by the image frame. In contradistinction, one would expect the male sexed body to be 
photographed predominately using the long shot and the sharp focus, insofar as the oppositional logic 
suggests that the masculine is conveyed by the marks that are not feminine. Therefore, this school 
would assert the categorical difference that underpins their analysis to determine, to a significant 
degree, these forms of codification.
Contrary to the expectation formed by their analysis, figure 4 shows that there is little 
variation between the length of the shot and the sexed model. The medium shot length is the most 
frequently used, at 48.95% of the total 1985-95 sample, compared with only 30.92% for the long shot, 
and surprisingly, only 20.13% for the close-up. Note also that the long shot is used more frequently to 
codify the female sexed model than the close-up; just over a third. While it remains the case that the 
body can still be fetishised using the medium shot, this process is made much harder with the long shot 
when the fetishism has to operate within the image (see Doane:!99l:46-8;Cowie: 1997:104-5). The 
close-up ensures that the body dominates the frame and so produces a closeness to the viewer that is 
singular to the image. Doane accords this closeness a special connection to the feminine state of'to-be- 
looked-at-ness' because the viewer is awarded unconditionally the control of the gaze. What is more









































Chi = 4.5991, df= 2, there is no significant relationship
significant is that of all the photographs of female sexed models, only 17.08% of the representations 
use the close-up, compared to 23.41% of male models. While this difference is not significant 
statistically, the direction of the difference challenges the postmodernists/feminists' categorical 
assumption that more female sexed models than male would be photographed using the close-up.
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How does this compare with focus use, the second code to which the postmodernist/feminists 
have given central importance? The importance of the soft codes rests with its capacity to render the 
feminine iconic by seeming to make the thing desirable in itself (Doane; 1991). First, soft focus glosses 
over the textures to produce a smooth soft surface to the face and body. Second, it is also a key 
technique by which we conventionally codify the feminine with the emotions of the intellectually 
adrift, for example dreaminess. In contradistinction, sharp focus attends to the precise detail of things, a 
quality that has been extended to denote engagement and concentration. If we look at figure 5, we can 
readily identify that, again, there is no significant difference between the sexed models and the various 
focuses used to photograph them. Both the male and female sexed models are predominantly 
photographed using the sharp focus: 66.15% of female cases, compared to 61.74% of all male sexed 
models photographed. Thus, the realist focus is the predominant codification. Moreover, the direction 
of difference again runs counter to expectation: the higher frequency does not rest with the masculine. 
Only 26.40%, that is just over 1:4, of the women photographed were codified using the soft focus as 
compared to 31.88%, (just under 1:3) of all male sexed models in the sample. Once more, the direction









































Chi = 2.2489, df= 2, there is no significant relationship
of difference runs contrary to the expectations raised by postmodernist/feminist analysis: the higher 
frequency lies with the male sexed models.
In addition, this represents a shift in frequency from 1975. Figure 5a overleaf indicates that the 
above distributions signal a shift in the codification of both the male and the female sexed model. 
For example, from the 1975 sample we can see that just over 80% of men shown were codified in sharp 
focus, which corresponds much more to the kinds of descriptions afforded by the 
postmodernist/feminist model and surely reflects the context within which the initial semiotic analyses 
were conducted. In contrast, there is a 3:1 ratio of soft focus to sharp focus, which is more in line with 
the order of the gendered dichotomy.
Ill

































We can combine the focus with the shot length. The tabulation below shows that the most 
dominant form of fashion photography combines the medium shot with the realism of the sharp focus 
(33.43% of the total sample). Second, there is the long shot combined with sharp focus, accounting for 
21.07% of the sample. Within these groupings, there is a marginal difference across sex, with the 
female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of the long shot. Thus, the female sexed 
model assumes a higher proportion of the codes which, when combined, fetishise the least. In contrast, 
the close-up is used more frequently on the male sexed body, both within the sharp and soft focus. In 
fact, 29.47% of male sexed models codified using the soft focus are shot in close-up compared to 
24.71% of female sexed models. Thus, the combined codes that are said to fetishise the most are used 
more frequently on the male sexed model than the female. Two elements emerge: first, the realist forms 
of codification assume the greater proportion of the cases assessed; second, the codes that are said to 
fetishise the body, that is function as a form of disavowal for the lack that it signifies, par excellence, 
are used with a greater frequency on the male sexed model.




























































Chi = 16.2049, df=6, there is a significant relationship at 5% 
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR
It has been shown that the distributions of the above variables further challenge the 
categoricalism that defines the assignment of meaning and the structural, causal significance of certain
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codes within the postmodernist/feminist model. Through their selected semiotic readings, proponents 
of this model have identified relationships between the signifler and the signified that are said to be 
definitive of the representations of the feminine and thus integral to the formation of the identity. Yet 
my results find no statistical difference in the distributions of the shot length or the focus. Furthermore, 
where minimal difference does appear, the frequencies of use are higher when representing the 
masculine than the feminine. Arguably, these codes may be overridden by the fetishisation of the body 
through clothes and the narrative context, as well as the direction of the gaze and so forth. For example, 
it may be the case that the soft focus is put to minimal use because the feminine as passive is securely 
anchored through body positions that show the feminine withdrawing from space, that is, the social 
symbolic is drawn upon to reproduce gendered oppositions. Yet if we combine these results with the 
finding that codification of the model through use of the prop did not reflect the gendered dichotomy 
either, then an empirical base is forming that directly challenges the categorical assumptions that define 
semiotic readings undertaken within the postmodernist/feminist perspective. Furthermore, the notion 
that the male sexed model has undergone feminisation (Neale:1992; Startton:1996) does not provide a 
clear basis to explain these apparent contradictions. This is an important point of friction because it 
brings to the fore the irreconcilable tension: the corporeal accomplishment contradicts Symbolic 
construction.
NARRATIVE ADDRESS AND CONTEXTUAL REALISM
One source that may secure the Symbolic determination of the gendered body is the specific 
narrative address. This is established through the interaction of the model's gaze, the photographer and 
the spectator. From Mulvey to Dyer to Mayne and Kaplan, all have addressed the division between the 
masculine and the feminine in terms of who looks away (private voyeur), and who looks and asserts 
themselves to the viewer (public addressing viewer). The seer/seen axis is elaborated through the 
structural relationship to power: the 'seer' is always the masculine Master. Where the gaze is held by 
the 'slave', this look is temporary, transgressive and surreptitious. However, as figure 7 shows, this








































Chi = 0.7929, df= 2, there is no significant difference
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structural relationship is not organised into categorically opposite groups whereby the masculine is 
defined by the active gaze, and the feminine is defined by the private voyeuristic gaze. In fact, the 
private voyeur is emerging as the central mode of codification for both the male and the female sexed 
models; 61.90% and 64.74% respectively. What difference exists is statistically insignificant. This 
compares strikingly with the low frequency with which the direct active gaze is utilised; only 30.04% 
of male sexed models are thus codified compared to 26.73% of female sexed models. This table 
establishes that sexual difference does not define how the codification is deployed and thus does not 
correspond to the active/passive order of the mode of address. Even if we take into account Dyer's 
recognition that the private voyeur, while marginal, is applied to the male pin-up, this still fails to 
recognise the extent to which men are equally subject to the look that cannot be returned. This 
significant increase may be a result of the equally significant shift to the single model because arguably 
'private voyeur' is best able to commodity the body via the language of desire. I return to this again in 
the examination of the facial expressions: do images deploy strategies that negate the passivity of being 
the seen object and are these strategies used to encode the masculine as the postmodernists/feminists 
describe. To summarise, the mode of objectificaiton that is said to define the voyeuristic gaze appears 
to be defining how both the sexed bodies are represented.
Figure 7a indicates that in 1975, just over half of the all the female sexed models were 
codified in a manner that directly draws the viewer into narrative. This compares notably with the fall 
to just 8.29% of all the images sampled between 1985-1995. This fall seems to suggest that narrative 
address is no longer considered an effective form of commodification. More important, however, are 
the implications for identification patterns. Narrative address has a particular format that includes the 
participation of the viewer in order to complete the narrative. This requires a recognition on behalf of 
the viewer of the social scene staged and, according to the postmodernist/feminist model, secures the 
identification axis between the scene and the viewer. Figure 7a suggests that these sorts of 
identification strongly mark the codifications in 1975 when the mock-up realism of the image was 
identified during the first run of content analyses. This appears to have all but disappeared by 1985-95








































and, with it, the identification patterns assumed. The source of this change is, in part, a knock-on effect 
of the significant shift to the single model, which blocks this type of narrative interaction.
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We have thus far identified the extent to which the narrative address has declined in 
significance and the extent to which the 'private voyeur' now dominates. The significance of this lies in 
its separation of the active and passive elements of the narrative. The dominance of the single model 
codes and the absence of any direct relationship of model and prop leads one anticipate a significant 
impact on the image's ability to reproduce wider social relations through spatial relations within the 
two dimensional frame. Potentially, this may mean the removal of the image's capacity to draw upon 
wider social relations to reproduce the active/passive axis.
In conjunction with the decline of narrative-driven advertisements, one must re-introduce the 
massive impact that the single model will have upon how the space is occupied. To reiterate, the use of 
the single model compared to the heterosexual couple model is approximately 4:1. When we combine 
this with the fact that many of the models did not have any specific relationship with the visual 
environment, we find that, overwhelmingly, the symbolic production of the hierarchy through space no






























































































































































98 The proportion of same sex couples means that the distributions are too small to be significant.
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longer defines how the model is codified. Or at least, the clues are insufficient to be able to make th
at 
interpretation with any regularity. Figure 8 shows exactly how far-reaching this impact is. Both the
 
single model and the heterosexual couple are overwhelmingly depicted centre or just off-centre of the 
image. With regard to the single model, the table reconfirms that there is an absence of any clear 
relationship between the model and props, which means that the single model is the sole focal point
 of 
the image. This automatically marginalises the other spatial relationships to such an extent that the
y are 
of hardly any statistical relevance at all. Regarding the heterosexual couple, the table shows that the
y 
too have moved toward a much simplified spatial relationship, which is also organised around the 
centre focal point. The female sexed model is no more or less likely to be seated on top of a prop or
 
model than the male, nor is she more likely to be positioned in front of him so as to emphasise furth
er 
his probable larger relative size. Together, these findings signal a significant shift away from orderi
ng 
the image by a symbolic hierarchical relationship established through the relative occupancy of spac
e 
within the two-dimensional frame. Relative size is widely used to naturalise sexual dimorphism. 
Moreover, this provides further evidence that the codification of the image is moving toward a much
 
simplified form, which represents a significant shift from Goffrnan's careful analysis of how embod
ied 
social hierarchies are performed and highlighted within a two dimensional frame. The evidence here
 
simply does not show a marking-out of social space in terms of these particular gendered hierarchie
s.
The next two variables address the interrelationships between the scene and the active 
participation by a particular model with others and the designated social space. Again, preponderan
ce 
of the single model already curtails the extent to which the following variables are relevant. This 
necessarily affects the follow-up variable that seeks to define how bodies interact to demarcate, as w
ell 
as sexualise, space. Goffman isolated a number of key features that identified how the public/private
 
dichotomy was symbolically established. In particular, he examined how the connection of public 
domain to competency and command was secured through a number of visual barriers. These often 
cut 
across the two-dimensional frame. I adopted this not only for a more substantial historical link, but 
also















































because it readily achieves the status differentials that define patriarchy through the positions of the
 
body. It directly draws upon how the body performs, and thus reproduces visually, what are in effe
ct
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abstract relations. However, as figure 9 shows, this form of hierarchical display, where the male sexed 
model is in command of the social space so that the female sexed model is confined within his 
demarcations, has barely any continued relevance. The body is primarily codified by 'non- 
containment', (80.68% for the female sexed model compared to 83.90% for the male). The only 
marginal difference lies in the extent to which the feminine tends to be self-contained compared to the 
conventional representations of the masculine. But at only 8.14% of all the females sampled, this is of 
little consequence. This means that the man does not extend his body in front of the woman to establish 
a symbolic barrier thereby limiting the movement one can infer would have taken place in the social 
world. Equally, the female hardly ever contains herself by pulling her limbs in so as not to occupy 
space. This is a striking rejection of clear codifications that produce the feminine as passive. 
Consequently, the following variable, number 13, which aimed to identify exactly how the man 
contained the woman, as in the example above, is shown to be of no relevance. This can be readily 
demonstrated by identifying the number of automatic exclusions produced as a result of the 
overwhelming majority of cases identified as 'non-contained': 323 of the female cases were excluded, 
compared to 298 of the male".
I turn next to the centra) anchor for framing the image, namely the extent to which fashion 
advertisements codify the commodification process within realist social contexts. The significance of







































Chi = 7.7900, df= 2, therefore there is statistical significance at 5%
this is the extent to which the models are contextualised within ritualistic formats whereby the 
image 'looks like my life'. The 'naturalistic mock-up' carries the realist format and thus best facilitates 
identification. Therefore, this codification is crucial both for Goffrnan's analysis of how the image 
works in order to feed back to us our view of the social world as naturally hierarchical, and for the 
identification patterns that construct the subjectivity undertaking the viewing. If interpellation is at 
work, then it should be evident here. The postmodernist/feminist analysis seeks to examine how the 
identification process operates within the naturalisation of the gendered dichotomies because this mode 
of identification exposes the masochistic features of femininity: the process of identification takes place 
despite the dominatory version of femininity presented. Thus, 'naturalistic mock-ups' must dominate
' Please see Appendix C for the whole distributions left once the majority of sample is suspended.
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the codification, if the Symbolic is marked by the patriarchal order. Yet again, my results seem to 
suggest a shift in the format of the image. Figure 10 introduces some substantial statistical shifts. 
First, it shows that the 'naturalistic mock-up' is no longer the central form of codification by which the 
feminine or the masculine is set. In only 27.11% of the total sample is there a naturalistic setting, with 
the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of this, 29.38% compared to 24.66% for 
the male sexed model. This would seem to explain why the social divisions of space appear to have 
marginal presence here. Therefore, the significant difference rests in the extent to which the male sexed 
model is located within a neutral setting. In 47.97% of cases the male sexed model is located against a 
blank backdrop where there are no props or scenes of any kind. This means that nearly half have no 
social contextualisation whatsoever. Note the corresponding significance of the higher frequency of 
female sexed models within a stylistic codification compared to male sexed models: 33.75% and 
27.36% respectively. This is combined with the markedly higher number of male sexed models in a 
neutral context than female (47.97% compared to 36.88%'°°). This shows that the presentation of the 
male body does not tend to be contextualised, and when it is, this is least likely to be in a realist 
context.
The stylistic codification is the second most frequent coding for the male sexed model, 
assuming 27.36%. Here the model is either located within a contradictory setting compared to mock 
action, or the model himself is exposing the artifice of the image by self-referentially bringing to the 
fore what actually takes place to produce a naturalistic image. In this way, the techniques of the 
naturalistic mock-up are exposed by making the artifice the theme of the image. Neutral and stylistic 
codifications combined make up 75% of the sample of men, which undermines the assurance by which 
we can legitimately assume that realism continues to define how the male sexed models are codified. 
Moreover, it removes a considerable number of clues by which we usually make speculative inferences 
as to 'who' the model might be. Only naturalistic images gives an idea as to the models personality 
traits, that is how feminine or masculine he is.
With regard to the female sexed model, there is a more or less even distribution across the 
three codifications, with naturalistic mock-up accounting for just under a third and neutral codification 
taking the largest proportion at 36.88%. Again, the naturalistic code, which is best able to interpellate 
identification, is found to have the lowest frequency. Correspondingly, the female model is more likely 
to be depicted exposing the artifice of the image than securing the naturalness of the female model and 
the private sphere. Therefore, the realist form that carries forward the ideological patterns, as well as 
securing the identification of subjectivity via the representation, is shown to be a marginal form of 
codification for the male and female sexed models. The absence of a naturalistic setting also makes it 
harder to secure the naturalness of the gendered gesture because the context, which is central to 
securing the gesture's meaning, is absent. Therefore, to make the gesture apparent, it must be rendered 
even more obvious, that is further subject to the hyper-ritualisation through which a gesture can be
read.
We can get a sense of the extent of the shifts from figure lOa (overleaf). This table reflects the 
kinds of distributions we would expect from both the feminist content analysis and from Goffman's
100 When crosstabulated, Chi score registers 6.0527, df = 1, 5% significance level.
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analysis. As indicated, in 1975 there is a dominance of the realist format at 66.67% compared to the 
29.38% that emerges from 1985 onwards. In addition, the format of the advertisement has yet to take 
on any surrealism of stylistic codification that is associated with the postmodern cultural turn 
(Featherstone; 1990; Jameson; 1984). The extensive use of realist features provides an empirical base 
upon which its influence resided and upon which the postmodernist/feminist semiotic analyses depend. 
1 argue that the data presented here shows that this base is in decline and, with it, go the features of the 
naturalistic mock-up that are said to interpellate identification.








































There are a number of significant shifts suggested by the data presented here. First, it was 
noted that there has been a massive reduction in the use of the narrative address that implies the 
participation and thus identification of the viewer. Second, it was noted that the images do not draw 
upon the symbolic organisation of space in order to recreate the social relations of space we embody. 
This was further secured through the total decline of aligning the feminine to the private sphere, which 
was said to determine the ways in which women occupy space. Fourth, this shift is not gender 
differentiated. Therefore, the male sexed model is just as likely to be codified by the 'private voyeur' 
form as the female sexed model. Then, the social contextualisation of the image was examined, and it 
was found that the 'naturalistic mock-up' no longer defines the context of the body's presentation, 
instead both the male and female models are more likely to be located in a neutral context, or in one 
which draws attention to the artifice inherent to the image. As identified, 42.21% of the total sample is 
located against a neutral backdrop, which automatically excludes 291 cases from the social setting. 
This clearly affects the gendering of space. Finally, an important relationship appears to be emerging: 
as the realist mode declines, so the simplification of the image increases.
THE SOCIAL SCENE
The central issue is whether the social location of each sexed model continues to observe the 
order established by the gendered dichotomy. The social scene establishes the extent to which social
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settings and different kinds of activity are aligned to this dichotomy. However, the results above, 
particularly the decline in the realist context to the image, has already undermined the extent to which 
social space will reflect this order: first, it has been identified that the male sexed model is not 
contextualised socially in nearly 50% of all cases; second, it has been established that the application 
and exaggeration of social relations regarding space no longer appear to define the construction of the 
image. Therefore, for those cases that are relevant here, one must identify some clear differences in the 
context if it is to be described as reflecting the Symbolic world we live in at all. For example, it must 
provide the appropriate backdrop to establish the activity of the masculine subject, particularly through 
dynamic scenarios, as well as those that establish the feminine as passive. In addition, one would 
expect to find here the extensive use of'grooming' or the more non-specific 'narcissistic' codifications 
to locate the explicit eroticisation of male sexed models. This contextualisation is said to aid the 
negation of the objectification process, and in particular, maintain a structure between the viewer and 
the viewed whereby the male sexed model leaves the gaze unacknowledged. This directly references 
Moore's analyses (1988), as well as drawing upon elements of Wernick's analysis (1991). Also, it 
extends the logic of Dyer's examination of the pin-up which I addressed, namely that the codification 
negates the significance of the (woman) viewer. Essentially, the codification 'catches' the male sexed 
model in a context where he would be naturally undressed (Finch: 1990). This form of negation is not



















































































Chi = 7.4835, df = 8, there is no significant relationship
IOI See Appendix B for a the full extent of the amalgamations.
120
required by the feminine because the objectification it implies is said to be the very essence of the 
'feminine as represented'.
Significantly, the table above gives a strong indication that those specific locations in space no 
longer contexutalise gender display in fashion advertisements. The male sexed model is no more likely 
to be pictured 'socialising' than the female sexed model. Neither is the male model located in the 
context of leisure or sport, another context whereby the body can be shown while negating the implicit 
objectification. The two codes, which maintain an echo of the gendered dichotomy, are the rural 
settings and the private or domestic sphere, but only minimally so. By this I mean that there were only 
the barest of props or setting established, which was suggestive rather than clearly contextualising. 
Note also the low frequency of grooming. Even though this had to be amalgamated with 'narcissistic', 
still only 2.5% of the total sample of male models were coded thus. Strictly speaking, it is not even 
statistically valid because the nominal number is supposed to exceed 10. Potentially therefore, it may 
be the case that the male sexed model, while sexualised, no longer mobilises strategies, contexts or 
looks that negate the implicit 'to-be-looked-at-ness'. In conclusion, these results strongly indicate that 
social space is no longer ordered by the gendered dichotomy of the public/private.
The final formal feature I wish to introduce, before moving on to the particulars of the body, is 
the part of spatial variable that examines the more abstract relationship of the model's body or part of 
body with the two-dimensional plane of the image. I had intended to use these codes for two points of 
analysis: first, to trace it as a formal feature that identifies the relative importance awarded to each 
sexed body by the sheer amount of pictorial space the body assumes; and second, to utilises Goffman's 
analysis, which hinges on the premise that we can treat an image 'as real' if it structurally reproduces 
status differentials that define social interaction. However, the distributions no longer appear to be 
defined by such differentials, at least to any significant extent. I turn then to the second feature (which 
uses the amount of space the body assumes as a point of fixity for the bodily presentations). Thus its 
second purpose was to address the metaphoric distance placed between the viewer and the body. The 
second aim relates to the framing produced by the shot length and ways this goes on to frame the whole 
body. It identifies how much of the body, and 'parts' of the body are contained within the frame. For 
example, in 'dominates frame entirely' the part of the body depicted will fill the whole frame and, as a 
result, it will bring the body very close to the viewer. It has the effect of magnifying the flesh and is 
therefore a crucial code with which to render the flesh an object of desire in itself. For the other 
codifications, a greater sense of naturalistic perspective is introduced, linking the shot length to the 
sense of the body within naturalistic perspective 102 .
Figure 12 indicates that the formal frame and its positioning of the body fails again to be 
marked by difference between the sexes. The sex of the model has a marginal affect of the differing 
distributions, usually about 3%. For example, of all the male sexed models, 19.39% occupied '/2 of the 
visual frame compared to 16.93% of the female sample. The most significant difference lies between 
those that occupy a third of the space and those that dominate the frame entirely. Again, this difference 
goes against the expectations formed by the postmodernist/feminist analysis because it is the male
102 This proved to be a more accurate way of codifying perspective, which is why codes 9 and 10 were dropped 
from analysis if variable 6.
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sexed model that is more likely to be codified using the extreme close-up that effectively eroticises the 
flesh by making the whole torso fill the two-dimensional frame. Note also that, empirically, this 
corroborates the shot length discussed earlier, thereby demonstrating the consistency of coding. Of all 
the female sexed models sampled, 24.21% occupy a third of the visual frame compared to 18.71% of 
male sexed models. This gives us a sense of the full body at middle distance so that the head and feet 
correspond to the top and bottom of the page. 17.61% of female sexed models sampled were framed in 
the extreme close-up compared to 26.87% of males. We can add to the shot length the effect this has on 
the body presented, producing two distinct modes. First, we have a sense of the body being close to the 
surface of the image, which gives the bodily presentation the tactility and intimacy of the close-up, 
particularly of the male sexed model. Second, we have a sense of the whole body in the distance 
framed by the picture's edge, particularly for the female sexed model. The fact that this contradicts 
expectations so much cannot be attributed to the coding, as there is very little that this ambiguous about 
the dividing the image into three, with the female sexed model occupying the centre third.




























































Chi = 10.5921, df- 5, there is no significant relationship
Thus, on a more methodological note, this illustrates how the variables within taxonomy 
cross-reference each other and thus act as a check that the coding procedures are extended across the 
coding frame as a whole. Each variable isolates a specific feature from its interrelated parts, yet an 
accurate correspondence exists between them which suggests that dependence upon the conventional 
use of each term establishes a secure base with which to apply the same criteria repeatedly. I argue that 
this supports my methodological position that each image can be successfully assessed in terms of 
manifest parts and thus not solely in terms of its unique individual features.
SUMMARY THUS FAR
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1. The codes analysed present evidence that key features in the construction of the image cannot be 
said to be categorically distributed by gender. In fact, there is a marked absence of statistical 
association.
2. There is a relationship emerging that traces an inverse relationship: as the simplification of the 
image increases so the codes that construct the image as realist decline. By simplification I mean 
that the detail of the ideological baggage is being replaced by direct codes that place the body and 
the clothes worn right at the centre of the image, rather than using props, settings and so forth to 
tell a story about the sort of men who wear label 'X'. This emerging trend was initially identified 
in Millum and was also shown to persist, if marginally, by both Liess et al. and Wernick.
THE TAXONOMY OF THE BODY
This section traces how various conventional body positions and expressions are utilised to 
mark each body and thus connect each body to the broader contours of the Symbolic. The central 
principle is that the codes seek to isolate what the body must 'do' to readily achieve natural femininity. 
For example, Goffman drew particular attention to the feminine touch, arguing that this was a specific 
way the fragility and delicacy of the feminine can be applied to the commodity itself, while the 
Mulveyian paradigm examines the direction and force of the look to reflect the broader patterns of 
Symbolic power. I argue that the Symbolic and its associated oppositions ought to filter through and, at 
the very least, organise the simplest, most manifest features. If sexual difference, as described by the 
Mulveyian paradigm, defines the everyday visual world, then it ought to be readily apparent, not 
requiring sophisticated and highly skilled semiotic analysis in order to identify its meaning. This is 
because, when we undertake ordinary interpretation in the everyday world, we don't attend to meaning 
in that way (Cavell: 1995).
How does the visual image combine the various codifications in order to make the sexing of 
the body the most unambiguous code to apply? I have argued that what this is examining are the ways 
in which utilising, grasping and manipulating define the production of the masculine because this is 
treated as unproblematically reflecting the essence of the male body. Self-evident in this treatment of 
the body is the fact that sex and gender, as defined by Oakley (1972), are treated as equivalent and 
interchangeable in a common-sense context. For example, the withdrawal from space, be it for reasons 
of modesty or in response to a potential threat, ought to mark the feminine because this reflects the 
ideological essence of the female body, namely weak and in need of protection. Therefore, this 
accomplishes the naturalisation of sexed body. Moreover, it is in this sense that the accomplishment 
raises the question of'what the body does' in order to re-established that process of naturalisation. This 
is what is involved in the negation of the practices of gender accomplishment.
I begin by tracing what part of the body is represented, primarily because it gives us an 
immediate sense of the diversity or limitation of the body positions and gestures possible. For example, 
if to accomplish the feminine requires the repeated representations of the torso, which brings the body 
closer to the picture surface, then this also brings the breast closer to the viewer. The breast is regularly 
used to achieve the social accomplishment of sex. It deploys the inference that breasted people have
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vaginas and are therefore women. To this, we can add the closeness of the face, perhaps as a 
mechanism to anchor the softness of the skin and the absence of a larynx. It acts as substitute and 
reference for biological sex. By using these codes, therefore, it is possible to trace the encoding or 
sexing of the body. I conclude with an analysis of the variable that traces the specific ways that the 
body can be fetishised. This is followed by an analysis of'body type' (variable eleven), which 
addresses the physique, appearance and character presentations of the body. This last analysis will take 
two distinct forms: first, it will begin with a brief account of why this variable was only partially 
successful; second, I assess the distributions of the types of bodily features. I then return the analysis of 
the accomplishment of the sexed body that we initially encountered.
THE GENERAL BODY FORM: WHAT PARTS OF THE BODY 'DO' GENDER DISPLAY?
Figure 13 below identifies the specific parts of the body framed by the image. The variable 
establishes the bodily base on which the further detail of the expressions and positions can be added. 
Those techniques that encode 'to-be-looked-at-ness', those said to define representation of the 
feminine, bring the body to the surface of the picture frame and would surely be applied more 
frequently to the female sexed model. Here, however, there is clear evidence that many of the gestured 
codes must be contextual ised in terms of the whole body (60.63%), rather than the various bodily 
fragments (39.37%). This automatically marginalises those codes that break up the integrity of the body 
and contradicts the semiotic evidence of postmodernism/feminism and, theoretically, presents problems 
for their model because it is difficult to continue to place central importance upon the fetishisation 
process, which facilitates the masculine disavowal of lack, when only a minority of images represent 
the body 'in bits'. As figure 13 illustrates, the feminine is not codified through the visualisation as a 
'body bit' any more than the masculine. In fact, the reverse is true, since the distributions contravene 
the expected direction.


















































Chi = 6.1307, df=3, there is no significant relationship
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The results show that, contrary to expectations, it is the male sexed body that is more 
frequently represented via the face or the torso alone not the female (20.85% and 10.95% of the male 
sample respectively compared to 15.41% and 9.28% for the female sample). If one cross-tabulates 
these codes with the shot length, one finds that of the 59 male cases half also dominate the frame and 
thus appear to bring the body to the picture surface. Cowie noted that this is a particularly intense form 
of objectification, presumably of the feminine, because the combination brings the flesh so close as to 
almost denote a degree of (projected) intimacy (1997:105). This kind of codification regularly features 
in those images that fetishise the female body because the model is not in command of how the body 
will be viewed, but must passively receive the gaze. Here, it is the male body that is potentially subject 
to such a gaze. Yet, a third of all the images of the male sexed model are isolated from a direct sense of 
a body's social and physical relationship to space, replaced instead by the face as an object of beauty 
alone (Bergen 1974; Pollock: 1991; 1992). If postmodernist/feminist versions of a dichotomous 
structure pervade culture, this reversal ought not to occur.
Cultural analysis of this kind has assessed single images in terms of this specific mode of 
beautification and the particular ways that the face becomes akin to the photographer's muse. All such 
description has then been connected to the ideological ramifications in terms of the passive/active and 
the subject/object dualisms that organise the image. Yet, a content analysis drawing upon the semiotic 
codes identified within cultural analysis fails to provide evidence to reconfirm the gendered divide of 
who is objectified, beautified, made into an object satisfying in itself. This no longer applies solely to 
the feminine. Moreover, this evidence contradicts a second facet of the postmodern/feminist model, 
namely that they describe 'anomalous' cases as 'femininisation'. This 'reorganisation' effectively 
reconnects soft focus, for example, back to the feminine so that the opposition of the male and female 
is categorically ordered within the Symbolic. So rather than taking such empirical evidence as a 
weakening of the dimorphic production of the body within the Symbolic, they themselves re-apply that 
dimorphic logic so that the passive defines the feminine.
Listed in figure 14 overleaf are some simple features that locate the body in symbolic space. 
The central distribution here is the extent to which a majority of images are codified with the body 
facing forward: 59.44% of all the female sexed models sampled and 62.29% of the males. Again, this 
automatically marginalises many of the other codifications included 103 , which I argue, is connected to 
the increasing simplification of the image identified above. Many of the images coded contain only a 
single model, very few use props to tell a story about the model, and to this we now add that most 
models, both male and female, are codified facing forward. 'Twisting' is the second largest proportion, 
which at 23.55% gives a strong indication of how common facing forward is. Again, this kind of 
movement, conventionally associated with the over-stated display of clothes, is not characterised by 
gender difference (barely 2% between them). We must look therefore to the body in profile to trace a 
substantial difference: namely 25.08% of female compared to 16.84% of male sexed models. 
Nevertheless, for every female sexed model posing in profile there are over twice as many facing 
forward.
103 Hence the number of amalgamations; see Appendix B.
125
The endurance of the profile as a form that readily codifies the feminine raises a number of 
issues. A body in profile does not necessarily ensure that the face will be averting the gaze by seeming 
to look elsewhere, as the head can be turned to the camera. Yet placing the body in profile does align 
the postures with the historical traditions of the feminine as representation (Berger: 1974; Dyer 1986). 
Locating the body in profile also emphasises the sexualisation of the breast by presenting it in 
silhouette. This potentially sets up a classic pose for the femme fatale: the profile emphasising the 
curves, primarily of the breast, combined with the directness of the look. There is a second facet 
connected to the endurance of the profile: emphasising the shape and 'universal' presence of the breast 
connects it to the 'self-evident' corporeal base of the sexed body. The breast offers 'evidence' of the 
absolute and categorical foundation of sexual difference. Therefore, it is in connection to the biological 
body that the profile code remains significant while other gendered postures have significantly 
diminished, as for example lying down.





























































































Chi = 22.9925, df= 3, there is significance at 1%
Codes like 'lying down' and 'leaning back' simply do not appear to feature much, for either 
the male or female sexed model. This means that a central mechanism that sexualises the presentation, 
for example lying on the back with one leg bent, is almost entirely absent, thereby negating the low 
status implied by the position. Arguably, this results from the increased simplicity of the image, 
perhaps because the body is best able to display clothes when the postures are at their most simple. But
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this equally means that the process that constructs gendered subjectivities in and through these bodily 
gestural displays is made much more ambiguous. This carries important ideological implications 
regarding the coherency of the patriarchal dualism. In addition, the model does not appear to be using 
the imagined projection effacing the viewer to entice or display. Thus, this form of framing further 
indicates an increasing homogeneity between the ways the male and the female are displayed.
The body is able to impose a fixity upon the possibility of social exchanges depending upon 
how that body is positioned in relation to the other. Yet, as mentioned, the body performs a perplexing 
number of possible gestures, which should not be assumed to be in co-ordination. The torso and head, 
connected by the spine, make for the points of fixity and a phenomenological orientation that limits the 
ploysemic possibilities of the body. Thus the face, hands, arms and legs secure the detail of the 
gesticulations made. Hence, I have emphasised the body's ability to anchor representation and 
interpretation. The next series of tables build upon our sense of the fixity of the presentation using the 
ways this can be animated and/or anchored to the core dichotomies through gesticulation. I begin with 
the legs and arms and then move onto the hand, who touches whom, how and how much.
THE BODY AND ITS GESTURES
If display is in any sense ordered by the patriarchal dichotomy at all then this must 
predominately lie within the gestures. I begin by looking at the legs, which add to the gendering of the 
body through the differing meanings conveyed through the forms of standing and sitting. Therefore we 
are paying particular attention to whether the legs are closed or open, extended outwards or not, and so 
forth.
The first thing to note is that in 42% of the images legs are not represented, which 
automatically removes a substantial part of the sample. The second element to be combined with this is 
the large percentage of women who were photographed occupying a third of the image compared to the 
percentage of men that were shown to dominate the frame, meaning that the visual orientation is not 
towards the men's legs. But does this imply that the image is orientated to the women's legs? The 
answer has to be no when one reflects that by occupying a third of the frame,the female is also 
projected as standing in the middle distance. Given that for a fetish to operate within the photographic 
frame it needs to be close-up, this somewhat rules fetishisation out as a means of recapturing 
ideologically the image. One would expect there to be a noted trend, particularly for underwear and 
hosiery advertisements, where fetishising the female leg is a central part of the marketisation. Yet 'legs 
only' has been withdrawn from the general idiom (figure 13) because it was shown to be statistically 
insignificant, registering only 5 cases. This indicates that the markets that these magazines target 
simply do not carry this kind of commodity, and thus do not codify the feminine through it. By 
implication then, the representations appear to be organised according to the requirements of 
commodification rather than the pre-requisites of the hierarchical Symbolic. This surely compounds the 
notion that images are organised to serve our latent desire, which require the fetish to function in order 
that (masculine) subjects can disavow the threat that lack poses for them. Most importantly, the 
influence of the commodification process, rather than the symbolic regime, may well prove to the
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determining trajectory within the presentation of gender. Regardless of whether it is more dominant, 
sexualising the leg via visual codification that disavow does not appear to be emerging as the central 
feature. Or rather, the decline is marked enough to query assertions that 'the feminine has become 
synonymous with selling' (Pollock; 1992:138). Or rather, both bodies are utilised to sell.






















































































































Chi = 19.9127, df = 12, there is no significant relationship
Among those 60% that were photographed presenting the full body, there is no marked 
diversity in the ways both the male and the female sexed models pose. Hence the cross-tabulation does 
not register statistical difference. Thus the female sexed model is just as likely to be seated with her 
legs open as her male counterpart, just as he is equally often depicted with his legs closed when 
seated 104 . Emphasis upon the leg does remain, namely in the posture that bends the knee slightly 
thereby tilting the hips. This draws attention to the hips as a marker of the sexed body, but also
104 Potentially, although this needs investigation, the absence difference may well reflect an emphasis 
upon youth and a 'relaxed attitude' that is set up in opposition to the discipline implied by the erectness 
of the traditional adulthood. The oppositions of these categories may prove more central to the active 
codification of specific meanings than gender is appearing to be here.
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encloses the tilted hip within an erotic codification. The female sexed model in both cases is twice as 
likely to embody this posture as the male sexed model. Yet once again, it barely registers 1 in 5 images. 
In fact, there is a higher frequency of female sexed models extending their legs into space than either of 
the above. Alternatively, one can look to the convention of crossing the legs and pulling the legs in 
toward the body. This symbolically associates the female body with appearing not to take up space, as 
well as displaying an appropriate amount of'modesty'. Yet this occurs about as frequently as those 
cases where the female model sits with her legs open.
What conclusions can one draw from this? Principally, that the position of the leg appears to 
be marked by a degree of diversity that only minimally adheres to the fetishisation and 
commodification that are conventionally associated with the display of the leg. This offers evidence 
that challenges Millum and Goffman, who both emphasised how the feminine is often reduced to body 
bits so that the leg is displayed in a manner that cuts it away from whose leg it is. In addition, the 
naturalistic postures through which gender is displayed in social interaction are seemingly being 
replaced by postures that denote 'youth'. Again reflecting the markets within which the images are 
produced.
I turn next to the various ways that the arm is positioned and how this contributes to the 
presentation of gender. The first thing to note from figure 16 overleaf is that most of the arm positions 
are not used particularly. This means that neither sexed model is encoded performing a mock-action, 
hugging the body or pointing upwards. This singles out 'arms relaxed by side' and 'arms bent' as the 
two most common types of postures. Furthermore, these are both noticeably gender differentiated. As a 
proportion, in 40.84% of cases the male sexed models were depicted with their arms relaxed by their 
sides, compared to 29.35% of females. Conversely, 47.95% of female sexed models had their arms 
bent, compared to 31.30% of the males. Thus the male model is statistically more likely to have his 
arms relaxed by his side, and the female sexed model is far more likely to have her arms bent. This 
registers a significant difference in the gestures, but only in those that appear to be most innocuous.
It is only by considering the possible implications that each coded gesture may carry that some 
sense can be made of this difference. First, the bent arm has the potential to establish naturalistically 
the gendered nature of touch, because having the arm bent tends to bring the hand towards the torso 
and into the centre of the image. Bringing the hand into the centre of the frame, also brings the markers 
of the hand that 'reflect the facticity of sex'. For example, to convey a sense of delicacy to an object, it 
tends to be held by the tips of the fingers, with nails that are usually filed and painted; conversely, a 
product for men is connoted through a grasp. Each position connotes the gendered dichotomy but does 
so through the physical display of the hand, that is, the combination of the elements that secures the 
naturalisation of categorical sex difference. Lastly, this posture sets up the potential for the image to 
reference soft-core pornographic codes through self touch. Often the female sexed model is shown to 
caress her body (in the most acute cases on or near the erogenous zones). Moreover, while this position 
sets the contexts for the hand to accomplish the femininity of the body, the corresponding features are 
not used to secure the masculine. However, the fact that there are a significant number of cases among 
male models where the hand is held by the side automatically means that the hand cannot secure the 
masculine of aptitude and skill. The extent to which the male sexed model is codified with his arms by
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his side may in fact prove to be a series of codes that reflect the dialectic of the Other insofar as the 
masculine need not positively represent itself, but rather uses the feminine 'definitions' as a means to 





























































































Chi = 17.7606, df= 9, there is a significant association at 5%
signify what it is not. However, this requires that the gestures of the hand reflect a clear trend for 
specific sorts of gestures or expressions, that is, it requires that a trend emerge of something that is 
distinctly feminine and unquestionably passive.
Therefore, who is touching whom is central to how that we make sense of the higher 
proportion of female models with their arm bent. This can be extended to the possible means of 
displaying the hand, which also carries the markers of natural sex. However, emphasising the possible 
ways open for the hand to reproduce the Symbolic ought not to obscure the fact that just over a third of 
the all female cases also had their arms relaxed by side. Such a posture is conventionally read as the 
'body at rest' and can be defined as the body at its least symbolically invested. However, this is entirely 
dependent upon a similarly neutral hand position to be properly secured and therefore ought not to be 
undermined by any substantial evidence that verifies Goffman's initial findings, namely that femininity 
is symbolically secured through the extent of the touch as well as the type of touch.
105 Again this had to be ordered as multiple variable simply because the arms need not be doing the 
same thing. Therefore, each percentage must be treated as independent and describes only its individual 
proportion.
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The first clear distribution shows that if the hand is not held at rest then the model, of either 
sex, will touch their bodies. Of those models who touch themselves, the female sexed models do it 
more frequently, approximately a 3:2 ratio to male sexed models. Potentially, therefore an opening is 
emerging for a significant difference to be secured, providing the type of touch is equally marked by 
such statistical difference. The second stark result that struck me, which is why I have opted to include 
the whole table despite half of the codes being statistically insignificant, is how few instances there are 
of either model interacting via touch. There are four aspects to this: first, the masculine authority is no 
longer codified via his capacity to guide, lead or condescend by touching the subject with the lower 
status in the public domain (Goffman: 1979:60; Major and Williams: 1980; Henley: 1977); second, the 
feminine is not located within the heterosexist matrix by caressing and stroking the man she is with, 
particularly prevalent when located in the private domain; third, the potential for the homoerotic, 
secured through touch, is also equally non-existent (the implication that only those who are 'intimate' 
touch each other); fourth, the objectified feminine is not secured by caressing the commodity either. 107 
Therefore, what emerges is that of all those cases where the female model is shown with her arms bent, 
the likelihood is that the hand goes on to touch a part of her own body, presumably around the torso 
area. This is crucial for positively securing femininity via the bodily performance required to compose 
the image. Thus the tactility of the touch with the body is central to construction of passive femininity.
106 As I have elected to present the whole table here, Chi cannot be calculated because well have half of 
the cells will have an expected frequency of less than 5 which is deemed significant. 
107 1 have genderised the homoerotic here because women are more tactile, ideological speaking, and 
therefore it does not throw up the 'spectre' of homosexuality in the same way.
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Nevertheless, what the data has effectively ruled out is that touch is used either to anchor the male 
sexed model's higher social status by guiding the female through public space, as Goffman identified, 
or to establish for example the centrality of feminine care within the domestic setting. Conventionally, 
these codes are considered primary means to reproduce the active/passive dichotomy.
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR
We now have a sense of how the central features of the body position are located in the frame. 
What has further been identified is not a marked difference between the sexed body and the positions 
assumed, but the striking similarity and simplicity of the postures chosen. The simplicity is derived 
from the position the body adopts toward the camera, predominately positioned facing the camera, and 
sometimes to the side, with a number of the ordinary leg positions. Most importantly, none of the 
results show a clear gender pattern emerging in that they are sufficiently ambiguous to question the 
description offered by the postmodernist/feminists. Moreover, it was noted how few images deployed 
the leg as a fetish with which to secure the disavowal of the male viewer. To this, I noted how few 
images were marked by the tactile interaction between subjects, despite the fact that 40% of images 
that featured more than one model. So the potential to for the ideological anchor is there. Instead, the 
pattern that emerges is one where the highest frequencies involve relatively neutral arm positions: male 
sexed models are depicted predominantly with their arms down by their sides, and the female sexed 
models with their arms bent. The postmodernist/feminist response must surely be that the ideological 
axis of the active/passive is pinned to the self-touch offered by having the arm bent. This introduces a 
potential for the performance of gender by connecting it to where and how the hand touches the 
model's own body. Thus we must look to securing the alignment of the feminine as passive through the 
nature of the touch. This is particularly so when one considers that the results show that the male sexed 
model is not holding an object, and thus potentially manipulating it or using it as a prop to stage the 
instruction of a subordinate. The male sexed model is more likely to have the hand at rest, or in fact 
touching himself (35.47%), rather than actively doing something it.
WHERE THE HAND TOUCHES THE BODY AND HOW
I begin by drawing attention to a number of exclusions that automatically impact on this 
analysis of the feminisation of touch: in total there are 329 cases automatically excluded produced by 
the filtering system of Snap for Windows. 108 As a result, there have been a number of amalgamations, 
the most significant of which is that the various erogenous zones had to be combined in order to 
produce a statistically analysable figure 109 . So what do the remaining data show?
Arguably, these next variables ought prove to be a vital anchor for the constitution of the 
active/passive dichotomy. In addition, where the hand touches the model's own body ought to offer the
108 For example, those images coded 'face only' clearly have no bearing on this codification.
109 Please see Appendix B
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potential to sexualise the body, particularly by touching the key erogenous zones. This appears to be 
born out here, with the cross-tabulation registering a statistical association at the 1% level. For


















































































































Chi = 28.5111, df- 12, there is a significant relationship at the 1% level
example, the female sexed model is almost twice as likely to have her hands on her hips as the male 
sexed model. This introduces a correspondence with the sexing of the body: first, in terms of drawing 
upon the conventions that define this gesture as one of assertive and confident sexuality in phallic 
femininity; second, connecting the discourse to the category of the natural body that associates hips 
with the woman's body. Yet this reading is much undermined by the infrequency of those cases where 
the feminine is constructed through this posture. They account for only 20.11% (36 out of 179) of the 
touches possible' 10 . Again, one would expect the female sexed model to be represented as touching her 
hair significantly more often than the male sexed model. However, it represents only 7.26% of all those
110 Note: because the hand can touch two things at once, it was necessary to operational ise this variable 
as a multiple variable and thus the percentage must be read as individual proportion of total number of
cases in that variable - 32 cases of a possible 179
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female models codified here. This is clearly a marginal proportion that somewhat overshadows the 
categorical, sexed nature of the touch. This also has a critical impact upon the presumptions of the 
psychoanalytic models. For example, Flugel (1930) argued that the association of feminine sexual 
attraction with long hair was that the hair is a fetishistic displacement for the castrated state that defines 
the feminine. Or, to put it in more directly Lacanian/cultural studies terms, the lack that she embodies 
(Silverman:1991; Millum:1975; Stratton:1996). Therefore, by touching the hair, the feminine model 
draws attention to its fetishistic properties and thus its sexual attractiveness. However, my data signals 
a different undercurrent: while the conventional codes of gender presentation continue to be marked by 
statistical difference, their share of the sample is now marginal. They are no longer the central codes by 
which the male or the female is represented. In other words, while the feminine touches different zones 
of the body, establishing a strong statistical association, the proportion is simply too small to be 
described as structuring the symbolic and certainly too marginal to secure the effective productivity of 
subjectivity; such small quantities are just too contingent for the reproduction of the social order.
Neither is there an apparent shift to secure the dualisms and the associate forms by 
increasingly using soft-core pornographic codes: in only 19 cases are the erogenous zones'" touched, 
of which the male sexed model accounts for a higher proportion than the female. In addition, my results 
show that in all 15 cases where the male model is touching his own body, he is shown to be touching 
his own genitalia in 5 cases and his own buttocks in 9 cases. To further compound expectations, in 
none of these cases is the male sexed model caught in moments of narcissistic admiration. Therefore 
there is no narrative to reconnect the masculine to the active. Rather, most instances occur when the 
male sexed model is located in the neutral background. The extremely low frequency questions the 
assumption that the erotic male body must be located in scenes that redefine the erotic as narcissistic 
(Moore: 1988).
This data identifies trends that, I argue, problematise the postmodernist/feminist description. 
This is because a significant proportion of the sample was excluded because no touch is involved at all. 
These distributions further impact upon the results, since only 179 (55%) cases out of a possible 323 
where found to be touching the body. Within these cases, there is a relatively even distribution across 
the various body zones, with the torso having the highest frequency, although this does not include the 
breast. Thus we can conclude that to an extent to the sexed body is produced through touch, insofar as 
the female sexed model tends to touch herself, in various areas, mpre than the male sexed model. If 
there should be a marked difference in the nature of the touch, then it must lie with how the female 
sexed model touches these various bodily zones.
Yet, as figure 19 shows overleaf, the distributions simply did not follow the categorical order. 
Again, the data is altered as a result of 185 pre-programmed exclusions, thereby excluding a third of 
cases from this form of codification" 2 . The distributions that emerge tend to confirm the emergence of 
a greater simplification in the nature of the representations and a greater degree of homogenisation 
between the male and female models. For example, the masculine is not constructed by the male model 
manipulating the object, and neither is the feminine constructed by fingering or fiddling with things.
'"Made up of the genitals, the breast and buttock.
112 The decrease from the previous number of exclusion results from the inclusion of the object or
commodity.
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The female model does not appear to be caressing herself or anything else. On the contrary, the single 
largest frequency rests with a neutral touch. This requires that the hand be defined by its pragmatic use, 
be it holding a glass at a table (but not caressing it) carrying a book or using the hand in a basic 
rudimentary way. Mostly, the hand holding or touching in this manner has a specific ideological 
connection with the model codified, and as the previous data suggests, the models were rarely 
constructed narratively to, or engaging with, their environment. This is vital to the data and I will return 
to this as part of the conclusion of this chapter.

































































































In figure 3, it was identified that 86.61% of the sample had no specific relationship with the 
props or commodities. Moreover, the codes that traced the gendering of the hand through touch did not 
reflect the gender dichotomy either. Together, this trend identifies a shift to a more pragmatic 
relationship of hand to objects and so removes a fundamental feature that connects the model to the 
social world. In particular it has become much more difficult to define the 'who' the model, that is,
113 The chi value cannot be calculated because 22.73% of the cells have an expected value of the less 
than 5.
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what sort of a woman she is. By this, I mean that without these sorts of connotive detail, it is very 
difficult to look at the model and say: 'she fiddles with things and does not seem to be able to 
concentrate'. When it is possible to make the inferences between the bodily performance and the sexual 
character, the image is much better placed to construct patterns of identification and, consequently, 
construct the 'appropriate' subject position. The images furnish data whereby the body is clearly 
marked as male or female, but does not appear to be codified further. Thus the findings lead to two 
central conclusions: first, that codification appears to have withdrawn from the domain of sexual 
character; second, the secure categorisation of sex appears to take place independently of other social 
cues.
THE FACE AND THE GAZE
I turn now to the cluster of codes that directly target the various facial expressions and the 
gendered nature of the gaze. Based upon the postmodernist/feminist analysis, a marked difference in 
the direction of the gaze and the expressions performed ought to order the distribution of the results. 
Thus, one expects notable difference in the deployment of the passive gaze, and its associations with 
looking away so as to avert the eyes, of the head being positioned in profile in order to connote the 
feminine as 'to-be-looked-at-ness' and so on. One expects also a notable difference in the use of the 
seductive gaze. This is used to define the feminine as the 'femme fatale' through which to encode 
phallic femininity. Conversely, the direction of gaze will also trace the extent to which the male body 
undergoes 'femininisation', using the conventionalised gestures that construct the (male) body as 
desirable. Equally expected are the masculine (male) codifications, for example through the direct 
assertion of a look that forces the viewer to appear to be returning the model's directed gaze. Such 
codes are central to the reproduction the dichotomy where the masculine 'sees' and the other is 'seen'. 
Also, we would expect there to be ample use of the codes that negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' 
inherent within modelling by the extensive deployment of 'looking up and out' of the imaginary frame 
so that male model can negate their objectification (Dyerl992;1993). Hence, the aim is to examine the 
extent and direction of statistical difference in the distributions of the sexed models in this cluster.
However, before the detail is examined, it is necessary to contextualise these results in terms 
of the limitations set by the corporeal body so that the importance-pf the expression can be examined. I 
begin with the head position, which establishes some of the corporeal and material boundaries as to 
what expressions can be performed. This is followed by analysis of the direction of the gaze, which 
further limits corporeally the expressions that can be performed, and then 1 follow this with the 
expressive gaze.
From the table overleaf, one is struck again by the homogeneity between the male and the 
female sexed model. For example, only 14.29% of the sample of female sexed models are in profile, 
which compares to 13.73% of male sexed models. Equally significant is the small percentage this 
codification holds overall: 14.03% of the total sample. Even if the expectation were for there to be little 
difference between the male and the female sexed models, one would surely have expected that the 
coding via the profile would assume a larger quantity overall. Yet this particular presentation, one
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which formally presents the model as an object of representation, does not feature much, despite the 
fact that at the bottom line the models are there to present the goods.
Overall, the largest frequency lies with those models, both male and female, that are facing 
forward directly at the camera. This accounts for approximately a third of each. This indicates that 
the 
cues are focused upon the body itself: the body is predominately facing forward that is most often 
combined with the face facing forward, assuming the largest single proportion. Perhaps this is beca
use 
the intense and categorical codifications rest with the construction of the body rather than the 
construction of sexual character. Irrespective, the direction of the gaze and the expressions are cent
ral 
to the meanings generated. The only code that registers any significance is the larger number of fem
ale 
sexed models shown turning toward the camera. Again, this needs further anchoring with the 
expressions to see to what extent it is used to invite the gaze. Equally significant, and again contrar
y to 
expectation, are the central codes that directly and explicitly denigrate the model: not only is there 
no 
marked difference between the male and the female sexed models, but when combined, the 'back o
f the





















































































Chi = 13.5299, df= 8, there is no statistical association
head' and the 'head down' account for just 8.25% of the total sample. This somewhat problematises 
Nayak's assertion that the concealment of the face is a central technique to denote the subordinate 
the 
Black body as otherness. Likewise frequencies this low cannot be elevated to the status of 
encapsulating the negation of feminine that is central to producing the Master: the masculine is kno
wn
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by what the feminine is not. Neither body nor subject can be interpellated by such an infrequent 
codification.
The final element I would like to draw attention to refers to a code borrowed from Goffman. 
This is the head cant (p 179-86) which he describes as a core mechanism by which to demonstrate the 
lack of seriousness in women. He argues that the posture is often performed in combination with 
dreaminess or an adrift expression. He describes it as a form of'cutesy-ness' or submissiveness, 
especially when the head is dropped onto a man's shoulder. However, my results suggest that not only 
is this rarely used (8.07% for females), but again, it is used just as often on the male sexed model 
(7.75%). The deeper theoretical question is this: does the head cant, for example, maintain its 
connotative meaning of the gendered nature of sexual character, or does it mean that this connotation is 
losing its conventional base when used on both males and females? Overall, I argue that my results 
argue that the latter is the case. The level of the connotative is operating to reproduce naturalised sex so 
that sex and gender, male and man, are understood common-sensically as interchangeable.
Thus to make sense of the uniformity with which the face is presented, namely facing forward, 
it is vital that the direction of the gaze and the expressions be examined. In particular, the directions of 
the gaze, and its social and metaphorical distinctions of the higher and the lower, are key: the feminine 
looks down and the masculine looks up; the feminine is modest when she turns away, the masculine is 
assertive, looking directly into the three-dimensional space projected. Yet the results do not reflect this




















































































Chi ~ 9.0518, df= 8, there is not significant relationship
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dichotomous organisation of the direction of the gaze with ease. In fact, the distributions further 
undermine this logic. This striking absence of difference comes from small frequency numbers, equally 
distributed, of male and female sexed models that had their eyes closed or were looking out of the 
frame, and so forth. Thus the largest majority, 33.33% of the female sample, compared to 35.47% of 
the males, were gazing out at the viewer. This is the direction that connects directly with the camera 
through which the image positions the viewer within the model's field of vision. The data shows that 
the largest frequency assumes only a third of the sample. The next largest frequency, for example 
'looking away', barely reach 10% of the sample. Relationally speaking, this means that gazing at the 
viewer is by far the most frequent code used. An image is three times more likely to be codified as 
staring at the viewer than not. This further displaces the marks of the gender dichotomy onto the 
expression of the gaze itself. Thus, while the variable showed that there is a degree of variation as to 
which direction is adopted, this does not detract sufficiently from the homogeneity that is increasingly 
coming to define the core visual order. Moreover, this homogeneity is registered with the codes that are 
least open, interpretively speaking, that is, they are not based in the esoteric nature of my interpretation, 
but by the corporeal impositions of the body. I will return to this.
Hence the central markers of sexual difference within the Symbolic must include the 
expressive gaze and the expressions of the mouth, perhaps two of the most important areas of the face 
with regard to how the face is sexualised. Therefore, these have the capacity to offset the emerging 
neutrality, one might even say banality, that is increasingly defining many of the other codes. In 
particular, if the neutral body stance is offset by the use of overt forms of sexualisation, which are also 
categorically distributed, then this would provide empirical evidence that legitimates the continued 
assumption regarding the nature of the Symbolic. What sort of evidence does figure 22 furnish 
overleaf? Firstly, staring, the most neutral expression descriptively, is shown to be the most frequently 
used for both the male and the female sexed models; secondly, it accounts for a higher proportion of 
the female sample. This has to be attributed, in part, to the minimal cues of location, body posture 
props, which are joined now by this neutral expression. Moreover, without more complex cues, it is 
impossible to 'read' or key (Goffman:1979) an expression.
The second most frequent code is 'assertive'. The proportion of females from the total is 
31.42%"4 . Contrariwise, only 3.72% of 296 female models were recorded as expressing coyness. This 
combines with the other codes that have also registered a significant decline in the representation of 
passive femininity; for example shyness and dreaminess. At least here there is some remnance of the 
former division insofar as the female model is three times more likely to be coded as 'dreamy' than the 
male sexed model. Another element worth noting is the decline of'to-be-looked-at-ness', that is, the 
form of display and self-objectification that functions to attract the gaze. Just 13.85% of the females 
from the proportion of 296 were clearly marked by this look of invitation and display. Nor could it be 
clearly stated that this is strictly confined to the feminine, if to a much lesser degree, since 10.04% of 
the male sexed models also marked their address with the invitation to consume them voyeuristically.
114 Note that this is a multiple variable so that each percentage represents its share of the total 
independently of the other distributions. Therefore, the sum total of percentages is greater than 100. 
This is produced from the possible of repeats from codes like 'frowning' 'semi-concealed' and 'raised 
eyebrows'. See Appendix B.
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Much more in keeping with expectation, when guided by the order of the Symbolic, is that the male 
sexed models register nearly one in five images were they are asserting their gaze. Yet, just as with the 
female models, the males were mostly staring, with no particular expression and certainly no particular 
'insight to the soul' (Hillel: 1998; Magli: 1989; Schmitt: 1989). Note also that there is not that marked a 
difference regarding the use of Dyer's 'other-worldly'. Note finally the extent to which the male body



























































































































CM = 24.4863, df = 14, there is significance at 5%
has been coded as seductive, with male sexed models register nearly twice as many instances as 
females. It is through differences like these that the variable shows up distinctions. However, this does 
not provide evidence for the Symbolic order, because the difference is in the wrong direction, that is, 
that the male is codified using the seductive gaze more frequently than the female. This cannot be 
offset by calling upon the narcissistic context of the seductive look, thereby displacing the seduction to
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self-love because other codes have identified the high degree to which most images are free of any 
clear narrative contextualisation. Only by undertaking the sorts of theoretical contortion critiqued 
earlier can this evidence be read as confirmation of the postmodern/feminist description of the 
Symbolic. Note also the low frequency with which the 'other-worldly' gaze is used by the male sexed 
model to resist or negate the objectification. The evidence suggests that the notion of the Symbolic 
being ordered through the universal categorical opposition is increasingly difficult to sustain.
Given that the gaze did not produce the categorical organisation of the sexed body according 
to the active/passive dichotomy, it is therefore left to the expressions of the mouth to reflect this 
dichotomy. The mouth is significant not only through its central place as expressive through speech as 
well as smiling, laughter, sneering and so forth, but also because of its psychoanalytic significance as a 
sexual stage of development. The phallic mouth is therefore profoundly important in securing 'phallic 
femininity'. For example, Kubrick's 'Lolita' pictures the nymphet sucking a lollipop. Therefore, 
symbolically it carries the sexual connotations of an orifice of pleasure and invitation. If the 
postmodernist/feminist model has some descriptive base, then it should express itself through the 
phallic possibilities that the mouth offers.
The table below identifies that this expressive element is statistically significant: the sex of the 
model affects the form the mouth takes. Both the male and female model register similar frequencies of 
an open mouth, which implies that men appear to be represented smiling broadly or laughing just as 
often as women. However, the male sexed models are more likely to have their mouths closed (nearly 
70% of the sample, compared to 55.45% of the female models). The second noted difference is that the 
female sexed model is twice as likely to have her mouth semi-open. What could be the symbolic 
significance of this? I propose that the closure of the mouth seals it off as an orifice, while the mouth









































Chi = 15.0210, df= 2, there is a strong association at 1%
half-open sets up the potential for erotic consumption because it brings into view a space, which can be 
filled. The open mouth does not seem to be able to do this because it has lost all the essential sexual 
suggestiveness. This brings two elements to bear: first, the corporeal base is essential for tracing the 
symbolic elaboration of the body, rather than presuming that symbolic operations fully determine the 
fleshy matter; second, it begs the question of to what extent this is undermined or secured through
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expressions. I turn next to the expressions and then to the cross-tabulation of the above with the 
expressions in order to delineate their interrelationship.
The first thing to note from figure 24 overleaf is the overwhelmingly marginal use of any 
expressions at all. 'Smiling', for example, assumes only 23.59% of the female sexed models compared 
to 52.16% of those shown with no identifiable expression. Moreover, these proportions are mirrored for 
the male sexed models. This further weakens the legitimacy of the categorical order of the Symbolic. It 
simply cannot be awarded such causal significance when, in a sample of fashion images, the feminine 
as passive is not ordering how gender is codified. The second striking result is how few images have 
utilised the 'phallic mouth/object' code: only 6.31% of the female sample. This indicates strongly that 
within this sample, clear pornographic codification is not seeping into mainstream images. Not only 
that, but the 'phallicisation of the feminine' (Stratton: 1996) is not established with anything like the 
frequency implied by the Symbolic order. However, despite these similarities, the extent to which the 
female sexed model is represented with the mouth semi-open, alongside the notable absence of any 
expression, may well signify how the mouth is sexualised, that is, by restricting the mouth to a 
suggestive orifice.
From table 24, it is possible to identify whether the mouth, posed as semi open and without an 
expression, is used to secure a specific mode of sexual isation of the feminine, as well as providing 
empirical evidence for the psychoanalytic origins of the eroticisaiton. What the data reveals is that it



































































Chi = 12.5182, df= 6, there is not statistical association
does secure a proportion, but that this must be placed in context with the number of'expressionless' 
images where the mouth is closed, thereby rendering it a marginal mode of representation. 291 is the 
total sample of females of which 116, or 39.86%, are codified with their mouths closed and with no
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expression. This distribution surely secures the move toward a homogeneity between the 
representations of men and women. In comparison, the total number of females with their mouths semi- 
open and expressionless is 22.33%. Therefore, the female model is twice as likely to be captured with 
no expression at all as sexualised with the mouth semi-open. Nevertheless, this sexualising code is one 
of clearest forms so far because if we look at the percentage of the male models codified thus, it


















































































registers 10.74%, that is half as few. The final point of interest furnished from this analysis is the equal 
frequency with which the male and the female models smile and laugh fully, heartily, so that their 
mouths open: 14.46% and 15.12% respectively. Not only is this half as much as when the female model 
has no expression at all, but it also registers the fact that the male and female models are codified 
smiling and laughing more or less equally. Again, the empirical evidence fundamentally challenges the 
notion that the sexed categories are defined by patriarchal Symbolic. On the contrary, apart from key 
areas of the body itself, the data presented simply cannot be said to be defined by categorical sexual 
difference where the 'feminine as other' operates as a mode of representation for the 'masculine One'.
OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR:
There is a clear trend that shows that the Symbolic does not operate universally to institute 
sexual difference. In fact, the codes of the body are simple rather than weighted ideological 
complexity:
1. The model is predominately shown alone;
2 There is no specific narrative link between the social environment, nor is there a direct link,
subordinate or otherwise, with props used. In fact, a significant number have no additional props or
social setting;
115 1 have elected not to include percentages because what is required is the proportion of the female 
sample as a sum total in comparison with the male sexed model.
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3. Neither sexed model is defined by their social status in terms of how they occupy space, or with 
whom;
4. Both the male and the female sexed models are equally located within the voyeuristic context; 
neither are visually orientated to the viewer through the narrative;
5. Most of the models, both male and female, are represented using the medium or long shot with
sharp focus. 
Moving on to the body:
6. Most models are represented facing forward;
7. Those body positions that have been associated with symbolic withdrawal from public space or the 
demarcation of public ownership of the female in space proved no longer to define representation 
at all;
8. Neither the male or female was differentiated clearly by whom they touch or how they touch; this 
is limited to the fact that the female touches herself more than the male does, but not in a particular 
way that aligns the nature of the touch to the gendered dichotomy;
9. Both the male model and the female model are most often represented with their faces looking 
forward in the direction of the viewer, but with a neutral facial expression that does not engage the 
viewer directly, be it expression gaze or mouth;
10. The few differences that are registered do not always follow the direction dictated by the Symbolic 
order. As was noted, the male model was codified more frequently using the seductive gaze than 
the female sexed model.
Methodologically:
11. These results cross verify each other as the results for shot length for example correspond to the 
body idiom which likewise corresponds to the registered decline in the use of staring out of the 
photograph frame as a technique to negate the 'to-be-looked-ness';
12. The sorts of results that are expected as guided by postmodernism/feminism were registered within 
the Cosmopolitan sample of 1975.
The marked absence of difference is most significant because codes that aim to establish 'who the 
model is' are in decline, at least according to this extensive sample. The commodification process does 
not seem to draw upon our gendered world of sexual character, yet maintains a 'commitment' to 
ensuring the body is always subject to the appropriate assignment of sex. By this, I mean that the clarity 
by which one could assign the sex of the body is not reflected in assignments of sexual character so that 
one could straightforwardedly say: 'as a female she loses concentration because, as you can see, she 
keeps daydreaming'. Moreover, one should not resign the attribution of the sexed body to the 'realism' 
of the image because, as is well known, this is a construction, a visual accomplishment that the camera 
can undermine at any time. Equally, therefore, the realism must be achieved. As Goffman argues, the 
image is a thing of artifice, not authenticity. How do we make sense of the ease of sexual attribution in 
light of the fact that there is no sexual character and no symbolic signs apparent to secure the feminine 
as passive? 1 argue that the ideological imput of the image rests in the construction of the body, that is, 
in the 'self-evidence' that sex and gender are one and the same thing. Ideologically therefore,
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representations are concerned with underpinning the equivalence of social and biological within the 
production of the facticity of sex. This is why I have left the variables that explicitly tackle 'body type' 
and sexualisation until last, because I suggest that it is here that the significant construction work 
resides.
SEXUALISATION
What does this variable reveal? A number of things, some of which run counter to the idea 
that it is the 'model as subjectivity' that is the discursive target rather than the corporeal body. The first 
thing to note is the high frequency that has classified half the sample as 'non-sexualised'. This is 
startling at first because it challenges both lay and academic preconceived ideas regarding the extent

























































































of the sexualisation process. One may well be inclined to think that this reflects interpretative error. Yet 
if one takes stock for a moment, it is possible to place this in some context. We have noted throughout
" 6 The extent to which the results challenge the orthodoxy was startling to me, particularly as on first 
viewing I 'have no results'. Yet, I began to remember the banality of the coding process, where 1 
recognised how uniform many of the images were. Advertising forms such a large part of the visual 
field, we in fact may only be able to remember the stark examples precisely because they are unusual. 
117 Chi is not calculated because, despite amalgamations, there remains 10% of the cells with an 
expected value of less 5.
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the shift toward the simplification of the image. This was identified by looking at the frequency with 
which the models were facing forward, looking forward, having their arms by their sides, or were 
staring or had the mouth closed without an expression. One only needs to reflect on the proportions to 
also contextualise the extent to which the images appear not to be dominated by the sexualisation 
process.
While most of the female sexed models were fully dressed, they were also encoded as 
revealing the flesh, mostly the thigh or breast. Similarly, the male model reveals or completely bares 
his chest, something that the female model rarely does unless in the context of pornography. We also 
find here that there are equal numbers of cases where the feminine and the masculine direct attention to 
the groin area. There is an equal frequency (6.61% for the female models and 6.77% for the male) with 
which they both reveal the lower stomach and hip bone. I suggest that this does indicate that there is a 
dimorphic logic at work here, but one that is required because sexual difference under-defines our 
gendered system. The codifications operate by defining what is sexy in a woman and what is sexy in a 
man through the apparent differences of the body. Sexiness is defined as being derived from the 
essence of the sexed body; the sexed body produces either men or women. This reveals how we 
collapse the social and the biological as part of our social understanding of gender. For example, bodies 
are natural and have different biological roles in reproduction and yet this so called self-evidence is 
supported by some women wearing padded bras because they have small breasts and therefore are not 
feminine enough. Thus, I am arguing that by drawing attention to the few features of corporeal 
difference (we do, of course, have 26 chromosomes in common and only 1 that this different) we shut 
attention off from the ways in which corporeal bodies are altered to meet the construction of gender 
difference. Hence, I continue to challenge the postmodern/feminist model of the construction of sex by 
rejecting idea that the body is constituted according to the reign of the phallus, which re-introduces all 
those codes that negate lack that have just established as marginal.
Table 27 overleaf adds to that the dimorphic logic of sex by building up further the common 
sense notion that one physical attribute, say the penis, corresponds with another, for example the 
presence of muscle. Moreover, what this construction seemingly ignores is that far from being a 
reflection of the primary attribution, secondary and tertiary features, such as muscle or having pert 
breasts, are organised and managed in order to produce a regime of gender (Connell: 1987) that is 
common-sensically treated as natural. Society is not involved in 'making babies' and so is not involved 
in making the adult males either. This status of'nature' means that no social activity is required. 
Therefore little attention is paid to the normative definitions of'male' as this is outside of the domain 
of society. Equally, if we look at the hands, almost one in three images have drawn attention to the 
hand, not so much by the nature of the touch, but rather by the 'look' of the hand. In particular, the 
tendency for the female model to have her arms bent, thus bringing the hands into the centre of the 
image, may enable the hand to be displayed, and with it, the practical accomplishments that mark that 
hand as 'female'. I have in mind the nail varnish and manicure, which 'naturally' is something a 
woman does. Thus we are beginning to trace the reversal of what is proposed by 
postmodernism/feminism: what is deemed to of the body is being understood through the matrix of the
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social. In contrast, my aim is to contribute to an emphasis that includes ideas of construction but 
equally draws the corporeal into this process.
The second element that emerges from this table is the extent to which both the male and 
female models fall into the codes that trace the body beautiful, the singular difference being that the 
male body had muscle and the female was invariable slim. Both the male and female models are 
classified as tall. There were twice as many men who had no chest hair (presumably removed) than had












































































































































visible chest hair. Women were just as likely to have short hair as long, but very few men had long 
hair Again, the painting of the nails, while not being a significant proportion of women, nevertheless
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marked the female models out from the male. Thus marked difference is appearing in terms of bodily 
display, which is significant by its temporariness and its ongoing accomplishment This is the practice 
of masculinity and femininity. When chest hair comes back into fashion, re-gains its sex appeal, so this 
particular style will vanish. The ideological requirements demanded by the postmodernist/feminists 
will struggle to deal with these shifts as they require something more continuous in order to be able to 
construct subjectivity through representation.
It has been noted that the female model is consistently codified occupying a third of the two- 
dimensional page, and filling the page from top to bottom. This projects the body into the length of the 
page, which then makes her appear tall. This can be achieved irrespective of whether the model is 
actually tall or not. Thus the appearance of the body as beautiful is a manifestation as much of how the 
image functions within its two-dimensional plain (Goffrnan:1979) as it serves any ideological 
movement. It is an accomplishment of the artifice of the image more than a result of the pressures of 
ideological reproduction.
I have elected to suspend any of the sub-categories that targeted the tertiary level of 
personality" 8 as part of my examination, namely those that traced the active/passive dichotomy and its 
associate forms. This is because I abandoned these codes toward the end of the data imputing as I 
became increasingly aware that the criteria by which I had expected to assess the sexual character could 
not be applied with any consistency. This was in part a result of poor operationalisation. In particular, 
the variable was too big without sufficient internal organisation, which assists greatly in applying the 
criteria with regularity. However, equally important, if not more so, was the significant decline in the 
realist codifications. Gone from the images were the social space and the sorts of objects and goods that 
characterise different spaces. There was no formal use of status cues, nothing in fact that we could use 
to 'read' the presentations of self people offer. I could not code this particular female model as being 
'weak' or 'emotional' or of a 'soft' nature because there simply were not enough cues by which such a 
judgement could be made.
The simplification of the image meant that 1 was faced with a beautiful body, clearly marked 
as female, but which did not tell me anything about 'her'. For example, without the props of the private 
domestic setting, one cannot get an idea of the sorts of things she likes. With the ritualisation of social 
life, we are able to glean from the staged nature of the image, what sort of 'person' she is constructed 
as being. This level of meaning does not characterise the advertisements sampled here. In addition 
therefore, despite the poor codification of variable 26, which sought to identify the core dichotomies, it 
was always going to fall at the same hurdle: there simply were not enough social cues to abstract with 
any consistencies whether this particular model could be said to be defined by an element of the core 
gendered dichotomies. I argue that my results have clearly established the extent to which the image 
has been greatly simplified so that the inability to read the image necessarily leads to this conclusion.
118 See Appendicies B and C
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SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of improvements that could be made to the taxonomy, particularly in the 
light of the results found here. The most apparent improvement would be to have a considerably larger 
sample size. As it stands, once the initial distributions are in place, there were insufficient cases to 
cross-tabulate 3 or more variables. The aim was to develop multiple perspectives on the body whereby 
various positions could be examined in terms of other expressions or gestures. Figure 23 gives an 
indication of what this would have looked like. However, the effect of the small sample size was 
exaggerated by the distributions identified. For example, in many of the variables, most of the sample 
(usually about 60%) clustered around one core sub-variable, which left the remaining 40% to be 
distributed amongst the remaining sub-variables, often about six or seven. Consequently, some cell 
values were often split further so as to rule out this comparative analysis. The second central feature 
would be to develop a number of codes from variable eleven. This would include many more 
secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics so that one could build a picture of the macro features used 
to secure the facticity of the dimorphic sexed body.
AND THE IMAGES THEMSELVES?
I conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of a number of images, the aim of which is to 
recontextualise the codes used to quantify some of the images in circulation. The images included do 
not represent a collection selected from the random sample but rather reflect: a) those images that 
caused me to question the assumption that the Symbolic is ordered by clear gendered dichotomisation 
only; b) those images of women that emerged from my results and appear to represent a drop in the 
intense ideological production of the 'feminine as passive'. I have chosen these because I think these 
two elements represent the central findings that challenge the adequacies of the semiotic descriptions 
taken to task above. I begin with the images of the male models.
From plates 1 and 2, one can glean that the production of the body as male is central despite 
the poses. In plate 1 " 9 the male model is located within a plain brown background. I have argued that 
this significantly reduces the ability to anchor him in the public social world, which is a key element of 
the Symbolic. The second element to notice is the angle of the head. His face is looking downwards, 
away from the viewer. Ideologically speaking, this is supposed to align the model with the passive 
because the angle of the head prevents a direct engagement with the viewer. This is consolidated by the 
addition of the downward gaze. Furthermore, there is no expression on the mouth, which makes the 
face very still and somewhat isolated. The shirt that he is modelling is position to reveal the breast 
bone. Here the light catches and emphasises the glossiness of skin. Codes such as these usually codify 
the feminine. The chest may have been waxed, as there is no indication of any chest hair, so there is 
also some indication that this form of masculinity results, in part, from a social practice not ideological
construction alone.
His hands are concealed by placing them in his pockets; something that is conventionally 
associated with men. However, this also conceals one of the central anchors we immediately use in
119 Esquire magazine, Feburary 1995.
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everyday life to assign the sex of the person. Hands can reveal elements about the social positioning of 
the person; for example, labourers' hand as opposed to office workers. In conventional gender terms, 
we look to the size and the presence of veins to assist in sex assignment. Combined, these elements 
undermine a clear production of masculinity. However, his sex is secured in other ways. For example, 
the angle of the camera draws attention to the jaw and, in particular, to the fact that he is not clean 
shaven. This deliberate codification sets the body apart from women's, where facial hair is always 
removed. The presence facial hair stands in contrast to the hair on his head, which has been stylised and 
opens up the potential to draw reference to the 1930's haircuts some women had. I am referring to the 
curl placed over the forehead. I argue that while these elements are sufficient to secure the body as 
male, they do not unambiguously locate him within the conventions of hegemonic masculinity. The 
placement of a pink scarf suggests that this image is aimed at a specific market, namely the gay men's 
market. Perhaps then, the source of the variation of images is derived from the market sector at which 
the product is self-consciously pitched. Therefore the codification of an image such as this depends 
upon combining the traditions of the feminine with a sufficient number of makers that secures a male 
sex assignment. This assignment presents some fundamental problems for the notion of feminisation 
because the codes do not construct this body as female despite the presence of a 'to-be-looked-ness'.
Plate 2 120 is predominately coded via the lighting, or brownish tinge that makes the chest 
appear very velvety. This makes the skin the central focus of the image. Note also that soft focus has 
been used to create that sense of velvety skin. The central lighting draws attention to the muscle of the 
body, particularly the breast. His torso fills the page thereby bringing the surface of the skin close to the 
eye. This reflects Goffman's notion that we are able to imaginatively connect a codification to an actual 
embodied position. However, active interpretation is not to be treated the same as the meaning created 
by the interpellated subject. The viewer is placed so as if he/she were standing in close proximity to 
him. Again, the smoothness seems to suggest that he has waxed his chest. However, this may in fact be 
an outcome air-brushing the image and draws are attention to the artifice of the image. Either way, it 
removes the image from the actual embodiment of most men. He has his hands folded across his chest, 
which recalls the way arms are used to conceal women's torsos. In addition, this withdraws the arms; 
combining the codes to connote modesty. However, the position of the arms also draws attention to the 
distribution of hair, which assists in securing the body as male. The emphasis upon the chest bone does 
this also. The second crucial feature is the position of the head. He too is looking downwards, as well 
as appearing to have his eyes closed. This codification reduces further the capacity of the model to 
impose his subjectivity thereby making the viewer the subject of the gaze. This is effectively how 'coy' 
is visually produced. Another additionally element to this image is the fact that the only object in 
colour is the bottle of beer. The position of the head assists in drawing the gaze directly to the 
commodity. Moreover, the downward angle of the head implies that the body is subordinate to the 
object. Conventionally, this would be defined as an objectified body and I suggest that this ought to be 
extended the male body also, given the evidence presented here. Along side the elements of the body 
that draw upon our common sense ways of assigning sex, there are a number of tensions included 
within the image. One is the thumb that indents the skin on the arm holding the bottle. This does
120 Arena Spring 1995.
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convey some uneasiness in the image. The most explicit is the pun 'Poor Homme', which alludes to the 
French 'pour' or 'for'. This is referencing the wide use of pour homme' in perfume advertising, for 
which the bottle of bear is substituted. Equally, however, it means that the male model is to be pitied.
I have included this image because it directly draws upon the theoretical and empirical critique 
offered. The semiotic analyses analysed in chapter two would 'deal' with the clash of the male body 
and the abundance of feminine codification by defining it as an example of feminisation. Yet, to do so 
is to implicitly acknowledge the prior assignment of the sex of the body because without that prior 
assignment the notion of feminisation would not be required because the production would reflect the 
Symbolic order (Mathieu:1996). Furthermore, the instabilities that have been self-consciously included, 
but applied to the male body, making them ironic. To use irony in this way is to disrupt the free flow of 
ideological meaning (Rorty: 1989). The postmodernist/feminist model has no means to account for this 
because the constructed subject is the outcome of meaning and never a user of meaning. 1 refer back to 
Benhabib's critique here. Ultimately, what is crucial to both these images is the extent to which 
beautification and commodification define the image. Hence, 1 argue that these processes should no 
longer considered processes that target women only, or even predominately.
In contradistinction, I have selected an image that reflects extent to which the images of 
women have become less riddled with ideology. I argue that my results have unambiguously shown the 
extent to which the explicit positioning of the woman as passive has declined. This introduces a tension 
in that the beautification and commodification continue but that this is placed directly on to the body, 
rather than the construction of a 'character' or the alignment with the private domain, for example. 
Thus, they supply 'information' only on what a woman looks like, not on how she should behave or 
feel. I have selected one from Cosmopolitan November 2002 on order to give an indication that these 
sorts of images persist.
Plate 3 exposes, I think, the ways in which a significant proportion of images are composed to 
draw one's attention directly to the artifice of the image. Just as above, the image is marked by the 
absence of any social context with which we can glean something as to the 'who' of the model. It was 
as a result of images like these that I was unable to apply the variable that traced the core dichotomies. 
She is caught in the middle of an artificial posture that self-consciously draws attention to how the 
image is constructed. It does not function via naturalistic mock-up; on the contrary, it reveals what 
actually takes place to compose an image. Her arms extend outwards and her body is captured in 
movement. A mock-up of a dance move perhaps? At best, one could say that her posture displays the 
clothes, but then would not one expect that if one were to seek out such advertisements? I think that 
what is critical for me is how banal the image is and how much the image is ordered around the 
necessity to the display the clothes; hence the movement. Her hair is held back by fingers, which gives 
us sight of her face. Her eyes look downwards, but without the symbolic effect of the images above 
because the angle is a result of the movement and thus does not carry the 'staged' quality of those 
above. How is one to make an identification with such an image? Perhaps, identification is secured by 
imaging oneself in the suit? However, this seems a little vague. Or at least it is vague enough to query 
whether such an image could secure the reproduction of the Symbolic and the subordinated 
subjectivities it constitutes. Again, it is the explicit commodification process that stands out in this
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image, and yet it is so explicit, how could you miss it? 1 think that if this image is going to be found to 
make an imput in the reproduction of the social order, then we must turn to the how social interaction 
mediates between ideological construction and the subject. I query that asserting that it operates at an 
unconscious level is sufficient to explain how an image of this kind operates in the social world. This is 
important because the data has shown that simplistic images like this that are in circulation.
A SUMMARY
The content analysis undertaken here has provided a set of data that stands in opposition to 
much of the description and analysis of representation. I think that there are four basic reasons as to 
why:
1. Unlike much of the research conducted on gender representation, [ did not organise my data in 
such a way that it set out to establish difference, the problem then developed is: what kind of 
difference is being looked for. 1 sought to avoid this by allowing the distributions themselves to 
furnish difference, usually defined as 'the findings', or as has emerged, to 'fail' to establish any 
substantive relationship of difference at all.
2. However, what has emerged from this is an introduction of what unites the images of men and 
women. I identified that the image has moved, for both men and women, toward a significant 
simplification, and thus I simultaneously traced the decline in the use of realism; secondly, and 
most importantly, by not emphasising difference, I was able to identify the extent to which the 
forms of representation are in fact characterised by homogeneity.
3. Combined, these two shifts undermine the legitimacy with which one can continue to assume that 
the categorical differences of the Symbolic continues to describe the actual images in circulation.
4. By using a series of codes that are relatively closed, interpretatively speaking, or are guided by 
clear delineations of their operations, I have generated a bank of empirical data with which to 
challenge the assumptions of the Symbolic. I argue that this makes the case for the need to return 
to content analysis so that ideological concerns are linked to how representative, or not, the image 
subject to semiotic analysis is.
5. The images are organised by taking the gendered body and using the body itself, separate from 
sexual character, as system through which to commodify and promote the item. 1 argue that this 
contributes to the demise of the detail of the social setting and props.
Finally, I return to an issue raised when delineating the difference within postmodernism/feminism. 
The data has shown that the Symbolic is simply not sufficiently dichotomised to secure the identification 
patterns that the theory asserts. What is the consequence for the theory from these cultural applications 
are drawn? I suggest that this evidenced weakens the claims that they make theoretically and 
substantiates the necessity to engage both theoretically and empirically.
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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODIES, SEX AND 
GENDER
153
I conclude with a reiteration of the general theoretical problems identified with regard to the 
strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its application within the visual cultural sphere. I 
follow this with an introduction of how a model that incorporates the corporeal body, as well as 
maintaining a sharp eye on ideology, might proceed. I return here to Goffman (1979) and integrate this 
with Garfinkel's explication of how naturalisation within the practice of gender occurs. Garfmkel 
(1967) assists in showing the various ways 'genital sex' underdetermines the social, everyday 
understandings of sex. This provides the background to a model that seeks explore the social activity 
that exists between biological sex and gender roles and/or identity, that is, practices common-sensically 
said to be derived from or rooted in chromosomal sex. What is important to me is that within the social 
and everyday background, sex and gender do not operate as a semantic distinction. This distinction 
resides largely within the academy. Garfinkel attends to how sex and gender are linked in the lived 
embodied world, given that the biological category underdetermines the social operations of sex. 
Moreover, this offers an alternative to the dualistic logic that has tended to limit the analysis of the 
sex/gender distinction, yet without ejecting the corporeal; a charge which I have lodged against the 
Lacanian postmodern feminists throughout this thesis.
I will then extend this analysis by linking it to Lakoff s( 1987) notion of family resemblances. 
This does two things: first, it offers a non-unitary and non-objectivist classification scheme so that the 
varied practices undertaken to sustain sex (resulting from the failure of biology to achieve this) can be 
brought more clearly into view; second, by developing the notion of sex as a family resemblance, we 
are better able to keep a handle on its manifold forms; we do, after all, often mean much more than 
chromosomal sex when we speak of'sex'. In particular, we can treat the various elements, for example 
differing conceptions of motherhood, as an integral part of the cluster contained within how a category 
of this complexity works because we no longer treat these as objective properties.
I conclude with a research framework that seeks to explore the relationship of representations 
to social gendered action. What is of central importance is the extent to which representations continue 
to visualise the normative body, and thus address ideological formations, but emphasise how these are 
incorporated into everyday actions, rather than treating images as determinants of that action. I argue 
that only this emphasis can account for the variability of being women and this is why we need a 
conceptualisation, like Lakoff s, that can accommodate a much more flexible form of classification so 
that central, marginal and marginalized forms and practices of being a woman can remain the central 
theoretical focus.
THEORETICAL CONTESTATIONS
I highlighted what 1 consider to be a series of fundamental problems with the model offered by 
the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism. I focused on the over-emphasis on the constitutive 
function of discourse that, when combined with a certain deployment of Lacanianism, produces a 
number of problematic theoretical closures. They are:
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1. An inadequate theorisation of the subject derived from an over-reliance upon the mirror phase 
and the concept of interpellation.
2. The model is ahistorical, as it has neither a subject capable of bringing about change, nor a 
model the Symbolic that can interpellate new subjectivities.
3. A self-evident treatment of the body as object and root of subject positions.
4. A coterminous, but contradictory, reliance upon a disembodied subject; leading to the absolute 
negation of active female heterosexual ity.
5. A restricted model of how an image functions and what images are in circulation.
These closures, brought about by structural determinism, reduce the human condition to a series of 
structural oppositions, which relies upon defining femininity and masculinity by identifying their 
various fixed properties: active/passive, subject/object and so on. These dualisms are said to be 
contained within the language that we speak and thus organises or interpellates the subject. A key 
example discussed is the prescription that if a male model is photographed looking down and away 
from the viewer, 'he' is feminised, thereby maintaining the connection between the feminine and the 
passive. This logic is equally operative when the viewer is addressed. If a woman is to gain pleasure 
from an image she can only do so by oscillating and assuming masculine patterns of desire. Hence, a 
subject and/or representation cannot be both feminine and active. Anything identified as 'active', 
however vaguely, and is born by the female falls outside of this fixed and unitary classification and is 
either masculinised or pathologised. Such an analysis reveals the ambiguous place of the body in the 
writings by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. Only if the subject is disembodied could one 
really contemplate theoretically ruling out the possibility that some women may experience active 
heterosexuality, or at least something more complex than elaborated by the postmodernists/feminists 
discussed here. I suggest that if one concludes that all active desire is masculine desire, one is left 
wondering about the body because their analysis of desire feels curiously disembodied. Desire is, in 
fundamental ways, corporeal and is experienced at the level of the flesh, regardless of the fact that 
desire has social origins.
Yet, I have offered the argument that their theoretical delineation of the disembodied subject 
operates coterminously with their use of the 'body as a self-evident object'. Hence Lacanian 
postmodernists/feminists treat the body as an unexamined presupposition upon which the culturally 
structured process can be 'read'. Oscillation, masculinisation, and so on, are all process that assume 
sexual dimorphism. Without treating the body as self-evident, they are unable to trace the domination 
that is said to reside within the visual domain. 'He is feminised' in no way critically targets the primary 
assignment 'he'. Masculine and feminine are placed 'on top of the body' so that deviation at the level 
of cultural construction can be traced. In effect, masculine and feminine become patterns of desire that 
refer to the order of the mind - the construction of the subject - and this has the effect of ensuring that 
the body remains the sole raison d'etre of biology. It therefore reproduces the mind/body dualism, and 
thus fails to tackle its implicit genderisation (Lloyd: 1984). In essence, postmodernism/feminism of the 
kind evaluated here aims to treat the body as a discursive object, a product of cultural forces, but can 
only do so by ignoring the body at the corporeal level, that is, by accepting the body as self-evident. 1
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have tried to argue that this effectively re-introduces the sex/gender distinction, but in a far le
ss 
interrogated way than under Oakley for example. Yet, they equally depend upon the body as 
self- 
evident, one that underpins the identification of psychic shifts.
A direct consequence of the fact that these structural dualisms maintain their integrity above 
the empirical world they are supposed to describe is that it effectively denies individuals the 
capacity to 
reflect, challenge and alter the social world through potentially transformative practices. This
 is why 
theory of this kind is charged with ahistoricism. There is no social change to account for beca
use they 
lack a social subject or motor from which social change can emerge. For if we do not act on the world 
but are only subject to it, then, this seriously limits the quality and variability of action. As I argued, we 
are merely cultural dupes acting out our roles. This model is forced into a position of ahistori
cism, 
produced by its structural determinism, because the Symbolic is said to speak through the sub
ject. 
Therefore, postmodernism/feminism lacks a 'motor', as it were, to bring about new Symbolic
 
formations. The specific form that this structural determinism takes is particularly problemati
c, in my 
view, for this reason: it is dangerously idealist in its resonance. Language systems seem to be
 
immaterial, free standing and fully independent of the embodied subjects that utter the words. One gets 
no sense that the language system is alive because it forms part of the speech acts we do m T
he 
strictures that the language system imposes is also the frame through which speech acts eme
rge 
(Cavell:1995; Goffrnan:1974). Moreover, the voice of the speaker is as disembodied as desire. One 
develops no sense of the 'entity' doing the utterance, so consequently, those who recognise th
at it is 
'real' bodies, with voice boxes, who speak, find themselves in a perverse situation of seeking
 to 're- 
establish' that bodies are 'real'. The postmodernists/feminists reviewed here extend a sense o
f the 
Symbolic universe that is confined to the (re)presentations made of it. Thus, from their theoretical 
stance, substantive change need not be of any concern.
The problematic theorisations of the subject and its relationship to the body render the 
theorists discussed here unable to account for their own consciousness. At best they call upon
 pre- 
Oedipal desire. This effectively re-essentialises their own desire and places them back into th
e order 
that says they lack sufficient moral regulation to engage in the public world. As Gadamer (1975) 
argues, seeking to valourise the subordinated term merely achieves the re-affirmation of its s
ubordinate 
position and thus the patriarchal dualisms that are allegedly their theoretical target. Hence, 
postmodernists/feminists, and the cultural applications they undertake, have not deconstructe
d the 
essence of the woman's body at all, but operate within the very logic they profess to be the o
bject of 
their critique.
METHODOLOGIC1AL CONCERNS AND EMPIRICAL REFUTATION
My theoretical critique highlighted a number of theoretical weaknesses in the theorisation of
 
the body offered by Lacanian postmodernists/feminists. I then went on to challenge directly 
the 
ideologically over-determined description of the Symbolic by conducting a content analysis. 
My
121 This in part reflects the loose application of the term 'text', which elides all the difference
s between 
these texts, including the visual, linguistic, books and bodies.
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central theoretical challenge was to suggest that a sign must be sufficiently stable if it is to perform
 an 
ideological function. These signs are supposed to make the world recognisable and, for that reason,
 are 
not self-consciously elliptical and difficult to pin down as they slip across a web of meaning. In 
contestation, 1 simply offered the following proposition: if the universal Symbolic is the source of 
gendered subjectivity, then it must be characterised by the active/passive and masculine/feminine 
dichotomies. Thus codes of this kind are straightforward, conventional and quantifiable. However, 
the 
data furnished by my content analysis, which used many of their forms of codification, simply does
 not 
make the postmodernist/feminist position critiqued here a tenable one. Empirically, women are not 
repeatedly encoded with variables that define her as passive, coy, shy or confined to the domestic 
sphere, for example. In fact, the contextual anchor of most of the images was so vague that applyi
ng 
the coding criteria with regard to femininity as character consistently proved difficult; I abandoned 
my 
attempt, suggesting that this is largely because the use of realist scenes to anchor the expression hav
e 
disappeared. I was unable to consistently code the images along the contours of the gendered 
dichotomy and I included two images that illustrate how images of men cannot easily be recuperate
d 
into the domain of the mind (Dyer: 1992). In fact, the emphasis on the skin and the use of light indicates 
that the body is encoded as desirable through its physicality. This theoretically implies that men are
 
codified and positioned in the same ways as women. The content analysis has furnished evidence th
at 
there is an emerging trend that indicates an increasing homogenisation of the images of men and 
women, which signals that men's bodies are increasingly the target of the processes of 
commodification and sexualisation. This may open up new patterns of desire, both active and passiv
e 
for men and women.
In contradistinction, semiotics is the preferred method of analysis of postmodern Cultural 
Studies precisely because it can trace the interaction of the signifier/signified in the production of 
meaning. Yet, when language and symbols are made to serve an ideological position, all signs com
e to 
mean the same thing, in this case, 'the feminine as lack'. This is encapsulated, I think, in their exten
sive 
deployment of the neologism '(re)presentation'. This theoretical closure makes the necessity to 
uncover, and account for, new forms of representation redundant. The subtlety of the semiotic meth
od, 
attentive to how meaning is constructed, is gone. Instead, we are left with only a few images analys
ed, 
whose selection is made without any systematic rigour. This is, I argue, one of the reasons why the 
manifold shifts in representation have gone by 'un-decoded'. The shifts discussed above create a 
cultural space to consume the images of men differently, since the image is no longer located withi
n 
situations that offset or negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of the male within the image. The 
postmodernist/feminist 122 emphasis upon the spoken means that they rule out the need to consider t
he 
speaker and thus the potential variation he or she introduces. There is no scope for irony (Rorty: 1989) 
or for users to mobilise the inherent instability of language and potentially produce new signs. The 
models assessed here are fundamentally ahistorical, both in terms of the construction of the subject and 
in terms of the production of the sign.
122 1 refer here to the cultural analyses critiqued and their broader location within the strong 
programme.
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Moreover, my argument proposes that it is not possible to recuperate the phallocratic order, 
namely via feminisation, because all the images clearly establish or mark the body as male. Moreover, 
where codes were shown to have a high frequency of use, for example the voyeuristic gaze, which is 
particularly important here, the codes were equally distributed across the male and female models. It is 
worth noting that the core feature of the voyeuristic coding was that the gaze was not reciprocated. This 
result cannot be put down to interpretative prejudice on my part because the position of the head 
determines whether or not a gaze can be returned. This is imposed by the materiality of the body; it is 
not the outcome of discourse constituting the materialisation of the body (Butler: 1990). My critique, 
combined with this evidence, means that it cannot merely be dismissed as a difference in theoretical 
orientation. 1 suggest that this empirical data fundamentally weakens the claims made by the 
postmodernism/feminism criticised here. However, I do not wish to imply I that I consider the image to 
be free of ideological construction, rather, that the ideological target has shifted to the body itself, to an 
intensified production of the dimorphic body.
BODIES, IMAGES AND IDEOLOGY
To reiterate, one of the central conclusions drawn from the data is that the ideological content 
of the image appears to target less 'what kind of woman is she' than that bodies are strictly and 
absolutely dimorphic. So how should we make sense of this? Garfmkel's (1967) analysis of the 
relationship between the normative distributions of sex into the dimorphic body and the social practice 
by which this is accomplished, alongside Goffrnan's model of the image, seem to me to be pertinent. 1 
begin with Goffman (1979).
As Goffman argues, we are prepared to suspend our knowledge that the image is a construct in 
order to engage with it. The consequence of the suspension of disbelief is that, as a society, we accept 
the patterns of the body beautiful as natural and eternal at that point in time, despite it shifting 
according to the whims of fashion. Goffman has shown that in order for an image to work, it has to 
hyper-ritualise the scene so that it brings into focus the taken for granted background upon which it 
depends. Goffman suggests that the essence that makes the image function is its artifice. This carries 
significant implications in the light of the evidence furnished by my content analysis because the object 
of codification is not the naturalisation of the social setting, but the naturalisation of the body. This 
opens up a place to identify the ideological function, namely the production of the normative body, 
which acts as a yardstick within the social background. The paradox is that when we accept the 
naturalness of sex within the visual image, that acceptance is an outcome of hyper-ritualising, that is, 
making visible the cultural rules we use to assign sex. Moreover, it allows us to negate the practice 
involved in the production of the 'natural sexed body', namely the hours spent in the gym by the model 
to produce the right contours to reflect the lighting and shadows best (illustrated in plate 2). In turn, 
these contours then are treated as a natural, and thus naturalised, aspect of the body, that is 'men are 
muscular'. Another example can be found regarding the technique of airbrushing, which removes all 
the small 'imperfections' of the body - a pimple here and flesh 'out' of contour there. Most people
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'know' that this takes place, yet it does not affect how the image is read. I suggest that this is where the 
normative body makes its entry because the standard is largely unattainable yet operates as the 
yardstick by which society judges the bodies of its members. Thus, within these images, we can trace 
the ideological formation of the body, which is then naturalised as the essence of man or woman. In my 
view, muscle and facial hair are particularly important features of bodies which are used to secure the 
body as self-evidently and unambiguously male or female. For example, in plate 1,1 suggested that the 
evidence of facial hair was crucial in ensuring the correct assignment, but does not negate the potential 
for homoeroticsm. 1 suggest that thinking about images within this framework allows for a more subtle 
understanding of how they are encoded and naturalised, than drawing upon a structurally determinist 
model.
Garfmkel, while not occupying an identical theoretical domain as Goffman, nevertheless 
begins to explore how a cultural background organises ambiguity to anchor or stabilise our notions of 
'sex'. In a sense, Goffrnan uses the notion of hyper-ritualisation and Garfinkel uses aberrant cases to 
bring the background into view. I bring the two together to link images as a source, but not 
determinant, of the practices to naturalise sex. By anchoring cultural patterns to sex, society conflates 
the sociological distinction into one: they are one and the same thing, a 'symptom' of being a man or a 
woman. Garfinkel addresses the normative order by arguing that what members within this society 
deem 'the normal', and thus the morally sanctioned, is to be either female or male and that membership 
to one or other is permanent. His exploration of how such a world is constructed looks not to the 
material reality of sex, but to social accomplishments by which the moral normative position is placed 
at the centre of all interaction. One of his points, adopted by Kessler (2000), is that we largely assume 
that the performance corresponds to the physical level of reality: we operate believing that we 'know'. 
However, what the knowledge is of is the enculturation and embodiment of the meanings of sex and 
gender. Thus, for Garfinkel, the distinction of sex and gender makes no impact within everyday 
practice because they are treated as one and the same thing. Therefore, Garfmkel is not suggesting that, 
for a significant proportion of the time, a person having one set of genitals will not correspond to the 
public performance demanded of those with a specific genital sex. He does not doubt that in most cases 
the physical classification of genitals is real. He does not sit alongside radical constructionists who 
argue that the margins, most notably the intersex (Kessler:2000), make a mockery of the bimodal 
distribution, whose theories force one into the strange position of having to insist upon the extra 
discursive qualities of bodies.
Garfinkel is examining the exceptional not to cast doubt on the fact that there are two types of 
bodies with two differing roles in reproduction, but because the exceptional reveals the background that 
'the normal' does not recognise. The naturalisation is complete because the genitals match their 
performance. Garfinkel does, however, make the case that the exceptional, those who fall out of the 
normative order, reveal something of the social, discursive regime that makes sense of what these body 
differences mean and how they are embodied; that is, having this set of genitals 'of course' means that 
you sit with your legs closed, crossed, or tucked under the chair. From the example, we already have a 
woman in mind. When a person's genitals match the gendered performance, the social practices that 
sustain that relationship become obscured. Thus, what Garfinkel likes about aberrant cases is the extent
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to which they have a "remarkable awareness and un-commonsense knowledge of the organisation and 
operation of social structures that were for those that are able to take their sexual status for 
granted...seen but not noticed backgrounds" (Garfinkel: 1967:118). Encapsulated within this statement 
are, I think, all sorts of social practices that are important to sustaining bodily dimorphism, while 
negating corporeal commonality, and merging these with the assumptions and practices of social 
dimorphism so that it is treated as a universal, ahistorical 'fact'. I think that the fusing of the biological 
with the social, thus rendering invisible important parts of our social conduct that is undertaken by both 
men and women, and diverting attention away from the physical properties men and women share, is 
what the ideological function of naturalisation is all about. The biological difference, which forms part 
of the body, is merged with social differences, which are understood to be so different as to be deemed 
opposite. Kessler and McKenna (1978) also draw attention to the social requirement that gender be 
made culturally visible through core codes like hair, muscle, deportment and such like. It is here that 
the significance of the visual domain makes its entry, as social practices draw upon the representations 
as a source for the codes of hair, muscle, facial hair, eyebrow shape and so on. Kessler and McKenna 
target the commonsense attitude, namely that one is a woman by virtue of a set of genitalia. They ask 
then, why should there be such an intense focus upon magnifying that 'fact', for example the 'Wonder 
Bra'. Their answer is that genitals are simply insufficient to secure the assignment of'woman' to the 
body that has female genitalia (see also Connell:1987).
Throughout this thesis, there have been on-going references to the sex/gender distinction and 
its tendency to operate dualistically, so that the body is deemed fully independent of society. One of the 
issues addressed was the propensity for the social/gender to become more and more peripheral in the 
explanation for the lived patterns of being a man or a woman. The social element is lost because 
current practices are 'lived' as pre-reflexive embodied features. Consequently, explanations that state 
that the body has fixed innate features gather favour because they reflect seemingly the fact they are 
'felt' in the body. This, for me, is a central reason why sex and gender as a distinction needs to be re- 
thought as the analytical axis because it fails sufficiently to tackle the ideological tendency to relocate 
'embodiment' back into the biological (Delphy: 1996) One of the possible reasons is because one 
'lives' the two elements, interacting and combining them into a seamless sense of self as a woman or 
man. For example, our emotions 'feel' in the body and thus 'feel' as if they belong to sex. The outcome 
is that aggression is naturalised and becomes an innate quality of a man's body. Equally, the translation 
of an emotion into the disposition of a specific bodily sex reflects the ideological function that operates 
when producing absolute dimorphism. For example, within these structured contexts, an aggressive 
woman transgresses the moral character and its social sanction because, like her body, moral character 
is deemed to be absolutely dimorphic. As Connell (1987) argues it is the social management of gender 
that produces categoricalism so that an emotional propensity rapidly moves from particular men, to all 
men, united by their bodies; it has become a natural and permanent feature of 'being a man' and thus 
stands outside of society. Categoricalism organises the practices so that we come to see genital 
difference in terms of absolute gender oppositions. Hence, practices move back and forth between the 
two dualistic terms and manage the ways sex and gender is lived.
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What is required then is a model that theorises the relationship between body and society
 by 
'bringing the body into society' (Franks: 1991). I offer here a preliminary sketch about how we might 
move more effectively between the elements of the body and those of the normative orde
r. I draw upon 
the theoretical space between being in a body, knowing that one is unequivocally male, a
nd the sense 
of feeling masculine or feminine. I am persuaded by Connell and Garfinkel alike that onl
y a theory of 
practice can meet this criterion because it is social practice that produces the organisation
 of the body 
and the embodied identity that emerged from the body. Practice intervenes so that each m
ember of a 
social order, no matter how varied these are, can utter the following statement: 'I have the
se kinds of 
feelings because I have this set of genitals'. This assumption is not disrupted by the varia
tion in the 
ways of 'being' a man or a woman, located within various social orders. I believe that on
ly a notion of 
social practice can manage this.
THE UNPUNISHED BODY
One of the issues that leads me to hesitate in accepting the distinction between sex and ge
nder 
is that the category of sex is thoroughly filled with social content, as well as the bodily fa
ct of genital 
difference. So much about our gendered practices are based upon the social classification
 which 
reflects the ways we organise the signs of sex. We can see this when pubescent boys and 
girls are 
trying different ways of being a man or a woman, which runs conterminously with the de
cision of what 
sort of a man or woman 'feels' right, if it 'feels' right at all as in the case of transsexuals
 for example. 
What is important is that this practice, the learning to incorporate or inculcate the variou
s ways of being 
a woman, is that it is then naturalised and treated as a naturally occurring disposition of th
e body. The 
'fact' of this process is largely forgotten once naturalisation is complete. Alternatively, w
e naturalise 
the assumption that women don't have facial hair- a fact that is 'corroborated' in everyd
ay life. We 
naturalise the practice and ignore the fact that it is an outcome of an intervention on the b
ody, namely 
plucking. We allow our transformative practices, those that monitor and manage the body
, to slip into 
the taken-for-granted background. Curiously, this inverts the causal direction: women do
n't have facial 
because we pluck becomes 'I pluck my facial hair because women don't have facial hair'
. This 
example can be extended to gestures, deportment, posture and so on. Garfinkel's model s
hows how 
much of being a natural woman resides in the social background.
Examples such a this tell us that the body is unfinished Therefore the difference in genita
lia is 
a factor in the negotiations of gender rather than the base, however determining, of gende
r. For me, 
emphasising the unfinished nature of the body means that we must attempt to theorise be
yond the 
ranking that implicitly organises our commonsensical understandings of gender. Our soc
ial background 
fuses the scientific knowledge of chromosomal sex so that the assignment of genitalia is 
said to define 
something 'primary' of the body. From this follows our sense that the body will go on to
 produce the 
corresponding secondary characteristics. This forms such a significant element of social 
background 
that we cannot 'understand' practices that fly in the face of this 'truth'. We cannot, for ex
ample, accept 
the practice of 'berdache' (Herdt: 1993). To us, this is really about a man pretending to live as a woman 
because we cannot really understand a social background that does not define men and w
omen through 
the possession of a particular set of genitals. Transsexualism is a practice that stems fro
m our cultural
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background where sex and gender must be aligned if one is to be treated as a woman, as opposed to a 
man pretending to live as a woman.
I would like to offer a model of sex and gender that seeks to trace the interactions between 
having a set of genitals, which throws that body into the structured paths of gender, and the 
negotiations that are then subsequently undertaken. These negotiating practices do something to 
manage the fact that commonsensically we treat sex and gender as one and the same thing. The 
practices we undertake slip into the taken for granted parts of our social world, and thus, in 'normal' 
cases, they go largely unnoticed. Those who fall out of the normative order will be more conscious of 
the practices that intervene between sex and gender, exposing the ontological relationship that is born 
from being in a body. A young man's first nocturnal emissions, a sign of the emergence into male 
adulthood and all shifting physical and ontological issues this implies, may be precisely the point that 
triggers a profound sense of alienation, and a sense of self that is far stronger than any potential 
biological dispositions of sex. Thus, it is possible to link the current social practices, the meaning these 
confer onto the body and individual's sense of dislocation within them. In my view, this draws out 
nicely the notion of the body as unfinished (Shilling: 1993). Having a 'sex' that is material and extra- 
discursive does not make the body free from these discourses that make sense of it, or the individual 
negotiation that is undertaken within these discourses. In one respect, Giddens (1991) is right. In 'high 
modernity', the number of ontological questions that face an individual expand and are rendered more 
complex by the loss of tradition. Moreover, the massive expansion of technological control of the body 
offers new sources of embodied self. I think this stands even if Giddens' analysis is not sufficiently 
embodied (Shilling:1993; Lash and Urry:1994).
IN SUMMATION
By linking naturalisation to the production and content of the image, it is possible to keep an 
eye on the normative content of an image, without making the act of doing and being a woman a 
product of the internalisation of the normative content contained in an image. I propose that images act 
as frames of reference. This emphasises that images offer the normative as a visual standard, which go 
on to 'merge' into the background so that they can become a naturalised part of the accomplishment of 
gendered practices. However, this relationship is not a deterministic one, where the macro 
unambiguously determines the micro-practices. Agency and negotiation intervene between the 
normative discursive content and its utilisation in practice. Moreover, the space between the normative 
content and the process of incorporating all or some of its elements helps to explore how and what 
performances one takes up as opposed to another. Yet, neither is the relationship between the two 
component parts voluntary. Essentially, our practices draw upon the visual images a society produces 
and thus lodge within those practices, in some shape or form, the structures, discursive or economic, 
that underpin those actions (Bourdieu:1990; Goffrnan: 1979). Structures thus provide stable contexts 
from which the background of the lifeworld flows (See Taylor in Calhoun et al. 1993). Images, 
conventions, bodily gestures act as resources, rather than determinants, to be incorporated in embodied 
performances. This operates both pre-reflexively and in a consciously motivated way. Most
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importantly, the corporeality of the body is central to the production of self; not overridden by the 
Symbolic. A dynamic exchange is introduced between the discourses to which bodies are subject and 
our ability to do things with discourse and change what that discourse means. Discourses are not fixed 
because they operate within the actions we undertake. Thus they do sit outside of action but are 
reproduced or potentially challenged by what we do. It is in this sense that 1 think it is possible to locate 
these practices within the schema Shilling (1993) offers. It keeps in focus the discourses to which 
bodies are subject. It integrates the meaning of body upon which people act. It leaves open the potential 
to transform those meanings. And most importantly, it tackles the body directly.
LAKOFF'S VITAL CONTRIBUTION
I argue that the complexity of the relationship between the body and the feeling of gender 
cannot be appropriately theorised within the classical ideas of how categories work. This is because the 
objectivist and unitary basis of the classical way of thinking about a category fails to accommodate 
most socially based classifications. One of the aims of using practice to fill the crucial area resulting 
from underdetermination of sex by biology is that it brings into view the intervention that takes place 
between the flesh and the social accomplishment of gender. This is why 1 continue to think that one of 
the most persuasive elements of Connell's Gender and Power (1987) is his examination of the 
limitations of categorical logic. Connell suggests that categoricalism (54-6) came from a number of 
sources, one of which is structuralism. He argues that it is both possible and necessary to make 
generalisations, of which categories like 'women' are essential. However, he argues that serious 
problems arise when the generalisation is substituted for a normative standard. He argues that this logic 
is the reason why feminism found itself charged with ethnocentricism. He suggests that feminism 
leaves itself open to this charge because categoricalism prohibits the necessary integration of other 
forms of embodied existence. I have proposed that this equally applies to Nayak's analysis and is 
demonstrated by his theoretical inability to combine gender and ethnicity. Connell argues that the more 
categories that are included, the more internally regular each category must become. It seems to 
promote the following notion: I am like you in this respect, but different from you in another. To be 
with those to whom 1 really belong, we must be the same in all respects' 23 . This is because the model of 
the category is based upon a notion that there should be a single essence or property that unifies all 
members. I suspect that this is one of the reasons why some postmodernists/feminists are sceptical 
about the category 'woman'.
Using Lakoff' 24,1 suggest that it is possible to reclaim the category, that there is something 
called 'woman', without having to work out the singular property that defines all those contained 
within it. Lakoff s work (1987) offers a framework to draw these elements together. He does this by 
theorising coherently what categories are. He offers us an application of Wittgenstein's early 
formulation regarding family resemblances to more empirically vital categories; in this case the
123 Calhoun offers a cogent and stimulating analysis of this logic in his assessment of feminist stand- 
point theory. He suggests that the politics of recognition would serve better than a politics based upon
identity.
124 Lakoff also offers a definition of the basic realism that underpins his analysis, and this equally 
comes to underpin mind. See pp!58.
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category of 'woman'. As stated, one of the elements that differentiates the various feminist 
engagements with postmodernism is what the category of'woman' might mean (Riley:1988; 
Braidotti:1991; Bordo:1993; Butler: 1990; Gatens:1996; Fuss: 1990; New:2003). The debate hinges on 
whether the body can be treated as a point of political unity, or whether 'woman' is purely a product of 
discourse (Butler) or a terroristic meta-concept that negates difference (Riley). What underpins this 
debate is the assumption that to function politically, there needs to be a set of properties that unify all 
women all of the time. Lakoff s model offers us a way out of this by suggesting that no category is 
unitary in this way.
Lakoff argues that family resemblances can operate in many different ways, depending on the 
complexity of the category. He suggests that complex categories such as 'mother', which is only one 
element of 'woman', functions as a cluster. His challenge to classical theory (pp. 74) is that this 
concept cannot be defined as a set of clear, necessary and sufficient conditions into which all cases will 
fit. Instead, categories as complex as 'mother' work as a cluster which places the various kinds of 
mothers in a relationship to the normative 'real' mother. For example, the centre point around which 
different mothers cluster is the birth model: the person who gives birth is the mother. This initiates the 
normative model of the biological root of motherhood. Yet, Lakoff shows that this is already 
insufficient to cope with the number of variations that have become part of our contemporary world. 
Take for example the development of egg and embryo implants; suddenly the biological root is 
problematised. Here are some of the variations he offers:
The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.
The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that
child.
The marital model: the wife of the father is the mother.
The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother. (Lakoff: 1987:74-75)
His point is that linguistically, we manage various different kinds of mothers all the time and we 
manage these variations, drawing them from the background where the cluster resides. Important, for 
me, is the sense that the political can be drawn upon to work through what type of mothers are in the 
centre or periphery of the cluster. I am strongly persuaded by Lakoff s model as it opens up discussion 
and draws in the multi-various ways of being a woman. The ranking comes from the normative, not 
from the contested terrain of experience. Moreover, he clearly posits this within a background, where 
the social and linguistic reside. Therefore, it offers a theoretical space to fuse Garfinkel's emphasis 
upon the social as background with Lakoff s development of a linguistic background. Therefore, the 
pertinent criticisms of some of the fallacious claims by subject centred reason can be tackled head on 
without risking ejecting the embodied entity that acts in and on the social world. Nor does it lose sight 
of the fact that linguistic practices are equally involved in the social interactions of gender, reproduced
through practice.
The crucial link is that Lakoff s model no longer depends upon the unitary definition of 
woman, based upon a fixed number of objective, essential properties (Delphy: 1996). I am persuaded
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that a theorisation of categories, based within the notion of family resemblances, means that we can 
pull various structures together so that inclusion within a category is no longer dependent upon identity 
- being the same as another woman or as Reiley questions 'Am I that Name? (1988). Equally, the 
categories are no longer dependent upon biology, with its resulting determinism. Its strength, I think, 
resides precisely in its ability to provide theoretical frameworks that operate outside of that dualism by 
pulling both into categories defined by their clusters and family resemblances. It is no longer either 
society or biology, but rather that these are components within social and linguistic systems. Thinking 
about being a woman places emphasis upon the fact that it must, by definition, contain variability 
within it; a variability that is sustained and managed through practice. Thus, practice intervenes and 
alters how we can conceptualise our world but also alters the body itself. The most 'natural' of facts, 
namely that women give birth, has become altered, and with it the conceptualisation of the woman's 
body, namely through IVF programmes. The unfinished body is acted upon to create a form of 
embodiment, notably something between fertility and infertility.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Lakoff s model demonstrates how it is possible to integrate an internally differentiated 
category to our understanding of some of our most fundamental categories. He opens up space to pull 
in apparently marginal instances and reveal how they combine to secure the centre, and potentially 
normative, definition. I am interested in exploring how we might extend his model within empirical 
research that specifically targets centre and peripheral cases. My chosen axis is between young and 
older women, as it draws upon issues of beauty and issues of reproduction. It also opens up space to 
examine the heterogeneous nature of discourse. Thus, young women are targeted in terms of producing 
the body beautiful and thus must cope with the inevitable failure (Bordo:1993; Davis: 1995). 
Conversely, older women must construct a sense of body image from a discourse that deems the body 
redundant (Featherstone and Wernick: 1995). Their exclusion from the body beautiful is total and from 
this they too must build up a body image. Additionally, these two groups are linked via their 
relationship to reproduction and their bodies. Younger women are bound by the discourse that the body 
is always aging and thus their reproductive capacity is draining away. Older women belong to this 
continuum but theirs has already 'run out', and with this, so has their purpose, normatively speaking. 
Both groups are, therefore, subject to specific but interrelated discourses from which a sense of one's 
embodied self has to be constructed (Mead: 1934). Both represent a differing element of'woman' 
within that cluster (Lakoff: 1987). Moreover, it is possible to layer an additional normative element of 
the cluster concept of 'woman' by drawing upon the ideological position that reproduction plays in 
rendering some women 'more womanly' than others.
I aim to explore this by asking the respective cohort, from a sampling group gathered through 
snowballing, to keep a diary of daily events that focus upon where their embodiment as young and old 
women were particularly marked. The diaries will be kept up for three months. This aims to bring into 
focus elements from the pre-reflexive background, and to do so, time is needed to build up the 
reflections on a number of interactions. Alongside this, they are to note what images they consume and
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from which sources during this period. The interest here lies in the differing strategies between those 
who are culturally invisible with those targeted by a cultural over production of how' to be a woman, 
with all its changing fads. Again, this draws upon the interplay between the commonsense notion of the 
'facticity' of sex and all the strategies that will 'make a real woman out of you'. My focus is not what 
pleasures they derive during the consumption of the images (Hermes: 1995) but how long the images 
remain with them and how this alters their presentation and sense of self (Tseelon: 1995), particularly as 
the older women's embodiment is deemed to be the antithesis of the 'real' woman (de Beauvoir:1985; 
MacDonald:1983). The aim is to bring into relief where the sense of self is derived when one is largely 
without these sources, at least in comparison with the younger women. Conversely, with regard to the 
young women who are intensively targeted, how does this impact upon their ability to maintain a 
sustained sense of self. This is particularly important because it draws upon the imposition corporeal 
body makes upon one's location within the cluster as the body itself alters biologically. Here we can 
emphasise the corporeal facticity of the body.
The evidence furnished will be thought about in terms of the negotiation all individuals face 
between the T and the 'me' 125 (Mead: 1934), and the particular structured contexts the body imposes. 
The second element is to use these diaries as a resource as part of an interview in which the 
interviewees will reflect upon the entries. 1 deliberately seek to integrate reflexivity into the research 
process (Bourdieu and Wacquant: 1992) because I am interested in the formation of self over time and 
the specific interpretative practices required to generate this. Lastly, I aim to bring together the younger 
and older groups so that the respective discursive positioning to which each group is subject can be 
discussed and brought into stark contrast. This is the reason for wanting to use snowballing sampling, 
as I am then able to gather the perspectives between how the individuals see themselves and the 
performative projections they make, as compared to ideas held by the friendship network. The data 
therefore aims to target the role of discourse, particularly images, and the negotiations and practices 
these groups of women undertake to manage the discourse. Potentially, there is a space for the groups 
to discuss their understanding of their relationship to the normative and the feelings generated by 
inability to 'live up to them'. Most importantly, the 'talk' generated can then be mapped into a cluster 
concept, examining where potential points of unity emerge and when difference defines the discussions
undertaken.
Methodological guidance will come from Plummer's (1995) decisive and cogent work on life 
narratives. The diaries aim to pull together reflexive narratives about the lived reality of the various 
social positions within which their bodies locate them. Thus, it calls upon narratives to produce a series 
of reflections that pull together structure and action through an engagement with the micro-practices 
that people do with the system. Plummer's use of stories produces a narrative as well as a means to 
identify their own vocabulary through which they view the world. Stories produce for the narrator a 
sense of themselves over time, with the shifting patterns of identity that this necessarily entails. 
Moreover, from the textual nature of the data, it is possible to pull out the central tropes that not only 
guide the research as to how, as social subjects, we make sense of the world but also reveal the 
normative order and their relationship to it, that is, how they categorise their world.
125 This sets quite a different theoretical context for the research in comparison to Tseelon (1995).
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Thus, the research pulls together an understanding of the self that is de-centred, but without 
locking the self into the Oedipal complex. Mead's understanding of the interplay between the T and 
the 'me' offers a cogent alternative to the discursive model that defines the subject as a discursive 
outcome. It also offers a more sensitive understanding of the self as existing within a time trajectory, 
which always throws up new things and sees what were once vital parts of self fade. However, this is 
not free from the influence of structure, but locates the dilemmas of aging as located within the 
discourses that awarded it meaning. Thus structure and action can be analysed as a dynamic brought 
together through the practices that people undertake as part of their negotiation to construct a 























































































































































































































































Definitions of Content Analysis Variables
The framework below contains the guidelines to the definitions and evaluative criteria of the 
variables. Most of the categories are bound to the social background that defines them conventionally 
and at their most simple. In such cases no additional explanatory discussion will be given. When 
clarification is required, the evaluative criteria will be provided so that alternative manifestations can 
be ruled out. Where necessary, I have included some of the symbolic associations that the category 
holds. Note: all variables include "other" unless otherwise stated and all those cases unaccounted for, 
or esoteric cases. Note the following:
1. There are a number of automatic exclusions that have been pre-programmed. Where relevant, these 
will be included in the tables, denoted N/R (no reply). All figures will be excluded here.
2. As a result of a number of marked distributions, certain codes have been amalgamated with other 
logically compatible codes so that the figures presented can be subject to statistical analysis. All 
such cases are listed below. The new code is given first, and the merged codes second.
3. There have also been 8 codes that I have discarded simply because they do not add anything to the 
analysis. Again these are listed below.
4. Most of the codes listed below are categories that we rarely treat as anything but self-evident, 
which results in a high degree of uniformity in their application during the coding process.
Ql SEX: Sex of the model(s).
female '
male i ! 2
androgynous 3
other I 4
Codes 1 and 2, "female" and "male" refer to the sex of the models. Code 3, "androgynous", was 
only assigned if, after intense inspection, no significant feature was present through which a secure sex 
assignment could be made. For example, the use of the face alone, when combined with a neutral facial 
expression and blurry focus, conceals the hair follicles to such an extent that a clear conventional 
marker of sex is missing. Therefore, the coding is weighted toward re-establishing the social stasis of 
assumed and categorical sexual dimorphism. A single code would secure sex assignment rather than 
emphasising the other ambiguous codes that brought it under consideration initially. Code 4, 'other', 
was confined to those cases where the photographic style meant that little could be discerned. This 
could be because it was too out of focus, for example.
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Q2 NUMBERS: Refers to the number and sex of bodies contained within the photographic frame.
single I i i
single sex couples \ 2
single sex female 3
mixed couples ! i 4
crowd i i 5
other ! i 6
Derived Q29 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3=4; code 4 = 5, code 5 = 6.
The aim is to trace the extent of the emergence of homosexual codifications, both implicit and 
explicit, and the extent to which the heterosexual imperative determines the basic feature of the 
codification. Code 1, 'single', refers to the single model/body. Code 2, 'single sex couples', refers to 
those images that contain not more than two models of the same sex, thus establishing the potential for 
overtly gay or lesbian codings. This is adopted from Lewis and Rolley (1997) who argue that single sex 
coupling is a direct means to establish lesbian codification and pleasure. They refer to the coupling as a 
means through which identification can be positioned. Code 3, 'mixed couples', refers to the 
heterosexual couple. Any image that contains one male with two females is also coded as a 
heterosexual couple because, I suggest, it references the 'hyper-masculinity' model; for example, a 
'James Bond' figure who can "satisfy any or all women". Code 4, 'crowds', refers to those cases that 
have three or more bodies of any combination of sexes in the frame.
Q3 BLACK/WHITE BODY: To identify if the total absence of black bodies within advertisements has 
decreased.
white ' ' '
Black/Black Asian ' ! 2
other • 3
Code 1, 'white', is anything not defined as black. Code 2, 'Black/Black Asian', refers to all 
those that would not be defined as white in a society that normalises 'white' and white experience. The 
combination of colour and 'Black features' was used to assign ethnicity. This category examines the 
assignment of 'otherness' that Blacks undergo and how this visually interacts with sexualisation. 
Again, this involves seeking to unpack 'self-evidents' that are fundamentally socially constructed. 
Code 3, 'other', is for those cases where the assignment cannot be made.
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Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.
clothes 
perfume
The items which were classified as clothes included trousers, shirts etc. as well as underwear, 
tights, swimwear and shoes. The classification did not include items such as watches and sunglasses. 
The classification for perfume referred to scents only. It did not include those advertisements 
promoting cosmetics sold under the same label.
Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and 
subjugation.
model i 1
model and object ! i 2
model and obj/s i ! 3
object and model I : 4
object/s and model 5
other 6 
Derived Q28 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = 6
The relationship between the model and the commodity is represented in the order of the 
words in the code: the first value is dominant over the second. It seeks to trace the collective production 
of control with regard to the props or a central commodity. Therefore, if the man were driving the car 
we would conventionally associate that object/prop as being under his command; conversely, if the 
female is draped over the car this is classified as subordinate to the prop. Code 1, ' model ', refers to 
those cases where the model was either photographed in a neutral setting where there was nothing 
additional in the image beyond the model him/herself, or was photographed in a situation, for example 
in the street, where there was no specific relationship in the narrative between the context and the 
model, by which I mean the model/subject was merely 'passing through'. Code 2, "model and obj/s\ 
refers to those cases where the model is in control of the objects, props or commodity. Code 3, 'object/s 
and model\ refers to the opposite cases where the model is being subjugated or contorted by the 
objects and/or commodities. Note that the power relationship is implied by the word order of Codes 2 
and 3. Code 4, "other", is for those images that cannot be clearly coded in any of the above.
Three basic principles were applied to secure regular coding. First, if the model was deploying 
or manipulating the commodity or props, and therefore it is implied that the model knows about these 
objects, then this would be coded as controlling the objects. Conversely, if the model was lying on top 
of or underneath, the props or commodity, this would then be coded as being subjugated to the prop. 
Additionally, if the model was being shown how to use something, for example in an office, the person
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who is being shown is coded as being subservient to the other model and props because the model is 
not in control or command of the objects. Conversely, the model as tutor is classified as being in 
command. Second, if the model was highly sexualised with regard to the commodity or surrounding 
object, this is also coded as being subjugated to the prop. An example is if the (female) model is 
virtually naked or positioned in a compromising way with regard to the various props or commodities. 
Third, if the body is represented only as a body part to display the commodity, this would also be 
automatically coded as being subjugated to the objects. A classic example of this is for underwear or 
hosiery where only the pelvis or legs are shown. Often this is secured by having the legs extended in 
the air, thereby anchoring the sexualisation further.
Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how models are spatially represented - higher and central being related to 
being in control and dominatory, and lower and periphery being related to subjugation.
Q6A
dominates frame entirely ill 1/3 11 4
3/4 I i 2 1/4 115
1/2 113 less 1/4 (1 6
The variable has been split into parts, each referring to the specific features of space and the 
ways it is affected by the photographic process. Note: it is possible to cross reference the consistency of 
the common sense criteria by cross tabulating it with 'body parts', shot length and so on. Code 1, 
' dominates frame entirely', covers those cases where the body of the model has occupied the full frame 
of the image so that almost no background can be seen. Code 2, '3/4', refers to those cases where the 
frame of the images is also dominated by the body with the exception of some surrounding area; three- 
quarters of the page will be filled with a body. Code 3,' 1/2', refers to those cases where the body 
occupies approximately half of the frame. Thus, there will be roughly equal quarter parts of the page 
remaining unoccupied by the model's body. Code 4, '1/3', refers to those cases where the body 
occupies approximately a third of the frame. If this code is used, then the model's body ought to be 
able to fit into the frame three times. Code 5,' 1/4', refers to those cases where the model's body can be 
fitted into the frame four times. The divisions are used to aid the coding process. Code 6, 'less 1/4', 
therefore refers to those cases where the space depicted in the image is such that the model's body has 
little impact upon the space within the representation and is thus peripheral to that image. Alternatively, 
the model is framed within a crowd.
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Q6C ABANDONED - it does not make any 
signficant contribution that is not better served by 
codes elsewhere.
centre i ! 7 perspective I i 9 
off centre I i g non-perspective I i 10
This second cluster, Q6B, refers specifically to the central focal point of image and 
interaction. The coding procedure for this variable requires that the centre or foci of the image be 
pinpointed, and from this the model's position regarding the centre be judged. The third cluster, Q6C, 
refers to the 'realist' modes of constructing an image. Hence code 1, "perspective", will follow the 
order of perspective within the natural world so that everything moves back to a single point within the 
image. The code of''non-perspective', code 2, refers to those images where the distortions and 
alterations have been added to the image, or if the body 'occupies' the full spread so that the body no 
longer appears located in space. It can be produced through non-realist editing, camera angles or 
doctoring the image later. In each case, it disrupts our presumption that the photograph captures things 
as they 'really are'. The model's feet, for example, do not tally with the rest of the body because the 
camera angle is situated at the model's feet. This has the effect of placing the body along a perspective 
line so that the head appears to be very far away. Alternatively, the image may not respond to the 
established rules of representative visual perspective because the image has been removed from its 
original context and edited onto another background altogether.
Q6D
in front of ' 11 behind 1 17
level with I 12 beside I! 18
above/higher i I 13 opposite i l 19
below/lower i ! 14 periphery 1 i 20
seated/on top of ii 15 other ' 21
The coding of this sub-category employs the following procedure: in the case of two or more 
models, the one currently being processed will dictate the code selected. Thus, if the female model is 
taller than the male model, she would be classified as 'higher' and he would be classified as "lower', 
which is coded separately as a distinct case. To reiterate, the 'above' sub-variables are applied as they 
would be according to the background knowledge. They are entirely dependent upon the conventional 
use to which "behind' or "underneath' is put within everyday activity. Thus higher and lower refer to 
the relative height of the models to each other or to other objects. "On top of refers to those cases 
where the model is lying down, perhaps on a bed.' Underneath''', "behind", "beside' and "opposite' are 
coded as according to common sense. "Periphery' is the additional sub-variable to the spatial measure 
of'less than a 1/4' and thus has marginal occupancy of space relative to other models or objects.
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Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have traditionally been photographed - soft focus 

















This variable is related to the standard photographic techniques and how their application 
varies according to the sex of the model. Code 1, 'close up\ refers to those images where the detail of 
the body can be discerned. These have tended to be areas such the legs, or the use of profile and so on. 
"Close up' is read as intending to emphasise a particular detail, and excludes the rest of the body from 
the frame. This contrasts with code 3, 'long shof, which refers to those images where there is 
considerable detail of the context of the scene, and thus the model appears to be further away from 
viewer. Consequently, one would expect the full body to be represented here. One would also expect a 
significant difference in the gendered use of these codes. This draws directly upon the notion of 
isolating a body part and transforming that part into the fetish. Code 2, 'medium shof, refers to those 
cases that lie in between the two. One expects this to be used in shots that depict scenes inside rooms of 
various kinds, and the torso in particular.
The second cluster, Q7B, refers to the sorts of focus used. Again there has been exploration as 
to the ways in which the focus used has come to denote different sorts of gender associations. Based 
upon the existing debates one would expect the use of 'soft focus' to be more prevalent when 
representing female models than male. Code 4,''sharp focus', refers to the focus that has been 
associated with actual vision, under normal conditions, and is thus widely used within representative 
realist formats. Thus, there are clear distinctions between the background and the model, and the 
perspective would also be naturalistic. Code 5, 'soft focus', refers to those shots where the outline is 
slightly blurred so that the contours of the face are less well defined; hence the detail is removed. The 
general appeal of this sort of focusing is its softening of the appearance of the body, particularly the 
skin. Code 6, 'out offocus\ refers to those images where the image was exactly that, out of focus. This 
appearance can be recreated by squinting so that the clear boundaries between the environment and the 
body are completely blurred. Code 7, 'other\ refers to those cases that fall outside the above sub- 
variables.
Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation.





The categories relate to the various modes through which photography engages in 'realistic 
representation'. Thus, Code 1,'naturalistic mock-up', refers to those images that represent 'real life' 
both from the 'naturalness' of the setting, and the naturalness of the narrative taking place within that 
environment. One can imagine the same such scene in everyday life because it has been exaggerated or 
staged so that presentational features appear mundane and ordinary: i.e. visible and unmistakable. It is 
central to this form of encoding that the viewer/reader looks in on the scene, via the position of the 
photographer, without the narrative being directed to the viewer 126 . The viewer is, by definition, 
excluded or absent from the model's fictional world despite being positioned within the fictional world. 
In general, the model is surrounded with props and prompts that aid the reader's social classification of 
the model or the fiction. The commodity, for example hair spray, is promoted in a scene where, strictly 
speaking, the model's hair is now too shiny and too bouncy. Code 2, 'stylistic', refers to those images 
that are surreal in resonance. It refers to those styles that are self-consciously anti-naturalistic; for 
example, where the model is photographed doing an odd action or movement or an ordinary gesture but 
set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be acting in a sexualised yet 
child-like fashion in an industrial wasteland, or be in a fake beach scene wearing winter clothes and 
pretending to 'feel cold'. These codes often self-consciously expose the staged nature of all images, 
which I argue limits the identification process. Code 2 is therefore 'anti-realistic'.
The code 3, 'neutral', refers to those cases whereby the model is being photographed in the 
studio in front of a plain background, a background that is devoid of any props or markers of any kind. 
It provides no context, surreal or otherwise. The emptiness of the 'scene' means that there is very little 
visually going on apart from the model photographed in the clothes and the body idiom assumed. All 
these features must be present if the image is to be coded as 'neutral'. Therefore, the variable is 
weighted to find the conventional content of images as suggested by the established debates and 
positions regarding photography and advertising.
Q9 GENERAL IDIOM: This variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained 
within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 corresponds with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 
shows half the body.
full body
face only 5
legs cut off ' 2 chest area only ; 6
head cut off 3 legs only ii
cut at waist ' ' 4 other '
7
Code 1, 'full body\ refers to those cases where the whole body can be seen. It includes all 
those images where the top of the head and the feet are visible. The feet and the lower shin can be
126 1 have purpose'l^a^d^rTusing voyeur as I wish to distance this analysis from the 
psychoanalytic model that equates images with identification and des.re.
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edited from the frame, but the knee must be visible. The forehead too must be visible if the image is to 
be included in this variable. Code 2, 'legs cut off, refers to those cases where there is no knee visible 
and it is likely that the majority of the thigh is excluded from the frame. The pelvis must be visible. 
Piloting established that the image tended to either show the knee or remove a majority of the thigh 
from the frame altogether. Code 3, 'cut at waisf refers to those cases where there is no leg visible and 
no pelvis identifiable. The head must be visible. This fragmentation of the body has the impact of 
making the torso and head the primary focus of the individual and reader/viewer. Code 4, 'face only', 
refers to all those cases where only the shoulders and above are shown. Code 5, 'head cut off, refers to 
all those images where the head is cut from the picture frame or has been concealed in some way. If 
this is the case, it must override all other parts of the body showing, except for Code 5 and Code 7. The 
concealment or removal of the head has been given priority over the rest of the body depicted because 
the removal of the head, while parts or all of the body are showing, is an extreme example of total 
subjugation to the image and commodity. Code 6, 'chest area only" refers to those cases where the 
body has been reduced to the area below the shoulders and above the pelvis. This code will be treated 
as equally dominatory as 'head cut off and for some of the same reasons. In particular, it emphasises a 
key area that genderises the body, namely the breast and chest hair. Therefore, the coding has opened 
up a potential for a specific form of fetishisation of the male body. The same fetishisation process is 
applied to code 7, 'legs only', as is the same logic regarding potential distributions. Code 7 refers to 
those cases where the only parts of the body shown are the hips and legs of the model.





twisting away R or L
back facing camera
twisting towards R or L
profile
torso leaning forward
Derived Q30: code 1 = codes 










1-3; code 2 = 4; 
code 8 = code 1
torso leaning back
propped BY arms I 1
propped ON object 1
bowing from the waist 1
bent down
bowing from head I 1
on all fours 1
other i 1
code 3 = code 6; code 4 = codes 5, 7 1 









27 ; code 5 = 8; code 
13-17
Code 1, 'lying on side', refers to those images where the body is lying down on the side of the 
hips. The body would usually be positioned horizontally to the viewer. It is possible that the body may
127 These can be combined because each instance would only be classified as one or the other. In 
addition, they have been combined to facilitate interpretation; the results do not require the specific 
detail of the direction of the turn.
215
be placed in profile, and this would tend to make the focal point of the image the soles of the feet, the 
top of the head or the side of the body. The focus will distort the perspective of the body in the frame. 
This anti-naturalistic style ought to be recorded as 'stylistic' in variable 8, Code 3. Codes 2 and 3, 
'lying on back' and 'front', refer to those cases where the models are either lying on their chests with 
their bottoms facing upwards, or with their backs on the surface with their chests facing upwards. Code 
2 is defined by the visibility of the sternum which will be facing upwards towards the top of the page 
or, in terms of the images reality, 'up to the ceiling'. Conversely, if the sternum is concealed and the 
bottom is visible 'to the skies', one would classify this as Code 2. Code 4 is 'facingforward'. One 
would classify an image thus if none of the back is visible. If there is a little twist in the body, it will be 
classified as facing forward providing that nothing more than the arm socket can be seen on either side 
of the body. If the beginnings of the shoulder blades can be seen, then the case is not to be classified 
here. Likewise, one would expect the feet, if included in the frame, to be facing forward also. It is a 
relatively static posture. Code 6, 'backfacing camera', refers to those cases where the face is out of 
view and, from the spectator's point of view, the back of the head is visible, as are the buttocks and the 
back of the knees. The same rule applies as for facing forward, whereby anything that exceeds the 
visibility of the arm socket is not to be classified as an instance of this variable.
In the case where there is some back or shoulder blade visible, the image is to be classified as 
either Code 5 or Code 7, depending on the positioning of the twist from the perspective of the 
viewer/reader. Therefore it is of paramount importance that the coding of this variable be based upon 
the position of the model from the reader's point of view. Code 5, 'twisting away R or L', refers to 
those images where the body is facing forward, and thus the kneecap is facing forward. The result of 
the twist is to make parts of the back visible. The extent of the twist must appear to be about 90 degrees 
to qualify as an instance of twisting. Note: this degree of twist is only a guideline for marginal cases. In 
most cases one ought to look for the feet position, the amount of movement, the extent to which the 
knees are bent and the extent to which the previously concealed part of the body is becoming visible. 
Code 7, 'twisting towards L or R', refers to those where, from the point of view of the reader, a 
majority of the back is facing them. Correspondingly therefore, if the feet are visible, one would expect 
to see the back of the heel. It was decided that to note the direction of the twist was of no particular 
relevance to the research question. However, the starting position from which the body began is of 
importance since it plays its part in the relationship of the assertiveness of the model to the viewer. For 
example, if the model is facing forwards and physically turning away, this could well be an instance of 
the avoidance of the male gaze. Conversely, turning toward the viewer could be an instance of 
attempting to engage the viewer and thus 'receive' a positive evaluation from the viewer as part of the 
fiction of the frame. Code 8, 'profile', also includes those cases which abide by the common-sense 
features of the profile shot. With regard to boundary cases, one must not exceed the partial visibility of 
the side of the nose. Likewise, one ought not to be able to see a substantial part of the shoulder. Again, 
this code is considered to be a feminised one and thus synonymous with 'woman'.
The next two variables have been selected on the basis of their embodied view of the 
attentiveness of the model to the spectator. There are some occasions where this does not apply, but 
pilot sampling showed that these were infrequent. They have been included because they represent the
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simplest forms through which body position can radically alter the embodied posture. The two sub- 
variables refer mostly to those cases where the model is seated. Code 9, 'torso leaning forward1 , refers 
to those cases where, as the chest moves forward, it will hang over the legs or lap of the seated model. 
Based upon existing debates, one would again expect this to be a highly feminised code. For example, 
leaning forwards toward the spectator causes the body to overlap itself. This makes the body smaller in 
terms of the space that it occupies. This physical occupation of space is also accompanied by its 
'behavioural' aspects whereby the act of leaning towards the spectator is an embodied impression of 
being attentive and engaged with the spectator. This is the opposite to Code 10, "torso leaning back\ 
where the body is extended out into space. To lean back is not only a statement of being at ease in 
space, and therefore having the desire to fill the space, but it also moves the person's face and upper 
body away from the spectator. It is a form of disengagement, or at least gives an impression of 
neutrality. Thus, these two positions are marked by their different physical occupancy of space, as well 
as the different confidence being embodied. Extending the body out into space is a sign of being 
confident within the body. This is drawn from the sheer physical openness of the body and therefore its 
potential vulnerability. There is a marked difference between the open body and the closed one which 
is adopted in times of fear and threat. Therefore, one would expect this body position to reflect the 
gender dichotomy.
Code 11, 'propped BY arms\ refers to the sexualisation of Codes 3 and 10. In the case of 
women, it has the effect of emphasising the bust, and brings with it the sense of seeking to be sexual. 
This is partly why it is a posture that is often assumed on the beach. One would expect this code also to 
be significantly genderised. Code 12, 'propped ON object', refers to those cases where the body is 
supported by or leaning against something. This sort of image clearly gives the encoder the opportunity 
to furnish phallic symbols.
The other series of codes refer to other forms of ritualistic subordination, many of them also 
conveying deference to the superior body (of the masculine). Code 13, 'bowingfrom waist', is self- 
evident and is to be used to class all sorts of bowing except where it is only the head that is 
bent/bowing. The latter has been designated a separate category, Code 15. Code 14, 'bent down', refers 
to the visual forms of status display, as physical low-ness has become bound with moral lowness. 'On 
all fours', Code 16, has been included not only because of its sexual connotations, but also for its 
connotation of the animality of the subject; the latter form may connect it to the Black body. Code 17 is 
'other'.
Ql 1 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working definition of
physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings.
Any code that remains unmarked cannot be reliably ascertained from the photograph either to conform
or contradict.
strong ! 1 body hair id 15
weak 2 body hair unid 16
tal] 3 dyed/sculpted hair 17
small i 4 short hair ! 18
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muscular I! 5 longhair ! 19
slim i 1 6 tough \ i 20
skinnv 1 i 7 emotional II 21
emaciated , . 8 deiicate } 22
au naturale \ \ 9 soft II 23
stylised make-up M 10 macho II 24
normal make-up i I 11 fat ! i 25
painted nails n u sporty ! 26
long nails M 13 physically able i! 27
short nails I 14 other II 28
This variable was only a partial success, primarily because I could not consistently codify 
those elements in italics that reference the tertiary elements of sex. Below is an explanation of the 
conventions I expected to be visually present.
Code 1, 'strong', refers to those common-sense meanings stereotypically attributed to the 
male. Its content includes those elements that have been associated with Parson's 'instrumental role', as 
well as those characteristics applied to the male by Tiger and Fox (1974). This characteristic relates to 
the independence of the autonomous subject. He has the courage to stand alone, to protect the weak and 
infirm, displaying those characteristics that combine the essence of man's strong body with his strength 
of character. Conversely therefore, 'weak', Code 2, refers to the opposite, namely all that is feminine 
and 'expressive'. Thus the feminine is emotional, usually to excess, unstable, dependent, open to 
persuasion and a poor judge of character. Note also that both codes refer to the physical state of the 
body. Likewise, this links the essence of the gendered subject to its location in an essential body. Codes 
3 and 4, 'tall' and 'small', refer to an additional stereotypical association of men and women's bodies 
in terms of each other. As Goffman argues, selecting a female model who is smaller than the male 
carries the connotations of status difference metaphorically encoded through size. Code 5, 'muscular', 
is the stereotypical state of the masculine body. It refers to the physical embodiment of the power that 
masculinity promises. One ought to be able to see the shifting contours in the skin defined by the 
muscle. The body is toned, free of loose skin and with minimal exposure of boniness. Therefore, this 
not only anchors masculinity, but also potentially racialises the body (see chapter 3 'Content Analysis: 
A Resassessment, variable 4). This also brings into view the extent to which Bordo's model of the 
disciplined body can be said to be categorically divided along gender lines. 'Slim', Code 6, delineates 
the body that is free from fleshiness, fat or other untoned or undisciplined bodily-ness. The skeletal 
frame is apparent and, unlike the muscular body, cannot rely on the flesh as a protector. The collar 
bone is prominent, as is the absence of flesh at the top of the jaw and below the ear. The stomach is 
likely to be relatively flat, and so on. Code 7, 'skinny', is for the body where the elbow sticks out and 
the hip bone also has the appearance of protruding so that the stomach appears to hollow inwards. The 
ribs will be visible through the skin. Often the lighting forms shadows on the angles produced by the 
bone. Code 8, 'emaciated1 , refers to those bodies where the arm is considerably thinner along and 
around the bone than it is at the elbow. The shoulder blade is highly visible and sticks out. The absence
218
of flesh is such that the model appears seriously malnourished, so much so that the ridges of the breast 
bone are visible through the skin. The upper thigh is also extremely thin, so that the pubic bone is 
always visible even when the legs are together. It is images like these that have courted so much 
attention regarding the 'harm' the image can do to young girls' body image.
Code 9, 'au naturals', refers to those models who have the appearance of not being made up 
at all: the beauty lies in their purity. The naturalistic mock-up achieves the look of nature; it is known 
that this must be achieved. The code references the ideological patterning of the mock-up as well as the 
deeper ideological patterning of the feminine as nature's beauty espoused by the Pre-Raphaelite period, 
for example. Conversely, "stylised make-up" refers to those cases where the make-up is drawing 
attention to itself by its strangeness, its apparent stance against natural beauty and the wholesome 
woman. This style of make-up is akin to punk styling and is not necessarily aimed at making the 
woman look beautiful. It is much more about the creation of an eclectic and esoteric form of imaging, 
which in part contributes to the self-referential styling of the image. Code 11, "normal make-up', is for 
all those cases where this styling could conceivably be worn within the life-world. It is the sort of style 
that one would associate with the women's activity of producing prettiness as an ongoing process. It is 
the fashioning that belongs to the naturalistic mock-up. Codes 12, 13 and 14, 'painted nails', 'long 
nails' and 'short nails', are self-explanatory. Just as with the above, the use of nails is a means through 
which the gendered body is produced as an ongoing activity. Thus, just as shaving, plucking, make-up 
etc. is performed every day, so the preparation of the nails is another means through which the 
obviousness of sex is produced on a day-to-day basis.
'Body hair id', Code 15, refers to those cases where one can clearly see the presence of body 
hair, be it on the legs, chest, face or armpit etc. This ought to be highly gendered. Body hair is 
something that is ideologically bound to the masculine just as testosterone is bound to the masculine, 
and yet both are present in all bodies. Conversely therefore, one would expect there to be a marked 
gender difference here in 'body hair iinicf. This is to be used if all the flesh exposed is free from the 
appearance of body hair.
'Dyed/sculpted hair' is an additional code (number 17) which seeks to make the presentation 
of the body anti-naturalistic. One is not viewing this image in terms of it being applicable in everyday 
life. It is best to consider such hair styles along the lines of a punk-like presentation. 'Short hair', Code 
18, must be short on the neck to be classified as such. Therefore 'long hair', Code 19, one would 
associate with the feminine and must conceal the neck in some way. Combined, these codes trace the 
prevalence of conventional presentations of gender.
'Tough', 'emotional', 'delicate', 'soft' (Codes 20-27) have been included as these were 
additional codes used in the existing content analysis on gender. They have been taken from REFS> 
and are to be understood as the more detailed versions of the masculine and feminine stereotypes 
defined by the likes of Tiger and Fox. These are also applicable according to their stereotypes and are 
thus not to be used in any problematical sense as to what these words mean to us. 'Physically able' was 
introduced as a result of observations made during piloting. During piloting, I became increasingly 
aware that while the models were often slim, it was not the case that most of the models were unable to 
move through public space, to mobilise their bodies and space and be directed toward their utilitarian
219
aims. While it was the case that the models were rarely lifting something, it did not follow from my 
observations that feebleness was a permanent feature of their embodiment. Code 28 refers to those 
cases that fell outside this bodily agenda.
Q12 CONTAINED BODY: 128 Containment of the body is aimed at illiciting the degree of self- 
determination; whether the model is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is 
autnomous.
contained by self
contained by man [
contained by woman I













N/A = Q 9 = 5 removes 63 counts
This variable aims to explore the relationship between the body and its inhabitation of space, and is 
concerned specifically with the ways that a contained or confined body relates to the status ascribed to 
that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. Of particular concern is 
the gendered dichotomy that places the occupancy of space as masculine and the withdrawal from 
space as feminine. The latter, for example, has been used to denote modesty and combines with the 
child-like status ascribed to the feminine. Moreover, this has a direct connection to the corresponding 
public/private dichotomy. This variable seeks only to classify who or what is doing the containment; 
the specific postures that embody containment are described in Q13. "Contained by self, Code 1, 
refers to those models whose bodies are withdrawn from social space by holding or containing their 
own body through various body postures. For example, making oneself small by holding all the limbs 
close to the chest. Alternatively, the model's legs could be pulled up in some way with her own arms 
hugging her body. Often this body position is accompanied by a complicit gaze, a 'god's eye that 
monitors her modesty'. This is regarded as an example of minimal self-determination. The timidity 
within social space and, by implication, social activity, means that this is an example of active 
passivity 129 . There are no external coercive factors at play which can be drawn upon as an explanation 
for the withdrawal. Rather it is established as part of the model's 'feminine habitus'.
Code 2, "contained by man\ refers to those cases where the demarcation of space and thus, 
following Goffman (1979: 54-56), ownership of space, is coded through the relative positioning of the 
man's and woman's body. Goffman argues that the ownership and control of space is established
128 Note that question 11 has not been included here as it was abandoned during coding. This has been 
discussed in detail in the above methodology section.
129 The notion of active passivity alludes to the fact that all kinds of femininities are practices. 
Therefore they must be done. They are not a state of being, but something that must be 'performed'. 
They are an aspect of the social constructed habitus. This will be discussed in more detail when the 
alternative to post-structuralism is discussed later.
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through the extension of limbs into space. For example, the arm will be placed in front of the woman 
and will therefore act as a barrier to her movement, as well as being a symbolic appearance of 
'protecting' her. Additionally, this code establishes the man's right over the woman. The bodily barrier 
limits where she can go and what she can do. Thus, the key coded features that need to be identified 
here are whether the masculine body is producing and constructing the masculinity of the space. Other 
examples of this include the woman being held by the man from behind. This can be compounded by 
having the woman seated while the claim is made.
Code 3, "containedby woman\ refers to those very same features and seeks to trace whether 
the control of space through bodily positioning has been transferred onto the feminine body. Thus, 
another female or male would have to be blocked in some way by her embodiment, her relative 
authority, thereby according her control of the space. This would usually be carried within the narrative 
of the advertisement, for example by her teaching him what to do in the office. Effectively, this sub- 
variable seeks to address whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As 
repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this 
association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. Note that both Codes 2 and 3 are secured 
further if the body that is contained is also positioned lower in some way, thereby coding status through 
its relationship with things higher. Codes 2 and 3 can be cross-tabulated against the single sex couple 
thereby producing some indicative data as to whether explicitly heterosexist postures and relative body 
positions have been mobilised or rejected in potentially homoerotic scenes.
Code 4, "contained by object', is a slight shift from the relationship between embodied states 
and other bodies. It refers instead to the relationship that the model has to the commodity or object. 
This is a slight departure from Goffman's particular analysis of how hyper reality is presented. Here, I 
am referring to those images that have reduced the person to a means of sexual display. Thus, the 
model can be placed leaning against phallic symbols, or worse still adopt a posture that codes the body 
as on the verge of being penetrated by the phallic symbol. Other sorts of image that are to be coded 
within this category are those through which the body is fetishised by being cut down to 'legs only', as 
for example in a hosiery advertisement. This has taken the notion of containment and the negation of 
autonomy to its extreme as it is either reduced to mere penetrative flesh, or to an objectified means of 
display. Within these contexts, there is no self with which to view the spectator. Again it would have 
been beneficial to differentiate between those objects that confine and those phallic objects that 
penetrate. Code 5, 'contained by other/object', seeks only to count those cases where the above ritual 
subordination is compounded by the presence of the active masculinity. Potentially, because of the way 
the topography leads the image to establish the boundaries of gender distinction, there could be equal 
distributions of men and women coded in these ways. However, a sceptical position would expect this 
to be an unlikely outcome.
Code 6 is "mutual containment/embrace'. Coding such an image for heterosexual couples 
requires that both the male and female are present in the image, that they are embracing, kissing and 
possibly engaging in minimal foreplay. However, the central element must be that the sexual activity, 
of whatever kind, is mutual and thus reflects active engagement by both. These must be codings where 
the embrace appears to result from mutual initiation. Thus, the bodies must be moving towards each
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other and both bodies must be either going to embrace or already embracing. Therefore, both of the 
woman's arms must be raised towards the man and not by her side. Any image that is to be classified 
under this code must be free of passive body positioning such as described above. The female must not 
be turning away, blushing, looking down, concealing her mouth, or appearing to be moving away from 
the man.
Code 7, 'non-containment', refers to those images where the body may be single or with other 
bodies but is able to move freely and act instantly upon a choice or decision or whim. Thus, it would 
suggest that non-containment relates to the autonomy of the body to move through space at will. The 
body will not be withdrawing from the social space, nor be directed or guided through the social space. 
There must certainly not be any physical or symbolic barriers to its movement or occupation of space. 
Therefore, there are no arms around the body or across the body, for example. Code 8, "-other', refers to 
those cases that do not apply to any of the above or are too ambiguous to be coded consistently and 
confidently.
Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of some of the ways in which the idiom could visually portray 
containment.
legs held in by arms
legs crossed and pulled in
held in and hugging self












other's arm round neck 1 !
other's arm round waist 1 !
held protectively i '
embracing other/obj !









This variable seeks to trace the central means by which containment is coded. It seeks to trace 
the very embodied means through which withdrawal from social space is encoded. The aim is to cross- 
tabulate this with variable 12 in order to see how the different genders mobilise space using which 
particular gestures and postures. Code 1, 'legs held in by arms', refers to the embodied posture where 
the legs are pulled up towards the chest and kept in place by the arms clasped around them. Not only 
does it make the physical space smaller, but the limbs also protect and conceal the chest. This posture 
tends to be adopted when seated on the floor, thereby visually encoding the body as being of low status 
by being low down. Code 2, 'legs crossed and pulled in by arms', refers to a similar posture, but rather 
than the legs being clasped to the chest, they are just pulled up and thus withdrawn from the occupancy 
of social space. The crossed legs are held there by the arms. This posture suggests slightly more control 
within social space as it is not such a closed posture. However, it nevertheless continues to suggest low 
or little status, again by being on the floor, as well as invoking a child-like posture. Another variation
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of this child-like posture is Code 3, where the woman is holding her legs in and hugging herself. Again 
this withdrawal is conventionally disconnected from confidence and public life.
Code 4, 'clinging to other\ can only be used as a classification if there are two or more 
models in the frame. The word clinging has been purposely selected to refer to the fact that the model is 
embracing, or holding on to, the other, without it being reciprocated. Additionally, the word clinging 
has been used to refer to the clutchiness of the grasp, as if to let go would mean imminent danger. This 
continues the theme of childishness that these postures suggest.' Confined by product', Code 5, refers 
to those cases where the model is unable to move through social space because of the barrier that the 
product is imposing. This could be referring to shoes that are so immensely high that mobility is 
seriously impaired. It could be that the model is captured while they are getting undressed, thereby 
objectifying the model. Alternatively, the body may be bound. This category aims to distinguish those 
images where the body is confined from the sub-variable in Q12 which refers to those images where 
the body has been dissected by the frame and thus is merely the legs upon which the tights are 
displayed.
The next cluster of three codes seeks to classify those images where one model is claimed by 
the other as personal property. Thus, it seeks to trace the encodings that take place to trace how 'his 
woman' is visually proffered. Goffrnan has described the ways that these sorts of relative statuses are 
coded through visual barriers or the spacing of the bodies. For example, 'contained demarcating 
ownership', Code 6, is where the man stands, the woman is seated and the man has his hand placed on 
her shoulder. The woman, however, is likely to have her hands cupped in her lap. This makes sure the 
hands do not touch anything and, through its stillness, gives the posture a degree of passivity. Note that 
this mock-up of the professional man and his wife is an over-conventionalised mode through which her 
subordinate status regarding class is conferred. By the same token, it is also the same convention 
through which her status is understood to be conferred by her husband. Thus, this code is to be used if 
there are extreme differences in the relative placing of the models, if there are distinct features to the 
narrative whereby she is visiting his office, for example. Usually, the narrative provides explanations as 
to why she is out of the domestic setting.
In cases where such narrative aids are absent, one must apply on the codes using the body. 
The two commonest forms are 'hand around neck or shoulder' and 'hand around waist', Codes 6 and 7 
respectively. It is important to note that these classifications require the woman to have her hands either 
folded or hanging down by her side. This suggests non-reciprocation and again gives a degree of 
passivity to the embodied position. By positioning the arm around the neck or waist, one is following 
the custom of holding on to one's personal possessions in public so they do not go astray. "Held 
protectively' refers to those images where the demarcation of containment is made in other ways. 
Usually, these are supported by a narrative where the public arena is perceived to be a dangerous place 
for the female, and thus the male must continually touch or stand in front of his companion, or shield 
her, for example. This can be seen in the ways that politicians conduct their wives through public space 
and was a particular favourite of John Major, although he was/is not alone.
The next pair refers to who is doing the embracing and what they are embracing, and refers 
specifically to what Goffrnan describes as the child-like 'snuggling' women do when cuddling men.
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Goffrnan describes it as child-like because it gives the appearance of the female seeking protection, b
ut 
also the comfort and re-assurance a child receives from its parent's body and size. Piloting noted that
 
this was applied to the product so that the product afforded comfort as part of its appeal. Again this 
code has been operationalised to be potentially coded to both male and female models. Thus, Codes 1
0 
and 11, 'embracing other/obf and 'emracED by other/obj\ traces who embraces in an attempt to tra
ce 
those occasions when women are able to embrace and empower the product or other. 'Other* is used 
for those cases that were unanticipated.
Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree 
to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By 'reveal' I mean that the clothing is lifted o
r 
moved or cut to draw attention to and overtly sexualise that part of the body which would 
conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms 
etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.
non-sexualisation 1 underwear M 10
fully dressed 2 see-through clothing ! I 11
reveal shoulder 3 covered towel : 12
reveal stomach/hip bone II 4 naked self-concealment i 13
reveal upper chest : 5 naked except commodity i 14
reveal thigh 6 naked upper chest i I 15
reveal/accentuate breast 7 fully naked i 16
flies up/down i 8 other ; 17
getting dressed i i 9
Includes some preprogammed exclusions: Q9 = 5. This automatically excludes 63 cases.
Q14 = Q4]: code 8=15, code 9 = codes 8, 9,11,12,13,14,16
This variable seeks to explore how the sex of the model affects what parts of the body are 
eroticised as well as whether the sex of the model affects the degree to which the body is fetishised. 
The variables contain an implicit scale of degree beginning with non-sexualisation where there is no 
visible markings to make the body sexy (although the bodies always remain sexed) through to complete 
nakedness or naked self-concealment. Nakedness is interpreted as being an extreme form of 
sexualisation both through the revelation of the flesh and the subjugation to the product. This is a 
complex variable as it hits at the heart of the multiplicity of the body. It is possible to reveal various 
parts of the body simultaneously. Therefore there are very few ways in which the variable could be 
tackled. Note that while there is an analytic scale implicit.in this variable, it is not statistically testabl
e.
'Non-sexualisation' refers to those images that have no visible codings of sexiness. The 
models must be fully clothed with no flesh being revealed. It is likely that there are no visible signs t
hat 
the model seeks to incite the viewer by pouting, licking the lips, staring up through the eyebrows
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especially if the head is slightly tilted. Conversely, one would expect the mouth to be still as well a
s the 
eyes looking forward. 'Fully dressed", Code 2, refers to those bodies where the sexualisation is eith
er 
due to a facial expression like those listed above, or because the flesh of the body is being revealed
 in 
some way. The revealing of the flesh has been located to five key areas of the body. These tally wit
h 
the commonly understood erogenous zones of the Western body. They are: revealing the shoulder, 
revealing the stomach and/or hip bone, revealing the upper chest, revealing the thigh, and revealing
 or 
accentuating the breast. The means through which Codes 2 to 7 are represented in the image are va
ried 
but follow common-sense expectations. Thus, revealing the breast is a more detailed version of 
revealing the chest and is generally achieved through having a shirt loosely buttoned. Alternatively
, the 
chest in general could be revealed by the model getting undressed or dressed. Likewise, the revelati
on 
of the thigh is dependent upon the skirt being blown, or the ways that the model is being seated, 
especially with shorts on, for example. The means by which the flesh is revealed is not the particula
r 
focus; rather this variable seeks to address mainly what is being revealed.
Not until one comes to more extreme means through which the body is sexualised does one 
find excessive visibility of flesh. Code 8, 'flies up/down', and code 9, "getting dressed", refer to the 
specific means by which the genital area can be focused upon, without using explicitly soft porn or
 
page 3-type codes. They draw directly from Moore's paper where she argues that one of the shifts 
taking place in the codification of the male body is catching him dressing, as for example in the now
 
infamous mass-audience Levis 501 advertisement where Nick Cayman undresses explicitly in an 
almost identical way to a strip tease. Additionally, there is the extensive use of highly sexualised bo
dies 
to sell underwear, hence Code 10. These sorts of products have extensively used the naked body 
beautiful. These images often use the mundanity of underwear as a means to sell through explicitly
 
sexualised images. Code 11, 'see-through clothing", traces those items of clothing that explicitly 
objectify the body. This, along with underwear, is the most unproblematic example of the way fashion 
as an industry is exploitative of people's bodies and images for financial gain. Code 12, 'covered 
towel', refers to those images where bathroom scenes are used as a means to stage the body within 
a 
naturalistic setting, but one that also allows for the legitimate exposure of flesh. Cologne 
advertisements in particular use narcissistic grooming scenes as a means to reveal the flesh of the b
ody 
beautiful. Again this has been drawn directly from Moore's article where she argues that "it is now
 
possible to represent the male body as a pleasurable object on condition that this pleasure can be 
contained within a narcissistic/autoerotic discourse." 130 It is from the extensive use of these sorts of
 
code that some core data will be drawn. Is this something that differs explicitly between men and 
women now? And if this is no longer the case, what sorts of empirical problems does this pose Scre
en 
theory and other feminist critiques?
Ol 5 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is 
touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 corresponds to cases where t
he 
hand is active but not touching anyone.
130 Moore S. (1988) 'Here's Looking at You, Kid!' in Gamman, M., Marshment, L. (Ed) The Female 















hand is active/not touching i
no touch/neutral
other





Q15 = Q31: code 2 = 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = code 6; code 5 = codes 7, 8; code 6 = code 9.
Code 1, 'touching own body', is straightforward and refers to all parts of the body. Codes 2 
and 3, 'touching a man's body', refer to those images where a male or female touches any part of the 
male model's body. Conversely, "touching a woman's body' refers to those cases where the male or 
female is touching the woman's body. This allows a number of aspects to be traced. Firstly, it traces the 
extent to which heterosexual couples are visually encoded or determined through the seal of a touch, as 
well as whether this is entirely secured through the feminine. Additionally, it can be identified whether 
single sex couples are shown to be touching, and therefore potentially making the 'relationship' 
between them more explicit. This has a specific gender divide. Firstly, it examines the extent to which 
males alone are allowed to touch and whether this still invokes the homoerotic and therefore must be 
repressed between straight men. Conversely, it also allows us, on those occasions where women are 
touching, to trace the extent to which an element of the homoerotic surfaces and whether it is repressed 
through the presumed asexualness or sexual passivity of heterosexual women.
Code 6, 'touching commodity', is self-explanatory. Code 7, 'hand is active/not touching', 
refers to those cases where the hand is visible within the frame and is active in some way but not 
touching. For example, the fist could be clenched, the hand could be held closed as a result of a 
sporting activity or used to maintain balance. Additionally, the hands are used to stage a stylistic pose 
and thus can be used to form impressions like holding a pretend gun, for example. Code 8, 'no 
touch/neutral', refers to those images where the hand is included in the frame of the images but is at 
rest and not holding anything. Examples where this code would be used are cases where the hands are 
at rest and the arms hang loosely beside the body. 'Other' refers to those cases that do not apply to any 
of the above.
O16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specifiy what is being touched, which again feeds back to notions 
concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded, this means that 
both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means either that one hand or arm is 
concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.





hand on/through hair 
hand on hip(s) 
hand on leg(s) 
hand on torso 
hand on face 
hand on neck 
hand on bum 
hand on breasts 
hand on genitals 
hand behind back
3 hand forcing ribs forward
4 clenched fists
5 hand at rest
6 leaning on
7 holding hands














This variable includes the automatic exclusions Q9 = (5,7) and Q15 = (6,7,8). This totals 328 cases 
unaffected.
Resultant amalgamations: Ql6 = Q38: codes 9= 15, 10= 16, 11 =16, 13= 19, 14 = 8-13,22,23.
This variable seeks to break down into greater detail exactly what parts of the body are 
touched, and to what extent those postures and positions are gender differentiated. This provides a 
means through which the areas available to touch, and by whom, can be traced. It allows one to identify 
which areas of the body are barred to one sex, but available to feel and touch to the other sex. The 
underlying theme being traced here refers to the convention that women are able to touch much more 
than men. On a more extreme level, women can treat their own bodies as objects. These objects can be 
caressed and stroked so that the reassuring warmth and pleasure that is gained from women's bodies is 
also experienced from the woman's own body. It is a pleasure that is gained from women's 
objectification.
Codes 1 and 2, 'one hand1 and "both hands\ refer to whether the hands are doing the same 
thing or different things. The relationship between these two aspects does not relate directly to the 
debate concerning the association of the feminine with the tactile. Rather, it is a means through which 
the visual symmetry can be traced. To have both hands doing the same thing conveys within the image 
a simplicity through symmetry. Conversely, having the hands doing different things makes the image 
busier and tends to make it more active, since there is actually more going on. The relationship between 
the symmetry and business can be grafted onto the notion of the active and the passive. Since the 
dichotomy has to be visually elaborated, it is dependent upon the possibilities and potential of
227
visualisations. Note that because there can potentially be hands touching two different objects or bodies 
or body parts at the same time, there may well be a considerably larger base number for this variable.
All of the categories are self-evident, with no exceptions. The various parts of the body have 
been coded. Code 3, "hand through hair', refers to those images where the hand touches the hair as if 
the hair is a source of pleasure and fulfilment for the model. These images usually depict the model 
with long and extremely glossy hair and, like the 'naturalistic mock up' referred to above, the hair will 
tend to be extremely shiny. The hair is given the connotation of being an object of pleasure and 
fulfilment for the model who touches it. It is almost as if the hair comforts the female as a cuddly toy 
would. The hair is desirable in itself. Psychoanalytically, it is considered that the presence of long hair 
on women rather than men, and the fact that women continually touch their hair, is a means through 
which disavowal is achieved for the male. Thus women with long hair are considered to be more 
attractive, and this is why they draw attention to their hair (see Flugell930; Millum 1975).
Code 4, 'hand on hips', refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body 
posture to convey the notion of confidence. It suggests a certain impatience. However, this 
assertiveness could become sexualised by being combined with a phallic facial gesture. We can 
combine the two to trace exactly how the gesture is anchored. This must be borne in mind, as 
assertiveness will constitute a shift toward becoming a femme fatale. The pattern that is of interest is 
whether it is a very gendered gesture and, if so, how this assertiveness is combined with other gestures 
and whether it is supported or undermined. It refers to those images that are using this conventionalised 
body posture.
Code 5, ''hands on legs', will be used to explore the extent to which legs are gendered through 
touch. Arguably, if the prevailing approaches are accurate descriptions of the masculine and the 
feminine, one would expect the legs to show up substantial gender differences. The legs have been a 
long-standing area of the female body that has been eroticised, and since hegemonic patterns have been 
organised to exclude women from this eroticism, to touch a woman must be part of an emotional 
relationship cast within romantic discourse. Thus part of the purpose of touching a woman's leg is to 
display the access that the man is presumed to have to the woman's body. Additionally, since access to 
the erotic zones of a woman's body is presumed to be open to men, part of the symbolism of touching 
the leg is that it secures the man's ownership of the woman in a similar way to putting his arm around 
her waist, as discussed above (Q13).Therefore it is likely that there is a higher frequency of men 
touching women's legs than vice versa. Conversely, if Code 6, "hands on torso', corresponds to 
expectation then one would expect the torso to be touched by the female model. This does two things in 
particular. Firstly, it confirms the male model's masculinity as sexually appealing, thereby connecting 
this appeal to the muscularity of the chest. Secondly, the comparable size of a man's chest to a 
woman's means that by touching the chest, visually it can appear as if she gleans protection from him. 
The combinations of their relative size visually encodes the promise of the power of male muscularity. 
It also confirms that women require such protection.
Codes 7 and 8, 'hand on face' and 'hand on neck', refer to the extent to which the face is 
made a central feature of the codification by leading the eye to it through the touch. According to the 
existing literature, especially the codes isolated by Goffman, the touching of the face is a distinctly
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feminine gesture. The reason is that it moves to objectify the face by conferring its softness on to the 
softness of the commodity, for example the softness of the smell. If the man does touch the woman's 
face, this has the effect of conferring significant status differences between the sexes, because such a 
touch coming from a man is associated with fatherhood, and therefore relegates the female back to a 
childish status, as so many other codes do.
Code 9, 10 and 11 detail those images where the hand is touching either the bottom, the 
genitals or the breast of the model. This variable traces to what extent these are considered areas 
available to touch equally by both sexes or are gender divided. One would expect this to follow a strict 
pattern of gender difference, especially in the extent to which men would touch these areas 
considerably more often than women as part of their display of active sexuality.
Code 12, 'hand behind back', is self-explanatory. It is being interpreted here as part of the 
ongoing codifications that remove activity from the frame. Code 14, 'clenchedfists', seeks to trace 
whether hyper-masculine poses are still being widely applied, and whether this is being used as a 
means to portray masculinity in a surreal and stylistic setting by women.
Code 15, 'hand at rest', is a neutral hand pose and refers to the sorts of ways the hands are left 
when not in use. One usually either lets them hang down by one's side, or leaves them flopped or 
resting in the lap. Henley (1997; 1981) argues that men touch women much more than women touch 
men. This she based upon observation of intentional touch (Major and Williams 1980:20). If this is the 
case, one would expect to find neutral hand poses to be a predominately feminine gesture, as well as 
one that also defines the Other, namely the Black models. It conveys a certain passivity, since the hands 
are understood to be the major part of the body for skilful manipulation. Code 16, 'leaning on\ refers 
to those images where the body is being propped up by or leaning on the hands and has straight and 
locked arms. This form of posture has quite different meanings according to the gendered body. For 
example, this position is not in any way formal, and is often associated with a nonchalant and therefore 
male attitude. It has not conventionally been associated with femininity. Added to this is the fact that 
such a body posture draws attention to the breast by pushing the breast bone forward. Thus for the 
female body, it is not only 'speaking attitude' but it is also a sexualised position. It is therefore 
somewhat contradictory and may suggest a type of posture that is assertive and consciously sexy. Code 
17, 'holding hands', seeks to trace the frequency with which this heterosexist hand gesture is used. It is 
possible to see the extent to which this may have been adopted by same sex couples as a means to bring 
gay and lesbian relations into popular visual culture. Code 18, 'neutrally touching own body", is a 
variable that seeks to trace the possible presence of the ideologically neutral gesture. One would use 
this code if the touch had the appearance of being a lackadaisical gesture, certainly pre-reflexive and 
possibly random. This sort of gesture is such that it falls outside those semiotic gestures that aid the 
classification of passivity or activity. Examples of this could be a hand that appears to have just fallen 
beside the chair. Code 19, 'holding ori, seeks merely to trace the extent to which men and women 
touch and hold onto things. One would expect, following Goffman, that this has a considerable gender 
difference as it has been a long standing convention to have women cling or hold on to a man's body 
for protection. This variable seeks to identify how much that is still the case. 'Hands covered', Code 
20, refers to those cases where the hand is concealed, for example by being placed in a pocket. Again
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this is an informal gesture and suggests a degree of nonchalance that is not associated with passive 
femininity. 'Aggressive gesture'. Code 21, seeks to trace the extent to which aggressive masculinity is 
present and if any cases of femininity as aggressive are ever represented. It is likely that if there are 
some cases they will be located within the stylistic photographic format. 'Other', Code 22, is included 
for unanticipated cases.






















)9 = (5,7), Q15 = (8). Total number of cases excluded is 207.
This variable builds upon the preceding one, identifying how the object or body is touched. It 
introduces greater descriptive detail regarding the gendered nature of touch. The categories compiled 
develop those initially identified by Goffman. Goffman's codifications of the visual forms of 
ritualisation pay particular attention to the child-like positions and gestures given to women in order to 
place them in a subordinate position relative to men. As alluded to above, the key distinction Goffman 
makes centres around the gentleness or weakness with which women touch things as opposed to men. 
The masculine form of touch could be described better as being more of a grip, firm and confident. 
Conversely, the feminine touch fondles or fiddles, never really directing or controlling that which is 
touched. Goffman almost regards it not as a touch, but rather as a caress, as stroking or petting. He 
argues that it has the effect of reducing all objects to a form of cuddly toy. This is very different to the 
atmosphere associated with the masculine touch, which is firm and confident and able.
Coding these descriptive categories must be accompanied by background and therefore is 
culturally embedded. For example, if one was to code the touch as 'utilising' one would use the 
common-sense meaning. The meaning is unproblematic in the sense that we use the word rather than 
problematise and ask how it comes to be meaningful. Additionally one can use the accompanying 
narrative. This is the most general category and refers to those cases where additional detail is excluded 
from the frame. Alternatively, if one was to code 'expert', Code 2, one would expect the model to be 
using a prop to demonstrate that the model was giving advice, teaching and so forth. There are likely to 
be other markers that establish the status that can act as a guide. Code 3, 'grasping', refers to those 
images where the hand is clutching the object roughly, with a great deal of strength. The touch ought to 
come from the palm of the hand with the fingers apart and tightened. The veins may even be visible. 
'Manipulating', Code 4, refers to those images where the object is being applied to something. This 
ought to take place with the finger tips, but the object touched is functional. Again this kind of touch 
may in part be dependent upon the narrative of the image. If the conventions of touch are still in use, 
one would expect these forms of touch to be masculine and thus applied when featuring a male model.
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The next cluster of codes can be thought of as the 'feminine touch' and the operationalisation 
of the codes has been heavily influenced by Goffman. Code 5, "fiddling 1 , refers to those images where 
the hand holds the object idly. Much of the touch is confined to fingertips, with the fingertips close 
together. It is touching for the sake of touching and without an aim, perhaps through boredom or habit. 
Again, this sort of fidgeting is associated with children, thereby lowering the status of the female 
model. Code 7, 'caressing', refers to those images where the fingers stroke the object that is being 
touched. This can be done with both the front and the back of the hand. The fingers will tend to be 
close together and lie flat on top of the object or body. There ought to be an appearance of lightness of 
touch. '•Embracing', Code 8, refers to those images where the object is cupped in the hands. For 
example, this could include those images where the perfume bottle is embraced within the cupped 
hands. The impact is to make the hands a part of the object or commodity. It reduces the hands to the 
ornamental.
Code 9,'-holding/'neutr-al', refers to those images where the hand is not expressive in any way. 
For example, the hand holds onto a banister but it neither grasps it nor fingers nor fiddles with it. The 
hand uses it, and the hand gesture is almost absent. It is merely one of pragmatism and application. It is 
not being suggested that this is without significance and therefore signification. In cases where the hand 
is holding something neutrally and it can be identified as a woman's hand, this has both a significance 
and a signification. It suggests something about the ideological traces circulating regarding 
'emphasised femininity'. Code 10, 'other', is included for unanticipated cases.





relaxed by side !
folded
arms bent i









resting on leg(s) !
over the head i
hugging the body '













Q18 = Q36: 1 = 1,2=2,3=3,4 = 5,6=7,7 = 8,8= 10, 9 = 11, 10 = 21, 11 = 13, 12=4,9,14
This refers to the use and positioning of the arms within the frame. Part of its significance lies 
in the extent to which the female body is coded through symmetry and stillness compared to the male 
body. It also seeks to examine the extent to which the body is used actively and framed through 
movement. The 'feminine as passive' is visually coded through lack of movement, particularly within 
the public domain. Conversely therefore, it is possible to associate active, moving bodies with 
masculine codes. Physicalness has been conventionally applied to male bodies. Most of the arm 
positions selected are a result of piloting, and have been drawn predominantly from naturalistic body
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postures. The forms of body postures relate in various ways to the negotiating of spac
e, the occupancy 
of space and how, through the positions of the arms, the space can become sexualised
.
Codes 1 and 2 examine whether the arms are used to achieve a symmetry of image or 
whether 
the images tend to be more complex by varying the activity of the arms. This is not sp
ecifically 
concerned with gender difference, but it may prove important regarding the extent of 
the codification 
that women's bodies undergo compared with men's. This is not overtly connected wit
h gender. 
However, part of the existing debates concerns the objectification of the woman's body through 
display, of which a still, symmetrical, almost unlived body forms a part.
Code 3, 'pointing up/outwards', refers to those images where the arms are sticking up
 in the 
air and above the head or out into space, away from the body. This classifies all those 
positions that 
may be framed as a result of movement from dancing or sport. It can either be used as
 a naturalistic 
pose or as a stylisation. By combining this variable with photographic style it is possib
le to identify 
whether the images that seek to 'reflect real life' tend to use less movement of the bod
y, so that those 
images that seek to define their style against this prevailing position adopt movement.
 Code 4, 'relaxed 
by side', refers to the arm position at rest when the body is culturally defined as being
 in its 'natural 
biological state'. It is considered the most neutral position for the arms to adopt. It wo
uld again suggest 
changes to the nature of the dominant ideological patterns if this proved to be a) a frequently used pose 
and b) equally coded upon male and female bodies.'Arms folded"', Code 5, is regarded as a closed 
gesture rather than an open one because it prohibits the possibility of other gesticulatio
ns. It can be 
used in two distinct ways, depending upon the additional information. It can be either 
used as a means 
of being aloof, particularly when standing, or as a barrier or protection, especially if a
ccompanied by 
other codes of a closed body. As with many of the other preceding codes, the issue of
 the gesture's 
specific meaning is not central to the coding process at this point. The differing contex
ts that affect the 
meaning assigned can be ascertained through cross-tabulation of the data.
"Arms bent', Code 6, refers to those images where the arm is bent, producing an angle 
at the 
elbow. This is also considered a neutral body movement and is not considered to be g
endered. Thus, if 
there is a high frequency of this code, again it would seem to suggest that there has be
en a shift in the 
hegemonic formations of patriarchy. "Resting on legs', Code 7, refers to those cases w
here the arms are 
lying or resting on the lap. There is no activity and the hands are relaxed with a slight 
bend in the 
fingers. There ought to be a floppy appearance to both arms and hands. Code 8, 'over
 the heacT, refers 
to those cases where the arms have been held up, with the arms bent so that they close
 over the head. 
This use of the arms has the effect of revealing the armpit and thereby sexualising the
 body. Code 9, 
'hugging the body', refers to those images where the arms are wrapped around the bod
y. Again this 
posture relates to what Goffrnan describes as the child-like poses in which women are
 depicted. 
Additionally, the gesture of hugging the body is one means whereby the objectified body is used in its 
objectified form by the woman herself. Thus, the body is a source of pleasure for her as it would be for 
another. 'Arm in action' refers to those images where the arms are framed in moveme
nt. This code is to 
be applied when the action that has been framed is a 'realistic one'. By this I mean th
at it is not difficult 
to envisage doing the movement in the life-world as part of the activity. Conversely, 
Code 11, 'in mock 
movement', refers to those cases where the movement that has been photographed is a
 pretend action. It
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is a sort of clowning. It can be considered as a mock up of the already hyper reality. 'Leaning' refers to 
those images where the arms are being used to prop up the torso. Potentially, this has a slightly 
different connotation if used by the male or female, in that the act of leaning on the arms can be 
sexualised by drawing more attention to the already accentuated breast. Conversely, assuming that 
there is an absence of other codes that undermine this, the posture could be considered an occasion of 
hegemonic masculinity in that it opens the chest up and therefore leaves it open to attack. The same 
could also be said for the female, thereby making any sexualisation features present part of the 
codification of the femme fatale. Code 13 is 'other'.
Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs. 
Q19A ABANDONED: Does not add anything to the analysis.
one leg '< 1 
both legs i I 2
Q19B
open when seated 3 bent fully at the knee il 13 
closed when seated ! 4 extended outwards : 14 
open when lying down 5 running M 15 
closed when lying down l 6 walking ' 16 
crossed and pulled in 7 pretend movement 17 
crossed and extended
outward M 8 standing open n 18 
astride 9 standing closed ' 19 
intertwined with obj/other 10 kneeling ! 20 
knee slightly bent point
forward :l 11 other ' 21 
knee bent sideways ' ! 12
There are a number of pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (2,4,5,6). This automatically removes 274 
counts.
Q19 = Q35: 5 = 7, 6 = 9, 7 = 11, 8 = 12, 9 = 13, 10 = 14, 11 = 16, 12 = 17, 13 = 21, 14 = 22, 15 
5,6,8,10,15,18,19,20,23,24
Codes 1 and 2, 'one leg' and 'both tegs', again refer to the notion of the symmetry of the body 
as defined above in Q18. Code 3, 'open when seated', refers to those images where the body is seated 
but the legs are apart, therefore the knees must not be touching. The knees ought to be separated so that
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the distance between them is greater than the width of the hips. Conversely, Code 4, 'dosed when 
seated1 , refers to those images where the body is seated and the legs are closed, or close together. If the 
knees are not quite touching, they must be close enough to be the same width as the torso. The 
meanings that surround these postures connect with two elements. Firstly, to sit with the legs apart is to 
extend the limbs into space, occupying it and imposing the body onto it. This has not been a feature of 
femininity as historically understood. Also, the posture takes on a moral dimension for it is said that for 
women to sit with their legs apart invites sexual advances and the condemnation that comes with them. 
To sit with the legs apart is immodest since it entertains the possibility of revealing the thigh or 
genitalia, thereby rendering the woman a tart, femme fatale or slut. Thus, it is necessary to trace the 
extent to which those cases, if any, of a woman sitting with her legs open fell outside the non- 
sexualisation category.
Codes 5 and 6, 'open when lying down' and 'closed when lying down', are self-explanatory 
and use the same pointers for identification as Codes 3 and 4. Goffman noted that the predominance of 
women featured lying down was another visual codification whereby their low status compared with 
men could be confirmed. In addition, it has very close associations with sexual intercourse. Lying down 
has been a regular pose used in porn. Thus, this posture is marked very heavily by the gender of 
embodiment. It is also the case that the passivity of the body suggested by the body position adds to the 
convention that women cannot actively deploy their bodies effectively. Goffman has connected this to 
the child status with which women are coded. It is considered here that if there is a high frequency of 
women lying down and with their legs open, possibly not wearing much clothing, then this is an 
extremely patriarchal image. Code 7, 'legs crossed and pulled in', refers to the sitting position that 
children use in school. Once again, Goffman's notion of the childishness of hegemonic patterns of 
femininity could well come into effect in this posture. The low status of the sitting position is also 
associated with the fact that one would tend to sit in this way if one were sitting on the ground. This 
can be placed in opposition to Code 8, 'crossed and/or extended', where the legs are stretched out. This 
seems to suggest that the person is at ease with their environment and confident. Again, such obvious 
occupation of space is something that has been associated with the embodiment of masculinity. 
'Astride', Code 8, is self-explanatory and is also suggestive of someone confident and at ease with their 
environment. Consequently, one would expect that the male body be marked by these codes. Plus it 
goes against the convention of associating femininity with physical stillness.
'Knee slightly bent forward" is identified in the following way: one of the legs must be 
straight, with no bend at the knee. The other leg will have a slight bend at the knee which has the effect 
of lowering the hip on that side of the body. This emphasises both the hips and the bottom area. It also 
draws attention to the legs. It is a classic pose and has often been used when a woman wants to entice 
and incite sexual desire. The sexiness of the pose has been added to by being used when standing in 
doorways. This acts as a kind of frame for the pose. This pose has been used almost exclusively on 
women, and correspondingly one would expect there to be marked difference in its use here. 'Knee 
bent sideways'. Code 10, is a variation on the above code. However, having turned the knee outwards, 
more attention is given to the leg and more of the thigh is potentially revealed.
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'Fully bent at the knee\ Code 11, is basically the same as squatting. The body ought to be 
lower than it would be if it was standing, with the knees nearer the face. 'Running', Code 12, is self- 
explanatory, as is 'walking', Code 11. One would expect these to be used to photograph men more than 
women because of the action that is necessarily implied. 'Pretend movement', Code 13, is the same as 
the 'pretend arm movement' definition above. An example could be a pretend karate kick. 'Standing 
open' and 'standing closed refer to the most basic body stance. Those cases coded as standing closed 
must have the knees either touching or very close together. Conversely, legs that are coded as being 
apart must have quite a large space between the knees. The model must be standing still. These codes 
are taken to be relatively neutral postures that are not widely used in the visualisations of gender 
difference. It is therefore expected that this will not be a particularly frequent posture, but any cases 
that are identified will tend to apply to the male body, since women are positioned lower than men, by 
being seated for example. 'Kneeling' is self-explanatory. It is a highly ritualised means to convey 
deference. However, its associations with courtly behaviour or religious genuflection suggest that this 
will be a masculine posture, but performed mostly to other men. The variable also includes 'other'.
HEAD: Head position
head back




head in profile ! i








head tilted to side
head hidden
back of head i
head pushed forward
other






Q20 = Q42: 1 =1,2 =2, 3 =3, 4 = 4, 5 =5, 6 = 6, 7 = 8,8=10,9 = 7,9,11
This variable addresses the direction of the face and the position of the head. This is of central 
importance, as it is fundamental to determining the relationship of the body posture to the sorts of 
expressions commanded by the facial area. The position of the head not only establishes certain limits 
to the direction of the gaze, but can also determine the hierarchical relationships between the viewer 
and the model. Thus to have the head looking down is to impart a sense of the model's deference and 
respect to a higher authority. To turn away from the viewer's gaze suggests modesty and coyness. The 
direction of the head position is a relatively common-sense means through which certain status 
relationships can be coded in relatively indisputable terms. To stare directly into another's eyes is 
assertive, whereas to turn away from the gaze, to avoid the gaze in this way, is reactive. Head on, direct 
facial and eye contact are regarded as the most prominent means through which autonomy is asserted 
facially. Conversely then, to turn away, to avert the gaze, is seen as reactive and a means through which 
that person is defined by others.
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The definitions of this variable are relatively straightforward. It does not employ any unusual 
features that contravene common-sense understandings. Therefore, there should be little need for 
clarification regarding the direction and position of the head. Code I, 'head back', refers to those cases 
where the head has been allowed to flop back against the neck. Consequently, the chin will be pointing 
upwards, and there will be large amounts of the neck showing. It is the position adopted when one 
wants to look straight upwards to the sky. This position is not expected to be frequent. Any use of this 
position is expected to form part of the image-maker's bid to establish an anti-realist image. One would 
not expect there to be any eye contact made. If the head is described as "head down", Code 2, one 
would expect the viewer to be able to see the crown of the head. Much of the face is concealed as a 
result, and the chin ought to be touching the neck or thereabouts. 'Head straight ahead" refers to those 
images where the head is facing directly forwards. Both eyes are facing forward, both ears are equally 
visible. The head should be fully upright. The chin should not be turned towards either shoulder in any 
way.
'Head turning away\ Code 4, is coded for those cases where the body is predominantly 
facing forward, the shoulders may be twisted slightly, much of the side of the neck is visible, as is the 
side of the head. One would expect to able to see one ear. The meaning of this turn can best be secured 
when considered in conjunction with the direction of the gaze. If the eyes are turning away also, one 
would conventionally accept this as being the response of someone who wishes to avoid the viewer's 
gaze. However, if the eyes are looking toward the viewer, it is much more ambiguous because it 
suggests that the model is looking but contravening the conventions or looking against the grain. 
"Turning towards camera" refers to those images where the body, particularly the shoulders, are 
twisting towards the position of the camera. Thus the hips would tend to be facing in the opposite 
direction, causing the torso to twist. Additionally, one would expect the eyes to be looking in the 
direction toward which the body is turning. Therefore, if the body is turning toward the camera, one 
would expect the eyes to also be looking in that direction. One would use this code too if the head 
movement is introducing a greater percentage of the face. If it is the case that more of the face is being 
concealed through the movement, then one would use Code 4. "Profile" is self-explanatory. The margin 
for the codification comes when both eyes can be seen. If this is the case then one would code it as 
either twisting away or towards, depending on the other features mentioned above. One would expect 
this code to be a feminine one, for it both removes the moHe] from the possibility of engaging in eye 
contact with the viewer, and has the impact upon the face of rendering it artifice. The head becomes 
statuesque, still, objectified.
'Head hidden" refers to those images where the head is concealed in some way. It may be 
concealed under a hat, hair or a towel etc. The 'back of head" is self-explanatory, and as a result there 
ought to be no facial features visible. Both these variables have been theoretically conceived as being 
extremely objectifying poses, since there is no possibility of asserting the personhood of the model, no 
means through which to facially engage or respond to the narrative set up. It is a visual way of blocking 
the models' narrative from the space in which they have been located. Similarly the child in the 
classroom is made to turn their back and face away. It removes the person's possibility to engage. It 
also has the effect of making the person vulnerable to the events or activities that are taking place
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'behind their back', as they are unable to see what is going on. Code 10,'head pushedforward'
', is not 
expected to be a common pose, but is potentially a head position nevertheless and could be use
d as an 
anti-naturalistic code. It is identified by the presence of the chin being positioned away from th
e neck. 
Code 11 \s'Other\
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The mouth has been identified as being critical to the overall evaluation of the sexualisation 
process, since the mouth is a central erogenous zone. The expression of the mouth can also be a
 central 
focus whereby the other erotic features that may be present on the body are negated, or it can a
t least 
establish contradiction to or conflict with the general embodiment. This can be done through ei
ther 
being expressionless or adopting an assertive or aggressive gesticulation while at the same time
 
revealing flesh. Clearly, this is one of the areas where one would expect there to be a marked d
ifference 
in the gendered expression. One would expect a high prevalence of 'phallic mouth' expressions
 for 
those images that seek to adopt and codify the body as a femme fatale. Conversely, one would 
expect 
there to be a high frequency of expressions that seek to engage the viewer, thereby establishing
 
emphasised femininity. By seeking to engage the viewer/other, the female is responding to the 
power 
difference in social interaction whereby she must entice, engage and respond to please the subject, and 
by implication therefore please the normative male subject. One would expect the male models to have 
a very low frequency of expressions that are overtly sexual. This code can be a valuable source
 of data 
through which it is possible to explore the extent to which one can talk about feminised male b
odies.
237
Q21A seeks to identify whether the mouth is simply open or closed. This has an effect upon 
the possible mouth expressions used and when. Code 1, 'mouth closed1 , refers to all those images 
where the mouth is firmly shut with the lips touching. Code 2, 'mouth semi-open", refers to those 
images where the lips are slightly parted. It may be possible to see the tips of the teeth. It is also 
possible to see the tip of the tongue in the mouth. The inside of the mouth may be slightly visible. If 
this is the case, the back of the mouth will be concealed through the lack of light that can penetrate into 
the throat. Code 3 is "mouth open", and designates those images where the model's mouth is fully open. 
One ought to be able to see all of the teeth and tongue. Also, the inside of the mouth ought to be 
visible. It is debatable as to which of these codes is the one most open to sexualisation. I have elected to 
take mouth closed as the least sexual. The sexualness of the other two codes will depend upon what 
other sorts of codes are taking place. For example, having the mouth semi-open when the eyes are 
looking up at the viewer through the eyebrows is conventionally taken as being more sexual than if the 
mouth were to be fully open. Conversely however, if the mouth is fully open with a phallic object close 
by, one could reasonably argue that this is more sexualised than if the mouth were semi-open. Thus, 
these codes are considered to be potentially equally sexualised.
Q21B identifies in more detail the sorts of expressions that are predominantly used and on 
whom. Code 4, "expressionless", refers to those images where there is no particular expression used at 
all. There is no noticeable evidence of any of the muscles contracting to produce a smile or a grimace. 
The lips are not being pushed forward to produce a pout. This non-expression results in there being a 
stillness to the mouth area. There should not be too much attention paid to the code variable. It is not 
being suggested here that an expressionless mouth is not 'expressive'. It is just that the label aims to 
denote those times when the mouth has not adopted a particular expression, like smiling or laughing 
and so on. It is understood here that adopting a non-expressive facial gesture is to express a certain 
distance or disengagement from the viewer. There is no attempt to entice the viewer or to turn the 
viewer on. It suggests a certain emotional neutrality or ascetic disposition, since the absence of another 
expression also means the absence of a mood expressed. Smiling means one is happy, for example. An 
example of an expressionless mouth as a form of expression is photographs from the turn of the 
century. In these photographs, the subjects rarely smile and this conveys a certain formality to the 
proceedings. It is not the case that the same formality is conveyed now, especially considering the 
naturalistic mock of feminine pleasure that has been so clearly identified. Here the non-expression is 
expressive by virtue of the absence of the incessant need for women to be rapturous in advertisements. 
Therefore, in the context of contemporary fashion advertising conventions, one would expect this 
emotional withdrawal to be something that signifies the masculine.
Code 5 is "smiling" and is used as commonly understood. Thus one would expect the ends of 
the mouth to be turning upwards. It is not necessarily the case that the teeth are visible, but they will 
tend to be so if the person is modelling 'happiness'. Code 6 is "laughing" and in these cases one would 
expect the teeth to be fully visible. Thus one would expect there to be higher frequency of laughing 
when the mouth is open. "Smirking 1 , Code 7, refers to those cases where the model is laughing through 
their smile. "Half smiling", Code 8, refers to those images where there are traces of what could become 
a smile. This would be associated with less enthusiasm and greater reticence. Code 9,'pouting", refers
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to those images where the lips are puckered together to make them appear full and more fleshy. 
Puckering the lips in this way is a key expression used to sexualise the mouth. This classic pose has 
been identified as one way through which the female body has been encoded to become an erotic and 
pleasing object to the viewer, and remains so. 'Licking lips' refers to those occasions when the tongue 
is used to increase the sexualisation of the mouth. It draws the viewer's attention to the mouth and the 
tongue, both of which are highly sexually charged parts of the body, but it reconfirms this association 
by introducing the moistness of the mouth. Thus it is considered here to be a highly objectifying 
codification, especially if coupled with 'looking being looked af defined below. 'Kissing' is taken to 
mean different things according to the relationship of who is doing the kissing, who is kissed or 
whether it is the result of mutual embrace. This relationship can be identified by cross-tabulating with 
Q12 as defined above. However, it is expected here that most of the occasions when the model is 
kissing will be examples of the visual display of the heterosexist imperative. The kiss is therefore 
bound both by the sexual normalisation that it implies and by the hierarchical essence of'romantic 
relationships'. For example, some of these power relationships could be visually displayed by the male 
kissing the female upon the head, as a parent kisses a child. This sort of visualisation is a development 
of Goffman's notion of the 'feminine as childish'. Alternatively, it could be the case that the female is 
kissing the male; if so, it would be interesting to identify the various codes used to establish this as part 
and parcel of general sexual servicing by women. For example, if the kiss is also accompanied by the 
gesture of cuddling, or holding onto the male for physical support.
Code 12, "sulking", is a broad category to include all those facial expressions where the model 
is in a bad mood, etc. One would expect the mouth to be twisted, or turning down. This has the effect 
of tightening the muscles on either side of the chin. It is likely too that the eyes are turned away and 
therefore seeking to 'avoid eye contact'. 'Snarling'1 is an expression where the model has pulled one lip 
up at the side, thereby making the nostril flare. This is a variation on the possible expressions of 
aggression and not just non-engagement, but rather active withdrawal from the visual relationship with 
the viewer. One would not expect these to be widely used within the naturalistic mock-up frame. 
However, they may well be used to mobilise the face for a stylistic, anti-realistic format. If one follows 
the analyses under scrutiny here, this format should not affect the deployment of such expressions as a 
masculine position, and therefore applied to the male model.
'Phallic mouth\ Code 14, is seeking to examine the extent to which this pornographic code 
has been assimilated into wider cultural production. Thus the mouth symbolises the act of fellatio. This 
code is a development of the pout. The pornographic code can be compounded through the use of an 
object as a substitute phallus. Thus Code 15 is 'phallic mouth with objecf. If this is being used on the 
male model, this may well suggest that there has been a decrease in the almost obsessive need to assert 
hegemonic masculinity, for such a sexualisation upon the male body surely introduces the homoerotic 
into the public visual domain. 'Finger naive\ Code 16, references Goffman's observation that the 
hands have been a decisive way through which the passivity and childishness of femininity has been 
conveyed. Goffman identified that the tip of the finger was often placed into the mouth and sucked, or 
surrounded by the lips. He argues that this effectively reduces the woman to the status of the child 
because of the basic childishness of the action. Note that one would use this code for such an image if
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the finger was in combination with a coy facial expression. If it is accompanied by a deep look through 
the eyebrows, or a girlie dress with suspenders, one would classify it as Code 15. 'Finger anxious', 
Code 17, is an expression that must be accompanied with a frown. The combination of the two work to 
establish the finger as providing some sort of security. Also, part of its passivity stems from the fact 
that the person is unable to deal with the situation, and thus devoid of the skill of decision making. It is 
therefore fundamentally associated with the feminine. 'Clenchedjaw' refers to those occasions where 
the muscle is seen to be taut and the mouth is firmly shut tight. It is an aggressive pose and suggests 
annoyance. Thus, working in combination with the visible muscle, one would expect this to be used 
extensively on the male. 'Tonguesticking ouf, Code 19, is an additional means through which the 
childishness of the model is ascertained. If accompanied with a pout, or the revelation of flesh, or the 
eyes looking up through the eyebrows, this code can also become sexualised. 'Heavily painted lips' 
seeks to trace those examples where the use of lipstick has been applied to sexualise the mouth. It must 
be very thick and pink or red in colour if it is to be coded thus. It would usually be accompanied by an 
excessive sheen. Code 21 is 'other'.
Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the 
photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mise-en-scene = an 
active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of the model's gaze. Code 2 = looking, but in a 
way that implicates the viewer within the narrative. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer 
and is thus more straightforwardly unproblematic.
public addressing viewer 1 private voyeur i - 3 
narrative address i : 2 other i 4
N/A = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7. This excludes 31 cases automatically.
Spectatorial address is seeking specifically to capture the extent to which the mise-en-scene of 
the image combines with the positioning of the model in a frame and the viewer. It directly references 
the ways in which cultural studies, especially those informed by psychoanalysis, argue that passivity is 
both visually structured and negated if the model is male. This variable seeks to trace the possible 
exchange of looks that take place in this 'realistic' medium. It is directly referencing Mulvey's 
arguments regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the 
myth of representative realism.
The central means through which the codes are to be applied regards the exchange of looks, or 
lack of them. Thus for Code 1, 'public addressing viewer\ one must have an exchange of looks 
whereby the model looks directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer into the 
place of the camera. The gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she 
positions themselves in relation to the image. To look at such an image is to engage with the model. 
The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or 
her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or
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desire for the viewer. However, it could equally be one whereby the model appears to be the initiator, 
through their adoption of a gaze that makes the viewer an object in the exchange. This compares with 
what has been described as 'narrative address'. Code 2 refers to those images where the viewer is 
implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchanged looks 
between one of the models and the viewer. For example, where the female model is looking into the 
camera and therefore at the viewer while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby making the joke at his 
expense and between the viewer and model. The central protagonist in such a mise-en-scene is the 
female model since she commands the viewer's gaze as well as duping her boyfriend. Code 3, 'private 
voyeur', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as 
being oblivious to it. Thus the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer 
into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocal behaviour and free to see what they want. 
It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing, and as a result one would expect this to be much 
more prevalent when used to photograph women. If such a frame is used to represent men, it is usually 
accompanied by a gaze of the model that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic. This is what 
Dyer refers to as the instabilities contained in images of men. In order to disavow the latent passivity of 
being the object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity, for example 
displaying their cerebral superiority over the female model by looking up to the heavens, thereby 
making the body inconsequential to their true being. Alternatively, argues Dyer, the male model can 
look off, thereby referring to an activity that is beyond the frame of reference of the viewer. To look off 
to the side is to demonstrate to the viewer that they are of no interest and of no consequence. 131 Such a 
denigration of the female viewer is compounded by the use of muscle both as a means to signify the 
power of embodiment that the male body is synonymous with, as well as a means to shift the passivity 
back onto the viewer. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could 
suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus of looking is gendered.
Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/passivity.
looking up
gazing out at viewer
looking down
looking away
staring out of photo frame














This automatically excludes 47 cases.
This variable is concerned with tracing the direction of the gaze in terms of the position with 
the viewer. Eye contact, who can look at whom and when, is intensely reflective of the power 
relationships that determine and characterise interaction. Thus, if this is combined with the general
131 Dyer R. (1992) 'Don't look now: the male pin-up' in The Sexual Subject: The Screen Reader' 
edited by Caughie, J. and Kuhn, A. Routledge, London. pp267.
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composite of the look in the above variable, one will be able to see the ex
tent to which the relations of 
looks are built around the active and passive nexus. For example, if there
 is an equal distribution of the 
voyeuristic pose because the model is looking down, then this would rep
resent a considerable shift in 
the ways that gender is visually and expressively pinned to the dichotom
y. If this is not the case then 
one needs to examine exactly what it means to be able to unequivocally i
dentify the body as male and 
identify a variety of codes, some of which used to be the preserve of the 
feminine. The central coding 
rule that must be followed here is that all judgements made with regard to the direction of the g
aze 
must be done so from the position of the viewer. It is the most consistent
 position with which to gauge 
the direction of the look. Secondly, it is the relationship of the gaze with 
the viewer that is of interest 
and importance. Again this draws us back to the attention that has been p
aid to the gaze in feminist 
psychoanalytic theory.
Code 1, 'looking up\ refers to those images where the model's eyes are l
ooking upwards 
towards the sky. This tends to have the effect of making the person look 
up through their eyebrows. 
One ought to be able to see a little more of the bottom of the whites of th
eir eyes. Code 2, "gazing out 
at viewer", refers to those images where the model is staring directly out 
of the photo frame at the 
viewer. This relationship of looks is achieved by making the model look 
into the lens of the camera. 
Consequently, the model will always be looking at the viewer no matter 
where the viewer stands in 
relation to the model. This gives the viewer a sense of being the object because no matter wher
e they 
stand and look at the model, the model will always be establishing eye co
ntact. Within the social 
relations that have existed, this conforms to the classic established and p
atriarchal relationships of 
looks. 'Looking down' refers to all those models whose gaze is turned do
wnwards towards the floor. 
The direction of the eyes will mean that the model is looking down, almo
st as if they are looking down 
the nose. Looking down has been associated with a number of passive po
sitions with regard to the other 
subject. It has been associated both with shame, and with deference toward one's elder and bet
ter. 
Additionally, looking down has been associated as a means to avoid a ga
ze. Thus, if there is an 
insignificant gender difference here, this may indicate a substantial shift 
in the formations of an 
'emphasised femininity'. 'Looking away' refers to those cases where the 
eyes are looking in the 
opposite direction from that of the viewer's position. Thus for example, 
if the camera angle is from the 
left side, the model would be looking towards the right side. This code d
emonstrates clearly how the 
rule of the viewer's position is vital to the assignment of the codes.
'Staring out of photo frame\ Code 5, is another eye position that can only
 be coded with 
regard to the viewer's position. The best way to assign this is to consider
 oneself as the viewer standing 
against the model's horizon. Thus the origin of the perspective is to be f
ound in that fictional, visual 
world. The effect is to make the model's gaze appear to be fixed upon so
mething in the distance. It 
appears as if the gaze goes over the viewer's head to something much m
ore important beyond. 
'Looking out at other/obf refers to those looks in which the viewer is bo
th visually and narratively 
positioned as a voyeur. Effectively, what this achieves is to marginalise 
the significance of the viewer's 
gaze by making the narrative axis exist within the photo frame and betw
een the signifying elements 
within the frame. Thus, the model's concern lies not with the viewer but
 with that upon which the 
model's gaze is resting. Piloting established this was a relatively infrequ
ent code and as a result it was
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decided not to differentiate between whether the object of the gaze was another model or a prop. 
'Looking straight aheacf, Code 7, refers to those images where the model is merely looking straight 
ahead of her. This takes two distinct forms. Firstly, if the head is not facing the point of view of the 
viewer, but is in profile for example, then the direction of the gaze would be straight ahead from the 
viewer's position. Secondly, when the model looks into the camera directly, but is staring deeply so as 
to appear not to be aware of their surroundings, the implication then is that the viewer would also be 
glossed over as the model daydreams, being unable to concentrate and fix her gaze upon something in 
particular. 'Eyes closed', Code 8, applies according to common-sense rules. It is considered to be a 
passive form, since one is vulnerable to that which cannot be seen, as well as closed to signification 
regarding who or what the model is to the viewer. There can be very little performative potential if one 
has one's eyes closed. 'Other' is Code 9.
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8. This excludes 84 cases.











'Authoritative' refers to those occasions when the viewer is situated below the model 
regarding the camera position, and when the model tends to look down along their nose at the viewer. It 
has the effect of making the model appear haughty, or irritable regarding the meaninglessness or trivia 
of the activity. If the expression is secured through the camera position relative to the gaze, it must 
either be connected with the relative status position, or in command of action. On these sorts of 
occasions, the active masculine ought to come into play. Conversely, an 'assertive gaze', Code 2, will 
be one where the stare is held and is hard. There is a sort of gloss generated through the held eye 
expression, which is unresponsive to the imagined viewer in the room. Hence, the viewer is diegetically 
built into the frame which the model's gaze is asserting himself or herself towards. There will tend to 
be few engaging gestures on the face or the body. The model does not seek to show interest or concern 
with the 'outside world' through expressive gestures. In addition, the model may well be employing 
other assertive body positions. 'Staring', Code 3, refers to those cases where the eyes stare somewhat
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blankly into space. It is not necessarily directed at the viewer as one would expect with Codes I or 2, 
especially 1. The effect is to produce a glaze over the face in general and eyes in particular.
Code 4, 'other worldly', refers directly to Dyer's article where he delineates specific forms of 
codification that are effective in negating the objectification that the male model must undergo in pin- 
ups. He argued that by drawing upon the metaphorical convention of'up' with the mind, the model 
tends to look up and out of the frame in order to thoroughly disengage from the 'admiration' received. 
Code 5, 'dreaminess', connects to the sense of the model as mentally adrift. Thus the focus is in part 
suggested by the tension around the eyes which is lacking, as is any formality to the scene depicted. In 
particular, this code will often use the soft focus to assist in securing the notion of the daydream. Code 
6, 'glancing', refers to those images where the look is characterised by a rapid engagement. Therefore, 
the direction of glance will be staged so that it appears contrary to the direction of movement. This 
signals the brevity of the look. Code 1, 'surprised', is classified by the combination of the narrative, as 
well as the tendency for the mouth to be open and for the eyebrows to be lifted so that the eyes appear 
bigger. This has been combined with the ' raised eyebrows'. Code 9,' looking being looked at', relates 
directly to Mulvey's notion and to the presentation of the feminine that is consciously ordered 
according to the desires of the onlooker. Therefore, the look is one of response to the active and 
powerful gaze of the other. 'Seductive' is identified by the tendency for the model to look up and 
through their brow directly at the viewer. Therefore, the position of the camera and the viewer tends to 
be above the model in question. Often this is accompanied by a half smile or a closed mouth. Code 11 
operates in the opposite way, in that the model will tend to have the head positioned down, but also at 
an angle which tends to turn the returned look back to the viewer while also looking up. Code 12 seeks 
to address those cases where the eyes do not appear to suggest an expression or disposition. In part, it is 
guided by an absence of muscle use in the face. It represents those occasions, which are rare, when the 
eyes do not appear to contribute to a meaning generated in the image. Code 13, 'shy', is close to coy 
but the return look is less apparent. Here, the face is turning away and looking down so that no 
reciprocal exchange is present. 'Frowning' refers to those cases where the eyebrows are brought 
forward in disapproval. The last codes attend to those cases where the eyes are concealed, each 
suggesting or accomplishing a degree of anonymity.
Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is 
divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral, thus it is difficult to 
identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers that it would be difficult to 
say for example that the model is a working-class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph 
Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read, and so with private
min.
smoking I lovers sexual 12
drinking/bar ''• 2 house chores 13
car/driving i 3 comforting/care work 14































Q25 = Q51: 1=2,4,7, 2=1,3,6,3=8,9,12,4=5,11, 5=16, 6=18, 7=20, 8=19, 9=10,13,14,17
The purpose of this variable was to add a generalised context within which the pose was 
taken, as well as to identify the extent to which the location of gender in space is still marked by gender 
difference. The object of this variable is not to examine the detailed significations and the relationships 
between these elements, for example, how they work to make us all instantly recognise this scene as a 
pub scene. The object is to examine the sorts of settings, which act as stage sets, are frequently used 
and in what sorts of space gender can be performed. The key difference to which this is referring is of 
course the public/private dichotomy. The location of gender within these domains has been identified 
within the feminist movement as one of the key areas through which patriarchal relations are 
maintained. As argued previously, it was one of the key successes of the massive number of content 
analyses conducted that they were able to repeatedly show the consistency with which the 
stereotypical, ideologically laden contexts were used. The consistency of results was such that it 
became very difficult to dispute the extent to which women were located within the private domain 
and, not only that, were submerged underneath the massive number of domestic props. The second 
significant staging that was identified was the extent to which women in these images had become 
synonymous with mothering. Conversely, men were regularly found within the public domain, 
particularly in work places. If women were in the public arena they were invariably supported and 
accompanied by a man. Another key difference between men and women photographed was that only 
men were staged with leisure activities that took place,outside.
Gofftnan again confirmed the extent to which women were predominately located within the 
domestic sphere in a majority of the adverts he examined. Additionally, many of the images he 
examined were fashion advertisements. Clothes can be staged in almost any environment, since most 
occasions involve clothes at some point. This is because they have become a central resource for the 
presentation of self or the staging of self within the naturalistic mock-ups of the advertising industry. 
The central importance that Goffman's work plays here is in establishing that fashion images are not a 
block for staging the feminine within the private or domestic sphere.
However, from the piloting stage it became quite apparent that there was not the same 
proliferation of domestic contexts as had been identified before. It is because this was established early 
on that there are so few codes detailing a range of domestic situations. However, the possibility that the
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piloting was inaccurate was taken into account. As a result, there are two distinctly feminine codes 
which are defined below. These have also been supported by a more general category that is used for 
those situations with some domestic prompts, for example, but which are marginal in their relationship 
to the model.
The other central contextualisaton that has been explored here is that of the heterosexist 
imperative. Thus there are a number of narrative situations which directly draw upon the 
persuasiveness of heterosexuality within culture, as well as the extent to which these act as 
normalisations. Effectively, if these series of codes are cross-tabulated with the codes that identify who 
the models are photographed with, this gives a good indication of the sorts of general features that we 
are dealing with. The central proposition that is being presumed here is that while the single model may 
still be encoded with the heterosexual imperative, it is of a weaker kind compared to those images 
where the woman must always be standing, hugging, caressing the man, her protector. The premise 
remains that those images where a single woman is eroticised, without context and without prompts, 
provide the basis for far more open readings.
Some of the situations are not so much contexts or places, but rather classic presentations. 
Thus Code 1, 'smoking, refers to those occasions where the man or woman is focused around the act 
of smoking. Part of the importance of smoking is that it has been a central means to draw attention to 
the mouth and to eroticise it as well. The cigarette has often been a phallic symbol and its extensive 
use, especially marked by gender difference, would demonstrate a persistence in the centrality of the 
mouth in sexualising women. Conversely, in most of the images where men are smoking, the cigarette 
is not near their mouths. On those occasions where the cigarette has been placed near the mouth, the 
above sub-variable of 'Phallic mouth with object' will be coded. 'Drinking/bar', Code 2, refers to all 
those cases where the stage is in the public arena of a bar. Again, if compared to those cases where the 
model occupies or withdraws from the space, this will aid the identification of the extent to which a) 
women are present in public bars at all, and b) if present, they are dependent upon the masculine to 
protect and secure their safety. Code 3, 'car/driving', refers to those cases where the woman is 
subjugated to object. The car has been specifically drawn upon because it has been conventionally used 
as a phallic symbol with which to subjugate the female. This code also allows us to identify whether 
this symbol remains highly gendered in terms of who is photographed at the wheel, but in a much more 
extreme shift, the extent to which men undergo sexualisation via the car. It seeks to identify how some 
symbols may have been appropriated by gay imagery, and the extent to which it has infiltrated 
mainstream culture. 'Cafe/restaurant\ Code 4, is the first of the specific scenes that seek to identify the 
extent to which the heterosexist imperative is almost omnipresent. To eat with one's loved one is a 
classic and conventional form through which to frame patriarchal heterosexual ity.
' Washing!grooming, Code 5, refers back to the semiotic analysis done by Moore and seeks to 
identify the extent to which such contexts have been applied to reveal the flesh of the male models. 
Additionally, it may show the extent to which this is also applied to women. It would be interesting to 
identify whether the direction of the gaze shifts the nature of the contextualisation. For example, the 
camera position could act as if it were a mirror so that the point of view of the viewer is to be directly 
voyeuristic. It is this sort of codification that marks the scenes with female models, compared to
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naturalistic mock-ups where the male will be seen from an angle and thus a much weaker act of 
voyeurism.
'Sport', Code 6, refers to those occasions where the activity of the body is located within the 
construct of sport. This brings certain contours of the hegemonic construction of masculinity as being 
both about the skill to which the masculine body can be used and, equally as importantly, about the 
power that this activity encompasses. This is diametrically opposed to the forms of embodiment that 
are given over the feminine body. The feminine body has instead been associated with stillness, display 
cum self-objectification and weakness. The location of physical movement within this context brings 
into play a whole number of significations and associations that are beyond the scope of this project to 
decode. However, the central relevance here is that the central feature of hegemonic masculinity as 
physical prowess is brought into centre stage. Thus, if there are a number of images where it is the 
female that has been located within the context of sporting activity, as well as being located within 
naturalistic mock-up, this may signify a shift away from the dominance of the feminine as weak. It is 
probably unlikely to be the case that there are equal distributions, but it may be that the frequency has 
nevertheless grown.
'Partying' is again self-explanatory and is to be judged according to common-sense 
categorisation. Its inclusion is based upon the question of whether there has been a move toward 
groups. Its inclusion is partly to provide a context in which those group photographs can be 
contextualised.
Code 8, 'romantic scene', refers to those images where the couple are located within a 
romantic context. Again only those images that deploy the commonest features conventional to the 
codification of romance are coded thus. These features include staring into each other's eyes, holding 
hands, and so on. Another central feature associated with the codification of romance is to have the 
female clinging onto the male by hugging his arm for example, and perhaps even leaning her head upon 
his shoulder. Again this traces the extent of the normalisation of heterosexuality, and the power in 
equalities inherent within this ideology. These images are not overtly sexual in nature, but rather 
establish an emotional pattern. Conversely, code 9, "lovers' tiff, refers to the alternative but related 
side of romance - the temporary break-up. Part of the conventional content of the break-up is the 
implicit resolution, the happy ending. Thus this scene is marked by the couples disagreeing, usually 
with the female being dismissed by the male. It is through her dismissal that her passivity is confirmed, 
as well as confirming the female as being more emotional. Therefore, part of the resolution entails the 
male coming to his senses and realising that she is after all what he wants. The resolution is marked by 
the male achieving what he wants, thereby making his happiness what the female wants. Thus his 
emotional state becomes the subject of her activity, simultaneously securing her passivity. Her 
contentment is dependent upon becoming the passive object of the man's desire.
The above two scenes differ from 'lovers/sexual' in that this scene establishes a different 
relationship between the male and female because of the absence of the implied domestic bliss. The 
positioning of the body/bodies is much more explicitly sexual and will tend to 'borrow' codes from soft 
porn. Thus the wholesomeness of romance has been dropped. Part of what makes these images more 
overtly sexual is the fact that there is little other to the image than the sexual pleasure on display. Thus
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it has a much greater narcissistic element to it. The object of the liaison is sexual gratification, not life- 
long happiness.
Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations 
there are, and to what extent the common-sense understandings within the academy concerning the 
body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm 
the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, 1 mean that the mode 
of representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered 
masculine.
subject/object i ]
activity/passivity i I 2
doer/done to and for I : 3
talker/listener i i 4
sprawled/draped ' ! 5 
occupying/passing through i 6
protector/protected ; I 7 
decision maker/decidED for ll 8
professional/non-prof ; 9
manual/office \ '•• 10
desirer/sexual object : 11
subject/prostitute 12
subject/virgin I . 13
thinking mind/body •' 14
object/subject 'I 15
passive/active I 16
done to/doer ; I 17
listener/talker it 18
draped/sprawled I '  19
passing/occupying ' I 20 
decidED/decision maker ' 21
non-prof./prof i 22
body/thinking mind i 23











i-d 1990 i 5
i-d 1995 i 6
arena 1987 i i 7
arena 1990 : ! 8
arena 1995 i 9
cosmo 1975 I 10
cosmo 1985 11
cosmo 1990 112
cosmo 1995 i ! 13
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APPENDIX C
WHOLE NUMBERS INCLUDE FIGURES FROM 1975, 1985-95





Q2 NUMBERS: This allows any analysis to relate the issue of how the idiom alters according to the 








Q3 ETHNIC: This variable attempts to link possible patterns in the representation of the body idiom 




Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.
clothes 628 
perfume 75
Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and 
subjugation. The relationship is counted according to the first value. For example, if the model 
preceeds the object then the model is read as dominating the object.
model 607
model and obj 41
model and objs 1
model and group 0
object and model 40
objects and model 11
other 2
Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how Q4 is spatially represented - higher and central being related to 
control and domination and lower and periphery being related to subjugation. Higher is supposed to 
relate to the models and above and below to relate to the object. The extent to which the model fills the 
picture space can also be related to domination. The greater the space taken by the model the lesser the 
model is subjugated.






















Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have been traditionally been photographed - soft 






out of focus 50
other 7
Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation. 
This will feed in later regarding what people actually do with the images that they know are not 'real'. 
Code 1 refers to the mock-up of everyday life which effectively renders it a stylisation; code 2 is pure 
style and its conventions are not about the representations of'real life'; code 3 refers to whether the 
photographic background is blank.




Q9 GENREAL IDIOM: The variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained 
within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 correspond with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 
shows half the body.
full body 409
legs cut off 79
head cut off 8





Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: The variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.
lying on side 7
lying on back 17
lying on front 10
facing forward 428
twisting away R or L 105
back facing camera 42 
twisting towards R or L 57
profile 146
torso leaning forward 76
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torso leaning back 37
propped BY arms 62
propped ON object 55
bowing from the waist 8
bent down 1
bowing from head 3
on all fours 3
other 7
Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working defintion of 
physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. 
Any code that remains unmarked it is because it cannot be reliable ascertained from the photograph 















body hair id 32













Q12 CONTAINED BODY: Containment of the body is supposed to illicit the degree of self- 
determination; whether it is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is non-contained.
contained by self 36
contained by man 25
contained by woman 9
contained by object 13




Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of the some fo the ways in which the idiom could visually portray 
containment. Note that for codes 7 and 8 arm is in the single because both implies an embrace. One 
arm demarcates ownership more clearly. Note that 1-4+10 if Q12 = 1 self contained; if Q12 = 4 then 
Q13 = 5; if Q12 = 2 or 3, then Q13 = 6-9+11
legs held in by arms 7
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legs crossed and pulled in 6
held in and hugging self 19
clinging to other model 1
confined by product 18 
contained demarcating ownership 16
other's arm round neck 6
other's arm round waist 2
held protectively 3
embracing other/obj 2
embracED by other/obj 3
other 7
Q14 TITILATION: Refering to the titlation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree 
to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By reveal I mean that the clothing is lifted or 
moved or cut to draw attention to overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be 
concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used 




reveal stomach/hip bone 41









naked except commodity 4
naked upper chest 38
fully naked 2
other 4
Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is 
touching whom, espcially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 correspond with whether the 
hand is active but not touching anyone.
touching own body 268
touching man's body 31
touching woman's body 26
own and man's 8
own and woman's 6
touching commodity 28 
hand is active/not touching 142
no touch/neutral 90
other 31
Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specifiy what is being touched which again feeds back to notions 
concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded this means that 
both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means that one hand or arm is either 
concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.
hand on/through hair 26 
hand on hip(s) 60 
hand on leg(s) 47 
hand on torso 87 
hand on face 24 
hand on neck 21
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hand on bum 12
hand on breasts 3
hand on genitals 6
hand behind back 10
hand forcing ribs forward 3
clenched fists 3
hand in rest 43
leaning on 12
holding hands 42 
neutrally touching OWN body 23
holding on 35
hands covered 9
hands in pockets 39
aggressive gesture 2
other 33












Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.
pointing up/outwards 56
extended up 23
relaxed by side 215
folded 30
arms bent 262
resting on leg(s) 45
over the head 12
hugging the body 61
arm in action 24
in mock movement 42
leaning 50
other 17
Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to sjngle and both legs.
open when seated 39
closed when seated 36
open when lying down 6
closed when lying down 4
crossed and pulled in 20 
crossed and extended outwards 12
astride 82
intertwined with obj/other 3 
knee slightly bent point forward 54
knee bent sideways 27
















head turning away 92
head straight ahead 211
turning towards camera 123
head in profile 90
head hidden 11
head tilted to side 54
head pushed forward 12
back of head 16
other 3
Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.













phallic mouth 36 
phallic mouth with object 4
finger niave 0
finger anxious 2
clenched jaw 8 
tongue sticking out 5
other 33
Q22 SPECTATOR! AL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the 
photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mis-en-scene = an 
active relationship with the camera; the veiwer = object of models gaze. Code 2 = looking but in a way 
that implicates the viewer within the narrative, esp. looking being looked at. Code 3 = no exchange 
between model and viewer and is thus more straight forwardly unproblematic.




Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/ passivity.
looking up 31




staring out of photo frame 65
looking at other/obj 70
looking straight ahead 64
eyes closed 37
other 21








raised eyebrows 27 











Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an inidication of the degree to which space 
is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral thus it is difficult to 
identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers it would be difficult to say 
that the model is a working class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public 









lovers lift 9 
narcissistic - sexual 5 











Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations 
there are and to what extent the common sense understandings within the academy concerning the body 
idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the 
stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of
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